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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines how, in the global context of the 1990s, economic planning for an 
economically disadvantaged peripheral region within a small open national economy 
has become an exercise in the maxim “Think Globally and Act Locally”. It examines the 
content, context and process of economic policy making in Atlantic Canada in the 
1990s. It critically analyzes the dissonance between generic visions of a competitive 
Atlantic Canada and the particular regional realities that must be taken into consideration 
if the plans are to be successful. The thesis also suggests a normative course of action 
in policy planning and implementation that can reduce this dissonance.
The thesis is organized around four fundamental questions: 1) How is a competitive 
economy created in the global context of the 1990s and what roles should the state and 
the market assume? 2) What prescriptions for competitiveness are being presented in 
Atlantic Canadian economic policy documents? 3) What impediments and advantages 
does the Atlantic Canadian political-economy present to the realisation of this vision of 
a competitive economy? and 4) How can the economic policy planning and implementa­
tion processes be improved in order to better the chances of success for these kinds of 
policies?
The critical analysis of the literature addresses the first three questions by surveying the 
areas of industrial policy, management theory, and Atlantic Canadian economic history 
and economic development planning. The fourth question is addressed through an 
empirical case study evaluation of Nova Scotia Voluntary Planning, a non-govemment 
sector organization composed of industry and labour leaders, and of its economic 
strategy document entitled “Creating Our Own Future”. Theoretical and methodological 
guidelines for the evaluation models were drawn from the literature on policy research, 
cooperative inquiry, critical planning and critical evaluation theory, the role of 
mediating structures in public policy delivery and planning as social learning.
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PART I
OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER 1
THESIS OVERVIEW
1.1 INITIAL THESIS CONCEPTUALIZATION ANO 
DEVELOPMENT OF A WORKING HYPOTHESIS
I began this examination of the direction of regional development policy in Atlantic 
Canada^ in 1989. My interest in the subject was motivated by the fact that the hundreds 
of students that graduate every year fiom the commerce department at Saint Mary’s 
University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, where I teach, face relatively few local job pros­
pects. Commonly, graduating students either remain under-employed or have to leave 
the region in order to find a “good” job. Economic conditions in the region are poor and 
have been poor for a long time. Were it not for public sector employment and for 
transfer and equalization payments from the federal government, the region’s economy 
would have been even worse. Why was the region seemingly stuck in perpetual under­
development? What had been done to stimulate economic growth? What else could be 
done? I decided to make these questions the central theme of my doctoral studies.
Given my previous experience as a marketing manager and consultant, my initial view 
of the task revolved around the application of strategic management and strategic 
marketing concepts to the process of economic planning. Economic development 
planning had often been criticized for not having clear objectives, effective means for 
policy implementation, or accurate measures of evaluation. Moreover, the vagaries of 
the political environment in which policies were created usually led to policy initiatives 
being arrived at in an ad hoc manner, as well as to uncoordinated efforts by the various 
levels and agencies of government. This seemed like a perfect opportunity for the 
application of models of “strategic planning” developed in the private sector to the 
public sector process of economic planning. The Japanese Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (Mm) had managed to do it -  could Atlantic Canadians do it too?
The first issue to consider concerned the nature of strategic planning at a regional or 
national economic level. I looked at the question of whether governments should 
actively “plan” the industrial structure through a “hands-on” approach, or whether 
development goals are best achieved through a “hands-ofP’ approach to the economic 
sector. This led me squarely into the industrial policy/managed trade vs. laissez 
faire/free markets debate. As far as the focus of this thesis was concerned, I had to 
choose at that point between carrying on with my initial idea of applying private sector-
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based schemes of strategic planning to the public sector process of economic planning, 
or instead, looking at private sector-led development initiatives where government 
limited its intervention in the economy to maintaining a “good business climate” and let 
the private sector decide the direction of economic activity. I chose the latter because 
this is the direction of current policy in Canada and in the Atlantic region, and an 
empirical study of actual policy in practice seemed more useful than a diatribe on 
counterfactuals. The focus of the research was now firmly established -  the relationship 
between competitive strategy and economic development in Atlantic Canada.
In the sum m er of 19901 had the opportunity to be a research assistant for the Atlantic 
Provinces Economic Council’s (APEC) 1990 Annual Conference background paper, 
“Strategies and Options for the 1990s” (APEC Oct. 1990). This major policy document 
established two of the principal themes^ to be found in the regional economic develop­
ment policy documents of the early 1990s -  private sector competitiveness and regional 
economic cooperation. I examined the theory on competitiveness and contrasted the 
requirements for a competitive economy with the existing political economy of Atlantic 
Canada. The paper I submitted to APEC, and subsequently presented at the 1990 
Atlantic Canada Economic Association Conference^ (ACEA), concluded that:
The initial findings of this research suggest that an economic 
development strategy for the Atlantic region based on competitiveness, 
entrepreneurship, productivity and innovation, as it is currently being 
developed and implemented, is likely to encounter serious obstacles and 
structural impediments. The right set of incentives is not being provided 
to the various agents of change. (Sagebien 1990)
The principal disincentives identified in the paper were monopoly, patronage, a 
paternalistic corporate culture, reliance on subsidies and transfer payments to attract or 
“prop-up” industry, a politicized government services delivery mechanism, and a 
clientelist attitude on the part of the recipients (provinces, business and individuals). 
The paper recommended that more interdisciplinary research be conducted and that 
policy action be developed beyond knee-jerk political ideology and party affiliations. 
Above all, the paper made a call for “realism” in policy development and 
implementation:
We can become competitive if we design a system that gives the right 
incentives to all the agents of change.... A new strategy wiU require an 
honest assessment of our strengths -  let’s build on them But it will also 
require a thorough examination of our weaknesses. The fact is that we 
do not have the right incentives for a competitive economy. Turning a 
deaf ear to well researched and documented articles because they come
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from the critical attitude of the political left, or to disregard the value of 
all anecdotal evidence (even when intuitively appealing) because it does 
not meet academic rigour, will only lead to anodier embarrassing 
procession of the emperor in his new clothes. Furthermore, it is not 
enough to ‘know’ that the emperor is not wearing any clothes -  policy 
makers must acknowledge these problems and attempt to deal with them 
honestly and effectively(Sagebien 1990)
This thesis responds to this call for realism by critically analyzing the dissonance 
between generic visions of a competitive Atlantic Canadian economy and the particular 
regional realities that must be taken into consideration if the plans are to be successful, 
and by suggesting a normative course of action in policy planning and implementation 
that can reduce this dissonance. Thus the thesis has critical, analytic and normative 
components.
1 2  RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The thesis is organized around four fundamental questions.
How is a competitive economy created in the global context of the 1990s and 
what roles should the state and the market assume?
What prescriptions for competitiveness are being presented in Atlantic Canadian 
economic policy documents?
What impediments and advantages does the Atlantic Canadian political-economy 
present to the realization of this vision of a competitive economy?
How can the economic policy planning and implementation processes be 
improved in order to better the chances of success for these kinds of policies?
These questions are referred to throughout the text as “fundamental questions” one, 
two, three and four.
1.3 METHODOLOGY
The thesis addresses the questions posed above by: 1) examining the ideological cont­
ent of the Atlantic Canadian economic policy documents of the 1990s -  the themes that 
frame the discussions presented in the documents and the economic and managerial 
theories and assumptions from which they were drawn; 2) critically analyzing the 
context in which they were developed -  global political economy of the 1990s and the 
political-economic and planning history of the Atlantic region; and 3) evaluating the
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planning and implementation process undergone by one representative policy initiative 
in the province of Nova Scotia. In other words, it looks at what is being proposed, 
where it is being applied, and how it is being implemented. Furthermore, the thesis 
suggests that the success of the policy content (the plan) depends primarily on the way 
in which the process of delivery itself (the legitimacy and efficacy of the delivery agent) 
reflects an accurate understanding of the context in which it is being ^plied (the 
political-economy).
The content and the context are examined through an extensive critical analysis of the 
literature on competitiveness and on Atlantic Canadian economic and planning history. 
The process is examined through a case study, an evaluation of Nova Scotia Voluntary 
Planning and of its economic strategy “Creating Our Own Future” (V.P., Nov. 1991).
1.3.1 Critical Analysis of the Literature
The critical analysis of the literature proceeded on two major fronts:^ 1) an exposé of 
the current theories attempting to explain how and why economies and companies 
become competitive, and 2) the study of the Atlantic region’s political-economic history 
and record of regional economic development initiatives up to the end of 1992. The first 
thrust of the critical analysis of the literature attempts to answer the first fundamental 
question posed by the thesis. The second thrust addresses the second and third 
fundamental questions.
The first part of the critical analysis of the literature provides an overview of the 
political-economic and ideological, global and national contexts that is required in order 
to understand current Atlantic Canadian regional policy as a “product of its times”. It is 
a comprehensive, albeit not exhaustive, catalogue of the eclectic intellectual furniture 
that is available in the 1990s for the arrangement of economic policy documents in the 
region and elsewhere. This part of the thesis examines the interaction among state 
intervention, company strategies and market outcomes in the international economy by 
focusing on two major issues: 1) the debates over the right formula for achieving 
multinational, national, regional and local economic well-being (the competitive 
advantage of nations), and 2) the search for sustainable corporate competitive advantage 
(the major determinant of national competitive advantage).
The critical analysis of the literature on the regional development of Atlantic Canada 
included a survey of the works on the economic history of the region, the theories 
attempting to explain regional development and under-development, and the history of
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regional economic development initiatives up to 1992. The analysis of current regional 
development initiatives (from 1990 to mid-1992), conducted through the examination 
of a variety of published documents, distilled the main themes in the regional 
development literature and assessed their various formulas for development.
1.3.2 Case Study
Despite the considerable regional development efforts of the Canadian government, 
Atlantic Canada still remains, by all economic indicators, an underdeveloped region of 
the country. Historically, it has high levels of unemployment and ranks below the 
national average in earned income levels. The economy is tied to low value-added 
p r im ^  resource production and to public sector-based services (e.g. schools, 
military, hospitals etc.). The region is also highly dependent on government subsidies 
to individuals and businesses. Moreover, the changes affecting the industrialized world 
call into question the Canadian government’s commitment, or its ability, to continue 
along the present path of fiscal redistribution and regional economic development (or 
lack thereof).
The continued economic plight of the Atlantic provinces has resulted in the formation of 
non-govemmental organizations aimed at mobilizing the human resources of the 
provinces for the purpose of economic revitalization. In Nova Scotia, for example, the 
forms these movements have taken throughout history have been varied -  i.e. social 
gospel movements, lobbying groups, militant labour organizations, community econo­
mic development initiatives and regional rights advocacy groups within the Canadian 
federation. Recently, corporatist responses involving the concerted efforts of the private 
sector, labour, academia and the public sector have gained special importance as the 
confidence of citizens in the government’s ability to solve economic problems erodes.
Nova Scotia Voluntary Planning (Voluntary Planning) is one such organization. 
Founded in 1963 as the province’s sole economic planning body. Voluntary Plarming 
has been involved a number of planning exercises in 30 years, providing a forum for 
the partnership of business, labour and government in the pursuit of provincial 
economic objectives. The organization has been successful in promoting communica­
tion among these economic sectors in a non-partisan, arms-length to government 
manner. In 1991, Voluntary Planning published “Creating Our Own Future” (V.P., 
Nov. 1991), Nova Scotia’s formal economic strategy plan. The planning process for 
the development of this document included a series of province-wide consultations with 
sector leaders and with the public-at-large. This exposure gave the organization a higher
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public profile and broadened its mandate beyond mediating the interests of government 
and the “private sector”. Voluntary Planning now spoke for the interests of the “non- 
govemment sector” -  the private sector and the public-at-large. Both the provincial 
government and Voluntary Planning committed themselves to the implementation of 
this economic strategy plan and the maintenance of a communications loop connecting 
the sectors/communities, Voluntary Planning, and the government. A Monitoring 
Committee composed of influential government, private sector and labour 
representatives was appointed to oversee strategy implementation.
In late 1992 and in early 1993,1 became involved in two activities that allowed me to 
closely observe and affect regional development planning and implementation. First, I 
was asked by the Executive Director of Voluntary Planning, Elizabeth Mills, to join the 
Communication Committee of Voluntary Planning in order to help design an evaluation 
methodology for Voluntary Planning’s activities. I was subsequently invited by 
Voluntary Planning to observe the series of public consultations conducted in 1993 and 
to participate in the Strategic Planning Review Committee that evaluated the entire 
organization. I also was invited by Mary Morrissey, Head of the Secretariat to the 
Monitoring Committee (Henson College), to join them on an informal basis^ in the 
process of conducting the Year One evaluation of both Voluntary Planning and the 
Provincial Government. While there was a definite conflict of interest because I 
participated in both Voluntary Planning and Secretariat activities, I was able to perform 
my duties on both committees by maintaining the confidentiality of the meetings and 
deliberations of both groups. These developments were most fortuitous in that they 
provided me with a case study of a private sector-led development initiative through 
which to examine regional policy formulation, implementation and evaluation within the 
global, national, managerial and individual context established in the literature review.
The work done as a member of Voluntary Planning’s Communication Committee, as an 
observer of the 1993 consultations, as well as a research assistant to the Secretariat to 
the Monitoring Committee provided the formal empirical evidence for the thesis’ 
arguments. Since the deliberations of the Strategic Planning Review Committee 
occurred after the data-gathering stage of the thesis was completed, the insights that I 
gained through participation in this activity are not formally part of the thesis.
However, the preliminary results of this review strongly support the conclusions and 
recommendations presented in Chapter 12.
The case study attempted to answer the fourth fundamental question posed by the thesis 
by conducting a series of performance evaluations. These evaluations of “Creating Our
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Own Future” and of Voluntary Planning were designed to shed some light on the 
questions: 1) Is the economic strategy working? 2) Why or why not? and 3) How can 
my research improve the chances for its success? Given this set of questions, the 
evaluations conducted addressed: 1) the effectiveness of the economic strategy and of 
the government of Nova Scotia and Voluntary Planning in meeting the goals outlined in 
the economic strategy; 2) the appropriateness of the model of economic development 
(private sector-led development) proposed by Voluntary Planning within the political 
economy of Atlantic Canada and of the world in the 1990s; and 3) the efficacy of 
Voluntary Planning in achieving the objectives laid out by the strategy, particularly in 
terms of its role as a mediating structure between the various publics^ of the province of 
Nova Scotia.
1.4 ASSUMPTIONS, CAVEATS AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The parameters of the research conducted for this thesis were set by three major 
assumptions and one caveat. The assumptions, made in 1989, were that in the 1990s:
1) Canadian federal transfer payments, subsidies and expenditures in the Atlantic 
provinces will continue to be substantially reduced; 2) Quebec will seek some form of 
sovereignty-association; and 3) North America will continue on its present path towards 
a U.S ./Canada/Mexico trade bloc. The assumptions have proved accurate so far, and 
the vicissitudes they present to the Atlantic region will continue to exacerbate the 
economic conditions, as well as the need for fresh thinking and definitive action in 
regional policy planning and implementation.
The caveat is that the assumed efficacy of particular types of remedies for national and 
international economic ills is affected by the popularity of such remedies at the time, 
even when there is no truly reliable evidence on which to base their likely success or 
failure. When theory -  right or wrong -  is on the side of the coming rulers of social 
order, it is generally ensured a long life. In the words of Keynes:
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are 
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly 
understood. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt 
from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are 
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.
(John Maynard Keynes, quoted in Fusfeld 1990)
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Thus from the outset of the thesis, it was clear to me that the private sector-led model 
advocated by Voluntary Planning and by other Atlantic Canadian policy makers is a 
product of its time and place, not a panacea.
A review of the literature on social and planning policy implementation and evaluation 
revealed four very useful approaches to the research undertaken for this thesis. The 
critical theory approach to planning and evaluation provided the overall theoretical 
Framework for the critical analysis of Atlantic Canadian regional policy and for the 
evaluation of “Creating Our Own Future” and of Voluntary Planning. It also suggested 
a normative course of action. The policy research approach provided the action-oriented 
methodological guidelines for the study. The cooperative inquiry approach provided the 
research rationale for direct involvement in the planning and implementation process. It 
also increased the likelihood of implementation of the recommendations made in the 
evaluation process. The social learning definition of planning provided a bridge 
between these two social policy research methodologies and the planning literature. The 
literature on mediating structures provided an alternative organizational model for 
Voluntary Planning. The approaches are documented in detail in Chapter 2.
1.5 RELEVANCE OF THE THESIS TO THE FIELD OF 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING
In the early 1990s, there is hardly a speech or treatise on current events that does not 
begin with a litany of the dramatic economic and political reorganizations occurring in 
the world. Pandora’s box has once again been opened by the end of both the Cold War 
order and U.S. economic hegemony. The virtues of market-oriented economies and 
entrepreneurship, the need for productivity and competitiveness, the role of national 
industrial policy, and the extent of trade bloc protectionism are some of the issues being 
widely debated. Economists, business leaders and politicians alike are attempting to 
design the type of economic environment that can best position individual nations, 
regions and business firms within this unstable global environment. This thesis 
examines how, in this global context, economic planning for an economically 
disadvantaged peripheral region such as Atlantic Canada has become an exercise in the 
maxim “Think Globally and Act Locally”.
As a case-specific analysis, the thesis does not attempt to abstract a general model for 
either the development of regional economic strategies or for the methodologies to be 
used in evaluating them. Instead, it critically examines a private sector-led economic 
planning initiative within the regional, national and global political-economic and
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ideological climate of its time. It demonstrates how generic, globally endorsed policy 
prescriptions encounter serious obstacles when the local political economy of the region 
to which it is being applied is overlooked in the process of planning and implementa­
tion. Case-specific recommendations for improving the success record of economic 
strategy implementation in Atlantic Canada are also presented.
While the thesis does not suggest a new body of theory, it is nevertheless of general 
interest to regional planners for three reasons. First, because “Creating Our Own 
Future” is a prime example, at a regional level, of the kind of private sector-led 
development economic planning that is dominant at a national level in the 1990s. 
Second, because it describes a planning organization undergoing a process of rapid 
change as a response to regional, national and global political-economic turbulence.
The implementation of “Creating Our Own Future” is requiring Voluntary Planning to 
evolve from an elite advisory body to government towards a vehicle for participatory 
democracy in planning. Moreover, the fact that the organization has gone beyond 
merely giving advice through its planning documents and has taken on the role of 
implementation through public consultations, advocacy and lobbying, has made its 
planning activities go beyond being static policy prescriptions towards a dynamic and 
interactive model of planning. Third, because Voluntary Planning is reorganizing its 
activities and objectives along the lines advocated by critical planning theorists, and as 
such will provide in the years to come a rare empirical case study of the effectiveness of 
this innovative approach to planning.
1.6 ORGANIZATION OF THE CHAPTERS
The thesis is organized into five parts. Part I provides an overview of the thesis as well 
as a summary of the theoretical and methodological issues that provided the guidelines 
for the thesis research and organization. Parts II and m  present a critical analysis of the 
literature on competitiveness and on Atlantic Canadian economic history and regional 
economic policy. This analysis provides the fiamework for the discussion of the case 
study presented in Part IV. Part V presents a summary and a set of conclusions and 
recommendations. In terms of the four fundamental questions posed by the thesis:
Part n  addresses the first question; Part m  addresses questions two and three; and 
Parts rV and V address the fourth question.
Chapter 1 in Part I presents an overview of the thesis. Chapter 2 discusses how the 
thesis and case study evaluation design and analysis were guided by a critical theory 
perspective of planning and social policy evaluation, the definition of planning as social
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learning, the principles of policy research and cooperative inquiry and by the notion of 
a mediating structure as an alternative delivery mechanism for social programmes.
Part n  establishes the global and national ideological and political-economic context for 
the model of competitiveness advocated by the case study organization: a private 
sector-led economic development strategy. Chapter 3 looks at the changing political 
economy of the world in the 1990s and the resulting debate over the role of the state vs. 
the role of the market in achieving sustainable economic growth. It examines the debate 
over trade and industrial policy in the developed world and, to a lesser extent, the 
debate over state-centred development in the developing world. Chapter 4 examines 
some of the major debates on corporate management practices as well as Michael 
Porter’s “diamond” model as a private sector/market driven alternative to activist 
industrial policy. Chapter 5 chronicles the history of industrial policy in Canada and 
examines the impact of the current model of national economic development on the 
“have not”8 regions of Canada.
Part m  establishes the regional setting for the case study. Chapter 6 chronicles Atlantic 
Canada’s economic history and the record of regional policy initiatives. Chapter 7 
examines in detail the themes dominating the major economic policy documents at 
Atlantic, Maritime and Provincial levels from 1990 to 1992.
Part IV presents the case study. Chapter 8 provides a brief history of Nova Scotia 
Voluntary Planning and summarizes the tenets of its current economic strategy 
document “Creating Our Own Future”. Chapter 9 describes the overall evaluation 
methodology design for the various evaluations conducted: 1) the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of “Creating Our Own Future”; 2) the evaluation of the appropriateness of 
the model of economic development proposed by Voluntary Planning within the 
political-economic context of Atlantic Canada; and 3) the evaluation of the efficacy of 
Voluntary Planning vis à vis its proposed economic strategy. Chapter 10 provides a 
more detailed account of the methodology followed for the effectiveness evaluation and 
then reports and discusses the findings of the public report Chapter 11 presents the 
findings of the model appropriateness and efficacy evaluations.
In Part V, Chapter 12 summarizes the arguments presented in the thesis and provides a 
set of conclusions and recommendations to be used as guidelines for future economic 
planning in Nova Scotia and in Atlantic Canada. The chapter also presents a new series 
of research questions which surfaced during the research process undertaken for this 
thesis.
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Appendix A lists the members of the Voluntary Planning Board and Staff and the 
members of the various committees involved in the preparation and evaluation of the 
economic strategy. It also provides the names of the groups and individuals consulted as 
part of the Strategic Planning Review.
It is my hope that the arguments presented in this thesis can help the process of 
economic planning for the citizens of Nova Scotia and, by extension, for all Atlantic 
Canadians.
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ENDNOTES
Atlantic Canada comprises the provinces of Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, 
and Newfoundland/Labrador. When the latter is omitted, the area is referred to as the Maritime 
Provinces. See map in Chapter 6.
The third major theme was the Canadian constitutional crisis of the early 1990s. These thanes are 
addressed in Ch^to' 7.
Sagebien (1990). “Competitive Strategy and Economic Development in Atlantic Canada. Joining 
Vision with Practicality”, presented at the Atlantic Canada Econmnics Association Conference in 
St John’s, Newfoundland, in November 1990.
As in the case of the emperor’s new clothes, it is well known that monopoly, patronage and 
paternalism are the pillarê of the local political economy. However, they are very rarely 
acknowledged in economic development documents as factors ccHitributing to regional 
underdevelopment, much less counteracted through practical remedial action.
A third topic -  the dynamics of global political and economic integration vis à vis the Canadian 
constitutional crisis and NAFTA -  was also examined in some detail during the research phase of 
the thesis. The rationale for examining this topic as part of the thesis was that Canada’s 
constitutional crisis combined with the economic integration of the continent through the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) made the definition of the political context for planning 
very difficult. Would Canada as we know it exist in the mid-1990s? ^ a t  political, economic and 
social forces were affecting national re-definition? Could a constitutional solution to Quebec’s 
threat of secession be found? What would be the effect of continental integration? How would the 
region’s provincial governments and business elites react to this new set of predicaments? In order 
to betto  ^understand the dynamics of political and economic integratitm and disintegration, I 
examined the experience of the European Community and of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). 
My hope was to find some wisdom which I could then apply to the North American scenario. In 
1991, Eastern Europe was “liberated” and the Soviet Union disintegrated. By mid-1993, the future 
of the Treaty of Maastricht looked uncertain. Wisdom became more difficult to find in die nibble 
of the Cold War order. In Canada, the 1992 referendum on the set of constitutional proposals 
agreed to in 1991 (the Charlottetown Accord) came and went and the country did not disintegrate on 
the spot as feared by proponents of the Yes side. In 1993, all is quiet on the Canadian front In 
addition, since the evaluation of “Creating Our Own Future” did not require the examination of the 
impact of continental integration and disintegration, but only a discussion of the effects of the 
Canadian constitutional crisis on Atlantic Canada, the search for normative guidelines and helpful 
models with which to define some of the options available to Quebec, the Canadian Federation and 
North America was abandoned for the purposes of this thesis.
Given the confidential and politically charged nature of the report and the fact that I was not a 
member of Henson College (part of Dalhousie’s School of Public Affairs & Continuing 
Education), it was decided that it would be best if I worked with the Secretariat on an “informal” 
basis. This arrangement proved beneficial in two ways: it expedited approval by the Monitoring 
Committee’s Chairman, Allan Shaw, of my participation in the evaluation and it allowed me to 
have both active involvement in the process as well as some distance from which to observe and 
analyze it
A public is a constituent group, a stakeholder.7
 ^ A term used in Canada to refer to the poorer provinces.
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
“The only certainty is that the status quo is no longer an option.”
(Voluntary Planning, Nov. 1991)
When the rate of social change increases steadily while our control over 
the changes appears to decrease, we perceive the times as turbulent. In 
such times, planners have two major options. One often-used planning 
strategy is to remain detached finom the turbulence; waiting for it to 
subside into stability so that proven planning methods and theories may 
again be effective. A less common strategy is to plan within the 
turbulence; trying to understand its unfamiliar order while building new 
methods and theories appropriate to the changing conditions. Though 
the risks of the second strategy are greater, so are its opportunities for 
learning about society, planning and ourselves. (Godschalk 1974, p.l)
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The changes affecting the industrialized world have called into question the Canadian 
government’s commitment, as well as its ability, to continue along the present path of 
fiscal redistribution and regional economic development initiatives. Thus the most 
salient unifying characteristic of the regional economic development documents 
published in Atlantic Canada in the 1990s is the tone of urgency in their rhetoric. 
According to the vast majority of these documents, adaptation to global, national and 
regional turbulence will require the rapid transformation of the Atlantic economy from 
that of a “have not” region dependent on government transfers, to that of a self-reliant, 
globally competitive economy.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this thesis critically analyzes the dissonance between 
generic visions of a competitive Atlantic Canadian economy and the particular regional 
realities that must be taken into consideration if the plans are to be successful. The 
thesis also suggests a normative course of action in policy planning and implementation 
that can reduce this dissonance. It attempts to provide a “reality-check” for the 
aspirations for a competitive Atlantic economy articulated in economic development 
documents because while I agree that the status quo is not an option, I also believe that 
neither is wishful thinking.
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A review of the literature on social and planning policy implementation and evaluation 
revealed several very useful approaches to the achievement of the research objectives of 
the thesis. This chapter surveys the methodological concerns of policy research and 
cooperative inquiry, relates these perspectives to the view of planning as social 
learning, reviews the theoretical underpinnings of critical planning theory and critical 
evaluation theory and examines the notion of mediating structures as an alternative 
administrative structure.
2.2 THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES
2.2.1 Policy R esearch
Majchrzack’s (1984) work. Methods for Policy Research, provided the overall research 
orientation and framework for the thesis. She defines policy research “as the process of 
conducting research on, or analysis of, a fundamental social problem in order to 
provide policy-makers with pragmatic, action-oriented recommendations for alleviating 
the problem” (Op Cit, p. 12). Policy research’s distinctiveness comes from its high 
action orientation and from its concern for fundamental social problems. Even though 
evaluation research is often equated with policy research, the former “attempts to judge 
the utility of social programs” while the latter “examines a social problem and seeks 
alternative ways to solve the problem (including but not limited to social programs)” 
(Op Cit, p. 14). This thesis attempts to do both.
While policy research efforts and the disciplines that use this kind of research vary in a 
number of ways, the unifying characteristic of the types of research activities that can 
be classified under this rubric is that they are all focused on helping policy-makers 
solve social problems. In this way, policy research provides a bridge between the more 
reflective academic policy analysis and the practitioner-oriented applied policy analysis.
The elements that characterize policy research suited the research needs of the thesis in 
the following manner. Policy research:
• is multidimensional in focus. The causes of the economic underdevelopment of
Atlantic Canada and the repeated failure of the policies designed to alleviate this 
problem are a highly complex matter involving, historical, social, economic, and 
political dimensions. Therefore, the thesis’ literature review is comprehensive and 
the evaluation methodology for the case study incorporates these various 
dimensions in its analysis.
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• uses empirico-inductive research orientation. Instead of the traditional scientific 
hypothesis testing approach, in which I would attempt to prove a predetermined 
theory, the thesis focuses on an iterative process whereby information and model 
building were constantly interchanged, particularly during the case study phase of 
the thesis.
• incorporates the future as well as the past. The retrospective policy analysis and 
current policy evaluation conducted for the thesis yielded normative guidelines for 
future planning.
• focuses on malleable variables. Given the thesis’ orientation towards action and 
implementable recommendations, the research focuses on those aspects of the 
“social problem” of underdevelopment open to influence and intervention (i.e. 
malleable variables) -  the planning and implementation process itself.
• is responsive to study users. The needs of the case study subjects -  the Monitoring 
Committee and Voluntary Planning -  set the general guidelines for the evaluation. 
Recommendations were designed with their implementability by these subjects in 
mind.
• explicitly incorporates values. Critical theory provides a framework for the analysis 
of the values and power relationships involved in the planning process and in the 
assumptions behind the policy statements themselves. My personal bias for 
analyzing the problem from various theoretical dimensions, including those of the 
radical left, while searching for a solution within the existing political-economic- 
social system, is evident in the research design.
The policy research process also suited the research exigencies of the thesis. This
process consists of five phases:
• Preparation. The preliminary literature review on Atlantic Canadian economic and 
planning history, and on the theories of national competitive advantage conducted 
for the APEC project, provided me with sufficient background information to initiate 
the research project After the thesis research began, the literature review was vastly 
expanded.
• Conceptualization. The original conceptualization of the thesis stated in the first 
draft thesis proposal involved the application of strategic planning concepts to the 
process of regional economic planning. That conceptualization changed after the 
activities undertaken for the APEC study. At that point, the focus of the thesis 
became the study of how generic policy prescriptions endorsed globally encounter 
serious obstacles when the local political economy of the region to which it is being 
applied is overlooked in the process of planning and implementation. Given this
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conceptualization, I developed the four fundamental research questions that were to 
be addressed by the thesis (see page 10).
• Technical analysis. The thesis addresses these fundamental questions through a 
literature review and a case study.
The case study evaluations of “Creating Our Own Future” and of Voluntary Plan­
ning attempted to answer 1) Is the economic strategy working? 2) Why or why 
not? and 3) How can my research improve the chances for its success?
Given this set of questions, the evaluations conducted addressed:
1. the effectiveness of the economic strategy itself, and of the government of Nova 
Scotia’s and Voluntary Planning’s implementation record vis à vis the goals 
outlined in the economic strategy^
2. the appropriateness of this model of economic development (private sector-led 
development) within the political economy of Atlantic Canada and of the world 
in the 1990s
3. the efficacy of Voluntary Planning, particularly in terms of the organization’s 
role as a mediating structure between the various public and private sector 
publics of the province of Nova Scotia.
• Recommendations analysis. The recommendations made by the Monitoring Com­
mittee to the provincial government and to Voluntary Planning, as well as those I 
presented to Voluntary Planning, were made with an understanding of the potential 
consequences of the recommendations and an estimation of the probability that they 
would be adequately implemented.
• Communications. An adequate communicative relationship between the researcher 
and the policy makers is considered sine qua non in ensuring that the research 
findings and recommendations are implemented.^ The need for effective 
communication was a major factor in my adoption of cooperative inquiry techniques 
and in the application of critical theory to the evaluation of Atlantic Canadian 
regional development policy.
Two levels of communication were considered in the evaluation research design:
1) that between the researcher(s) and its clients -  in the case of the Secretariat, the 
Monitoring Committee, and in the case of my evaluation of Voluntary Planning, 
Voluntary Planning itself, and 2) that between the subjects of the evaluation and 
their publics, in the case of the Monitoring Committee, the government. Voluntary 
Planning and the citizens of Nova Scotia, and in the case of Voluntary Plamting, the 
private sector and the general public. Given the public nature of the Monitoring
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Committee’s Year One evaluation report, and Voluntary Planning’s activities, an 
overall communications strategy was designed for making public the results of the 
evaluations and for facilitating the implementation of the strategy in Year Two.
While these five phases are quite similar to those of other social research methodo­
logies, what characterizes the policy research methodology is its explicit intention to 
provide decision makers with useful knowledge as well as its commitment to action.
2.2.2 Cooperative Inquiry
Given my commitment to making a positive contribution to the economic condition of 
the Atlantic provinces, I welcomed the opportunity to work directly with the agents of 
change -  the Secretariat to the Monitoring Committee and Voluntary Planning. I chose 
to use a cooperative inquiry model of research because it provided me with a research 
paradigm for my dual roles as researcher and participant.
Reason (1988) uses the term “cooperative inquiry”, which he had earlier termed “new 
paradigm research”,^  to describe “the various approaches to research with people” 
(Reason 1984, p. 1, emphasis added). According to him, different disciplines use 
different terms to describe this type of inquiry. For example, the terms “participatory 
action research” (PAR) and “dialogical inquiry” have been used in a Third World 
development context, while the terms “collaborative inquiry” and “action science” have 
been used in humanistic psychology and organizational development Reason states that 
while the cooperative inquiry processes within the various disciplines look rather 
different, “the commonality in all the approaches is that they are all working openly, 
directly and collaboratively with the primary actors in their various fields of interest” 
(Op Cit, p. 2). As stated by Heron (1984), in cooperative inquiry the co-researchers are 
the co-subjects -  “the same persons devise, manage and draw conclusions from the 
research; and also undergo the experiences and perform the actions that are being 
researched” (Heron 1984, in Reason 1988, p. 40).
Cooperative inquiry is characterized by three interdependent aspects: 1) participatory 
and holistic knowing based on a dialogical relationship with the world and the subjects 
under study; 2) critical subjectivity that acknowledges the subjective relative constructs 
that colour the researcher’s view of the alleged “objective reality out there”; and 
3) knowledge in action, knowledge formed in and for action, rather than for reflection. 
Cooperative inquiry, particularly the PAR approach, is of particular relevance to this 
thesis not only because it facilitated my dual role as researcher^articipant, but because
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this approach increased the level of “implementability” of the recommendations made in 
the various evaluation exercises. It contributed to the achievement of the normative 
objectives of the thesis by increasing the likelihood that the results of the evaluations 
would be implemented. Smith’s (1979) review of the record of implementation of 
results of evaluation studies suggested that by and large there is an apparent “non-use” 
of results. Echoing the findings of policy researchers, Smith suggests that
the first and possibly the most important theme in bringing about effec­
tive implementation of the results of evaluation studies... [is].. ,a close 
relationship between the evaluation researcher and a clearly identified 
customer (or customers) o f evaluation studies, plus a sensitivity to the 
impact on others in the organization, if research results are acted upon.
This suggests that at the very least, the researchers need to be aware o f 
their own assumptive worlds, and to check them against those of their 
customers and of the subjects of research, to see if the research findings 
appear meaningful to either customers or the subjects of the research.
(Smith 1979, in Barret and Fudge 1981, p. 233, emphasis added)
Critics of this approach maintain that an arms-length distance fiom the evaluation 
subjects is required in order to maintain objectivity and not compromise the results 
should conflicts of interest arise. However, I do not believe that these two objectives -  
good communications and professional distance -  are necessarily mutually exclusive. 
By being part of the Secretariat and of Voluntary Planning I was able to conduct the 
evaluations by establishing a dialogue within a community of shared values and outlook 
that increased the chances of implementation of the evaluation results. This 
“membership”, however, did not prevent me from contributing to the Secretariat’s 
rigorous assessment of the government of Nova Scotia’s and Voluntary Planning’s 
Year One performance. Or from challenging the overall assumptions of the economic 
strategy and of Voluntary Planning in the model appropriateness and organizational 
efficacy evaluations conducted for this thesis. On the contrary, membership allowed me 
to provide recommendations that passed the “utilization test” (Smith 1979) -  the design 
of a feasible set of recommendations intended to address programme and strategy 
deficiencies.
Besides good communication between evaluator and client, social policy scholars have 
also suggested that the likelihood of implementation of evaluation results increases 
when the evaluator transcends the roles of “servant, judge or scientist” and assumes 
that of a “teacher” (Wise 1980) and change agent. The cooperative inquiry approach to 
evaluation also allowed me to assume the role of evaluator as “teacher” since, through 
joint discussions, I was able to stimulate new thinking and open up new ways of look-
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ing at things, which helped to introduce or foster a new emphasis or direction in the 
political debate about policy. The “repositioning” of Voluntary Planning as a mediating 
structure, discussed in Chapter 11 of this thesis, can be seen as a direct result of this 
shared action-oriented discovery process. The requirement of the evaluator as a change 
agent advocated by cooperative inquiry and policy research was also successfully met.
2.3 THE LINK TO THE PLANNING LITERATURE -  
PLANNING AS SOCIAL LEARNING
Michael’s (1974) conception of planning as a societal learning process and of plaiming 
organizations as boundary spanners and learning organizations provides a useful link 
between the planning literature and the policy research and the cooperative inquiry/PAR 
literature.
In his “Speculations on Future Planning Theory”, Michael (1974) suggested that
if society remains open enough to sustain the thrusts for autonomy, then 
some theorists will be preoccupied with understanding how relevant 
publics can participate more productively in planning processes 
undertaken by both formal and informal groups. Contributing to the 
complexity of this task will be the experimental political and public 
administration processes, superimposed on traditional ones. Weaving 
through the maze of organizational, legal, political, administrative and 
competence criteria for effective public participation will be the enlarging 
role of multinational corporations, which are themselves quasi-political 
entities of ambiguous potential for good and evil. (Op Git, pp. 37-38, 
emphasis added)
He further suggested that, given this complex scenario, “the accumulation of formal 
understanding of the dynamics of complex human systems will be slow and erratic, 
encouraging a view of planning as a societal learning process rather than as social 
engineering.”
Planning as a form of social learning encompasses earlier meanings of planning,^ and 
sets out to self-consciously experiment with various social goals and programmes to 
discover a desirable future. Michael suggests that in this context, planning organiza­
tions become learning organizations -  organizations that can create “a learning context 
[through communications activities] rather than merely an information processing 
system” (Op Git, p. 47) where the planner also assumes the role of teacher. He 
speculated that a planning organization that could become a learning organization could 
also become more efficacious by acting as a boundary spanner “facilitating the
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exchange of information, introducing signals into one component that elicits 
information useful or stimulating to the other components” (Op Cit, pp. 47-48).
Michael’s conception of planning organizations as boundary spanning and learning 
organizations bears considerable similarity to McCall’s (1987) notion of the function of 
PAR and to Berger and Neuhause’s (1974) concept of mediating structures discussed 
later in this chapter. According to McCall, PAR can be used: 1) “as a means to facilitate 
and lubricate outside interventions and policies, or 2) as a mediation, that is, as a means 
to modify, guide or redirect interventions, and 3) for empowerment of the weakest 
groups, in which case it becomes emancipating and liberating (McCall 1987, quoted in 
Swantz and Vaino-Matilla 1988, p. 131). Thus the PAR process itself can provide both 
a boundary spanning function between development agencies and subjects, as well as a 
process of learning. In other words, the planner/researcher/evaluator himself or herself 
provides the vehicle for social learning through his/her involvement with the various 
stakeholders in the process.
Cooperative inquiry, policy research and the societal learning definition of planning 
share the view of the social research/planning process as an iterative learning process 
for both researchers/planners and subjects. These modes of inquiry, research and 
planning also intend for the research^lanning results to lead to social action and to 
useful knowledge for both policy makers and for the research/planning subjects 
themselves. Rather than knowledge for knowledge’s sake, these approaches are 
concerned with knowledge that can articulate basic social problems in order to define 
action that can promote human welfare. However, in order to achieve those goals, two 
major questions have to be addressed: 1) What theoretical orientation can be applied to 
the study of social and planning policy formulation, implementation and evaluation that 
can help the social researcher/planner to conceptualize the nature of these social 
interactions in a way in which the knowledge accumulated by both the researcher and 
his/her “subjects” can lead to emancipatory action? and 2) What organizational model 
can facilitate these kinds of social policy goals? Critical theory provides the theoretical 
firamework and the literature on mediating structures provides an organizational model.
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2.4  THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK -  CRITICAL THEORY
2.4.1 Critical Planning
Planning is a process by which present conditions are assessed through the analysis of 
the past, and where the vision of certain futures, favoured over other visions, are set in 
motion through action. In a pluralistic society this process is bound to be fraught with 
the inherent conflicts of interest between various groups in society. Since social choices 
are made and priorities are established -  planning is more than merely a technical 
exercise -  it is a political process. Unfortunately, the political process as well as the 
stmcture of the economy organizes autonomy and independence for some people, 
powerlessness and dependence for others.
Planning is primarily about people; about solving problems of, by and for people; about 
organizing people’s efforts by suggesting a legitimate and attractive common vision of 
their future; and, in a democratic society, about obtaining their consent for action. 
Therefore, socially responsible planning requires that the nature of the unequal 
relationships resulting fixjm political and economic imperatives of those controlling the 
planning process, even when unintended, be at the very least recognized, if not 
ameliorated in the process. Addressing these inequalities as issues of market imperfec­
tions, stickiness in labour market mobility, or of the culture of poverty are woefully 
inadequate approaches. Blaming the victim does not shed light on the nature of the 
crime, nor does it lead to future action that can solve, or at least prevent, the problem. 
Critical theory can perhaps provide a theoretical framework with which to approach 
socially responsible planning.
Critical theory refers to the particular approach to social philosophy developed under 
the aegis of the Frankfurt School by authors such as Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse 
and Habermas.^ While there is no “cohesiveness and unity of thought” in their writ­
ings, the “fundamental and unifying objective of all critical theorists is the achievement, 
through critique, of a society free from all forms of domination” (Kemp 1982, p. 59).
Authors outside critical planning theory have made similar formulations of planning’s 
purpose. For example, Dyckman (1978) states that the “very purpose of planning is to 
release human abilities, to broaden the field of opportunity, and to enlarge human 
liberty” (Dyckman 1978, quoted in Muller 1982, p. 255); and Muller (1982) developed 
a model of “promotive planning” that sought to provide planning guidance and 
knowledge to disadvantaged groups in order to progressively promote self-sufficiency. 
Several of the essays collected in Paris (1982) address similar issues. For example.
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Fainstein and Fainstein (1982) go beyond demonstrating how traditional planning 
serves the bourgeois interests and “discusses strategies for structural change” (p. 147); 
while Mazzioti (1982) and Hague (1982) discuss the limits of the popular “advocacy 
planning” and “community action” approaches respectively in providing alternatives to 
traditional planning. Despite the lack of conclusiveness of the debates, Paris (1982) 
suggests that planners must continue to question whether planning can be part of a 
radical reconstruction of society.
The value of the critical theory approach to planning is that it offers a comprehensive 
framework^ for the achievement of its egalitarian aims. Critical theory provides at once 
a critique of the processes by which dominant classes maintain their political and 
economic control, an analysis of how these processes work through the systematic 
distortion of communication, and a suggestion of how to overcome these repressions. 
Thus it is critical, analytic and normative.
Kemp suggests that the application of critical theory to urban and regional planning, 
what he termed “critical planning theory”,
seeks to understand the relations of political and economic power which 
constitute, and are constituted in the planning process and to demon­
strate the contingency of existing formations -  that is how they could be 
otherwise. (Kemp 1982, p. 60)
Habermas’ writings provide a framework for conducting the type of analysis suggested 
by Kemp. According to Forester (1987a,^ 1987b), Habermas sets the stage for an 
empirical political analysis that exposes
the subtle ways that a given structure of state and productive relations 
functions: (1) to legitimate and perpetuate itself while it seeks to extend 
its power, (2) to exclude systematically from decision-making processes 
affecting their lives particular groups defined along economic, racial or 
sexual lines; (3) to promote the political and moral illusion that science 
and technology, through professional experts, can ‘solve* political 
problems; and so (4) to restrict public political argument, participation 
and mobilization regarding a whole range of policy options and 
alternatives which are inconvenient to (incompatible with) the existing 
patterns of ownership wealth and power. (Forester 1987a, p. 205)
By acknowledging the nature and dynamics of “what is”, and by reflecting on how it 
could be different, the planner can redress some of these deleterious consequences of 
this political-economic context.
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According to Kemp (1982), the review of critical planning theory reveals three 
approaches -  critical, analytic and normative. The critical approach derived &om 
Habermas’ critique of science and technology as ideology (Habermas 1971,1974)
sets out to demonstrate that current orthodoxies in urban and regional 
planning theory merely serve to perpetuate [and legitimize] the status 
quo. By formalizing an instrumental, technical mode of rationality with­
in the planning framework, existing theories suppress attempts to truly 
democratize the planning process. (Kemp 1982, p. 60, emphasis added)
From a critical planning theory point of view, the democratization of the planning 
process requires more than just an increase in the number of interactions between 
planning agencies and the public (public hearings, consultations etc.), but must also 
include an examination: 1) of class conflicts (Scott and Roweis 1977) as determinants 
of social and political control; 2) of the communication processes that dominate these 
interactions (Kemp 1987); and 3) an understanding of the difference between mere 
public/private interaction and actual social learning and citizen participation (Forester 
1987a, 1989; Kemp 1982).
The critical approach shares several concerns with the political economy approach to 
planning described by McDougaU (1982). Authors in the political economy approach to 
planning suggest that in order to understand the planning process and the nature of 
plans it is necessary to: 1) analyze them in terms of “(a) the capital accumulation pro­
cess and (b) the process of ideological reproduction”; and 2) analyze “actual planning 
practices in specific socio-histoiic situations” (McDougaU 1982, quoted in Healy 1982,
p. 261).
The analytic approach to critical planning seeks to apply critical theory empiiicaUy in 
order to analyze the planning system and highlight the operation of power and ideology 
in planning. According to Kemp, this approach:
takes its impetus from Habermas’ Legitimation Crisis [Habermas 1975] 
in which a sustained attempt is made to describe planning as an arm of 
the administrative sub-system of advanced capitaUsm, and thereby 
centraUy concerned with processes of legitimation of state intervention 
in order to disguise the continued private appropriation of sociaUy 
produced wealth. (Kemp 1982, p. 61)
For example, according to Kemp, by systematically distorting communication 
processes through decision-making and public inquiry,* the “state first depoliticises the 
public arena, and subsequently gains legitimation for its poUcies” (1982). Thus one of
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the aims of the analytic approach is to reconstruct this process of decision-making in 
order to examine the workings of power and ideology inherent in this process.
The normative approach to critical planning is concerned with helping planners 
overcome the distortions and repressions inherent in the planning system. According to 
Kemp (1982), this approach takes its impetus &om Habermas’ Legitimation Crisis and 
from his subsequent work on “universal pragmatics” and, as suggested by Forester, 
from Habermas’ “communications theory of society”.
Habermas (1979) suggests that ordinary everyday communications are underpinned by 
four norms of “universal pragmatics” or “validity claims” -  comprehensibility, sincer­
ity, legitimacy and truth. If these norms are violated by suppression or distortion, for 
example, then mutual understanding, trust and cooperation suffer. Habermas further 
sets out to isolate and reveal the debilitating power of communication systematically 
distorted by the bureaucratic, capitalistic and undemocratic institutions of the state and, 
by contrast, “the enabling power of democratic political criticism, mutual understand­
ing, and self-determined consensus on the other” (Forester 1987, p. 205).
Forester (1987a, 1989) views planning as a communicative process that 
“unnecessarily” becomes distorted by political ideologyH e sees critical theory as 
providing “a new way of understanding action, or what a planner does, as attention 
shaping (communicative action), rather than more narrowly as a means to a particular 
end (instrumental action)” (Forester 1987a, p. 203). Furthermore, he suggests that
If planners do not recognize how their ordinary actions may have subtle 
communicative effects, the planners may be well-meaning but counter­
productive nonetheless. They may be sincere but mistrusted, rigorous 
but unappreciated, reassuring yet resented. Where they intend to help, 
planners may created dependency; where they intend to express good 
faith, they may raise expectations unrealistically. (Ibid)
As Habermas’ theory would indicate. Forester suggests that
As our institutions and organizations violate the ordinary comprehensi­
bility we need to understand situations we face, they confuse and 
bewilder us. As jargons obscure, we are rendered incompetent. As 
organization members violate our ordinary expectation of sincerity,.. 
they cultivate mistrust, the expectation of and perhaps acquiescence to 
manipulation and deceit... Similarly as political structures and organiza­
tions violate the legitimacy condition, e.g. convert political issues into 
apparently technical ones through appeals to expertise, they depoliticize 
us, excluding us from collectively critical action affecting our lives. And
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finally, as institutions and organizations violate the truth condition 
allowing us ordinarily to draw implications and act, they mislead us, 
concealing from our attention actual possibilities of action... and the 
political and moral culpability and responsibility for the perpetuation of 
existing institutions. (Forester 1980, quoted in Kemp 1982, p. 63)
However, this process is not inevitable. Forester states that “by recognizing the prac­
tical, communicative character of planning actions, we can suggest strategies to avoid 
these problems and improve practice as well”. He suggests a series of “communicative 
strategies complementing planners’ technical work” (1987a, p. 219). However, he is 
careful to point out that these “organizing strategies” are nothing new if considered in 
isolation outside a context of structural analysis of systematically distorted communica­
tion. In his words:
responses to systematic misinformation must be more strategic, based 
on the planner’s analysis of the power structure at hand (Forester 1990, 
p. 35)... [For example] ...Only when planning administrators recognize 
... that inequitably set project review agendas may be regular, systemic 
products o f the larger political economy, then only will they be able to 
counter systematically managed agendas in their on-going work.
(Forester 1980, p. 22, quoted in Kemp 1982, his emphasis)
In sum, the contribution of critical theory to planning is, in Forester’s words:
pragmatics with vision -  to reveal true alternatives, to correct false 
expectations, to counter cynicism, to foster inquiry, to spread political 
responsibility, engagement and action. Critical planning practice, 
technically skilled and politically sensitive, is an organizing and 
democratizing practice. (1987a, p. 221)
This thesis addresses primarily the critical and normative approaches to critical planning 
theory. The model appropriateness evaluation suggests that the current economic strate­
gies based on competitiveness serve the economic and political interests of the present 
ruling elite, are designed to maintain the status quo, and that it is the structural impedi­
ments presented by this political economy itself that have, to a great extent, prevented 
past development strategies from positively affecting the economic conditions under 
which the majority of the region’s population lives. The normative component is 
addressed in the efficacy evaluation of Voluntary Planning and in the Conclusions 
section. It focuses on Voluntary Planning’s repositioning as a mediating structure. The 
analytic approach was not used since I did not examine the dynamics of the planning 
system itself.
Chapter! 33
2.4.2 Critical Evaluation
While I did not use Fischer’s (1987) critical evaluation model in the thesis I did find his 
discussion of the application of critical theory to the design of social programme 
evaluation very useful in helping me design an evaluation methodology for Voluntary 
Planning and for the Monitoring Committee’s report According to Fischer, “a critical 
evaluation is one that explicates (for the purposes of discourse) the full range of 
empirical and normative assumptions that contribute to a particular judgement, from 
manifest to latent, from concrete to abstract” (Fischer 1987, p. 238).
Fisher used a case study to illustrate the components of a critical evaluation. He des­
cribed the debates surrounding the evaluation of Head Start, a compensatory educa­
tional programme for disadvantaged children initiated by U.S. Democratic president 
Lyndon Johnson in the 1970s as part of his “War on Poverty”. The debate was sparked 
by a federal government-sponsored evaluation of Head Start conducted by the 
Westinghouse Learning Corporation (1969). The study concluded that after three years 
of programme implementation the “educational gains” as demonstrated by the measure­
ment of reading scores tended to be small. These results were seized by the Republican 
party as proof that the War on Poverty had been a “proven failure”. The ensuing debate 
over the validity of the results of the Westinghouse study proceeded on three fronts.^®
Many social scientists questioned the validity of the results of this empirical evaluation 
on methodological grounds. A second group of social scientists was supported by 
leaders of community groups representing the poor. They argued that measuring 
reading scores did not provide the right criteria forjudging programme success because 
increasing reading scores was not the only objective of the programme. The overall 
purpose of the programme, they argued, was to assist these children in the critical 
transition from poverty to middle class. Therefore, the success of the programme in 
providing “socially relevant experiences for ghetto children such as an enlargement of 
their sense of personal dignity and self worth and the development of socially 
responsible attitudes” (Fischer 1987a, p. 236) also had to be considered in evaluating 
programme success. Yet a third group suggested that
regardless of the outcomes or consequences (whether based on objective 
reading scores or on community related standards), empirical measure­
ment was an insufficient ground forjudging Head Start a failure. In this 
view. Head Start had been designed to ‘facilitate a basic value that must 
extend to all citizens in a democratic system: the right to equal opportun­
ity’. Thus the final evaluation o f such a programme must rest on a 
normative commitment to the equal opportunity principle regardless of
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its secondary or indirect consequences for other dimensions o f the social 
system, (Op Cit, p. 237, emphasis added)
In other words. Head Start is intrinsically “worthwhile” as part of a commitment to 
insuring equal opportunity, an overarching societal goal.
In the case of the Monitoring Committee’s report and Voluntary Planning’s evaluation, 
the effectiveness measures utilized followed the first mode of inquiry suggested by 
Fischer -  the empirical mode. However, the impetus for conducting the efficacy 
evaluation of Voluntary Planning was inspired by the third mode of inquiry suggested 
by Fischer -  the notion of the intrinsic “worthwhileness” of a forum for participatory 
planning, regardless of the outcomes of other forms of evaluation.
2 .5  THE ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL -  MEDIATING STRUCTURES
So far this chapter has presented: 1) the research orientations that guided the thesis -  
policy research and cooperative inquiry; 2) the definition of planning that linked these 
orientations with the planning literature -  planning as social learning; and 3) the overall 
theoretical framework for the analysis conducted -  the critical theory approach to 
planning and evaluation. The next section presents the notion of mediating structures. 
This organizational model guided the evaluation of Voluntary Planning’s organizational 
efficacy evaluation.
Berger and Neuhaus’ (1975) notion of mediating structures arose fiom their examina­
tion of tendencies in thinking about public policy in the U.S. in the mid-1970s. Their 
study revealed a major contradiction centred on the call for both the continuation of the 
services provided by the modem welfare state, and the “animus against government, 
bureaucracy, and bigness, as such” (Op Cit, p. 1). Rather than consider this contradic­
tion irrational, the authors posited that this reaction “is the sum of equally justified 
aspirations... [and that therefore] ...the public policy goal is to address human needs 
without exacerbating the reasons for the animus against the welfare state” (Op Cit, 
p. 2). The authors assert that what is being demanded is “alternative mechanisms for 
the provision of the services of the welfare state” (Op Cit, p. 1).
Berger and Neuhaus suggest that at the root of these seemingly contradictory demands 
for more services and less government lies the unprecedented dichotomy between 
public and private life presented by modernity. They depict individual life in modem 
society as a constant migration between the megastructures of modem life -  the state
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and the institutions of capitalist enterprise (management and labour alike) -  and “that 
modem phenomenon called private life” (Op Cit, p. 2). This migration presents the 
individual with “the double crisis of modem society” -  a crisis for the individual who 
must balance the demands of these two spheres, and a political crisis because the mega­
structures have become devoid of personal meaning and are therefore viewed as unreal 
or even malignant (Op Cit, p. 3).
Mediating structures -  “those institutions standing between the individual in his private 
life and the large institution of public life” -  (i.e. church, neighbourhood, family and 
voluntary organizations) help relieve this “double crisis” because they alleviate both 
“the anomic precariousness of individual existence in isolation from society and the 
threat of alienation to the public order” (Op Cit, p. 3). Furthermore, when the political 
order becomes detached from the value and reality of individual life (“delegitimized”)» 
mediating stmctures become essential as “value generating and value meaning agencies 
in society” (Ibid) and as the sought altemative means for the provision of the services 
of the welfare state. Moreover, the authors assert that this mediation cannot be 
“sporadic and occasional, it must be institutionalized in stmctures” (Op Cit, p. 4). They 
suggest three propositions: 1) that “mediating stmctures are essential for a vital 
democratic society; 2) that public policy should protect and foster mediating stmctures 
[the minimalist proposition]; and 3) that wherever possible, public policy should utilize 
mediating stmctures for the realization of social purposes [the maximalist proposition].”
Berger and Neuhaus are careful to point out that they are not advocating decentraliza­
tion, devolution or smallness -  three public policy proposals concerned with changing 
the stmcture of the system itself. What they are looking for is the “empowerment” of 
individuals by providing mediating stmctures that allow for the expression of the “real 
values and real needs of people in our society” (Op Cit, p. 7). In this way, mediating 
stmctures manage to integrate “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to planning by 
providing a communications and interaction loop between the various constituencies 
and governments. Berger and Neuhaus applaud the resistance of individuals to the 
“massification” of modem culture and they call for the emergence of a pluralist para­
digm where particularism (“tribalism”), either inherited or through personal election, is 
not regarded as a derisive term indicative of reversal of progress and reason, but as a 
way to resolve “the identity crisis which results from the identity diffusion of mass 
society”. They assert that within one’s group -  whether it be racial, national, political or 
religious, or all of these -  one discovers an answer to the elementary question “who am 
I?”, and is supported in living out that answer” (Op Cit, p. 41). Within this pluralistic
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paradigm, the goal of public policy is “to sustain as many particularities, in the hope 
that most people will accept, discover or devise one that fits” (Op Cit, p. 44).
Berger and Neuhaus* findings on the dual call for both the continuation of the services 
provided by the modem welfare state, and the “animus against government, bureau­
cracy, and bigness, as such** (Op Cit, p. 1) bear a remarkable similarity to the results of 
Voluntary Planning*s 1991 “Report on the Consultation Process** (V.P., May 1991) 
conducted as part of the planning process for “Creating Our Own Future**. If the 
authors are correct and what is being demanded by this seeming contradiction is an 
altemative policy delivery mechanism, then the literature on mediating stmctures is of 
particular relevance to the study of Voluntary Planning.
As will be discussed in Chapter 7, in 1991 Voluntary Planning evolved beyond being 
simply a planning organization in an advisory role to govemment into one that is 
committed to implementing change through an advocacy role. Even though it does not 
have the legislative authority to wield either “carrots** or “sticks** in order to provide the 
incentives for change, the organization does have the ability to translate abstract 
economic objectives into specific actions implementable at the govemment, corporate, 
union and individual citizen. More importantly, it provides a legitimate forum for the 
“articulation** of common values. In this capacity. Voluntary Planning could increase 
the political efficacy of Nova Scotians by helping them answer the questions “who am 
I?’* and “what do we collectively want?*’ and by supporting them in living out that 
answer through its intermediary and advocacy role.
By using this altemative mechanism for the articulation of common values and for the 
formulation of legitimate and effective social and economic policy, the technocrats, 
business people, workers, politicians and citizens of Nova Scotia might be able to leam 
to solve together the economic, political and social problems of the province.
2.6 THEORY AND METHODOLOGY AS APPLIED TO THE THESIS
This thesis hypothesizes that the success of the policy content of regional economic 
development strategies (the plans) will depend primarily on the way in which the 
process of delivery itself (the legitimacy and efficacy of the delivery agents) reflects an 
accurate understanding of the context in which it is being applied (the political-economy 
of a region). In other words, regions like Atlantic Canada can become competitive, but 
only if: 1) the policy prescriptions do more than just parrot calls for fashionable 
management clichés such as quality, excellence and innovation; 2) they directly address
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the impediments to competitiveness presented by the local political economy such as 
monopoly, patronage, paternalistic corporate culture etc.; and 3) if the political efficacy 
of the citizens of the region can be increased. This latter requirement has two primary 
implications: 1) planning, implementation and evaluation, in both the private and public 
sector spheres, must be viewed as a process of social learning, 2) mediating structures 
that allow for the re-allocation of the power relations between bureaucrats/technocrats 
and citizens, and between managers and workers, must be in place before substantial 
change can occur.
Given the diverse component parts of this conceptualization, I have had to draw from 
the literature of a variety of disciplines in order to define the elements of the content, 
context and process of regional policy in Atlantic Canada. I also have had to design a 
multi-dimensional evaluation model for the case study that could address their inter­
relationship. Critical planning theory provided me with a rationale for the analysis of 
the content and context of regional policy in Atlantic Canada and for the design of 
normative guidelines related to the process of policy delivery. The literature on 
mediating structures provided an altemative organizational model for policy delivery.
In his review of regional policy evaluation, partly based on earlier work (Diamond and 
Spence 1983), Diamond (1984) concludes that “the dominant view of evaluation 
research in regional policy is rather a limited one” (p. 37). Among the crucial missing 
elements is the study of “the political and administrative bureaucratic elements” (p. 37). 
Diamond also suggests that in addition to effects, effectiveness and efficiency, “worth­
whileness” be used as an evaluation criterion in regional and urban planning in order to 
raise fresh questions. In order to address the missing as well as the desired elements 
mentioned by Diamond, I had to “borrow” models fiom the social policy research, 
implementation and evaluation literature and apply them to the regional economic 
development policy setting. Critical evaluation theory suggested a broader view of the 
process of regional planning evaluation. The evaluations conducted in this thesis 
attempted to address the two elements mentioned by Diamond by empirically evaluating 
the effectiveness of the two bureaucracies involved in the planning and implementation 
process and assessing the worthwhileness of Voluntary Planning as a mediating 
structure by conducting an organizational efficacy evaluation.
The practicality and direct involvement advocated by policy research and cooperative 
inquiry approaches to social research facilitated the design of the evaluation process as 
well as the likelihood that the study recommendations would be implemented. As the 
old adage states -  “actions speak louder than words”.
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ENDNOTES
See Alteiman (1982) for a review of the literature on the "nascent** discipline of implementation 
analysis in urban and regional planning. The evaluation conducted for this thesis focused on the 
results obtained by Voluntary Planning and the provincial govmunent rather than on the process 
of decision-making that led to these results.
The focus on communications as the key to policy implementation has been explored by several 
authors. For example, Goggin et al. (19W) have developed a model for exploring the federal/ state 
policy implementation process that "attempts to make sense o f important aspects o f the political 
and administrative behaviour associated with the intergovernmental implementation of public 
policy. The model uses ccxnmunications theory as the ^ue that holds die pieces togedier. 
Messages, their senders, and the messages* recipients are the critical ingredients. Decoding these 
messages and absorbing them into the agency routine is what implementation is all about** 
(Goggin et al. 1990, p. 40).
See Reason and Rowan (eds) (1981).
 ^ Definitions of planning have evolved a long way from the view of the planning as simply pre­
paring l(xig-range plans. According to Godschalk (1974), the first development was that of 
planning as a process that required continued organizaticxial adaptaticxi. The next phase was a 
concern with planning policy^ resulting in two definitional streams, a policy analysis branch 
aimed at the pre-decisicm phase (see Lichfield 1970), and ccmcemed with weighing altemative 
policy options; and a management branch aimed at the post-decision phase and concerned with 
implanentation efficiency, effectiveness and efQcacy and organizational decision-making. See 
Friend and Hickling (1987) and Faludi (1987).
 ^ See McCarthy (1978) for an excellent exposition of the works of Jurgen Habermas.
 ^ See Kemp (1982) for a detailed review of the critical, analytic and normative approaches to critical
planning literature.
 ^ EarliCT versions of this article appeared in the Journal of the American Planning Association (July
1980) and in Clavel et al. (eds) Urban and Regional Planning in an Age o f Austerity ^ Pa^gamon 
Press.
® See Kemp*s (1987) analysis of public hearings in England.
 ^ Forester acknowledges that some distortions in communications are inevitable in any context
However, many are artificial, and deceptive.
10 Fischer’s critical evaluation seeks to integrate the modes of inquiry of these three ^proaches to
evaluation into a methodology of critical evaluation. He suggests that "what is needed is a method 
of logic designed to clarify the structures and the functions of the different o f the different 
propositions that constitute a comprehensive evaluation argument.... The objective is to translate 
the q)istemological requirements of the three modes of inquiry into a unified framework for the 
discursive assessment of policy judgements’* (Fischer 1987, p. 240).
___________ PART II____________
THE GLOBAL AND NATIONAL CONTEXTS. 
HOW ARE COMPETITIVE ECONOMIES CREATED?
INTRODUCTION TO PART II
In order to understand Atlantic Canadian regional policy as a “product of its times”,
Part n  examines the ideological, national and global context that influenced current 
Atlantic Canadian regional policy-making. As such, it explores the first question posed 
by this thesis: How is a competitive economy created in the global context of the 1990s 
and what roles should the state and the market assume? The answers to this question 
will then be contrasted with the answers provided in Part IQ of the thesis to the next 
two fundamental questions posed by the thesis: What prescriptions for competitiveness 
are being presented in Atlantic Canadian economic policy documents? and What 
impediments and advantages does the Atlantic Canadian political-economy present to 
the realization of this vision of a competitive economy?
Part n  is a comprehensive, albeit not exhaustive, catalogue of the eclectic intellectual 
furniture that is available in the 1990s for the arrangement of economic policy docu­
ments in the region and elsewhere. The critical analysis of the literature examines the 
interaction between state intervention, company strategies and market outcomes in the 
international economy by focusing on two major issues: 1) Chapters 3 and 5 examine 
the debates over the right formula for achieving multinational, national, regional and 
local economic well-being (the competitive advantage of nations), and 2) Chapter 4 
examines the search for sustainable corporate competitive advantage (a major 
determinant of national competitive advantage). An examination of the global political 
economy of the 1990s preambles Chapter 3 as background for these discussions.
The multi-disciplinary critical analysis of the literature presented in Part Q delves into 
the relevant aspects of the literature on political economy, industrial policy, national and 
regional economic development, and management The review reveals that the pundits 
of the various disciplines seem to be asking similar questions: Which capitalists will 
synthesize the formula for the best capitalism? Who will get (through competitive 
advantages), and keep (through sustaining those advantages), the golden fleece (the 
highest standard of living)? Will it belong to individual nations, blocs of countries or 
stateless global corporations? How will the ubiquitousness of transnational 
corporations and the patterns of global trade link the corporate management practices, 
industrial, macro-economic and trade policies of various nations? While political leaders 
are still claiming national “sovereignty” (the monopoly over law-making), is the 
concept of national “autonomy” (the ability to reach independent decisions) losing 
significance? What approach to economic planning is most effective under these 
conditions?
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Since there is no unchallenged orthodoxy, new paradigms are emerging by trial and 
error, and there are many camps in the debate. Despite the virulence of the arguments, 
regional policy formulation and evaluation in Atlantic Canada is best understood within 
this context because: 1) regional policy, particularly in Canada, is a sub-set of national 
industrial policy, which is in turn a sub-set of globalized interactions, thus the rhetoric 
used in regional economic development documents is an echo of that used in global and 
national forums, and 2) in Canada, as in many other countries, the private sector is 
progressively being asked to take a more active role in economic development. Since 
the opinions of the management analyst on which private sector agents are likely to base 
their prescriptions will affect economic policy development, the basis for their 
arguments also had to be examined.
The level of argument presented in Part II might seem far too detailed within the context 
of this thesis. The reason is that it is my firm belief that the arguments presented in Part 
n, particularly in Chapters 3 and 4, will serve as a means to decipher the fundamental 
conception of the global political economy and of the competitive strategies for 
adjustment that dominate current, as well as future, national and regional development 
policy in Canada. In the early 1990s, policy has taken a private sector-led orientation. 
However, it might swing in any relative direction between now and the end of the 
century. My aim is to provide a way to track the present and future trajectory of the 
swing by measuring it against the continuum of arguments presented in Part II.
CHAPTER 3
TO PLAN OR NOT TO PLA N ?
THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY DEBATES IN THE UNITED STA TES,
THE EUROPEAN COMM UNITY, JA PA N  AND THE ASIAN DRAGONS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 3 examines the debates over laissez faire/finee trade vs. industrial policy/ 
managed trade in the U.S. and the EC, and to a lesser extent the debate over state- vs. 
market-centred development presented by the rapid economic growth of Japan and the 
Asian Dragons (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan).
Several developments will bring the arguments presented in this chapter to the forefront 
of both national and regional economic planning in Canada in 1993. Among them are: 
1) the election of Bill Clinton as President of the United States on a platform of activist 
economic policies and the appointment to economic advisory positions of Robert Reich 
and Laura D* Andrea Tyson, leading advocates of industrial policy; 2) the hardening of 
trade disputes between, and even within, the major trading blocs; and 3) the fact that 
1993 is an election year in Canada and in Nova Scotia, and party platforms based on 
economic interventionism are likely to be formulated as alternatives to Voluntary 
Planning’s private sector-led development model.
Canadians have a saying -  whenever the U.S. sneezes, Canada gets a cold. The defeat 
of George Bush and the change in economic policy direction being attempted by the 
Clinton administration, might also signal the defeat of Brian Mulroney’s policies which 
have suffered from intense Reaganomics for several years. Given that Canadians have 
traditionally expected their governments to be actively involved in providing economic 
solutions, the mid-1990s might see the return of the traditional Canadian approach of 
state intervention in the national and regional economy. As will be examined in 
Chapters 5 and 7, the fundamental limiting factor to an activist Canadian industrial 
policy is that the coffers in Ottawa are empty. In any event, the debate is likely to 
intensify substantially in the 1993 elections.
The arguments are presented in four sections. The first provides the contextual 
background by examining the political economy of international relations in the 1990s. 
The chapter then examines the strategies for adjustment to this context pursued by the 
U.S., the European Community, and the developmental states of Japan and the Asian
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Dragons. The history of industrial policies in Canada, of which regional policy is an 
aspect, is examined in Chapter 5.
3.2  BACKGROUND -  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE 1 9 9 0 s
3.2.1 A Framework for Analysis -  The Conflicting Logic of S tates and M arkets
While Western economists have distinguished themselves as a profession where wide 
disagreement is the norm, “in economic theory, agreement that a regime of multilateral 
free trade was the best approach for promoting economic welfare was so universal as to 
be almost a prerequisite for membership in the association of professional economists” 
(Lawrence and Schultze 1990, p. 1). This core belief in the liberal trade system has 
always been debated, ^  however. It is currently under ferocious attack by economists, 
other academics, politicians, business leaders and a considerable segment of voters, 
particularly in North America and the EC. Neo-mercantilist arguments abound, centred 
on the need for activist “industrial policies” and “strategic” state intervention in 
economic matters. To add to the confusion, developing countries and the former Soviet 
bloc are liberalizing trade and markets just when many developed countries, notably the 
U.S. and the European Community, are involved in heated debates about the virtues of 
these policies.
What global circumstances are causing the questioning of the bedrock tenets of liberal 
economics? What are the competing theories? What are the implications of adhering to 
the policies suggested by these new theories, or of continuing along with the old 
policies -  for developed countries, and for underdeveloped regional or national 
economies? Chapter 3 examines these questions. The work surveys the state of the 
industrial policy debate in the U.S. and in Europe, and examines the “developmental 
state” in Japan and in the Asian Dragons.
One way to understand the conflicts and debates presented in this chapter is to look at 
the dynamics of the international political economy in terms of the interaction of the 
state and the market, and particularly at the opposing logics of these two forms of social 
organization. “States and markets have tended to displace other forms of political and 
economic organization in the modem world because of their efficiency in the production 
of power and wealth” (Gilpin 1987, p. 10). As the most powerful forms of large scale 
social organization, the fact that their dynamics differ considerably results in a great 
deal of system-wide tension:
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Whereas powerful market forces in the form of trade, money and 
foreign investments tend to jump national boundaries to escape political 
control and integrate societies, the tendency o f government is to restrict^ 
to channel, and to make economic activities serve the perceived interests 
of the state and of powerful groups within it. The logic of the market is 
to locate economic activities where they are most productive and profit­
able; the logic of the state is to capture and control the process of econo­
mic growth and capital accumulation, (Op Cit, p. 11, emphasis added)
Over the centuries, there has been considerable debate as to the nature and conse­
quences of this fundamentally opposed logic of states and markets. For example, many 
economists adhere to the view that nations should pursue their comparative advantages 
in trade matters and in that way give rise to a global political economy where there is a 
fundamental harmony of interests. Others argue that this harmony of interests is 
spurious and that instead, economic interdependence establishes hierarchical, depen­
dency and power relations among groups and national societies. These relations benefit 
some nations and groups more than others, inviting considerable inter-state conflict.
Several developments have made this debate particularly relevant in the latter part of the 
20th century:
1. the unprecedented integration of the world’s markets in terms of both trade and 
capital flows;
2. the absence of a hegemon in the liberal economic order,
3. the emergence of global oligopolistic markets that bear little resemblance to the 
world of perfect competition assumed by the economists;
4. the rise of multinational corporations;
5. the post-WW n  development of the welfare state, where the state assumed the role 
of provider of various social welfare and economic services, and where citizens 
expect their governments to guarantee their long-term economic welfare; and
6. the astonishing economic success of Japan and the NiCs predicated on the curious 
(from the point of view of liberal economists) mix of market and state referred to as 
the “developmental state”.
The result of these developments is that markets and national economies have become 
more integrated and interdependent, while states have come under increasing pressure 
to safeguard national economic interests, in a world where the rules of the game have 
changed substantially. Thus in the late 20th century, there is a growing tension between 
a global economy based on market principles and domestic economies based on state 
interventionism. International responses to this tension could lead either to global trade
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wars or to a new expansion of international trade through the realization of what 
Keinichi Ohmae (1991) calls the “Interlinked Economy”.^  In order to prevent the 
former and give the latter some impetus, the need for “intensive coordination of national 
policies [particularly macro-economic policy] and economic practices” (Gilpin 1987, 
p. 364) must be recognized and acted upon. Whether this cooperation is achievable or 
not is open to question.
3.2.2 The End of an Era. Am erica’s  Loss of Hegemony 
and the End of the Cold War
3.2.2a Hegemony Lost
The post-WW n  era of stable and ever-expanding patterns of international trade and 
economic development has come to an end. As Gilpin has eloquently summarized:
a significant transformation of the postwar international economic order 
has occurred. The Bretton Woods system of trade liberalization, stable 
currencies, and expanding global economic interdependency no longer 
exists, and the liberal conception of international economic relations has 
been undermined since the mid-1970s. The spread of protectionism, 
upheavals in monetary and financial markets, and the evolution of 
divergent national economic policies among the dominant economies 
have eroded the foundations of the international system. Yet, inertia, 
that powerful force in human affairs, has carried the norms and the 
institutions of a decreasingly relevant liberal order into the 1980s [and 
1990s]. (Gilpin 1987, p. 3)
Perhaps the most important element in this transformation is the U.S.’s loss of hege­
mony over the world economy. While there is considerable debate over whether the 
U.S. has actually declined as the world’s foremost economic power, several factors call 
into question the U.S.’s ability to maintain its role as hegemon. According to Daly 
(1991), in the 1980s: 1) the U.S. became completely dependent on foreign capital 
(mostly Japanese); 2) the U.S. became the world’s largest debtor nation; 3) foreign 
assets in the U.S. exceeded U.S. investments abroad by $170 billion; 4) the total U.S. 
debt quadrupled; and 5) the U.S. govemment and trade deficit topped $150 billion.
Compounding these problems is the fact that the U.S. has at times “abused” its role as 
hegemon in order to meet its own narrow national interests^ (Gilpin 1987). The turn 
towards protectionist policies has also further weakened the credibility of the U.S. In 
short, “America lacks the confidence to champion the cause of free trade and its govem­
ment has lost the will to block demand for protection” (Economist, Sept. 22,1990,
p. 22).
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But why is the role of the U.S. as hegemon so important? The answer can be found in 
the “hegemonic stability thesis” (Kindleberger 1973, cited in Daly 1991). According to 
its proponents, in order for the liberal economic order to be stable, the leadership of a 
hegemon is fundamental. A hegemon, such as Britain (the pax Britannica) in the second 
half of the 19th century or the U.S. after WWII (the pax AmericanaX is willing, for 
reasons of self-interest, to provide the leadership for and bear the costs of creating a 
liberal economic order. The critical role of the hegemon is that of crisis manager and, 
often, lender of last resort. Cooperating nations “find advantages in the simplification 
of situations of choice, in the reduction of bargaining costs, and the removal of 
uncertainty” (Daly 1991, p. 6). The world economic system under the stewardship of 
the hegemon is “institutionalized” by the establishment of mechanisms such as, in the 
case of the pax Americana, the IMF, GATT and the Bretton Woods agreement.
What happens when there is a vacuum of leadership? Since “the potential for order is a 
direct derivative of the concentration of power” (Op C it, p. 7), the lack of a hegemon 
and the subsequent fragmentation of power and loss of institutional efficacy results in 
instability. Without a crisis manager, a crisis might simply “get out of control”. It 
follows then that, since the U.S. dominance over world economic affairs has declined, 
so too has the stability of the world economic order. The debate over the future of 
GATT, the volatility of exchange rates after the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
agreement, the fear of world-wide protectionism, and the concern over the debt 
problem can be all be seen as the result of this transformation.
According to Daly (1991), the world economic system in the 1990s depends on two 
things: the extent of the decline of the U.S. as an economic power, and the extent to 
which order is brought about through cooperation. Thus the crucial issues of the global 
political economy of the 1990s centre on the questions: What will replace the pax 
Americanal Is there a likely candidate for hegemon? Can the current system be main­
tained in some way? Will the various nations or economic blocs cooperate? Or will the 
system degenerate into trade wars?
3.2.2b Beyond the Pax Americana
While the “triad economy” of spheres of economic influence centred on the United 
States, Europe and Japan^ is a reality, the emergence of these trade blocs does not 
necessarily forestall an era of protectionist beggar-thy-neighbour trade policies. The 
reason is simply that it is in the interest of all parties involved (particularly in that of the
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U.S. and Japan) to maintain the liberal economic order. Thus the emergence of some 
mechanism to safeguard the system is a likely occurrence, at least in the short run.
There are two major competing theories regarding the dynamics of this new balance. 
Keohane (1984, cited in Daly 1991) suggests a “system of complex interdependencies” 
as a replacement of hegemony. “It would rely on interest-based agenda-setting, of 
bargaining and negotiations. System wide cooperation provides the mechanism for 
stability, and the fear of protectionism and the uncertainties of competition the 
incentives” (Daly 1991, p. 8). Alternatively, Maswood (1989, cited in Daly 1991) 
suggests the likelihood of a “systems supporter'* scenario, where the current system is 
supported by a second party.
According to Daly (Ibid), “the history of trade friction in the past two decades seems to 
support the systems support idea”, with Japan acting as the system-supporter. “The 
logic [of this U.S.-Japan arrangement] lies in the fact that Japan, under the present 
regime, is the leading surplus and credit nation, and therefore has the most to lose. It is 
also the nation that, through its success, creates the greatest instability in the system” 
(Ibid).
Another possible scenario would have either the Japanese or the Europeans assuming 
world leadership and becoming the next hegemonic power. But can they do it? Most 
observers doubt it.^
The Japanese are seen as poor candidates because a major restructuring of their 
economy and their trade and industrial structure would be required for them to carry out 
hegemonic responsibilities. For example, the Japanese would have to change their 
pattern of moderating their domestic economy in favour of export-led growth and shift 
to a policy of domestic-led growth in order to provide domestic markets that could 
serve as “engines for growth” for other economies. Moreover, the role of exogenous 
factors, such as the existence of the pax Americana itself, have been downplayed in the 
study of the Pacific-Asian “miracle”. Some observers doubt that this record of econo­
mic success could be maintained in a different global political economy. In addition, 
Japan does not possess military power and its people and domestic systems -  political, 
cultural, social and educational -  are not yet adequately prepared for the tasks of 
international leadership. The complexity of the role of hegemon and the changes 
required suggests that Japan is simply not ready for the role.
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It is well established that Japan is critical to the maintenance of the current regime and 
the emergence of a new world economic order. However, some observers believe that 
the rise of a united Europe as a major global competitor could further weaken the 
Japanese position. First of all, while most observers worry about Japanese investment 
in the U.S. and Europe, the Americans and some of the EC nations are already the 
leading foreign investors in each other*s economies. Thus the Europeans and the 
Americans have a strategic advantage over the Japanese when it comes to penetrating 
each other’s markets and even “jumping” over protectionist trade barriers. Moreover, 
the sheer size of the EC market (which might grow even larger with the inclusion of the 
EFTA countries and possibly some Eastern European countries), and the massive 
restructuring and productivity growth that are likely to result from this experiment, 
suggest that Europe is becoming into an economic power capable of challenging and 
ultimately stifling the Japanese advance on world economics (Daly 1991). Thus EC 
support of the current regime, Europe’s challenge of the Japanese, and the role that the 
EC chooses to play in any new order, are also of crucial importance.
However, is Europe a contender for hegemon? In Europe
the dual challenge of the United States and Japan in high technology 
industries and the low-wage NICs in traditional industries poses a threat 
to the economic position of the Europeans and to their social and welfare 
gains. The combination of high wages, inflexible economic structures, 
and extensive govemment interventionism make it exceptionally difficult 
for the Western Europeans to adjust to shifts in comparative advantage.
(Gilpin 1987, p. 374)
These factors, combined with the pressures for including the EFTA countries and 
former COMECON countries in the EC, and the overtures for economic partnership from 
the newly formed states of the former Soviet Union, will most likely exacerbate 
Europe’s tendency to turn inward.
In sum, neither Japan nor the EC seems a likely candidate for hegemon.
3.2.2c The End of the Cold War
The end of the Cold War and the desire of the former Soviet Union and of the Eastern 
European nations to “join the market” and to integrate their economies with the 07  
economies suggests that the traditional east/west tensions are being relaxed. However, 
a whole new series of tensions have arisen. At least three major areas of conflict can be 
identified: 1) massive internal conflict within the former Soviet bloc as boundaries are
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redefined; 2) an age of real war ushered in by the end of the Cold War,^ 3) the 
acceleration of trade bloc protectionism resulting from the use of trade policy as an 
instrument of foreign policy.
The heralding of the 1990s as an age when peace-loving democracies with economies 
too inter-dependent to muck up with messy conflicts would determine the patterns of 
trade and military conflict was perhaps premature. Instead, a pattern of multiple 
conflicts and general instability has arisen. Besides the sad cost in human life, the fear 
and anxiety unleashed by military conflict between nations can deal a fatal blow to the 
logic of free trade which, by definition, runs contraiy to instincts of self-protection.
3.2.3 An Alternative Framework -  The Sociology of Global System s
Sklair’s (1991) treatise on the sociology of global systems suggests that state-centred 
approaches to the understanding of the modem global political economy, a world 
largely structured by global capitalism in its various forms, must be enhanced by a new 
conception of the global system based on transnational practices operating in three 
spheres: economic, political and cultural-ideological. Typically, these practices are 
characterized by a key institution: 1) the transnational coiporation is the major locus of 
transnational economic practices; 2) the transnational capitalist class is the major locus 
of transnational political practices; and 3) the major locus of transnational cultural- 
ideological practices is to be found in the culture-ideology of consumerism.
Sklair sees the triumph of global capitalism in the last decade of the 20th century as 
“the triumph of the transnational capitalist classes in selling the culture-ideology of 
consumerism and delivering goods through the transnational corporations and other 
economic institutions” (Sklair 1991, p. 238).
Thus if the U.S. as a nation-state can no longer lead the way to economic liberalism, 
can the interests of transnational companies and of the transnational capitalist class in 
inter-bloc trade be powerful enough to argue for the relaxation of trade barriers and 
stem the tide of protectionist sentiments in various part of the world? In other words, 
should the interests of these transnational classes and corporations be the real focus of 
analysis in the examination of global trends, rather than the conflicts between the 
interests of particular nation-states?
Since we do not really know how protectionist policies actually affect transnational 
companies and transnational capitalist classes, we cannot really tell where these 
companies and political actors stand on this issue. Can these companies simply adjust?
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Can they “jump” the border by setting up subsidiaries? For example, the response of 
Japanese auto-makers to import quotas was to move up-market for less volume and 
better margin, and to manufacture abroad. The response of transnational capitalist 
classes can also be to buy up each other’s companies until the nationality of the owners 
becomes so diffused that the issue of national protectionism becomes moot. For 
example, is a policy that helps a U.S. auto maker with factories in Mexico more 
desirable for the U.S. than a policy that benefits a Japanese-owned auto factory in the 
U.S.? If nothing else, this promises to be a fecund topic for future research.
3.3 THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY DEBATE IN THE U .S .
The next sections of this chapter examine the debate over the appropriate strategies for 
adjustment to the new realities of the world political economy. The first two sections 
examine the debate over industrial policy in the U.S. and in Europe. The chapter 
emphasizes the former because the outcome of the debate is likely to have severe 
repercussions for the rest of the world and because it will be the major influence on the 
policy debate in Canada. The chapter then looks at the Pacific-Asia “miracles”, 
examines their models for growth and ponders whether these models are applicable in 
other economies or under different conditions.
3.3.1 The Rise of Protectionism
The relaxation of trade bauiers in the last half of the 20th century resulted in an 
enormous expansion of global trade and in unparalleled economic growth for the 
nations involved in that trade. Tariffs on manufactured goods have dropped from 40% 
in 1947 to roughly 5% in 1990, and “between 1950 to 1975, the volume of trade 
expanded 500%, against an increased global output of 220%” {Economist, Sept. 22, 
1990, p. 7). Thus, the pursuit of free trade became one of the major objectives of 
capitalist economic planners. As a result of such policies,^ the war-ravaged economies 
of Europe and Japan were rebuilt quickly, and the U.S. economy enjoyed its most 
prosperous period in history. The developing countries also busily tried to “catch up” to 
the developed ones by taking their place in the global trading system.
However, while most of this evidence supports the case for free trade, and while 
economists, policy makers and business people still proclaim a belief in free trade as a 
theoretical ideal, there is a sense that the “realpolitik” of world trade suggests that free 
trade is just a myth. While GATT has been successful in reducing tariffs, non-tariff 
subsidies have complicated the achievement of reciprocity. There is a general feeling 
that everyone is cheating® and that while free trade is desirable, it is not achievable and
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beggar-thy-neighbour policies are justified. Thus the belief in the mutual benefit of 
open economic borders is seen by some as: the naïve altruism of a past era (the claim of 
proponents of industrial policy, managed trade and strategic trade); a privilege to be 
extended only to other trade bloc colleagues (the view of supporters of economic 
regionalism); the right of richer, more powerful nations to the spoils of economic 
imperialism (the recurring fear of developing nations); or plain foolishness damaging to 
the national economy (the protectionists* point of view).
While the problem of adjustment to the new economic order described in the previous 
section of the chapter is in large part to blame for these “doubts**, the success of the 
post-WW n  neo-mercantilism of the Japanese “developmental state** guided by Mm has 
also cracked the neatness and consistency of both the free trade and the laissez-faire 
arguments.
Japan bashing and Japan mimicking are both based on the belief that the Japanese 
model of economic development and trade policy has served Japan well, but at the 
expense of other countries. Some claim that the machinations and industrial policies of 
“Japan Inc.** render all hopes of a world of free trade inoperative. Thus, the knee-jerk 
reaction of the U.S. electorate and its policy makers is to say either: 1) there is some­
thing wrong with what we do, so let*s do what they do (industrial policy and managed 
trade); or 2) let*s make them do it our way or else (protect our markets from “unfair** 
competition, open up their markets, and retaliate if they do not play by our rules).
However, these two reactions fail to examine the real dynamics of the problem: 1) they 
do not capture the relationship between U.S. national economic policy and the loss of 
competitiveness in world markets;^ 2) they do not acknowledge that the Japanese 
market is perhaps one of the world*s most “open** markets by traditional measures; and 
3) above all, they do not examine whether the “developmental state** is suited to the 
realities of the new economic order.
The early 1990s have also brought a recession in the U.S. and Canada, and possibly in 
most of the world. Thus there is a heightened fear of further loss of jobs, particularly 
“good** jobs. There is a growing concern about the stagnation of real wages and 
incomes in the U.S. Moreover, there has been a growing identification of the threats to 
the national economy with international pressures on the U.S. economy (particularly 
from the Japanese), and a great deal of pressure to enact protectionist measures:
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there has been a great deal of pressure on the U.S. government not only 
to protect older declining industries, but to push aggressively for a 
wider opening of foreign markets to American exports and to insulate 
newer, high technology, U.S. industries from the real or alleged 
predatory practices of industries in other countries. (Lawrence and 
Schultze 1990, p. 3)1®
Legislation such as the Semiconductor Agreement and the Super 301 has been enacted 
in order to “protect” U.S. manufacturers finom “unfair” (as unilaterally defined by U.S. 
trade officials) trading practices of other countries, particularly Japan.
The effect of protectionist policy on trade is causing a great deal of concern to the 
advocates of free trade, who see these protectionist policies as part of the problem, not 
part of the solution.
3.3.2 Points and Counterpoints -  An Introduction to the Debate
As in any argument, there are many shades of grey. However, in the early 1990s the 
two major camps in the debate over economic and trade policy can be classified as 
follows: the orthodox case for free trade and laissez faire vs. the call for an industrial 
policy and for managed trade. At the core of these arguments lies the fact that the 
theoretical “pure competition” of classical economics has been replaced by a real world 
of rather “imperfect” competition. Big business and big government have gotten so big 
that their actions can certainly have an effect on (and in some cases even control) the 
market Since the playing field can be tilted, what is actually being debated is not just 
whether this tilting is a good idea or not, but -  how can one tilt it in one’s favour before 
others tilt it in theirs?
3.3.2a The Did Orthodoxy and the Case for Free Trade
The theoretical basis of this argument is rooted in the works of Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo. Advocates such as Schultze (1983), Lawrence and Schultze (1990), Krueger 
(1990), Curzon Price (1990a,b), Bhagwati (1988), and Porter (1990) among others, 
are currently defending and enriching this theory. Even though they differ among 
themselves on several points, in general terms they maintain that:
1. markets are the best way to allocate resources in an economy;
2. countries should specialize in their comparative advantage (some believe that the 
theory can be amended to take account of the increasingly complex structure of 
modem industry; others disagree);
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3. the reduction of trade barriers will result in the best possible outcome for all 
trading partners (whether all partners follow suit or not);
4. international protectionism is an all around bad idea;
5. government intervention in the market is not a good policy because lobbying and 
patronage (its resultant political economy), along with bureaucratic inability to 
handle the information requirements, prevent governments firom picking 
“winners”;
6. the restructuring that is caused by competitive markets is better than the protection 
of weak industries;
7. the diversion of resources into one segment of the economy inevitably damages 
other segments;
8. if foreign countries subsidize their exports it should be seen as a gift, and does 
not always warrant retaliatory action by the importing country; and
9 . the spirit o f GATT is worth salvaging.
As presented further on, advocates of “new approaches” to economic policy challenge 
many of these assertions.
For many of these “liberal” economists, the best industrial policy is to “keep inflation 
low, real interest rates gently positive and exchange rates stable” (Economist, June 8, 
1991, p. 15). As far as government-led industrial initiatives, they suggest investment in 
human capital and infrastructure. “A well-educated labour force, able to acquire new 
skills and adapt to changing demands, is the most valuable asset an economy can have. 
Governments need to invest adequately in infrastructure (such as roads), because there 
are good reasons for thinking that private business will not” (Ibid).
GATT’s principles and rules-based, multilateral approach have provided the mechanism 
for the liberalization of trade. GATT’s multilateral approach to the development of the 
rules of trade and to trade negotiation has been considered better than unilateral moves, 
or an array of bilateral negotiations, for several reasons: 1) they ensure consistency 
with the three guiding principles of GATT^  ^-  reciprocity, non-discrimination and 
transparency; 2) they are simpler because they bring all negotiators to the table at the 
same time; 3) they are less likely to arouse the ire of those left out of, or harmed by, the 
negotiations.
3.3.2b The Case for Industrial Policy
Advocates of a more actively managed industrial and trade policy in the U.S., as well 
as in other developed c o u n t r i e s , ^ ^  usually base their arguments on a sub-set or 
combination of the following assumptions:
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1. the U.S. is de-industrializing, or at least losing its competitiveness (Reich 1982);
2. Japan owes its industrial success to its industrial policy (Reich 1982; Johnson 
1982);
3. governments are able to devise a “winning” industrial structure (Reich 1982; 
Johnson 1982);
4. the American political system is able to pick and choose among individual firms 
and regions in a substantive, efficiency driven way (Reich 1982);
5. a coherent and well-coordinated industrial policy is better than the current system 
of ad hoc policies;
6. the theory of comparative advantage, where countries specialize in what they do 
best, is too “static” and that some industries are more equal than others (Scott 
1985);
7. there are “strategic” or “enabling” technologies “ (Tyson 1990);
8. imperfect competition is more the rule rather than the exception, and that the 
oligopolistic nature of some markets can be exploited through “managed trade” 
resulting in the capture of substantial rents for the managing firm/nation, at the 
expense of competing firms/nations (Tyson 1990);
9 . GATT is ineffective or even dead (Thurow 1990);
10. if the “unfair” actions (usually unilaterally determined by the U.S.) of other 
governments (usually Japan) negatively affect U.S. industry, the government 
should retaliate.
3.3.2b A vs. B
Schultze (1983) argues that assumptions 1 through 4 in case B are simply wrong. He
claims that instead:
1. the examination of the data does not reveal the de-industrialization of the U.S.;
2. the Japanese success owes a great deal to the Japanese high rate of savings and 
investment, to their constant upgrading of capital stock with new technologies 
(e.g. long-term return horizons for R&D investment), to the high quality of the 
Japanese workforce, to the guts and business instinct of Japanese executives who 
risked a great deal, and to the government's provision of a supportive business 
environment, rather than direction;
3. the information requirements of picking winners would overwhelm bureaucrats;
4. industrial policy would degenerate into protectionist policy because the U.S. 
political environment is too vulnerable to lobbying.
Like Schultze, many critics of the merit of new strategic theories generally
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do not so much dispute the theoretical possibility that carefully calibrated 
government trade intervention might, in certain circumstance, bring 
gains to the United States [or any country adopting them], but 
principally... [argue]... that the potential gains were small [the promised 
rents and technological advantages]; and that political pressure would 
convert an initially well-meaning intervention policy into a boondoggle 
o f special interests. (Lawrence and Schultze 1990, p. 5, emphasis 
added)
In addition, critics argue that protectionism takes the competitive pressure off producers 
and often denies the economy access to new technology in the form of imports.
Two other issues merit a brief examination. One is whether government intervention in 
the market creates a disjunction between the policies that benefit producers and those 
that benefit citizens. In economic terms, the effect of government policy on consumer 
and producer surpluses must be factored in to policy making. For example, if the 
creation of a “national champion” requires the reduction of domestic competition, and if 
this monopoly results in higher domestic prices for these goods -  is this a good policy? 
Are producers benefiting at the expense of consumers who, under freer market 
conditions, would get better prices? The second issue to explore is whether the 
industrial policy debates are really debates about trade, or are they instead debates about 
jobs, how to keep the desirable jobs at home and export the undesirable ones abroad.
3.3.3 W hat’s  GAH Got to Do With It?
The arguments about the future of GATT are reminiscent of the Monty Python “parrot” 
skit -  some claim that it is dead, while others maintain that it is just resting or 
knackered. In either case, one suspects that something is seriously wrong. In December 
of 1990, the GATT talks failed over disagreements between Europe and the U.S. on 
European farm subsidies. Subsidiary talks continue in a frenzied attempt to patch up 
some kind of mutually beneficial deal. By late 1992, the U.S. and the EC had not yet 
resolved their differences. But the growing disenchantment with GATT, and its rules- 
based multilateral approach, reflects not only the firustration over the recent ‘lack of 
results’ of GATT talks, but a deeper disenchantment with liberal trade altogether. 
Bypassing GATT with bilateral agreements (which, if they do not discriminate against 
third parties, are not necessarily against the spirit of GATT) and unilateral retaliatory 
actions (many of which are illegal under GATT) is much in vogue. Defenders of GATT 
(or at least of some form of multilateral agreement) point out that the proliferation of 
bilateral deals is likely to result in an unmanageable portfolio of agreements, many of 
which will pose problems of conflicts of interest
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Other observers argue that since bilateral trade deals and national industrial policies are 
very much a reality, they should be managed through international agreements. 
Bemoaning their existence and hoping for a world of free trade is just sticking one’s 
head in the sand. The call for harmonization of economic and trade policies for the 
Europe 1992 project^^ might become a global campaign. Ironically, GATT might end up 
becoming what it was originally meant to be before being downsized in response to 
perceived threats to national sovereignty -  the powerful and comprehensive 
International Trade Organization (rro).
The need to include the handling of services and other thorny issues in the agreement is 
not the only new problem for GATT. “Nations are moving into a world of non-tariff 
barriers that reflect the national preferences for all sorts of things unrelated to trade” 
(Baldwin, Destler and Reich 1990), and this greatly affects GATT’s effectiveness. Other 
trade barriers are also hard to dismantle. For example, archaic Japanese distribution 
channels, and the strong preference of Japanese consumers and industrial buyers for 
Japanese products stand in the way of gaining market share in the Japanese market But 
does any country, or even the Japanese government under the pressure of U.S. trade 
negotiators, have the right to force the Japanese to consume more foreign products? 
Worse, some observers fear that this “market-opening” through quotas could have the 
perverse effect of cartelizing the Japanese market further.
The U.S. and the Europeans, and to a lesser extent the U.S. and the Japanese, have 
locked horns over protectionist agricultural policies in Europe (e.g. CAP) and Japan 
(e.g. rice). One of the ironies of this debate is that for all the talk about strategic 
technologies, the GATT talks might fail due to arguments over agricultural products- 
potato chips rather than microchips.
3.3.4 A Closer Look at the Theory of Industrial and Trade Policy
Since there are many variations of the industrial policy/managed trade vs. free trade/ 
laissez faire debate, it is essential to define at least some of the most popular policy 
proposals, discuss the rationale of the various debates in general terms, and then 
examine some of the supporting arguments and criticisms.
3.3.4a Definitions
In a broad sense, every government has an industrial policy -  a policy towards the 
industrial sector, and all trade is managed. Thus the argument is not whether to adopt 
these policies, but what form they should take. Bayliss and El-Agraa (1990) state:
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Industrial policy embraces all acts and policies of the state in relation 
to industry [economic, social and environmental]. Such pohcy can be 
either positive, i.e. positive in relation to the state’s participation in, or 
control of, industry; or negative, to the extent that it might be the 
industrial policy of the state to minimize intervention in industry.
(Op Cit, p. 137)
The term “industrial policy” is used in this chapter to refer to “positive” policies. At the 
core of the argument of the industrial policy question is whether government should 
“deliberately set out to plan and create an industrial structure, and a pattern of output 
and investment, significantly different from what the market would have produced” 
(Lawrence and Schultze, 1990 p. 4). In essence, a government would delineate in 
broad terms a desirable industrial structure, and then proceed to lead economic activity 
and private investment along this path. The basic instruments of the state are protection 
and direct or indirect (tariff) subsidy. Various models exist in both market and non- 
market economies for the perusal of officials -  communist central planning, French 
dirigisme^ and the Japanese Mm-led model.
Trade policy is a sub-set of a nation’s industrial policy. In turn, managed trade is a sub­
set of trade policy. “Managed trade” is used “to describe different kinds of trade policy 
whose only common feature is some form or other of government intervention in 
international trade flows” (Op Cit, p. 11). The level of intervention varies from country 
to country. In the current debate in the U.S., the three most commonly discussed 
proposals that fall under the rubric of managed trade are:
1. **results oriented measures -  the establishment of quantitative targets for imports or 
exports... [These] are contrasted with rules-oriented policies, under which 
governments establish the rules of the trading game, whether they be protected or 
free in spirit, and then let the market determine the outcome” (Ibid). The most 
popular target for trade hardball is, of course, Japan. The U.S.’s Super 301 falls 
into this category.
2. strategic trade policy -  “unlike classical trade analysis, these theories apply to a 
world in which there are sometimes large gains from ‘getting the furthest with the 
mostest’ especially with specialized high technology products. If one or few firms 
can gain a foothold in a new market, through protection at home and favourable 
credit terms or subsidies for expansion, they may be able to take advantage of 
economies of large scale production and gain a sizeable share of the world market. 
They can, for a significant period of time, exploit the market to earn high incomes 
[“rents”] to be split among workers and owners” (Lawrence and Schultze 1990,
p. 2). In other words, the creation of “national champions”, at the expense of other
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domestic competitors, is good policy when the objective is to win in the global
arena of “imperfect competition”.
3. Support for “strategic" or “enabling" technologies -  This is a variation of the
traditional irfant industry argument for the protection of domestic industries.
Strategic technology advocates argue that the government should support these
industries for several reasons:
• certain high technology sectors, such as semiconductors, will underpin 
“advances in every field of science and technology for decades to come” 
(Business Weeky Feb. 5, 1990, p. 56);
• other governments (yes, Japan foremost) support this sector, thus the U.S. faces 
unfair foreign competition;
• private investment alone is not an adequate source of funding because of 
externalities (e.g. training of footloose employees);
• the “spillover” effects from the private investment in these technologies benefit 
the entire economy, but cannot be captured by the investing firm;
• technological superiority used to be maintained by the “trickling down” of 
advances in defense R&D contracts into the consumer markets. This flow is no 
longer certain because the dynamics of consumer markets differ too much finom 
those of the defense industry (Business Weeky Feb. 5, 1990).
Since both “strategic trade policy” and the support for “strategic technologies” involve 
dealing with the externalities of high-technology industries, their rationales are often 
confused in the popular debate. They are, nevertheless, two quite different rationales. 
The first is actually a zero-sum game, where beggar-thy-neighbour policies are used in 
order to secure “rents” for one’s nation at the expense of others. The second addresses 
the externalities of high technology industries in a way in which, at least in principle, 
the whole world could benefit fiom the development of these technologies (Economist, 
Sept. 22, 1990).
What all these proposals have in common is that they disagree with the orthodox case 
for free trade and laissez-faire policies as the best economic doctrine. They are a 
response to a world of oligopolistic and imperfect markets where the governments of 
developed countries, and blocs of countries, are actively managing their industrial and 
trade policies to the alleged harm of other countries’ economies.
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3.3.4b Analytical Frameworks for Trade Policy
Contrary to popular belief: 1) trade policy cannot change the overall level of national 
employment, and 2) “a country cannot, except in the short run, change its trade balance 
-  the excess of imports over exports -  by changing its trade policy. Whether a country 
runs a trade deficit or a trade surplus, and how large, is determined by its savings and 
investment propensities, not its trade policies” (Lawrence and Schultze 1990, p. 7). 
What then can it do? Trade policy can: 1) improve the terms of trade by increasing the 
demand for national goods, and 2) it can change the composition of output and employ­
ment by favouring certain industries over others (Lawrence and Schultze 1990, p. 7).
Having established realistic objectives for trade policy, the arguments for managed 
trade policy, which come in many varieties, can be categorized in several ways. 
Lawrence and Schultze (1990) suggest a framework that looks at: 1) which objective do 
they choose to attain -  better terms of trade or promoting strategic industries; 2) what 
means or tools they would use to achieve them (GATT, bilateral deals etc.); and 
3) whether the policies are offensive or defensive.
Baldwin, Destler and Reich (1990) suggest an alternative approach for the analysis and 
formulation of managed trade. They suggest a four-by-two matrix (four pairs of 
opposites) that locates the policies in terms of whether they are: 1) rule or outcome 
oriented (as previously discussed in this chapter); 2) sectoral or uniform (to benefit all 
sectors, or only some); 3) aggressive or passive (the degree of enforcement of 
agreements); or 4) bilateral or multilateral.
The choice of policy also depends on whether the goal of the policy is either: 1) more 
trade; 2) a zero-sum gain or positive sum gain; 3) relative wealth (the U.S. should be 
more wealthy than other countries, even if that means that the growth rate of all 
countries must slow down); 4) profits for U.S. corporations (whether manufacturing 
abroad or not); and 5) work force learning (who pays, and who benefits from this 
externality?). Whether trading blocs formalize or not, and what kind of policies they are 
likely to adopt if they do, adds yet another dimension to this argument
3.3.4c Static or Dynamic Comparative Advantages
The wisdom of basing national economic policy on “comparative” advantages is being 
questioned by some economists. What exponents of “dependency theory” (Frank 1969) 
have pointed out for some time now perhaps is being more widely recognized by 
traditional policy makers. As pointed out by Scott (1985), static comparative advantage
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favours the rich and the strong” (Op Cit, p. 94), and the specialized trade -  commodi­
ties for manufactures -  that binds less developed countries to the developed ones tends 
to perpetuate the status of the former as second class citizens. For example, had Japan 
based its post-WW II recovery on comparative advantages alone, it would have 
developed a policy based on exploiting its abundant cheap labour and would have 
m in im ized capital expenditures for advanced technologies in industries dominated by 
foreign giants. It did the reverse. It targeted industries which forced the nation’s firms 
to compete at breakneck speed and to innovate in order to catch up to the rest of the 
industrialized world.
In his discussion of East Asian competitiveness, Scott (1985) presents a revised theory 
of comparative advantage (Porter would call it “competitive” advantage) which focuses 
on opportunity as well as on resources, and on how a country can mobilize whatever 
limited resources it has in order to seize opportunities. It is a theory that focuses on 
“opportunities for change through time -  a dynamic theory of comparative advantage 
which supplements the traditional static Western one” (Op Cit, p. 93). But the leap 
from the dynamic theory of comparative advantage to a rationale for strategic or 
managed trade is a long leap. Nevertheless, this argument has been used to support 
government intervention in industrial structure.
3.3.4d Empirical Evidence -  W here are the Rents?
The empirical support for the various forms of managed trade is usually drawn from 
three sources: 1) the effect of government intervention on the commercial aircraft 
industry (i.e. Boeing vs. Airbus); 2) the role of an industrial policy in the Japanese 
“miracle” (and the Japanese-like minor miracles of the Asian Dragons); and 3) the 
importance of the semiconductor industry to the long-term technological superiority of a 
nation. The Asian miracle is discussed later on in this chapter. Therefore, I will only 
look at the other two cases in this section.
Boeing vs. Airbus
The commercial aircraft industry is probably one of the few industries in which the 
economies of scale are so large that a global oligopoly, possibly even a duopoly results. 
Economists like Baldwin and Krugman have studied both the real life version and the 
computer model version of the Boeing vs. Airbus struggle. Apparently, “these studies 
are no advertisements for the strategic approach to trade”:
Remembering the additional economic cost of the subsidy [by European 
governments to Airbus in the form of lower rates of return than com­
mercially available] which must ultimately be financed through higher
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implicit or explicit taxes, Europe probably lost America lost more, 
though, because Boeing’s profits were smaller, and this was not fully 
offset by the price benefit enjoyed by American aircraft users. The only 
clear winners were the countries whose airlines and passengers 
benefited from lower prices at no cost to themselves. {Economist^
Sept. 22, 1990, p. 21)
The Semiconductor Agreement
In 1986, the U.S. and Japan signed the Semiconductor Agreement “America’s semi­
conductor industry had accused Japan of dumping chips in the American market and in 
third markets, and of restricting its own access to the Japanese market” (Op Cit, p. 22). 
Japan obliged by raising the price of its chips in the American market, but was initially 
slow both in raising prices in third markets and in granting better access to American 
chips in Japan. With some further American sanctions Japanese prices in third markets 
were raised, but “America’s share of the Japanese chip market still refused to rise” 
(Ibid). Instead of promoting free trade and stopping predatory pricing, the Semiconduc­
tor Agreement had a perverse effect. It “ended up restricting free trade, helping the 
Japanese a little [because they kept the prices of chips cheap at home and thus gave a 
cost edge to its electronic products], and hurting everybody else a lot” (Ibid).
What these two examples of true-to-life managed trade suggest is not that the theoretical 
possibility of managed trade is flawed, but that the actual “management” of such trade 
is very hard to do. The hope of advocates of managed trade perhaps lies in the 
possibility that these measures can also benefit from “leaming-by-doing”.
3.3.4e Money Makes the World Go Around
If the rents to be captured by strategic trade policy are actually as substantial as argued 
by its supporters, why aren’t private investors rushing to invest in these “strategic” 
firms? Their unwillingness to invest is based on the belief that the risks involved in 
these large, long-term ventures with many “externalities” are too high. Careful analysis 
of this rationale reveals that the capital markets (based on risk and reward) have simply 
not adapted to the new realities of global trade. Ironically, “Saxonhouse (1982) argues 
that much of Japanese industrial policy is merely a substitute for better-developed U.S. 
capital markets and more mobile labour” (Saxonhouse, quoted in Carliner 1986, 
p. 167). So, why not fix the capital markets, instead of coming up with an industrial 
policy. In other words, rather than asking taxpayers to invest (through government 
subsidies etc.) in the welfare of firms which will later reap the direct benefits of 
successful government intervention, a fairer, and perhaps more effective strategy, 
would be for the U.S. government to encourage the development of new forms of
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private long-term venture capital vehicles. During their 1980s heyday, “junk bonds” 
were considered a vehicle for industrial restructuring (Peters 1991). Unfortunately, the 
financial abuses of this “decade of greed” led to their inglorious decline.
The fact that the cost of capital in the U.S. is rather high (for many reasons, but one is 
definitely the budget deficit), and that America has a low rate of savings and invest­
ment, makes funds scarce and profitability after debt-service much more difficult. As 
Japanese leaders often point out, their U.S. counterparts should be more concerned 
with putting their own financial house in order by increasing the rate of consumer 
savings and industrial investment, reducing the federal deficit, and acquiring a long­
term investment outlook, than with Japan bashing (or mimicking), import restrictions 
or export targets.
3.3.5 Will Other Countries Take the U .S.’s  New Protectionism  Lying Down?
Probably not. In the late 20th century, protectionist sentiment in Europe and Japan runs 
much deeper than in the U.S. In addition, neither Japan nor the Europe of 1992 has to 
comply when subjected to American pressure. In Japan, for example, there is a 
growing feeling that “Japan matters as much to America as America does to Japan, and 
that it would do both some good if Japan acted accordingly” {Economist, Jan. 26,
1991, p. 98). In other words, Japan can now stand up for itself when dealing with the 
U.S.^^ President Bush’s 1992 tour of Japan increased the level of mistrust and 
suspicion on both sides of the Pacific.
The fear of unleashing a retaliatoiy vicious circle (from more government-funded 
industry consortia to plain old quotas) is not totally unfounded. Not surprisingly, 
advocates and critics of strategic trade policy have developed an avid interest in “game 
theory”. The world of gargantuan firms engaged in cut-throat competition in global, 
oligopolistic industries resembles the “prisoner’s dilemma”. The “all spoils (read rents) 
to the victori’ scenario is challenged by research that shows that you can’t always win. 
Actually the least costly and most beneficial strategy for both parties is “tit for tat” -  
cooperate until your opponent cheats, retaliate every time just once, then return to 
cooperation. Over time, the “credible threat” of retaliation should serve as a deterrent 
for cheating and thus establish a pattern of cooperation. All is well that ends well. But 
unfortunately, game theory players usually take several rounds to end up at the “tit for 
tat” strategy.
Chapter 3 63
3.4 THE EUROPEAN CDMIVIUNITY
European industrial policy development lies somewhere between the full blown 
Japanese developmental state (described in the next section) and the tentative American 
policy. The debate is as active in Europe as it has been in the U.S., and many times it 
has pitted nations and leaders against each other. For example, while the French have 
traditionally preferred to “guide” their economy through state-directed dirigisme and 
“indicative planning”, the British, under the leadership of Thatcher, have enshrined “the 
market” as the almighty saviour of economies, and have proceeded to dismantle many 
vestiges of English statism. Since the outcome of these debates is likely to affect the EC 
trade stance and the U.S. perception of the EC’s willingness to “play fair”, a brief look 
at the European debate is relevant
The EC has been actively engaged in industrial policies for some time.^^ Early debates 
centred on the need to dismantle regional development policies in member countries 
because they allegedly caused market distortions and could lead to trade wars. In the 
1970s, the EC’s industrial policy was dominated by support for failing industries -  the 
losers in the various EC countries.
In the 1980s and early 1990s industrial policy become more “forward looking” -  it 
focused on transnational winners and high-technology. Besides their supervising and 
coordinating role, EC officials also began to have at their disposal resources to foster 
particular projects. According to Curzon Price (1990a), industrial policies became 
“legitimized” by their explicit inclusion in the Single European Act
The arguments in support of industrial policy follow the same lines of those being put 
forth in the American debate. But the EC’s sense of urgency comes from the fact that 
the single market of 1992 is very near. Europeans worry that U.S. and Japanese firms 
will run off with all the market opportunities that the single European market will offer. 
Since European companies are relatively small and backward in high technology 
industries, and since many are still dominated by national perspectives, the EC is 
supporting high-technology projects and encouraging transnational cooperation.
The range of EC-sponsored projects and transnational corporate initiatives is impres­
sive. Some examples are: the Eureka initiative (European Research Cooperation 
Agency) to develop and launch high-technology products; ESPRIT (European Pro­
gramme for Research in Information Technology); JET, a thermonuclear fusion project; 
and other projects to aid traditional industries, biotechnology, telecommunications.
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learning technologies, unconventional energy, X-ray examination, food science, 
informatics in medicine.^^
Once again, whether “Europe 1992” becomes “Fortress Europe” or not might be what 
determines whether these projects are part of a protectionist, zero-sum scheme intended 
to benefit particular corporate interests, or a good way to advance R&D and increase 
trade. However, the fears of Fortress Europe seem to have some basis in reality. 
“While Europe’s proclamations have steadfastly championed the cause of free trade and 
open trade, the reality will be different In critical areas such as motor vehicles and 
information technology the Europeans have displayed a dogged resistance to opening 
their markets to foreigners” (Daly 1991, p. 9). Since industrial policy has a political 
basis, the outcome of these debates will probably determine in great part the future of 
industrial policy in the EC.
3 .5  THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATES -  JAPAN AND THE ASIAN DRAGONS
The countries of the Pacific Rim, primarily Japan and the Asian “Dragons” -  South 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong -  are often cited as evidence in support of 
activist industrial policies and of state-centred development Thus a closer look at these 
models is helpful in the analysis of these policies.
3.5.1 Jap an
3.5.1a Jap an ese  Model?
There are many competing explanations for the “Japanese miracle”.T h i s  section of 
the chapter concerns itself mainly with the explanation that stresses the role of the 
developmental state in the economic miracle, since this thesis has provided the model 
and the empirical evidence for the adoption of an industrial policy in the West The 
discussion of the model is limited to a brief overview of the role of the state, its agen­
cies and the objective of its policies as presented by Johnson (1982). The applicability 
of the model to other countries, and the possible dangers that the model might present 
for Japan in the future, are also examined.
According to Johnson (1982), in countries like the United States,^^ where industrializa­
tion occurred early (19th century), the state took on only regulatory functions. Develop­
ment was market-oriented and the role of government was to regulate that development. 
In countries where industrialization occurred later, like Japan, the state took on a 
“developmental function”. Development was planned and the government was the key 
planner. Johnson calls the Japanese model plan rational and the U.S.-type model
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market rational. The Japanese model stands somewhere between the U.S.-type model 
and the plan ideological model of the communist countries. The plan rational and the 
market rational models have produced quite different orientations in terms of:
1) government/business relations (Mm-led industrial consortia or kieretsu vs. anti­
trust regulated industry); and 2) government policy objectives (the achievement of a 
target industrial structure vs. the regulation of the market).
As in France, where indicative planning and dirigisme are conducted by an elite corps 
of bureaucrats, the effectiveness of the Japanese plan rational model depends on the 
existence of a “powerful, talented and prestige-laden economic bureaucracy” (Johnson 
1982, p. 21). The most powerful agency of this bureaucracy is Mm. The fact that 
government bureaucrats form the hub of economic development gives the Japanese plan 
rational system a political rather than an economic base. While economists dominate 
economic policy-making in market rational states, nationalistic political officials 
dominate plan rational states. Thus the elegance of economic theory is less important 
than the effectiveness of government planning.
The making and executing of “industrial policy” is what the developmental state does 
through its agencies (e.g. Mm). The now familiar language of industrial policy in the 
West has been used to refer to Japanese economic policies for some time. Johnson 
quotes Ozaki’s definition of industrial policy in Japan:
.. .it refers to a complex of those policies concerning protection of 
domestic industries^ development of strategic industries, and adjustment 
of the economic structure in response or anticipation of internal and 
external changes which are formulated and pursued by M m  in the cause 
of national interest, as the term ‘national interest* is understood by Mm 
officials. (Ozaki in Johnson 1982, p. 29, emphasis added by author)
In sum, according to Johnson (1982, pp. 305-324) the Japanese model is based on 
four elements:
1. a small and elite bureaucracy capable of identifying an appropriate industrial 
structure and of devising and implementing strategies to achieve it;
2. “a political system where the bureaucracy is given sufficient scope to take 
initiative and operate effectively”. In this system, there must be a consensus that 
economic mobilization is a national priority;
3. “the perfection of market-conforming method of state intervention in the 
economy” (markets must remain competitive);
4 . a pilot organization like Mm.
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As far as the application of industrial policies to other countries, whether a particular 
government can or cannot manage such a policy effectively is, of course, a matter of 
judgement and of circumstance — which nation, government and specific policies are we 
discussing? As we have seen from earlier discussions, the key question is whether a 
country is able to replicate the Japanese model without giving in to pork-barrel politics 
and lobbying pressures. The Japanese are not free from these political failings, but 
somehow manage to muddle along.
Johnson is also careful to point out that
.. .for all their alleged borrowing from abroad, the Japanese political 
genius rests in the identification and use of their own political assets....
This suggests that other nations seeking to emulate Japan’s 
achievements might be better advised to fabricate institutions of their 
developmental state from local materials. (Johnson 1982, pp. 322-333)
Thus, at least in the short-run, American proponents of industrial policy should 
examine carefully the objections of critics like Schultze (1983) as well as the more 
laissez-faire/free trade suggestions of how to get back on track. Building on one’s 
strengths might be preferable to a change of course.
3.5.1b Future Prospects -  Living on the Edge -  Can Japan  inc. Survive?
Following is easier than leading. At least you know where you are going -  wherever 
others have already gone. The assertion that the industrial policies of Japan were key in 
helping Japan “catch up” to the developed West is plausible. What is harder to 
determine is whether these policies can adequately guide Japan, or any developed 
country adopting them, at the forefront of development
Generally speaking, the great strength of the plan rational system lies in 
its effectiveness in dealing with routine problems, whereas the great 
strength o f a market rational system lies in its effectiveness in dealing 
with critical problems. In the latter case, the emphasis on rules, 
procedures, and executive responsibility helps to promote action when 
problems of an unfamiliar or unknown magnitude arise. (Johnson 1982, 
p. 22, emphasis added)
As the world of unprecedented change of the 1990s and beyond continues to bring 
more surprises, perhaps a market-rational model will prove more effective for those in 
the lead. Are Americans (and as we shall see next, Europeans) throwing away their 
most valuable assets and asking for exactly the wrong policy at the wrong time?
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Compounding the problem is the fact that Japanese investment and market strategy 
might not be suitable to the world of triad economics. In relative terms, Japan has not 
been able to follow the lead of U.S. and European companies, which invested heavily 
in each other and developed consortia capable of operating in each other’s markets.
Perhaps the argument that most seriously questions Japan’s ability to maintain its 
record of growth is the one which examines the role of exogenous factors in the 
development of the Pacific Rim. This argument is presented later in this chapter.
3.5.2 The Asian Dragons
The debate over development and underdevelopment has gone through various phases. 
As summarized by Petras and Hui (1991):
In the 1950s it focused on socialists vs. capitalist exchange theories, in 
the 1960s on dependency vs. modernization, and in the 1970s and 
1980s it has been dominated by laissez faire neo-liberal vs. state centred 
polemics; discussion is now clearly onto the terrain of capitalist political 
economy. (Petras and Hui 1991, p. 179)
The collapse of the Soviet bloc provides evidence of the shortcomings of state-planned 
economies in managing and fostering the growth of developed economies, and has left 
a vacuum of support for underdeveloped economies following this model of develop­
ment. Development polemics have taken a sharp turn to the right. Perhaps the most 
convincing evidence in support of a capitalist model of development is provided by the 
rise of the Asian Dragons. During the past few decades, the Asian Dragons have 
achieved unparalleled rates of economic growth. In 1991, these countries accounted for 
10% of manufactured exports worldwide, barely behind the U.S.’s 12% {Economist, 
June 1,1991). Thus “understanding this miracle is the most urgent task in development 
economics” (Op Cit, p. 85). The two crucial questions that researchers must answer 
are: 1) what were the roles of both free markets and of state intervention in their 
development?, and 2) can this “hybrid” model be replicated?
3.5.2a The Role of the Market vs. the Role of the State in the “M iracle”
The task of synthesizing a model from the development experience of the Dragons has 
proven to be complicated by the fact that observers have tended to see in the situation 
whatever they have wanted to see. Like the proverbial blind men describing the 
elephant, each can accurately describe a part of the elephant, but a composite picture of 
the whole beast never seems to emerge. The Dragons are cited as proof of the success 
of free markets, as well as of the crucial role of state intervention in the market. “Free
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marketeers point to the Dragons* reliance on private enterprise, markets and relatively 
undistorted trade regimes. Interventionists point with equal assurance to clever 
bureaucracies, non-market allocation resources and highly distorted trade regimes’* 
{Economist, June 1,1991, p. 85). However, critique of either approach is often 
directed at their negligence in examining the role of exogenous factors (Daly 1991; 
Petras and Hui 1991), the role of class relations (Petras and Hui 1991), and the 
oppressive nature of the developmental state (Petras and Hui 1991; Economist, June 1, 
1991).
Economic liberals are comforted by the fact that Taiwan’s “real exchange rate was 
stable and undistorted, its exports were not discriminated against, wages were set to 
clear the labour market, [and] interest rates were kept positive in real terms”
{Economist, Ibid). However, their confidence in Taiwan’s liberalism is weakened by 
the fact that Taiwan’s government also “intervened to alter the trade and industrial 
output in ways it thought desirable... implemented land reforms, discriminated against 
owners of financial assets instead of industrial assets; used public enterprise as a means 
of conscious development strategy; protected parts of the economy from import compe­
tition; [and] used rules of inward investment to promote selected industries” (Ibid).
The level of state intervention in Taiwan is not an isolated case in the development 
experience of the Dragons. In a major comparative essay, Cummings concluded that “in 
the cases of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, state direction of development was 
critical” (cited in Petras and Hui 1991, p. 184). Petras and Hui use three indicators to 
determine the importance of the state in the economy: 1) the role of public enterprises;
2) the fiscal and financial power of the state (e.g. government’s expenditure as a share 
of GNP); and 3) the use of financial controls. In all three cases, the Dragons (some to a 
greater extent than others, and with exceptions in some cases) scored high in the state 
intervention report card. So much for watertight arguments in favour of laissez faire. 
Perhaps the greatest consolation for liberal economists comes from the fact that 
dependency theorists have lost even more ground in light of the success of the 
Dragons. Integration into international markets seems to be a good idea after all.20 
State-centred explanations of development have attempted to fill the vacuum left by the 
failure of liberal and dependency theorists to explain the Dragons’ rapid growth. That 
the role of the state was large seems to be well established. Whether it was the crucial 
element is still being debated. But whether this model can or should be replicated is 
another story altogether.
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3.5.2b Can This Model Be R eplicated?
This question is widely debated. While the success of the Dragons can in large part be 
attributed to state-centred policies, the failure of scores of other developing countries to 
achieve respectable rates of growth can be attributed to the use of the same development 
policies. Thus, other forces must also be at work.
The replicability of this model rests on the ability of the state to be “efficient”. Wade 
(1988,1991) and White (1988) argue that for state-centred development to work there 
has to be an efficient state predicated upon: 1) a high exposure to the international 
market; 2) the ability to purge corrupt factions and tighten party discipline;^! and 
3) political monopoly. While the first two elements of an efficient state are laudable, 
the last one makes liberals cringe. The developmental state is also quite often an agent 
of repression and a discipliner of the working class. Apparently, democracy has had to 
wait in many of the Dragons.
According to Petras and Hui, Wade and White’s^  ^analysis of the failures of Latin 
American development suggest that Latin American regimes intending to replicate East 
Asian policies were not able to do so, in part because the efficiency of the state was 
hampered by the existence of groups with sufficient autonomy to resist the development 
directives of the state. Latin American governments have recently been able to expose 
their economies to the market by replacing earlier policies of import-substitution. 
However, neither tight party discipline, less corruption, nor political monopoly has 
been achieved. The fact that much of the production in the lucrative end of the market is 
in the hands of the multinationals, and that there has been no concern with limiting the 
growth of financial capital and steering capital towards productive investments has 
further retarded the Latin American development experience.
But do the dangers of state intervention outweigh the possible benefits? According to 
the ‘World Development Report” (World Bank 1991),^ the answer is yes. This report 
attempts to distill 40 years of World Bank experience as a lender and adviser to the 
Third World, According to the report, the growth record of the Third World has shown 
that poor countries do indeed grow, but that some grow faster than others, and these 
disparities are caused by the economic policies embraced. Economic distortions in trade 
(tariffs etc.), foreign exchange (higher black market exchange rates), interest rates 
(positive or negative real rates), and fiscal policy (the size of budget deficits) were 
linked with low yields on specific development projects, and the lack of distortion on 
the projects with high yields.
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Apparently, many developing countries adopted the “wrong” kind of state intervention. 
Some capitalist developing countries tried policies of import substitution and infant 
industry protection to expedite their development and create better terms of trade. Their 
special status as “developing” countries allowed them exemption from GATT rules 
which otherwise would have exerted pressure on them to open their markets. For many 
of these developing countries, these policies backfired. Many other developing coun­
tries adopted the Soviet model of development where the market’s function of allocating 
resources is replaced by central planning. The results have been even more disastrous.
The World Bank’s report concludes that in order to grow, countries must use their 
economic assets ever more productively, and that the best way to spur productivity is 
for governments to intervene less in their economies. However, governments have a 
crucial role to play in financing public spending without creating inflation, investing in 
infirastructure like education, roads and health care. Thus, the formula for achieving 
better rates of growth involves four elements: 1) a competitive microeconomy brought 
about by allowing economies to “get the prices right”; 2) a stable macroeconomic 
policy; 3 ) global linkages; and 4) investment in infrastructure.
While the governments of Japan and the Dragons certainly did intervene in their 
respective economies, their success with state-centred development seems to be the 
result of knowing when and how to intervene, and when not to. The World Bank 
report suggests that getting the formula wrong could wreck a country’s economy.
3.5.3 The Role Of Exogenous Factors 
In the Development Experience of the Pacific Rim
The economic success of the Pacific Rim countries was a much heralded theme of the 
1980s. In the 1990s, however, there is less optimism about the future of the region, as 
well as about the replicability of their models of economic development. The reason for 
this creeping doubt regarding the Asian “miracles” centres on a reappraisal of the role of 
exogenous factors in their development
According to Daly (1991), the literature of the 1970s and 1980s that sought to explain 
the Pacific Rim’s success focused primarily on internal conditions.^ The explanations 
covered many topics: managerial practices, work systems, Confucian ethics, savings 
ratios, govemment-business links, and the role of the giant trading companies. The 
externalities of open markets and access to capital and technology were taken for 
granted. But Asia prospered in great part because of the liberal trade system organized
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by the U.S. It had “most favoured nation” access to the markets of developed countries 
(particularly the U.S.); deregulated international financial markets allowed them to 
borrow large sums of money; and the stable system of exchange rates provided by the 
Bretton Woods agreement facilitated trade and die development of export-based 
policies. What is usually also fcsgctten by those searching for endogenous causes of 
growth is that, in the Cold War era, Asian countries were of strategic importance to the 
U.S., and many enjoyed preferential treatment vis à vis other developing countries^ in 
the form of direct aid, military bases, lack of U.S. import restrictions on their products, 
and other income-expanding flows. Ihc  unraveling of the pax Americana, and the 
protectionist mood in the U.S. and Europe, could have severe repercussions in the 
Pacific Rim. Externalities might dictate how well Asia will do in the 1990s.
Is the Pacific Rim strong enough or self-sufficient enough to chart an economic course 
independent of the U.S. internal economy or its hegemonic leadership? For Daly 
(1991) and other observers, the answer seems to be No. As has been discussed earlier, 
Japan’s financial exposure in the U.S. is enormous, and many of the Pacific Rim 
products are U.S.-bound. In addition, “the over-priced and over-burdened Japanese 
consumption base, and the low consumption levels in the rest of the Pacific Rim [where 
the previously U.S.-bound trade would likely be diverted, should U.S. protectionism 
increase], place the entire Asia sphere in a position of grave vulnerability when the 
period of triad competition begins” (Silva and Sjogren 1990, quoted in Daly 1991). The 
Japanese model and the Dragons’ state-centred model might both fail to adapt to the 
transformation of the externalities, which were largely responsible for their success.
3.6 CONCLUSION
The loss of U.S. hegemony over the liberal economic order, combined with the end of 
the Cold War, has ushered in an era of increased global instability while a new balance 
of economic, political and military power is sought Japan has been willing and able to 
support the regime of the pax Americana, but the rise of Europe and the inherent 
weaknesses of the Japanese position call into question the continuation of this 
precarious system-support Since neither the Europeans nor the Japanese seem ready to 
assume hegemonic duties, the period of non-hegemonic instability is bound to last for 
some time. Moreover, should confidence in the dollar be weakened for whatever 
reason, “the Japanese-financed American hegemony may also one day collapse along 
with the possibilities of a stable international political order” (Gilpin 1987, p. 381).
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There is an enormous need for pluralist leadership and policy coordination. However, 
while the need for cooperation and conflict resolution among the G7 powers is perhaps 
greatest at this time, the complexity of the problems that face them, the lack of clear 
leadership (or even a clear “enemy”) or of mutually agreed upon rules (e.g. GATT), 
could overwhelm the system. Military conflict between them is doubtful. A broad- 
based détente accompanied by a “mixed system” consisting of “mercantilist competi­
tion, economic regionalism [trade blocs], and sectoral protectionism” (Op Cit, p. 394) 
is the likely result In summary:
...the liberal world economy has begun to spiral downward.... The 
social and economic structures of the advanced countries have demon­
strated considerable rigidity in their ability to adjust to these [as des­
cribed in this chapter] developments.... The concentration of economic 
political power in corporations, unions and states, along with a decrease 
in global economic growth, have greatly limited the effect of the adjust­
ment process.... Rather than adjustment, the response too frequently 
has been New Protectionism and Industrial Policy.... (Op Cit, p. 388)
In the U.S., the debate over appropriate adjustment strategies rages on. While some of 
the original advocates of activist policies, like Robert Reich (1990), have softened their 
stance (Reich 1991) and are now advocating a more indirect strategy of infrastructure 
and human capital investment, others like Robert Kuttner (1991) are still carrying the 
torch for economic planning. The call for industrial policies in the 1980s and early 
1990s has been associated with Democrats (Messrs. Reich and Kuttner are Democrats), 
who are in general less averse to government intervention in the economy, be it for 
social welfare or for other reasons. The public stance of the Republican Reagan and 
Bush administrations, on the other hand, has traditionally been to champion the 
“market” and to resist calls for the need to “work with industry”. However, the 
enormous military spending of the Reagan era, the tradition of pork-barreling, and the 
protectionist hard-ball measures against Japan by both administrations, were simply 
activist industrial policies by another name. A subsidy by any other name would smell 
as sweet.
In the early part of 1992, the recession, the political pressure to “put America first”, and 
“the speed at which some of the U.S.* most vaunted industries -  computers, semi­
conductors and commercial aircraft -  had lost market share to European and Japanese 
rivals” moved the Bush administration towards the activist camp. Industrial policy 
initiatives -  such as the High Performance Computing Act of 1991, and the offer to 
make some government laboratories previously engaged in the defense industry avail­
able to industry for R&D purposes -  were being supported by the Bush adminis­
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tration.^ For Republicans, the term “industrial policy” still carried the stigma of 
bureaucratic wastefulness by Democrats that it acquired during the 1980s. Therefore, in 
the 1992 election, one of their major quandaries was to find a way to validate economic 
interventionism without indicating a U-tum in the Republican economic platform.
Republicans were not able to call a spade a spade. However, Bül Clinton, the presi­
dent-elect, has no such problem. Some observers suggest that the promise of a more 
active government role in the economy might have been the election issue that secured 
the presidency for Bill Clinton. President Clinton’s economic platform commits his 
administration to a more activist industrial policy aimed at “kick-starting” the economy 
and providing jobs. His commitment was certainly demonstrated by the appointments 
of Robert Reich and Laura D* Andrea Tyson to economic advisory positions. Perhaps 
Mr. Reich and Ms. D’Andrea Tyson can design an American industrial policy that 
provides more than just scores of New Deal type jobs -  one that also addresses the 
need for adjustment in the capital markets and in the “guns and butter now” attitude of 
American consumers. Otherwise, interventionism is likely to become only a temporary 
Band-Aid on a festering wound.
The tug of war over how to manage the market is also intensifying in Europe:
The commission is split between representatives from countries like 
France and Italy who favour support for critical industries and those 
from countries like Britain and Holland who believe the maiket should 
decide the firm’s fate [Germany is somewhere in the middle]. The same 
splits can be found within some governments as well as many of 
Europe’s industries. {Economist^ Jan. 25,1992)
After a brief disenchantment with dirigisme in the mid-1980s when Thatcher’s 
proclamations and the liberalization of Eastern Europe’s economy seemed to signal the 
triumph of the market, the cause for state intervention is once again being championed. 
“Recession, Europe’s trade deficit with Japan and America, and its weakness in high- 
technology businesses such as semiconductors are slowly shifting the balance of 
opinion in favour of the interventionists” (Op Cit). This time the stakes of the game are 
higher -  instead of national champions, the call there now is for supra-national 
champions. The direction of policy is still unclear, but a move to activist policies is 
quite likely for the reasons cited above.
As for the Japanese, if their strategy of financing U.S. liquidity begins to falter, or if 
the rise of Europe 1992 substantially alters this equilibrium, drastic changes will have
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to be made to their national economic and trade policies in order to adapt to a new world 
economic order. Fortunately for them, their track record appears to indicate that they are 
likely to adapt their system in whichever way is required, even in the face of the 
inherent structural weaknesses of their economy. But what is a bit worrisome for 
Japan’s competitors and current trade partners is that a country that “for 40 years has 
acted like a poodle” is now suggesting that “it has the strength of a rottweiler” 
(Economist, Jan. 26,1991, p. 98). Will it bite the hand that feeds it?
The Asian Dragons, like Japan, have developed under a hybrid system where some 
aspects of the market were mixed with aspects of state control. For Petras and Hui 
(1991), “the paradox of South Korea and Taiwan is the dual nature of its state -  ‘weak’ 
on the outside and ‘strong’ on the inside, interventionists in the economy and 
submissive in international politics”.^  ^It is highly unlikely that the exact conditions that 
gave rise to this model can be replicated elsewhere. Whether parts of the model can be 
exported and result in successful development is not yet clear. Perhaps the most sober 
recommendation for countries trying to adopt this model is that both internal and 
external conditions must be right, and that a great deal of discipline is required on the 
part of politicians, bureaucrats, elites, managers, workers and citizens in order for this 
model to result in both efficient and equitable growth.
As far as the prospects for LDCs, I agree with Sklair’s (1991) assessment that even 
though developmental strategies for most LDCs will continue to be driven firom the 
outside by the demands of global capitalist system, the transnational capitalist classes 
created to mediate these developmental strategies at the national level are not only a 
comprador class, they can actually find ways to make these dynamics serve their own 
national development purposes.
What we are likely to see in the mid to late 1990s is an intensification of the debate in 
the United States, the EC and Canada as the neo-interventionists justify their policies 
after a decade of neo-liberal/firee market orthodoxy, as well as a great deal of 
experimentation with hybrid approaches by all governments, large and small, 
developed and not. In mid-1990s, the world will often stand at the brink of trade wars 
between blocs. One can only hope that common sense prevails and trade wars are not 
unleashed.
5Chapters 75
ENDNOTES
1 For example, dependency theorists argue that participating in the intmiational market causes 
development in some parts of the globe and underdevelopment in others.
 ^ See Chapter 4, on the manag^nent debates, for a discussion o f the “Interlinked Economy”.
 ^ For example, the U.S. financed its massive deficits by exporting inflated dollars to the rest o f the
world.
4 In 1992, the EC will comprise the world’s largest single market, and could cmceivably become 
larger if the EFTA and foniiCT COMECON countries can gain access. The U.S. recently negotiated a 
free trade agreement with Canada and is moving quickly to enter into an agreement with Mexico. 
The Asia-Pacific block, with Japan as its axis, is nowhere near as evolved as the other two blocs, 
but it is not hard to imagine that it might evolve as a defensive response to being left out of them. 
Probably the biggest obstacle to the formation of the Americas and the Asian trade blocs is the 
strong anti-imperialist sentiments of Latin American nations against the U.S., and of many Asian 
nations against Japan.
This section is based on the works of Gilpin (1987) and Daly (1991).
 ^ Apparently, the détente policies of the U.S. and the USSR, the “superpowers” o f the Cold War,
maintained a relative calm in military matters. Local conflict was tolerated, global conflict avoided.
 ^ See Berghahn (1973), Schrieber (1969), BBC (1990) for descriptions of the effect on Western
Europe and Japan of American economic, political and managerial models, interests and direct 
intervention.
 ^ For example through non-tariff barriers, gov^m ent subsidies, import regulations etc.
9 See Gilpin (1987).
 ^^  Protectionism as the “cause” o f this slowdown is, of course, a matter open to debate.
1  ^ The three guiding principles of GATT are embodied in its articles {Economist, Sept. 22,1990):
1) reciprocity -  if one country lowers its tariffs against another’s exports, it can expect the odier 
country to lower its tariffs in return; 2) non-discriminaticm -  every country is treated as a “most 
favoured nation” in trade; 3) tran^arency -  GATT urges countries to replace non-tariff barrias 
(import quotas, for instance) with tariffs, and then to “bind” those tariffs (that is, not to raise them 
again).
 ^^  For example, the arguments for activist policies in Canada described in Chapter S follow almost 
exactly along the same lines.
 ^^  Many critics of this approach {inter alia Curzon-Price) fear the bureaucratic boondoggle that it 
implies. They prefer a system of competition between systems which will naturally select the 
most efficient ones and üiose preferred by ccxisumers.
 ^^  See Dombusch (1990).
 ^^  See Shintaro (1990).
 ^^  See Curzon Price (1990a,b).
 ^^  See Curzon Price (1990a).
 ^^  Readers interested in the various ctxnpeting theories are advised to consult Olson (1982), Johnscxi 
(1982), Odagari (forthcoming), Schultz (1983), Porter (1990), Daly (1991).
 ^^  While this argument neatly contrasts the historical circumstances o f the U.S. vs. Japan, I argue in 
Chapt^ 5 that the Canadian state that emerged out of the confedoation o f 1867 was a 
developmental state.
20 petras and Hui (1991) list the strikes against dependency theory: 1) the prediction of stagnation by 
inclusion in an exploitative dependent relationship with developed eccmomies did not prove to be 
correct; 2) the emphasis on multinationals as the major external factor in development and 
underdevelopment obscures the understanding of the role o f strategic and political factors;
3) forei^  direct investment in Asian NICs (except for Singapore) contributed little to domestic 
economic growth, and these countries have actually become big foreign investors themselves.
 ^^  This line of argument is similar to the claim that industrial policy is very hard to implement 
because the delivery mechanism can be easily influenced by special interest groups.
22 Various sources. See Bibliography.
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This section is based on a series o f articles that appeared in the July 13,1991 issue of the 
Economist. The source document has not been examined by the author.
Both liberal and dependency theorists’ attempts to describe Pacific Rim development have been 
criticised for their lack of attention to the impact of international and geopolitical variables, 
security and strategic concerns and foreign aid.
As Petras (1991) is careful to point out, U.S. economic aid to Latin American countries was 
usually tied to conditions which benefited U.S. multinationals over local firms, while aid to Asian 
countries did not carry such stipulations.
See Time magazine, Dec. 23, 1991, pp. 32-33,54-55.
27 Petras and Hui (1991) suggest that this paradox might be resolved by the emergence o f a ruling 
class that demands its own independent political expression and the inability o f the U.S. to carry 
on in its capacity of economic hegemon and global policeman.
CHAPTER 4
PORTER’S DIAMOND AND THE MANAGEMENT DEBATES.
THEIR INFLUENCE ON PRIVATE SECTOR-LED DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
As examined in previous chapters, there has been a great deal of debate in academic, 
business and government circles over the relationship between corporate competitive­
ness and sustained national economic growth. Economists and management experts 
find themselves looking at the same series of events, but through very different glasses. 
As a result, their findings, models and theories are articulated in very different 
languages, and there has been relatively little cross-fertilization between the two 
disciplines. There is a “gap” in understanding resulting from “at least a failure of 
communication [on both parts] and probably a failure of relevance in the economic 
profession” (Kay 1991, p. 59).
When the subject of economics is raised, business leaders and management academics 
usually think of macroeconomics (forecasting and economic policy in particular). 
Economics for them is just another external uncontrollable factor they must concern 
themselves with in managing the firm. Microeconomics, on the other hand, is rarely of 
concern to them because it is considered unrealistic. Much of the management and 
business strategy literature has been motivated in part by the deficiencies of contem­
porary microeconomics. For example, Ansoff, a pioneer business strategist, states that:
Study of the firm has been the long time concern of the economics 
profession. Unfortunately for our present purpose [the study of 
business strategy], the so-called microeconomic theory of the firm 
which occupies much of the economist’s thought and attention, sheds 
relatively little light on the decision-making processes in a real world 
firm. (Ansoff 1965, quoted in Kay 1991, p. 59)
According to management experts and business people, one of the major blind spots in 
microeconomics^ is that it does not concern itself with the study of managers. Since “it 
is only managers -  not the nature of laws of economics or governments -  that make 
resources productive” (Drucker, quoted in Johnson 1982), the understanding of the 
firm and of the dynamics of competitiveness is woefully incomplete without the study 
of managers, the Hamlets who must decide whether to be or not to be in the global 
competitiveness stage.
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Economists, on the other hand, are critical of the management disciplines and consider 
them too “soft”.2 For example, while acknowledging the limitations of micro­
economics, Kay’s criticism of the discipline of business strategy is that
The tools of the strategist -  the experience curve and the portfolio matrix 
-  are jejune at best, and much of what passes for strategy is platitude or 
pious exhortation.... The absence of a well-ordered body of knowledge 
is most clearly reflected in the way in which the subject is taught... the 
case method. (Kay 1991, p. 60)
In order to develop both a realistic and rigorous understanding of the firm and of the 
elements of corporate and national competitiveness, economists and business leaders 
and management academics must attempt to close the gap in understanding. This is of 
particular importance because, in the 1990s, national and regional policy initiatives have 
taken a definite turn towards private sector-driven solutions. The prevalent view in 
economic development circles is that while the road to economic development might be 
paved by the public sector through macroeconomic policy and infrastructure spending 
etc., the direction of the road is generally determined by the market The vehicles on it 
are the firms of the private sector, and managers are the drivers. The term that is 
commonly used to refer to this approach to economic development and sustained 
economic performance is “private sector-led development”.
The purposes of this chapter are: 1) to examine one of the most influential works 
attempting to bridge the communications gap between economists and management 
analysts in their discussion of “competitiveness” -  Michael Porter’s, The Competitive 
Advantage of Nations (1990a); 2) to examine in some detail the management issues that 
I consider most germane to national and regional economic development policy; and
3) to examine the import of some of these debates on public policy. The discussions 
presented in this chapter provide a broad view of the core issues involved in private 
sector-driven economic development. The analysis of the appropriateness of the model 
of economic development underlying “Creating Our Own Future”, presented in Part IV, 
will draw heavily on the arguments reviewed in this chapter.
4.2  PORTER’S DIAMOND AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
TO ACTIVIST INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
4.2.1 Summary
What advocates of industrial policy in the developed countries want to achieve is pro­
bably not all that different from what advocates of the more traditional liberal approach
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want They all want to be “competitive” in global markets. Thus the ends of their poli­
cies -  a healthy economy and an economic structure that can give the nation a competi­
tive edge in global trade -  are not disputed. What is being debated hotly, though, are 
the means of keeping up a winning pace in this endless neck-and-neck race. As exa­
mined earlier, the most contentious issue in the debate is the need for, and the healthy 
extent of, an “industrial policy”. Michael Porter offers the advocates of free-trade and 
laissez-faire policies an empirical justification for their theories, and much more.
In The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Porter goes beyond static positive 
explanations of the competitiveness, or lack thereof, of certain industries within specific 
countries and suggests a normative course of action -  the constant and dynamic quest 
for productivity and innovation, through “polishing the national diamond”. He presents 
a comprehensive and systematic model of analysis -  the “diamond” -  which can be 
used by economic and business policy-makers to identify sources of competitive 
strengths and weaknesses, and to develop policy initiatives to address them. Thus 
policy-makers can make policy about industry, without resorting to “industrial policy”.
In this book Porter analyzes ten nations and an array of industries in search of the 
determinants of competitive advantage in an attempt to “isolate the fundamental forces 
underlying national competitive advantage from the idiosyncratic ones” (Porter 1990a, 
p. 24). The importance of Porter’s work for economic planners rests on his attempt to 
provide a general theory of international economic success which can answer: 1) “why 
do some companies based in some nations innovate more than others? and 2) why do 
some nations provide an environment that enables companies to improve and innovate 
faster than foreign rivals?” (Porter 1990b, p. 85). Porter’s comprehensive “diamond” 
model provides a powerful analytical framework with which to examine economic 
change and the development of the international “competitive” pecking order. ICs 
definition of competitiveness and the diagnostic tools he proposes provide a new 
vocabulary, grammar and syntax with which to examine “competitiveness”.
Perhaps one of Porter’s greatest contributions to the literature is his definition of “com­
petitiveness”. Given the high profile of the debate on competitiveness, this word means 
many things to many people, and lends itself to all kinds of dubious interpretations that 
serve ulterior motives (i.e. lay-offs during labor/management disputes, monopolistic 
concentration of assets etc.). The criteria used to judge the “competitiveness” of a 
nation have ranged from a favourable balance of trade or exchange rate, to the creation 
of jobs through abundant cheap labour. For Porter “the only meaningful concept of 
competitiveness at the national level is national productivity... [and] sustained produc­
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tivity growth requires that an economy continually upgrade itself’ (Porter 1990a, p. 6). 
Explanations of why some nations are competitive and others are not, based solely on 
the study of macroeconomic phenomena (exchange and interest rates etc.), factor 
advantages (cheap and abundant labour or natural resource endowments), intervention­
ist government policies, management practices, or labour/management relationships, 
are considered incomplete and inadequate. He points to examples that both support and 
disprove the rule that any one of these factors is primarily the source of competitive 
advantage.
Porter’s work goes beyond what he considers “static” models of comparative advantage 
to explain the patterns of international trade. Comparative advantages like abundant 
resources, cheap labour and artificially low currency exchange rates have been devalued 
by the advances in technology, communications and capital mobility. The traditional 
emphasis on building economies of scale is considered less important to national 
competitiveness than the need to maintain dynamism by not stifling vigorous domestic 
competition.
Porter suggests a more dynamic competitive advantage which takes into account the 
perpetual state of change of competition (exploiting and sustaining fleeting advantages), 
and the fact that managers of firms can respond creatively even to comparative 
disadvantages, and thus affect their competitive standing in an industry. For Porter, 
building on one’s strengths, as the theory of comparative advantage would suggest, is 
only reasonable. But more importantly, since necessity will always be the mother of 
invention, a country’s weakness can be the base of a newly found strength. Thus the 
Swedes develop specialized hard-rock mining products because they suit the Swedish 
terrain, while the Koreans can build capital-intensive empires from a base of almost no 
capital at all. In the parlance of strategic management, country specific advantages 
(CSA) as well as country specific disadvantages can be turned into firm specific 
advantages (PSA).
For Porter, the relevant level of analysis in determining national competitive advantage 
is the industry, not the nation as a whole. Firms in industries compete, not nations. In 
other words, a nation’s overall economic well-being depends on the competitiveness of 
its key industries. This, in turn, is dependent on a high and rapidly rising level of 
productivity. The national “diamond” is what determines the dynamics.
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4.2.2 The Diamond
Porter’s analytical model, the “diamond”, is perhaps one of the most comprehensive 
models for the study of national competitive advantage developed to date. The diamond 
model is a mutually reinforcing system composed of four primary and two ancillary 
determinants. The determinants of the diamond (Porter 1990a, p. 71) and Porter’s main 
conclusions about their effects are:
4.2.2a Primary Determ inants
1. “Factor conditions. The nation’s position in factors of production, such as skilled 
labour, infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given industry.”
Basic factors, such as a pool of labour or local access to raw materials do not 
constitute competitive advantages in and of themselves, particularly in know­
ledge-intensive industries. Factors must be highly specialized to an industry’s 
particular needs (i.e. specialized skills, or pools of venture capital) and require 
sustained investment to create. Nations succeed in industries where they are good 
factor creators and creating factor advantages is more important than inheriting 
them. Competitiveness is achieved and maintained by going beyond comparative 
advantages and disadvantages and creating higher level factors (value added, 
differentiated etc.) through innovation, education etc.
2. “Demand conditions. The nature of home demand for the industry’s product or 
service.”
The size of the market is not as important as the sophistication of the consumers 
and industrial buyers. National characteristics (German high regard for engineer­
ing, Italian love of design) affect the type of industries which become global 
contenders. National passions are great as long as they are tempered with the right 
dose of competitive discipline. Demanding buyers (consumers and industrial 
buyers alike) in the domestic market are needed to pressure companies to innovate 
faster, and can at times serve as indicators of global market trends.
3. “Related and supporting industries. The presence or absence in the nation of 
supplier industries and related industries that are internationally competitive.” 
Porter’s research reveals a pattern of industrial concentration similar to that 
presented by Perroux. “Competitive industries are not scattered helter-skelter 
throughout the economy but are usually linked through vertical (buyer-seller) or 
horizontal (common customers, technology, channels) relationships. Nor are 
clusters usually scattered physically; they tend to be concentrated geographically”
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(Porter 1990b, p. 83). Since industries develop in geographical and sectoral 
clusters, the existence of an internationally competitive firm can spur the 
formation of other internationally competitive firms in the same industry, or in a 
related (vertical or horizontal) industry. The flow of information creates dynamic 
networks of sophisticated buyers, suppliers and competitors. Companies benefit 
most when the suppliers themselves are global competitors.
4. “F/mi strategy, structure and rivalry. The conditions in the nation governing how 
companies are created, organized and managed.” National circumstances affect 
the goals of individuals and companies, the nature of capital markets, the kinds of 
careers skills pursued by workers, as well as their work ethic. No one managerial 
system is universally appropriate, and competitiveness results form a managerial 
system well suited to the success requirements of a particular industry. “Among 
all the points on the diamond, domestic rivalry is arguably the most important 
because of the powerfully stimulating effect it has on all others” (Porter 1990b,
p. 82).
4.2.2b Ancillary Determinants
5. '"Government” -  The role of government and its policy implications are examined 
later on in this chapter.
6. “Chance” -  These are acts of serendipity which present a challenge or an 
opportunity. For example, the loss of the U.S.’s pre-eminent economic position 
in the post-war years (which it gained by chance by winning WWII) can be 
attributed to the resurgence (catching up) of other economic powers like Japan 
and Germany, whose industrial base was destroyed during WW II (through the 
chance event of losing the war and having the war theatre in their territory).
4.2.2c The Diamond as  a System
The points of the diamond are self-reinforcing. However, two elements have the 
greatest impact on the system: domestic rivalry because it forces companies to upgrade 
continuously, and geographic concentration or “clusters of industries” because this 
proximity magnifies the interaction of the other four influences.
The dynamic nature of the “diamond” allows nations to develop substantial competen­
cies in specific industries in a relatively short time, and to maintain these competencies:
When a national environment permits and supports the most rapid 
accumulation of specialized assets and skills ... affords better ongoing
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information and insight into product and process needs... [and] 
pressures companies to innovate and invest... companies both gain a 
competitive advantage and upgrade those advantages over time. (Porter 
1990b, p. 77)
The dark side of the “diamond” is that once the process of decline has started, it is 
equally hard to arrest or reverse. For example, wealth brings its own decline, as 
managers and citizens seek their self-fulfillment rather than the relentless drive to 
improve and innovate.
4.2.3 Porter’s Stand on the industrial Policy Debate
Porter is careful not to fall into either extreme of the laissez-faire vs. industrial policy 
debate. He notes that advocates of a diminished government presence “ignore the 
legitimate role that government plays in shaping the context and institutional structure 
surrounding companies and in creating an environment that stimulates companies to 
gain competitive advantage”. He also notes that advocates of government help for 
industry “frequently propose policies that would actually hurt companies in the long run 
and create the demand for more helping” (Porter 1990b, p. 86). However, despite these 
caveats, he tends to lean strongly on the side of the free marketeers:
I find, consistent with the traditional liberal position, for example, that 
strict anti-trust laws, tough health and safety regulations, and heavy 
investment in training and human resources are beneficial. But my 
evidence seriously questions the wisdom of intervention to resurrect 
sick industries, regulations that limit competition, most efforts to restrict 
imports, and policies to tax long term capital gains. (Porter 1990a, 
p. xvi)
For Porter, the best way to boost productivity is essentially that also argued Adam 
Smith -  competition. Thus, the proponents of Strategic Trade Policy like Paul 
Krugman (1986) fi’om MIT, as well as those of managed trade like Lester Thurow also 
of MIT, will find that Porter’s conclusions based on empirical research,^ unlike most of 
their theoretical research, contradict some of their assertions. For exarnple. Porter’s 
verdict is that protectionist policies (such as subsidizing infant industries) rarely 
succeed, and that they do not result in competitive advantages, even in the case of the 
often cited M m  (Porter 1990a, p. 664). Moreover, managed trade is seen as a 
cartelization of markets by inefficient companies.
Even though supporters of strategic trade (or at least Krugman) do not consider them­
selves “protectionists”, and are opposed to managed trade, their theories do suggest a
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rationale for protectionism, and are thus not in line with traditional laissez-faire 
prescriptions. Perhaps what is most unfortunate is that these arguments have found 
their way into the arsenal of protectionist lobbies who, in the promotion of their own 
parochial interests, have further confused the public debate on industrial policy. The 
contrast between corporate and political time compounds the problem. While industries 
need a relatively long time horizon to develop competitiveness, politicians are forced to 
show short-term results. The usual result is that politicians succumb to the allure of 
quick-fixes.
Since the role of government in the economy is at the heart of this debate. Porter spells 
out clearly what governments should and should not do. He suggests that “the proper 
role of government is as a catalyst and challenger” (Porter 1990b, p. 86). Governments 
should push and challenge companies to upgrade their advantages. They should 
strengthen the diamond, not through direct industrial policy, but by creating higher 
factors indirectly through the enforcement of product, safety and environmental 
standards, and by spending in education, infrastructure etc. Thus the role of 
government is by definition partial because companies, not nations, compete, and by 
preference indirect because direct government involvement creates more problems than 
it solves. Porter’s policy prescriptions include (Porter 1990b, pp. 86-88):
“ 1. Focus on specialized factor creation [e.g. education];
2. Avoid intervening in factor and currency markets [devaluation];
3. Enforce strict product safety and environmental standards;
4. Sharply limit direct cooperation among industry rivals [d la M m  and ESPRIT];
5. Promote goals that lead to sustained investment [in the private sector -  investment 
in human skills, innovation and physical assets; in the public sector -  promote 
policies such as providing tax incentives for long-term capital gains];
6. Deregulate competition;
7. Enforce strong domestic anti-trust policies;
8. Reject managed trade.”
4.2.4 Porter on Japan
Porter does not mince words in his assessment of Japanese success:
Westerners have tended to create fantasies to explain Japanese success:
Japan Inc, neomercantilism, and national goals which are not centred on 
raising the standard of living... [However] Japan is an economy driven 
by firms not government....
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Japan is today in many ways two economies. One is vibrantly competi­
tive and characterized by rapid upgrading and productivity growth. Side 
by side is another economy in which there is little true competition and 
widespread inefficiency.... Some observers have argued that the 
Japanese model supersedes the model based on free trade and open 
competition that has underpinned postwar efforts at trade liberalization.
Instead, the Japanese case starkly illustrates the importance of competi­
tion and the need for a policy model to evolve [from previous more 
protectionist models] if a nation is to continue advancing. (Porter 1990a, 
pp. 420-421)
Porter reached similar conclusions regarding Korea’s success. Government-led 
industrial policies were not the key factor in growth, but rather a vibrant private sector. 
“Korea’s uniqueness as a nation comes fiom its rapidly improving talent base, the 
presence of large chaebol, the willingness to take risk, and the intensity of competition” 
(Op Cit, p. 479).
4.2.5 Economic Developm ent
What are the implications of the “diamond” for developing countries, regional policy 
and slow growth regions in developed countries? Porter only briefly examines this 
subject.
Porter suggests an evolution of national competitive advantage involving four stages: 
factor-driven; investment-driven; innovation-driven; wealth-driven. For him,
.. .the stages represent one of the ways of abstracting the upgrading 
process in a national economy. Each stage involves different industries 
and industry segments as well as different company strategies. The 
stages also differ substantially in the appropriate array of government 
policies toward industry. (Porter 1990a, p. 544)
In this model, the process of economic development involves upgrading an economy’s 
competitive position through achieving higher-order competitive advantages and in that 
way developing the ability to compete in high productivity segments and industries. 
Each nation goes through its own trajectory of development and economies do not 
necessarily move through these stages sequentially since stages can be skipped, and 
economies slip into decline. Unfortunately, the parallels between Porter’s “Stages of 
Competitive Development” and Rostow’s (1971) “Stages of Economic Growth” will 
probably cause the displeasure of development economists who consider Rostow’s 
theories both empirically unsubstantiated as well as ethnocentric.
Chapter 4 86
However, Porter’s typology does offer some insights regarding the requirements of 
industries at the various stages of their development. For example, as an industry 
moves from the “factor-driven” through the “investment-driven” stages, investment in 
Chandlerian economies of scale and scope are needed. Both Porter and Chandler trace 
the decline of industries, the “wealth-driven” stage for Porter, to management’s desire 
to harvest their industries through systematic dis-investment
According to Porter, since upgrading leads to higher national productivity, economic 
prosperity tends to rise as a nation moves through the first three stages. However, 
nations with abundant natural resources, like Canada and the oil producing countries of 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, can enjoy high per capita income and high standards of 
living while still in the factor-driven stage. Unfortunately, this privileged position 
cannot be sustained in the long run because it does not provide a solid foundation for 
sustained productivity growth and because complacency can easily lead to decline:
.. .where resource abundance is great enough, a nation may move 
directly from factor-driven stage to the wealth-driven stage. Diminishing 
competition, adversarial labour-management relations, and protection 
may arise as attention in the economy shifts towards preservation of the 
status quo. (Porter 1990a, p. 564)
“The decline of a wealth-driven economy can be arrested through policy changes, major 
discontinuities, or shifts in social values” (Op Cüt, p. 565). Since, according to Porter, 
Canada faces the risk of slipping into the wealth-driven stage, its constitutional crisis 
and the industrial restructuring that NAFTA will precipitate might be the silver lining of 
its dark cloud.
Porter’s assertion that all the points of the diamond have an effect on the competitive­
ness of national industries, and that the nature and dynamics of the diamond vaiy 
depending on which stage the national economy is undergoing, should be of some 
assistance to economic planners in the process of formulating policy. Porter’s assertion 
that any industry, whether mature, sunset, suririse, information-based etc., can be 
competitive is welcome news to most of the industrialized areas of the world that face 
problems of stmctural adjustment His prescription, reminiscent of Levitt’s “visceral 
feel of greatness” (Levitt 1964), is to go beyond the narrow view of the industry and 
find a sector where the firm can compete through some sort of innovative approach. 
Porter uses Italian success in shoes, textiles, micro steel mills, and tiles to illustrate this 
point. The fact that these industries are highly fragmented, and that the successful firms 
are mostly small and family owned, seems to contradict some of Chandler’s (1962,
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1977 and 1990) assertions about the necessary requirements for global competitiveness 
-  economies of scale and scope, and hierarchical professional management structures.
The tendency of industry participants to cluster around each other has serious repercus­
sions for regional planners in backward areas. In order for planners to attract firms to 
these areas, they need to counteract the gravitational pull of companies wanting to locate 
within their clusters, which are presumably in another geographical area. The use of 
industrial location incentives has not generally guaranteed long-term benefits to these 
regions because the fierce competition between constituencies for companies willing to 
relocate has made the costs of attracting them increasingly higher, and because these 
firms tend to be “footloose”, ready to relocate to ever greener pastures. Compounding 
the problem for planners is the fact that fostering endogenous development by helping 
one company become competitive might require the creation of parts of an entire 
competitive industry cluster -  a daunting task.
Porter’s policy prescriptions for achieving competitiveness are strikingly sinoilar to the 
World Bank’s (1991) prescriptions for economic development. They both assign the 
starring role to “the market” and cast “the state” in a supporting role as infrastructure 
investor and watchdog of market distortions. Given this convergence of opinion,^ 
economic planners in the 1990s are likely to seriously consider these prescriptions.
4.2.6 Com petitiveness, Efficiency and Equity
“Incentives, effort, perseverance, innovation and especially competition are the source 
of economic progress in any nation and the basis for a productive satisfied citizen” 
(Porter 1990a, p. 736). Even though Porter explicitly mentions that this statement is not 
an ideology or a set of values, but a reflection of what has worked in the nations he has 
studied, his conclusion does extol the virtues of the Protestant ethic and of capitalism. 
The “ideological neutrality” of this statement is likely to be debated.
Perhaps the issue that will draw the most heat is whether the efficiency of the capitalist 
model implied in the call for competitiveness can also deliver social and economic 
equity through a fair distribution of the fruits of success, within nations and amongst 
nations (e.g. what about the Southern hemisphere?). The choice of Sweden as a case 
study will help support Porter’s argument (at least his implicit assumption) that 
efficiency and equity are not necessarily in contradiction, and that the implementation of 
the policies he outlines will result in the greatest economic performance, and by 
extension, in the greatest social good. All this without sacrificing the basic core of a
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social democratic platform. The debate on the supposed trade-offs between efficiency 
and equity is not new, and Porter’s book has certainly not provided any definitive 
conclusions on this subject
4.2.7 Are Porter’s Recom m endation’s  Im plem entable?
Lester Thurow correctly points out that Porter’s findings and policy prescriptions are 
not much different fiom those of other experts in the field whose writings have not 
“made a dent in the system” (Thurow 1990). Thurow does not expect Porter’s book to 
overcome this inertia. He bemoans the lack of presidential leadership and of a political 
system that can support initiatives aimed at reversing the relative decline of the U.S. 
economy. The fact that, as discussed in the previous chapter, industrial policy Japanese 
style has a political, rather than an economic base becomes important when “actions” 
rather than words are demanded.
American bureaucratic indifference and inefficiency are familiar experiences for Porter. 
The Competitive Advantage o f Nations itself was inspired by his disappointment with 
the efficacy of President Reagan’s 1984 President’s Commission on Industrial Compe­
titiveness^ which degenerated into arguments about the definition of competitiveness 
and the desirability of an industrial policy. Bureaucratic stone-walling of the report was 
the straw that broke the camel’s back (Schrage 1990). Ergo  ^Porter’s new book. 
Actually, the turgid prose that Porter uses to make the same assertions over and over 
again in his analysis of hundreds of industries and a dozen or more countries some­
times comes across as a way to conceal his glee while saying “I told you so -  it’s 
competition or else...”.
The Competitive Advantage o f Nations has been generally accepted by the academic 
management community, but has not really been subjected to the scrutiny of the aca­
demic community of economists. This is perhaps because Mr. Porter was trained as an 
industrial economist before becoming a management guru (he popularized the discus­
sion of “competitive advantage”) and is therefore considered AWOL by some academic 
economists. Objections to his unorthodox approach to the measurement of economic 
performance and its implications for the development of economic policy is likely to 
come fiom this group. His light dismissal of the role of macroeconomics is also likely 
to arouse the ire of the economists whose bread and butter is directing the future well­
being of their nations by tinkering with the economy through macroeconomic tools.
The business press, on the other hand, has been quick to laud the work (despite 
unanimous agreement on the inadequacies of its prose and the excessive length of the
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work), with some reviewers claiming that Porter “has done for international capitalism 
what Marx did for the class struggle” {Economist, May 19,1990). In any case, this 
controversial book provides a useful model for private and public sector policy-makers.
4.3  THE MANAGEMENT DEBATES
Six of the ten “levers” presented in Voluntary Planning’s “Creating Our Own Future” 
have more to do with the language of management than with the language of traditional 
economic planning: people; quality; productivity; labour/management relations; trade; 
and creating and developing business. While relatively new to economists and regional 
planners, these topics have been discussed by management analysts for some time, and 
there is a rich body of literature and considerable debate. Tom Peters, management guru 
par excellence, has summarized the debates among leading management analysts in the 
1990s (Peters 1991). He lists eight major rows: competition vs. cooperation; global vs. 
local; big vs. small; integration vs. de-integration; quick and by the numbers vs. time 
consuming and messy; consistency vs. anarchy; gentle humanist vs. disturber of the 
peace; junk bonds (and the chaotic market for corporate control) vs. industrial policy. I 
have used Mr. Peters’ classifications and basic arguments and added authors and issues 
which he left unexamined in his article. I have dealt with some issues at length, and 
only briefly examined others which were deemed less relevant to this work. While the 
arguments are presented as polarities, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
Rather, they generally represent the arguments for or against the extremes of a position.
This section of Chapter 4 presents the ideological background for documents such as 
“Creating Our Own Future”. It is organized as a broad survey, rather than an in-depth 
study, of the key areas in the management literature that provide the building blocks of 
private sector-led development strategies. I have presented a few relevant highlights 
from the vast literature on management as pointers for more in-depth study. First, this 
section examines the debates oven competition vs. cooperation; global vs. local; big vs. 
small; integration vs. de-integration and managers vs. entrepreneurs; and internal vs. 
external advantages. Then it looks at an area of universal agreement -  the need for 
quality and innovation. The question of how to create the learning organizations that 
can foster quality and innovation brings us back to Peters’ debates on quick and by-the- 
numbers vs. time consuming and messy; consistency vs. anarchy; and gentle humanist 
vs. disturber of the peace. The debate over junk bonds (and the chaotic market for 
corporate control) vs. industrial policy was examined in earlier chapters. Finally, it 
examines some of the implications of these debates on public policy by looking at the 
question of whether entrepreneurs can be fostered through public policy initiatives.
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4.3.1 W hat Will M anagers Have to Worry About in the 1990s?
Our so-recentiy tried and true management tools are, arguably, worth­
less, many downright dangerous.... What is an organization? What is a 
product? What is a market? What is a person? What is a customer? I 
used to think I knew the answers, I don’t know. (Peters 1989)
According to Peters, competitiveness is likely to be based on a successful adaptation to 
ten major forces:
1) unprecedented uncertainty (i.e. price of oil, interest rates); 2) the need 
to respond with speed, flexibility and responsiveness and adaptiveness;
3) all markets are being fractured as products are increasingly 
customized; 4) quality design and service are important; 5) giant firms 
need to become more flexible in order to respond; 6) organizational 
configurations must reflect this flexibility; 7) old ideas about economies 
of scale being necessary are being challenged; 8) single organizations 
are giving way to cooperative networks for more efficient vertical and 
horizontal integration; 9) internalization and globalization; 10) despite 
technology, the line worker committed to constant improvement, and 
instantly retrained, must become the chief agent for adding value and 
achieving continuous innovation. (Peters 1989)
The obstacles and opportunities that managers will face in the 1990s are daunting. 
According to Lipsey, Purvis and Steiner (1991) a number of key characteristics 
dominate the modem industrial world:
1) Transnational corporations control much of the production and can 
locate their production of individual components of any one commodity 
wherever costs are lower,
2) This leads to globalized competition among transnational firms 
whereby firms in one country compete with firms in many other 
countries [and often in the same product/market which is referred to as 
‘intra-trade’];
3) In contrast, much innovative activity is done by individual 
entrepreneurs, who raise their capital in ‘angel markets’ [usually private 
investors who are willing to take considerable risks in funding start-ups] 
and, as they grow, look to more traditional capital markets for funds;
4) As new firms with new ideas succeed, they look to becoming 
globally competitive; at this point, it is often more profitable to sell the 
firm, with its ideas, to an established transnational rather than incur the 
enormous costs of developing a global marketing organization to sell the 
firm’s products;
5) Much modem production -  both in transnational and in small, 
innovating firms -  is knowledge intensive; it will go where the human
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capital is supplied cheapest; traditional natural resource motivations for 
industrial location are becoming less and less important in many lines of 
production;
6) In today’s rapidly changing, globally competitive world, each firm’s 
competitive advantage increasingly depends on its ability to innovate at a 
rate sufficiently rapid to stay on the cutting edge of product and 
production process development. (Lipsey, Purvis and Steiner 1991, 
p. 832)
Given this Darwinian scenario, where monolithic transnational corporations roam the 
globe in search of better breeding grounds while gobbling up small innovative firms, 
the search for “competitiveness” can be regarded as the search for adaptive behaviour 
that can guarantee survival in this environment. As examined in Chapter 7, Sklair 
(1991) suggests that the sheer size of these corporations makes their impact in global 
economic restructuring is greater than the efforts of many national policy-makers. But 
whether firms are big or small, transnational or local/national, in a developed or 
underdeveloped economy the reality of the nineties is that they all seem to find 
themselves playing alongside each other in a seemingly ever-shrinking playing field. 
Unfortunately, the survival of the fittest is complicated by the fact that the 
characteristics of the fittest are elusive, hard to define and vary depending on the 
environment they must adapt to.
4.3.2 How Should M anagers Respond? The Debates.
4.3.2a Competition vs. Cooperation^
The pro-competition camp is led by Michael Porter. As examined earlier, the main 
message of The Competitive Advantage o f Nations is that “vigorous domestic compe­
tition” in industry clusters (groups of world-class competitors, buyers, suppliers) is the 
key to sustained global competitive advantage, and thus to national economic well­
being.
Porter’s assertion bears some resemblance to Mancur Olson’s (1982) thesis that the 
“economic miracles” of post-war Germany and Japan can be explained by looking at 
the disruption that losing the war caused for its entrenched economic, social and 
political elites. According to Olson, the decartelization of Germany and the breaking up 
of the zaibatsu (privately owned industrial empires) in Japan, through a combination of 
the ravages of war and the active intervention of the occupying Allied forces (mainly the 
U.S.), created the fundamental conditions for their rapid post-war growth. For Olson, 
“countries whose distributional coalitions have been emasculated or abolished by
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totalitarian government, or foreign occupation, should grow relatively quickly after a 
free and street legal order is established”  ^(Op Cit, p. 75).
Olson’s assertion seems to strike a chord with Japanese observers. The pointed 
urgency of the Japanese to rebuild their economy after WW H has been compared with 
what the Japanese refer to as “the last fart of the ferret” (BBC 1990). Ferrets apparently 
emit a foul odour when in mortal danger and, according to these observers, the 
Japanese consensus and almost super-human productivity was caused by the same 
instinctual response to a life and death struggle.
Olson and Porter predict dynamic economies in countries where these coalitions or 
monopolies are prevented from mopping up, or biasing in their favour, all economic 
opportunities. If this is so, the economies of Eastern Europe are poised for fast growth. 
Matuschka (1991) refers to the “advantages of defeat” for Eastern Europe: “when the 
past is bankrupt (both morally and economically) the models of the future can be fully 
realized without concession to the inefficiencies of previous system” (Op Cit, p. 130).
Olson points out that, conversely, the accumulation of distributional coalitions (cartels 
etc.) in stable democracies like the U.K. and the U.S. can explain their slow growth 
rate. “Distributional coalitions slow down a society’s capacity to adopt new technolo­
gies and to relocate resources in response to changing conditions and thereby reduce the 
rate of economic growth” (Olson 1982, p. 74). Thus, both Porter and Olson predict the 
adverse effect that the formation and maintenance of these distributional coalitions, with 
their narrow cartelist self interests will have for a nation’s productivity. Like the U.K. 
and the U.S. before them, Japan and Germany have much to worry about now that 
they have achieved their miracles. After all, the zaibatsu have been replaced by the 
kieretsu. Koreans and their chaebols (also large industrial complexes) should also be on 
guard. Apparently, well organized packs of fat and happy ferrets do not fart.
Despite the assertions of observers like Olson and Porter, European corporations are 
busily merging and forming alliances that can give them the economies of scale that are 
allegedly required for them to be global contenders. In Europe and the U.S., critics of 
the traditional free trade and laissez-faire policies support their arguments by pointing to 
the neo-mercantilist policies which were adopted by the Japanese “developmental state” 
after WW II. These observers assign Mm (Johnson 1982) and the Japanese keiretsu 
(industrial groups or the oligopolistic organization of industries by conglomerates) the 
key roles in the “Japanese miracle”. They advocate a reduction of anti-trust laws in
Chapter 4 93
order to allow scale and more “cooperation” between industry actors, as well as more 
active participation by government in the development of an industrial policy.
Porter’s main message to managers and policy makers is that a quiet life gained through 
reliance on monopolized national markets is the number one enemy of global 
competitiveness and a nation’s future standard of living. He echoes the battle cry of 
Tom Peters -  “stop whining, overcome organizational inertia (so called ‘stability’) and 
leam to love change, competition, innovation and improvement” (Peters 1987). In a 
similar vein. Bishop and Kay (1988) conclude their study on privatization in the U.K. 
with the recommendation that government should reassert the promotion of competition 
over the transfer of ownership. In other words, who owns a monopoly is not 
important. Getting rid of the monopoly conditions is the point.
As examined earlier. Porter’s advice to nations trying to hitch their economic future to 
global entrepreneurial success is: don’t kid yourselves about the requirements for a 
lively entrepreneurial environment.
Porter dismisses the romantic illusion that entrepreneurial visionaries 
spring full blown into the global marketplace, like Athena from the head 
of Zeus. He convincingly argues that if these national diamonds [the 
dynamic factors required for national competitive advantage] don’t exist, 
these entrepreneurs are likelier to end up Don Quixotes than Henry 
Fords. (Schrage 1990)
His advice to companies is:
1) Create pressure for innovation; 2) Seek out the most capable 
competitors as motivators; 3) Establish early-warning systems; 4)
Improve the national diamond [by encouraging the formation of world- 
class clusters]; 5) Welcome domestic rivalry; 6) Globalize to tap 
selective advantages in other nations; 7) Use alliances only selectively;
8) Locate the home base to support competitive advantage. (Porter 
1990b, pp. 89-93)
4.3.2b Global vs. Local
Kenichi Ohmae (1990), from McKinsey Japan believes that the “Interlinked Economy” 
(ILE) -  the economies of the “Triad” (U.S., Europe and Japan) joined by other aggres­
sive economies (beginning with the NICs and eventually including Eastern Europe and 
Latin America) -  is already a reality and that national sovereignty is the only roadblock 
to the road offered by the ILE. Thus his main policy recommendations are to establish a 
global governance that can ensure the free flow of information, money goods, services.
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people and corporations {Report on Businessy Oct 1990). He further points out that 
companies are becoming stateless world citizens independent of their original 
nationalities.
Porter’s conclusion that, despite globalization, the characteristics of the home nation are 
crucial in determining the competitiveness of its firms abroad is diametrically opposed 
to Ohmae’s thesis. For Porter, productivity and innovation begin at home. Therefore 
the best strategy for managers of global firms is to preserve (and improve on) the 
characteristics of the home base which spurred its growth and global advantage, rather 
than shake off the company’s origins, as Ohmae would suggest.
Both Porter and Ohmae agree on some crucial points that have important implications 
for national policies on foreign ownership. For both authors, the nationality of a 
company’s owners is less important than the locus of its strategy-steering, innovation- 
driven, change-inducing activities. As long as these kinds of strategic decisions can be 
reached by managers of the foreign subsidiary, the host nation is able to derive long­
term benefits from the foreign transplant. Thus, relying on cheap resources and labour 
as a way to attract foreign capital is not a good strategy unless some “technology 
transfer” is part of the deal. National comparative advantage is “dynamic” and “man 
made” and is, therefore, subject to national economic development policies. Porter and 
Ohmae also agree that government restriction of trade is an all around bad idea which 
generally only serves the interests of entrenched bureaucracies.
As far as the future permeability of international boundaries, I remain quite skeptical 
about the advent of the borderless world. A redefinition of sovereignty and redrawing 
of boundaries is a more likely scenario. However, as presented in an earlier chapter, the 
fact that the primary determinants of the global political economy of the 1990s are no 
longer nation states, but rather transnational corporations, the transnational capitalist 
class and the ideology of consumerism does lend support to Ohmae’s vision of a 
borderless world, at least for corporations.
4.3.2c Big vs. Small
Chandler’s (1990) logic argues for large, professionally managed, vertically integrated 
organizations. The emergence of “global markets” and the existing dominance of trans­
national corporations in many markets will ensure a crucial role for large corporations 
in the years to come. But is bigness always better? Porter (1990a) doubts it. For him, 
niche markets dominated by family owned micro-firms (such as ceramic tiles in Italy)
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are an equally important source of competitive success in Augmented industries. Peters 
(1987) abhors American fascination with bigness and further points out that German 
success is due more to the “unheralded success of the Mittelstand (mid-sized firm) than 
to the Siemens, BASF’s and Daimler-Benzs” (Peters 1991). In Japan “a mass of 
nameless subcontractors” play a vital role and in the U.S. “up-start firms” are the 
cornerstone of American productivity (Op Cit).
Some compromise models which simultaneously exploit the advantages of scale and the 
motivational forces of more flexible and participatory organizations have become the 
object of much research. The Japanese organizational model, which includes life-time 
employment (for the lucky, mostly male, roughly 50% of the population), more con­
vergent pay-scales between workers and managers, steeper work profiles, enterprise 
unions, job rotation, quality circles, and constant retraining, has been meticulously 
examined and even copied (e.g. the GM Saturn operation). New forms of orgaitization, 
such as consortia of smaller firms who can be linked by telecommunications 
technology, are also beginning to emerge.
Flexible Specialization (Piore and Sabel 1982) is one of these compromise models. FS 
has become the catchphrase that best describes the hopes of management analysts 
seeking effective alternatives to Chandlerian corporate organizations involving mass 
production for mass markets. These analysts see the world that gave rise to Chandlerian 
corporations as having undergone a crisis in the late 20th century -  a crisis caused by 
several critical episodes including social unrest, abandonment of the gold standard, oil 
shocks and inflation. Corporations were simultaneously hit with the need for flexibility 
in responding to market demand and in structuring production or supply. The crisis 
required firms that could respond to chaotic and rapidly changing market requirements 
with flexible, specialized production processes and managerial organizations.
American mini-mills, the Italian textile firms and the German and Jg^anese machine tool 
makers are examples of adaptive responses to the bleak prospects of traditional 
industries in advanced economies. The flexible specialization debate centres on whether 
“Fordism” and Taylor’s “scientific management” can be replaced by something less 
dehumanizing but equally efficient On the one hand, we have the legacy of Fordism 
and scientific management -  large, rigid, fragmentary, impersonal, robot-Hke, cost- 
cutting, high volume driven production, run by professional, hierarchically structured 
management for a world of standardized consumption. On the other hand, FS -  the 
promise of a new appreciation of the humanness involved in the flexible production of 
specialized, higher quality goods by skilled craftsmen in flatter, decentralized
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organizations who are capable of innovating and improving standards. Let’s hope that 
the latter vision is actually replicable outside of the Third Italy and other areas in which 
it has been successful so far.
The implications of flexible specialization are important for developing countries and 
for disadvantaged regions in developed economies. FS provides a rationale for 
successful indigenous development based on the production of world-class goods for 
export. This model provides an alternative to the traditional model of economic 
development, which relies on large scale projects associated with either transnational 
corporations or government agencies. What must be carefully determined by economic 
developers, though, is whether the particular projects involved are actually feasible. In 
other words, certain markets are better served by mass production and mass marketing, 
and unless the appropriate niche can be found within it, flexible specialization 
approaches are likely to fail. In the process of bringing about a visionary change, the 
bottom line is always a good reminder of practicality.
Small businesses were lauded in the early 1980s as being major contributors to the 
economy. David Birch of MIT claimed that in the U.S. small businesses created eight of 
every ten net new jobs, a proportion he has since argued may have grown in the early 
1980s {Economist^ June 30,1990, p. 61). But some researchers are beginning to doubt 
this conventional wisdom. In the U.S., “the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
suggests that small businesses’ share of new jobs created during most of the 1980s was 
really somewhere between 60% and 65%, compared with their 50% share of existing 
jobs” (Ibid). The scaling back of venture capital investment in small businesses seems 
to have slowed the rate of small new venture creation.
Small businesses are also highly volatile. The SBA estimates that three out of five new 
small firms fail during the first five years. While they tend to grow faster than larger 
businesses once established, they also shrink faster when the economy is weak. Small 
businesses backed by venture capital also tend to have a higher rate of failure than self- 
financed enterprises. In conclusion, while small businesses still offer a chance to 
achieve the American Dream (or any other national dream of success), the odds do not 
seem as good as they were once thought to be.
Canadians face an even more depressing small business profile. The problem of low 
productivity in Canada is often identified with the smaller, Canadian-controlled plants 
and not with subsidiaries. In other words, large Canadian plants and foreign-owned 
plants, whether small or large, consistently outperform small Canadian plants. O’Farrel
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(1989) found a lack of competitiveness (in price and quality) in small manufacturing 
firms in Nova Scotia. In both cases, the managers of these plants were happily unaware 
of their lack of competitiveness or their relative low rate of productivity. The NAFTA is 
likely to have a painful effect on this sector of the Canadian economy.
4.3.2d Integration vs. De-integration and M anagers vs. Entrepreneurs
Who competes? Entrepreneurs and managers compete. The belief in the entrepreneur as 
the hero of the all important competitive challenge has acquired an almost mythological 
dimension, and the pursuit of “entrepreneurship” has preoccupied academics, policy 
makers and business people alike.
Entrepreneurship has alternatively been seen as an economic activity (Schumpeter), a 
cultural phenomenon (Weiss 1988), a set of character traits that define individuals 
(much of the popular business press), a type of organizational behaviour (Stevenson 
and Sahlman 1986). While the specific determinants of entrepreneurship still prove to 
be elusive, some common factors emerge in the literature. Kirzner (1980) describes the 
“primacy of entrepreneurial discovery” -  the entrepreneurs’ ability to perceive and 
harness opportunity -  as the primary causal agent for successful business activity. Like 
Kirzner, Stevenson and Sahlman (1986) refer to the entrepreneur as an individual who 
“perceives opportunity, finds the pursuit of opportunity desirable in the context of his 
or her life situation, and believes that success is possible” (Op Cit, p. 24). Since these 
personality traits can be manifested in both start-up companies and established 
organizations, Stevenson and Salhman’s prescription for long-time success echoes 
Peter’s recommendations -  the need to build “adaptive organizations and society” and 
the perception of opportunities as inherent in change (Op Cit).
Traditional corporate managers have recently acquired a sleepy, self-satisfied, stodgy 
and bureaucratic image and are blamed for the non-competitiveness of U.S. and British 
corporations. The assertion that large corporations inevitably stifle entrepreneurs has 
resulted in a call for flatter and more decentralized organizational structures (Peters 
1987), and for the divestiture of the misfitting bits of the portfolios of the “mindless” 
conglomerates of the 1980s (de-integration). The literature on the inadequacy of 
traditional managerial structure stands in contrast to the findings of A lfi^  Chandler. 
Chandler sees the corps of professional managers in large firms as the real heroes of 
capitalism. Vertically integrated and hierarchically managed institutions with ample 
economies of scale and scope result in the most efficient (and thus successful) firms.
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Whether the Chandlerian type of organization (in size and structure) was the causal 
agent for the success of large firms, or simply a natural adaptation to the requirements 
of the time -  the rapid expansion of oligopolistic corporations into a mass market with 
mass production technologies -  has not been firmly established The fact that this 
“corporate” model resulted in extraordinary business successes, that it has been applied 
world-wide (Scale and Scope looked at U.S., German and British coiporations), that 
the “visible hand” of large coiporate organizations has played an active role in shaping 
many economies, and that this model of organization is still being taught in the leading 
business schools makes the study of Chandler’s work important in understanding the 
history of modem enterprises and economic organization. What is not clear at this 
point, though, is whether this model should be emulated by those seeking to survive 
the global markets in the next century.
Livesay (1989) examined the role of the entrepreneur in small and large 19th and 20th 
century organizations and concluded that “ the presence or absence of intelligent, 
organized and creative entrepreneurs has determined the success or failure of companies 
much more clearly than the nature of their organizational charts” (Op Cit, p. 1). Thus 
the presence of a Lee laccoca at Chrysler, who is as much an entrepreneur as Steve 
Jobs of Apple Computers, had more to do with Chrysler’s turnaround than the army of 
Chandlerian managers that managed the day-to-day operations. Even though Livesay 
never used the term “intra-preneur” his work points to the emergence of this new 
mythical figure in the corporate landscape. This internal entrepreneur is supposed to be 
able to thrive and innovate in the quasi-open (read entrepreneurial) environment of de­
centralized corporations, despite size.
Whether entrepreneurs are capable of guiding the companies that they have built once 
they reach a certain size (in sales volume and employees) or more “stable” period is 
another issue which is often pondered. The usual argument is that the entrepreneurial 
“make-up” does not lend itself to the requirements of order and control of more stable 
corporations. Since there is evidence to both prove and disprove this argument, what 
can be learned from this debate is that self-examination is good advice for all business 
people, particularly successful entrepreneurs. You have started a great company, but 
can you really manage it now?
4.3.2e Internal vs. External Advantages
The arguments presented by Porter (1990a) and Chandler (1990), in respect to the 
sources and strategy implications of competitive advantage for the firm, at times
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support and contradict each other. Hannah and Williamson (1991) analyze these works 
from the point of view of whether: “long term advantage [is] primarily derived from 
sources internal to the firm?... [or]... Alternatively, does advantage come from 
tapping into the economies of scale and scope primarily external to an individual firm*? 
(Op Cit, p. 91). For Porter, “competitive advantage is drawn from a firm’s external 
environment as well as its own internal advantages... [thus]... the need for greater 
focus of management attention on developing strategy and structure that draw 
maximum strength from [“the diamond”]...” (Ibid, pp. 92 and 95). Chandler’s analysis 
centres on the success (or failure) of U.S., U.K. and German corporations in develop­
ing internal economies of scale and scope, and on the importance of the “visible hand” 
of professional managers. Hannah and Williamson’s analysis of Porter and Chandler 
suggests that: 1) external factor advantages must be managed properly and even created 
by management, and 2) scale and scope go beyond the ownership boundaries of the 
firm and involve clusters of firms in an industry.
The research on the effect of internal and external agents on firm behaviour and strategy 
is reminiscent of research that has been conducted for some time by social scientists and 
psychologists on the effects of inherent psychological tendencies and capabilities and of 
social conditioning on individual behaviour. In the case of individuals and firms, deter­
ministic models prove to be inadequate in explaining and predicting behaviour. In both 
cases an active decision maker’s response to the internal conditions and to the external 
environment is the key to successful adaptation. The “primacy of entrepreneurial 
discovery”, in its broadest sense, seems to be the place of departure in understanding 
good management.
4.3.2f An Area of Agreement -  Innovation and Quality
Since innovation leading to higher productivity is seen by most experts as the key to 
competitiveness, much research has gone into trying to capture the “Eureka factor^’. 
Once again, the Japanese, who built their global reputation on efficient production of 
copies of Western design, now seem to be bringing out new breakthrough models in 
electronics at an astonishing rate {Economist^ Jan. 12,1991, p. 75). To the Western 
economies, and to the U.S. in particular, this is adding insult to injury. How do they 
do it? Monocausal explanations for this phenomenon are certain to be unsatisfactory. 
But part of the answer might be found in the way Japanese companies, and those U.S. 
companies Peters calls “excellent”, deal with human capital.
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According to Hannah, the fundamental thesis of Odagari (1991) is that the “Japanese 
miracle” owes less to a govemment-led industrial policy and more to the ability of 
Japanese corporations to “create human capital, capability at all levels of the organiza­
tion, and a learning organization” (Hannah 1991). Therefore, since only humans can 
innovate, human capital is what creates other forms of capital, not the other way 
around. As Peter Drucker (1980) put it in Managing in Turbulent Times: “It is only 
managers -  not nature or laws of economics or governments -  that make resources 
productive” (quoted in Johnson 1982).
In a similar vein, when asked about the secret formula for Japan’s success, AJdo Morita 
of Sony states:
.. .the ingredients of success in our enterprise are people. It is very 
simple. The human infant is bom curious but that natural curiosity 
gradually drains away as they grow older. I consider it my job as a 
manager to do everything I can to nurture the curiosity of the people I 
work with. (Morita quoted in Cleese 1991)
In Search o f Excellence (Peters and Waterman 1982) profiled a handful of companies 
believed to have “the right stuff”. One of these was 3M, a highly innovative company. 
The book focused on the company’s policy of allowing their engineers to “bootleg” 
some time -  to devote some of their work hours to unofficial projects they felt were 
promising. This grey zone between working and tinkering, which empowers workers 
and managers, has resulted in some very successful product innovations, “Post-It” 
notes being a prime example.
However, one of the worrisome aspects of innovation (in technology, management 
practices, production techniques, marketing approaches, labour relations etc.) is that 
while it might confer on the innovator “first mover advantages” (lieberman and 
Montgomery 1988), these (or any) competitive advantages are not necessarily 
sustainable (Coyne 1986). Reverse engineering,^ the lack of intellectual property 
protection in many countries, and the sheer interdependence of world trade make 
capturing the benefits of innovation quite difficult. As examined in Chapter 3, this 
“externality” is one of the arguments used to support the need for a government- 
sponsored industrial policy in North America and the EC.
Porter (1990a) alludes to the findings of Chandler (1990) on the importance of scale 
economies, and of Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) on first mover advantages, but 
points out that these theories do not explain which firms fi-om which nations will reap
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the advantages which can be sustained. In other words, having first mover advantages 
and considerable scale economies might explain how certain firms got ahead in the 
global marketplace. But what environments and circumstances brought about these 
competitive advantages, and how does the national “diamond” create obstacles or 
advantages in this process?
Staying ahead in the global competitiveness race has become even more difficult with 
the rise of “intra-industry” trade or cross-trade between firms in developed countries of 
similar products within the same industry (e.g. cars for cars). The more traditional 
model of comparative advantage and inter-industry trade assumed a world of mutual 
benefit through specialization and, at least in theory, assumed that head-on collisions 
could be avoided because they were not in the interests of the involved parties. But in 
the world of economic giants battling it out in the same global industry, only the “best” 
firms, those most responsive to the needs of a particular market at a particular time can 
survive. These firms can be large or small, the first in the market or a later development 
-  but they must be swift.
4.3.3 Can Anything be Concluded from the Debates?
The ability to learn faster than your competitors may be the only
sustainable competitive advantage. (Arie De Geus, head of planning
Royal Dutch Shell, quoted in Senge 1990, p. 4)
Authors like Porter, Olson and Peters are all involved in the search for a dynamic model 
that can explain growth and competitiveness. Their prescriptions for healthy economies 
and corporations boil down to the need to welcome pressure, disruption and change. 
For Porter, the secret lies in a system that fosters vigorous domestic competition in 
world-class products. Peters tends to concentrate on the kind of management and 
structure that makes “excellent” companies. His recipe for success is “people oriented” 
(Peters 1983) and process oriented -  change is the name of the game (Peters 1987). For 
those who are hopeful about Eastern Europe’s transition to a market economy, political 
and economic fineedom (read capitalism and democracy) are seen as the “switch” that 
can turn on entrepreneurial vision and discovery. For the “small is beautiful” and the 
flexible specialization supporters, human scale and flexibility are key. For Olson (1982) 
the tendency of democratic nations under laissez-faire economic models to degenerate 
into cartelization must be acknowledged and counteracted. Others (Scott 1985) believe 
that comparative advantages must be redefined in a way which incorporates an active
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managerial element, strategic decision making. Ohmae (1990) believes that breaking the 
ties to nationalism will bring the benefits of a truly global economy.
What all these authors are in some way saying is that stability causes inertia, that 
standing still is likely to result in quick paralysis and atrophy. Thus the most funda­
mental conclusion that can be drawn firom the discussions presented in this chapter and 
in Chapter 3 is that size, management structure or style,® global or local focus, 
competition or cooperation are not per se important What is important, though, is the 
design and management of organizations that can keep pace with the firenetic level of 
change occurring in the world. As summarized by Peters:
To thrive ‘amidst’ chaos means to cope or come to grips with it, to 
succeed in spite of it. But that is too reactive an approach and misses the 
point The true objective is to take the chaos as given and leam to thrive 
on it. The winners of tomorrow will deal proactively with the chaos, 
will look at the chaos per se as the source of market advantage, not as a 
problem to be got around. Chaos and uncertainty are (will be) market 
opportunities for the wise; capitalizing on fleeting market anomalies will 
be the successful business’s greatest accomplishment. It is with that in 
mind that we must proceed. (Peters 1987, p. xiv)
According to Peters, a new management paradigm that is by nature holistic and 
integrative rather than reductionist is needed in order to cope with chaos.^ This new 
way of managing must:
1) be able to accommodate constant change or ‘thrive on chaos’; 2) have 
a long-term investment orientation; 3) be centred around people, consu­
mers and workers; 4) see the need to go beyond mass markets and mass 
production and also seek profitability by specializing in high-quality, 
value-added niche markets; 5) be socially and environmentally respon­
sible; 6) be willing and capable of developing an effective cooperative 
relationship with government and labour, 7) build flexible operations 
and management structures; 8) have a corporate commitment to an 
educated or ‘educable’ work force, which is dedicated to high levels of 
product and service quality; 9) invest in research and development 
projects; 10) create new markets for both new and apparently mature 
products and services; 11) create cooperative channel relations that are 
neither antagonistic nor monopolistic; 12) develop systems of incentives 
that reward change and innovation rather than bureaucratic mind; 13) 
and above all create the kind of leadership that can thrive on change and 
competitiveness and instill this vision in others by empowering them.
Senge (1990) focuses on the thirteenth aspect of a new management paradigm and 
argues that the companies that excel in the chaos of the future will be those that discover
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how to tap people’s commitment and capacity to leam at all levels in an organization. 
These types of organizations are termed “learning organizations” ®^, defined by Senge 
as places where people are “continually discovering how they create their reality. And 
how they can change it”.^  ^ (Op Cit, p. 13).
What distinguishes these organizations from traditional authoritarian “controlling 
organizations” is the mastery of certain basic disciplines:
1. the discipline o f personal mastery -  based on continually clarifying and 
deepening personal vision, of focusing energies, of developing patience and of 
seeing reality objectively. The juxtaposition of vision (what is wanted) and a clear 
picture of current reality (where one is relative to what one wants) creates the 
crucial “creative tension” that seeks resolution through effective action;
2. the discipline o f mental models -  being able to unearth the personal internal 
pictures of the world, bring them to the surface and hold them rigorously to 
scrutiny, as well as the ability to balance inquiry and advocacy;
3. the discipline o f building shared vision -  the ability to unearth shared “pictures of 
the future” that foster genuine commitment and enrollment rather than compliance;
4. the discipline of team learning -  based on dialogue and the ability to “think 
together”; and
5. the discipline o f systems thinking -  needed for seeing the structures that 
underlie complex situations, and for discerning high from low leverage change.
Systems thinking is the cornerstone that underlies all five learning disciplines because 
“all are concerned with a shift of mind from seeing parts to seeing wholes, from seeing 
people as helpless reactors to seeing them as active participants in shaping reality, from 
reacting to the present to creating the future” (Op Cit, p. 69). Thus the essence of 
systems thinking lies in a shift of mind (a metaonia) “of seeing relationships rather than 
linear cause and effect chains ... seeing processes of change, rather than snapshots”
(Op Cit, p. 73). For Senge, systems thinking is crucial because structure influences 
behaviour and subtle systemic feedback mechanisms predispose people to certain types 
of behaviour. Most often the system is dysfunctional. Moreover, leverage -  the ability 
to find an efficacious way to change a situation -  often comes from the new ways of 
thinking that systems thinking promotes.
What the literature on learning organizations suggests is that while tyrannical bosses, 
abusive organizations and dictators can exact great sacrifices from workers and citizens 
in the short-run, in the long-run, motivated workers and citizens are more flexible, 
productive, dedicated and responsive to change than coerced or unappreciated ones.
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Therefore, human dignity and wakefulness must be fostered in the workplace, and in 
society at large -  all of which can most certainly be done without endangering the 
bottom line. Similarly, economic planners attempting to improve economic conditions 
by relying on the entrepreneurship of the private sector should consider the words of 
Bill O’Brian, CEO of Hanover insurance:
We believe that there is no fundamental tradeoff between the higher 
virtues in life and economic success. We believe we can have both. In 
fact, we believe that, over the long term, the more we practice the higher 
virtues of life, the more economic success we will have (O’Brian quoted 
in Senge, p. 143).
Chapter 7 applies Senge’s framework to the analysis of the “learning disabilities” of the 
Atlantic Canadian political economy, and Chapter 12 examines some possible areas of 
what Senge calls “high leverage change” for future economic planning in the region.
4.4  CAN ENTREPRENEURS BE CREATED?
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY
Most of the arguments presented this chapter revolve around the right formula for 
fostering the kind of entrepreneurial environment that can guarantee national or regional 
competitive advantage. The proponents of private sector-led development strategies in 
Atlantic Canada and elsewhere assume that entrepreneurship can be created, that public 
policy has a role to play in such a creation, and that the availability and quality of 
entrepreneurs is in part related to the regional industrial culture. Are these assumptions 
valid? If so, what policy instruments are optimum?
According to liberal economists, the process of economic development can generally be 
attributed to the efficient interaction of factors such as capital, labour and natural 
resources. For Schumpeterian economists, the entrepreneur is the driving force behind 
the process of economic growth because, in the search for private gain, he or she 
makes use of these factors in innovative ways. Given the intuitive appeal of this 
formulation, it is not surprising to see the emergence of the entrepreneurship theme in 
the development as well as in the management literature. While the effect of lively 
entrepreneurship activity in economic development is not disputed, the causes of such 
dynamisms as well as its replicability in underdeveloped countries and regions still 
present baffling research questions.
The role and impact of public policy on the development of entrepreneurship is a widely 
debated topic. In extreme cases, such as the economic liberalization of the Eastern
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Europe, the change of public policy towards enterprise formation will certainly (in time) 
be the decisive factor in economic growth and in the spread of entrepreneurial activity. 
But in developed capitalist economies, public policy aimed at developing entrepreneur- 
shipi3 does not seem to show dramatic results. While a conclusive study has not yet 
been conducted, my review of the evidence of such programmes in Canada and the 
U.S. has led me to agree with Mokry’s (1988) conclusion:
It is widely accepted that government should play an integral part in 
entrepreneurial development The assumption is that if government and 
private interests provide the right kind of supports, more firms will start 
and survive. The evidence examined here indicates that activist 
government has produced neither the positive effects hoped for by its 
proponents nor the dire consequences predicted by the critics o f 
government.... The findings reported here support studies by Carlton,
Pennings and Dennis discussed earlier. Despite the use of the different 
methodologies, the data indicate that the public policy environment is 
not important in business start-up activity when measured at the 
community or state level. (Mokry 1988, p. 109, emphasis added)
As far as the types of programmes that have shown some positive results and which 
can guide future policy, Mokry’s literature review suggests that
programs to assist new or small firms do help ventures get under way or 
improve performance if they are intensive and designed around the 
needs of a particular group or individual business.... In other words, if 
we propose to raise the level of entrepreneurship in the community we 
must either engage in support programs on a scale many times larger 
than states or communities have tried or shaiply target our efforts to 
selected individuals.... (Op Cit, p . 11)
The success of these policies also requires the selection of “privileged locations” where 
there are sufficient agglomeration economies and a combination of “local initiative, 
flexible state legislation regarding local autonomy, and available federal state and 
private funding. In summary, the programmes must be “intensive, designed around 
community needs, managed at the community level, and sustained over a long period of 
time.” (Op Cit, pp. 112 and 113). While the democratic political process requires a 
visible response to the poorest communities (many of them in sparsely populated 
regions), the satisfaction of various constituencies, that leadership be drawn from 
members of the sponsoring party, and the evidence of short-term results, the vagaries 
of the process work against the achievement of these goals.
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The effects of national, regional and local culture on entrepreneurship has also been the 
subject of many studies. Since economic activity does not occur evenly along geogra­
phic lines, the study of the effect of regional and local factors on economic development 
and underdevelopment has become important to economic planners. Research findings 
(Weiss 1988) suggest that regional cultures within individual nations play an influential 
role in shaping, and are in turn shaped by, industrial and management practices. The 
way these regional values, infrastructure, financial and educational institutions, and 
industrial tradition affect risk-taking behaviour and the adoption of innovation is a 
crucial determinant of regional entrepreneurial dynamism. These findings are in concert 
with Porter’s description of industry clusters.
“High-technology” based economies have held considerable allure for economic 
planners in the 1980s and 1990s. What has yet to be determined though is the formula 
for creating these economies. In his comparative study of Massachusetts’ Route 128 
and California’s Silicon Valley, Weiss (1988) extended the concept of corporate culture 
to the level of “industry regional culture” which includes both subjective and objective 
influences of external characteristics on organizational members. He suggests that there 
is no one “high-tech” culture (or for that matter any “generic” industry culture), but 
rather a series of regional characteristics that weave themselves into an industry regional 
culture. These influences include: 1) geography, climate and physical layout;
2) history, culture and social traditions; 3) socio-demographic and work force 
characteristics; 4) regional economy; 5) political and legal conditions; 6) technological 
infrastructure. Case studies of Finland, India, France, Catalunia (Spain), Switzerland, 
Germany and Belize support Weiss’ claim that regional variables are a primary 
determinant of entrepreneurial and managerial behaviour across several industries.
The fact that many of the factors affecting regional entrepreneurship are beyond the 
control of most governments makes the design of effective public policy to spur 
entrepreneurship very difficult. Mokry recognizes the appeal of “entrepreneurship” for 
policy-makers and local communities in the process of economic development While 
he acknowledges that “continued evolution of entrepreneurial development policies will 
take place regardless of negative findings...”, he warns that “if we want to avoid 
putting resources into programs that do little to promote entrepreneurial activity, we 
need to continually ask the critical questions about what it is that we expect to 
accomplish through entrepreneurial development and how to go about it” (Op Cit, 
p. 115). Some of these critical questions centre on the kinds of programmes that can 
benefit specific communities in specific ways, and whether the specific firms being 
aided are the ones that can strengthen the community’s ability to generate its own firms
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in the future. In other words, Mokry is calling attention to the “environmental” context 
that Weiss and his colleagues outlined in their research.
While regional factors affect the entrepreneurial spirit, and this in turn affects the nature 
of economic development in a given region, it must be emphasized that entrepreneur­
ship is neither a factor that a region can “lack” nor a force which can be unleashed by 
merely summoning it. Thus, two points presented earlier are well worth repeating: 
entrepreneurship is “inherent”; however, the right “diamond” must be present in order 
to nurture the spark of enterprise. What is still in question is whether public sector 
initiatives have the capacity to alter the diamond significantly. If “entrepreneurship” is 
used as a “quick-fix” for economic development needs, neither the vociferous 
cheerleading of business leaders, nor the generic piecemeal approach of government is 
likely to be any more effective than “snake oil”.
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ENDNOTES
 ^ Another common criticism of microeconomic models is that they assume the existence o f perfect
competition. The develc^ment of a **new industrial econcxnics” based on more ‘^realistic” models of 
imperfect competition is a response to his inadequacy in microeconomic modeling. Some o f these 
arguments are presented in Chapter 3.
 ^ I acknowledge that a weakness of this dissertation is that I have not concerned myself with either
traditicxial macroeconomic proposals for economic managanent or micreconomic analysis o f the 
firm.
 ^ Criticism is likely to arise from those who might consid^ Porto’s omission of France, a nation 
which has achieved success in some industries through high-handed government economic 
planning {dirigisme and indicative planning), as a way to avoid testing his claim that government 
intervention, in the long-run, is harmful to economies.
^ Supported by extensive comparative research and, in the case o f the World Bank, by the analysis of
40 years o f development experience.
 ^ Some of these arguments and thwnes w ^e presented earli^ in this ch£p^. They are rq>eated here 
to highlight the nature of the debate on competiticm vs. coq)eration.
 ^ While Olson flirts with the notion that “the blood of patriots” might be required from time to time 
in order to upset these distributional coalitions, the economic boom of the 1980s in Europe and 
North America supports his more optimistic hope that systems can de-ossify in other ways too.
 ^ A method of copying industrial and electronic products. Competitws can disassemble the product 
(“reverse” it), leam how it was engineered, and duplicate it
 ^ **No one managerial style is universally appropriate and competitiveness in a specific industry 
results firom convergence of the management practices and organizational modes favoured in the 
country and the sources of competitive advantage in the industry” (Porter 1990b, p. 81). Abell’s 
(1978) notion o f strategic windows -  the matching or market requiremaits with company 
capabilities at a particular point in time -  bears great similarity to Porter’s argument
 ^ As described in Chapter 8, many of the elements of this new management paradigm are reflected in
Voluntary Planning’s “Creating Our Own Future”.
 ^^  For a study of the models of management education and labour force training followed in the major 
industrial countries of North America and Europe see Handy (1987) and NCEE (1990).
 ^  ^ As reflected in the name”Creating Our Own Future”, the notion of being able to create one’s own 
future is key to the economic development strategy of Voluntary Planning. However, as discussed 
in Part IV, the need to see how people themselves create the reality in which they are living is not 
clearly understood in the process of implementing the economic strategy.
 ^^  The Fifth Discipline is the name of Senge’s book on learning organizations.
1 ^  See for example, Hisrich, R. (ed) (1988).
 ^^  Porter’s clusters are a variation of these industry-regional characteristics.
CHAPTER 5
INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN CANADA. 
HISTORY AND IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT POLICY 
FOR THE “ HAVE NOT” REGIONS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Activist industrial policies have been a familiar aspect of the Canadian political- 
economic landscape for some time. Since the themes and budgets of national industrial 
policies have in many instances determined the nature and scope of regional policy, this 
chapter examines the ebb and flow of industrial policies in Canada in an attempt to shed 
some light on the development of Atlantic Canadian regional policy. Given that the 
general arguments for and against industrial policy have been presented in Part n , and 
since the focus of this research is on regional policy, I will limit my treatment of 
Canadian industrial policy to a few relevant highlights in the 19th century and in the late 
20th century. 1 The discussion of the 19th century revolves around the repercussions of 
Confederation and the National Policy on the current political economy of the country. 
The discussion of 20th century industrial policies focuses on the policy environment 
from the 1970s to the early 1990s.
5.2  ERAS IN CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY
Canadian industrial policy-making has gone through several phases: 1) a strong activist 
phase during the 19th century based on the National Policy and other interventionist 
policies; 2) a period of confusion and breakdown in national industrial policies during 
the inter-war years; 3) the formation of a revised and more integrated set of policies 
during and immediately after WW H; 4) the erosion of that framework leading to a 
confused multitude of policies in the 1980s (Bliss 1982); and 5) the creation of a new 
neo-liberal framework based on the pursuit of “competitiveness” in the early 1990s. In 
sum, in a little over 100 years the policy pendulum has done a full swing from the 
protectionist National Policy of 1867 to the neo-liberal “Prosperity Initiative” and 
NAFTA of the 1990s. All too often, though, the pendulum has swung in the middle, 
with confusing market signals and disappointing economic results.
The historical evolution of industrial policy in Canada is the result of the interplay of 
many factors, primary among them: 1) the debates between two visions of economic 
development — the laissez-faire/free market approach and the activist industrial
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policy/protectionist approach; 2) the role taken by the public and the private sectors in 
development; 3) the effect of U.S. economic policies and political climate on Canada;^ 
and 4) the tensions between the federal and provincial governments. These themes can 
be seen in the proceeding historical analysis.
5.2.1 R epercussions of Confederation and the Nationai Policy
The history of Confederation and of the National Policy will be reviewed in some detail 
in Chapter 6. Thus the discussion in this section focuses on how Confederation and the 
National Policy set the stage for the future political economy of Canada in terms of 
national and regional economic policy making. Five main effects can be noted:
1) Canada was established as a federation and regionalism would forever be part of the 
political and economic scene. Moreover, the British North American Act of 1867 would 
tend to centralize power by giving clear authority over many key matters, such as 
defense and economic development, to the federal government whose interests were 
more closely identified with the interests of central Canada.^ Thus conflicts between the 
federal and provincial governments would often arise and threaten the stability of the 
federation and complicate the process of national economic policy-making. According 
to Brown and Eastman:
In most advanced countries the central focus of industrial policy making 
is the relationship among government, industry and labour. In Canada, 
however, the federal system adds another crucial institutional layer 
which has often overshadowed the public-private process. With two 
levels of government controlling many of the tools necessary for forging 
industrial policy, such policy must reflect a balance between national 
and regional interests. (Brown and Eastman 1981, p. 5)
The effect of regionalism on Canadian economic policy-making has been so 
pronounced that Canadian national industrial policy has been referred to as the 
combination of ten separate regional industrial policies with varying and often 
conflicting aims.^ As would be expected, calls for policy coordination and 
federal^rovincial cooperation have abounded. But according to Brown and Eastman 
(1981), the achievement of a coordinated national policy will prove an elusive goal:
In general, Canada’s political realities are such that the territorial and 
inter-govemmental perspective will dominate economic policy-making 
in the next decade. Any ‘national* industrial strategy will o f necessity 
sacrifice clarity to the exigencies of regionalism. It will have to be 
sensitive and differentiated so as to benefit all regions, which means that 
it cannot focus on only one sector, even one as large as manufacturing.
Chapters 111
which is so highly concentrated on regional terms. To a very real 
degree, the limits of consultation between the public and private sectors, 
and between the two orders of government, will continue to constrain 
the making of an industrial strategy and a general economic policy for 
Canada. (Op Cit, p. 190, emphasis added)
2) The fiscal arrangements that resulted fiom Confederation meant that “there was a 
commitment to rough fiscal equity across provinces, and a recognition that responsi­
bility for achieving it rested with the federal government” (Norrie and Owram 1991, 
p. 286). This commitment to the “pursuit of parity” established the rationale for future 
regional development programmes and for federal transfer payments to the poorer 
provinces. After WW II, federal largesse became a way to keep the country together.
3) The current debates over the restructure of Canadian industry, the liberalization of 
trade, and the regional effects of commercial policy focus on the economic results of the 
industrialization behind the tariff walls of the National Policy.
4) Economic policy-making has been subject to the effects of powerful lobbies, and 
patronage is a familiar sight in the political landscape.^ For example, lobbies have been 
able to argue for non-interference with their growing empires and to neutralize 
government anti-trust action. This susceptibility to the effects of lobbying has exacer­
bated the distrust felt by the less powerful provinces for the political and commercial 
elites of Central Canada.
5) “Canadian liberalism has always placed more emphasis on the state’s role in 
development than is characteristic of mainstream liberalism”(Cannon 1984, p. 72).
The debates about whether these 19th-century policies were successful or not are 
reminiscent of the modem debates on the desirability of industrial policies. They centre 
on whether the existence of these policies increased the rate of Canadian wealth 
creation, or whether the wealth would have been created by private sector agents in 
equal or even greater magnitude without government interference.
5.2.2 Industrial Policies from the 1970s to the Mid-1980s
In the 1970s, the relatively coherent set of policies developed during and shortly after 
WWn began to break down and there was considerable debate over the need for a new 
set of strategies for national economic development Two main views developed, each 
associated with a federal-govemment research agency. 1) The Economic Council of 
Canada favoured trade liberalization as the best way to bring about the reorganization of
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industry. The pursuit of bilateral talks on a free trade agreement with the United States 
showed the most promise. 2) The Science Council, on the other hand, suggested that 
before liberalizing trade, some sort of “industrial policy” was needed. The industrial 
policy proposals included: particular sector promotion based on a presumed 
comparative advantage,^ an examination of the degree of Canadian ownership in 
specific industries, the relaxation of anti-combines regulations, R&D grants and other 
forms of government subsidy.
In the usual “Canadian compromise”, aspects of both policy stands were implemented 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, since the early 1980s, the economic policy 
pendulum has definitely swung towards market-driven solutions. For example, the 
1984 “Agenda for Economic Renewal” outlined initiatives designed to reduce direct 
government intervention in economic-decision making (i.e. investment liberalization, 
privatization, deregulation, elimination of some foreign ownership restrictions), and to 
enhance the environment for private sector action (i.e. deficit reduction, tax reform, 
trade liberalization) (ISTC 1990).
The result of these various policy initiatives has been that trade liberalization has 
become a reality in the 1990s through participation in GATT, and through the FTA and 
NAFTA, while the success of industrial policies has “proved more elusive” (Norrie and 
Owram 1991, p. 606). In the 1970s and 1980s, industrial policies have been hampered 
because these initiatives have often fallen victim to “government austerity” (Ibid, 
p. 606) and bureaucratic inefficiency, and that in the early 1980s, government 
initiatives designed to develop Canada’s rich resource base and the resulting 
manufacturing and service industry linkages fell victim to unfavourable market 
conditions for energy and commodities.
5.2.3 Competitiveness Fever -  The Late 1980s and the Early 1990s
In the late 1980s and early 1990s Canada has also been afflicted with competitiveness 
fever.7 As is the case in the EC and the U.S., while diagnosing the economic problems 
is generally an easy task, prescribing the right solution leads to fierce debates about the 
desirability of industrial policies. However, some observers believe that in Canada the 
important question is not whether to have an industrial policy, but what kind to have. 
They base their assertion on the pervasiveness of the welfare state and on the extent of 
the redistributive policies of the federal government, which they considered a de facto 
industrial policy.®
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5.2.3a Diagnosing the Economic Problem s
By world standards, Canada’s economic, political and social welfare record is enviable. 
Canada is a rich, pleasant, peaceful and prosperous country. However, many fear that 
the relative levels of prosperity cannot be maintained unless changes are made. While 
the fears of a reduced standard of living are perhaps exaggerated when Canada’s rich 
resource base is taken into account, there is nevertheless reason to worry. In the early 
1990s, Canada faces among other dilemmas: a recessionary environment (in Canada 
and in the U.S., its major trading partner), a large budget deficit, the most profound 
constitutional crisis in its history, unprecedented levels of distrust of government, a tax 
revolt over the Goods and Service Tax, and regional and minority alienation.
There is considerable agreement among economists, management analysts and 
politicians on the illnesses of the Canadian economy:
a. The rate of growth of Canadian productivity has been third lowest among all 
OECD countries over the past 30 years (ISTC 1990, p. i). “Annual productivity 
growth, which had been 2.3% in 1946-73, fell to 0.9% in 1973-90” {Economist^ 
June 29, 1991);
b. Canada cannot continue to rely on primary resource exploitation for three reasons: 
it is not environmentally sustainable; while the prices of its commodity exports 
have been rising in the 1980s, they could just as easily drop; and unless value is 
added to these resources, low-cost competition from the Third World commodity 
producers or from more productive developed competitors^ will continue to erode 
Canada’s market position;
c. Canada spends less of its GNP on R&D than its major trading partners -  1.33% of 
GDP in 1989, the lowest of the 07  {Economist, June 29,1991). Only 3% of the 
national firms have any research capability (ISTC 1990, p. iii). The general lack of 
inventiveness can be seen in the few patents taken out by Canadians; in 1987, 
7,246 Americans and 1,889 Germans took out patents in physics, while only 150 
Canadians did {Economist, June 29,1991). Investment capital and innovation 
have not been linked by the private sector (private companies and investment 
firms alike), and the public sector has spent $2.7 billion a year on research 
without being able to evaluate if these funds have been spent “to maximum 
advantage” (Wilson, quoted in Financial Post, July 24,1991, p. 1);
d. Canada’s educational system is expensive for taxpayers and inefficient “Canada 
ranks fourth among the world’s industrialized countries in per capita spending on 
education. Still, we have a 30% high school drop out rate and close to 40% of 
adults cannot meet the most everyday reading demands” {Financial Post, July 24,
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1991, p. 10). Students also rank low in international test scores. The connection 
between jobs and learning has not been made.
e. Canada has a high cost of capital. While the high interest rates and the high 
Canadian dollar exchange rate that characterized 1990 and 1991 have come down 
in 1992, the banks and capital markets have yet to adjust to the reality that large 
sums of risk capital are required if the fashionable high technologies are to be 
developed. Small pools of venture capital are not enough. In addition, payments 
on the fiscal budget deficit devour a third of government revenues {Economist, 
June 29, 1991).
f . Canadian business culture has traditionally been characterized as “relatively risk 
averse and parochial in outlook, not aggressive and well informed in trade 
matters, limited in its understanding of science and technology and often too 
dependent on government” (ISTC 1990, p. viii). “Canadian managers regard their 
companies as bureaucratic, poorly focused and relatively conservative and rigid” 
(NCMRD, p. 2). This tends to result in a brain drain to the U.S. of the most 
dynamic and innovative employees.
5.2.3b The Cures
Given these ailments, most generic cures for the Canadian economy involve:
1) enhancing productivity-based competitiveness through innovation; 2) diversification 
into “knowledge intensive” industries; 3) improvement of the Canadian technological 
base; 4) better education; 5) improved access to capital; 6) a good “business climate” 
(whatever that is...); 7) the reduction of interprovincial barriers to trade; and 8) that 
government “do” something. This latter point is the crux of the matter -  do what? Two 
reports offer suggestions: “Prosperity through Competitiveness” (Government of 
Canada 1991) and “Canada at the Crossroads” (Porter 1991).
In 1991, Industry Minister Michael Wilson released “Prosperity through Competitive­
ness”, a report that suggests Canadian competitiveness can be built with “five building 
blocks -  learning,!® science and technology, financing investment, a competitive 
domestic market and trade” {Financial Post, July 24,1991, p. 1). The findings of 
Wilson’s report were supported by Michael Porter’s subsequent study of Canadian 
competitiveness -  “Canada at the Crossroads”. Porter’s report was commissioned in 
part by the Government of Canada,!! and the fact that government officials were 
involved in defining the particulars of the study has raised suspicions about Mr. 
Porter’s ability to be an independent observer. Some critics believe that the report was 
commissioned as part of a campaign to “reinforce firmly the government’s message
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[Wilson’s report] on prosperity/competitiveness issues” (Enchin 1991). These 
allegations are strongly denied. In any case, Canada’s stated “industrial policy” has 
certainly taken a Porterian turn and Porter’s report has often served as a justification of 
the government’s neo-liberal policies. Thus a brief examination of Porter’s report on 
Canada is appropriate at this point.
Almost any individual with some basic knowledge of the Canadian economy and the 
competitive pressures brought about by the forces of globalization, and who succeeded 
in reading through The Competitive Advantage o f Nations^ could have guessed the 
findings of “Canada at the Crossroads”. In sum:
We believe... that Canada today is at an economic crossroads, and that 
the core of its economy is at risk. Canada’s rich natural resource 
endowments, its proximity to the United States [which affects trading 
patterns and which has resulted in an unusually high degree of foreign 
ownership], and a history of insulation from international competition, 
have combined to allow Canadian industry to achieve an enviable 
economic performance. These same advantages, however, have led to 
an array of policies, strategies and attitudes on the part of governments, 
business, labour and individual Canadians that leave the economy in 
many respects ill equipped to respond to a rapidly changing competitive 
environment. (Porter 1991, p. 4)
... This brief overview of Canada’s position in international competition 
and its export economy highlights a number of real or potential weak­
nesses. Canada’s high dependence on exports of relatively unprocessed 
natural resource based products signals a lack of breadth even in the 
country’s most prominent export clusters. Likewise, Canada’s very 
weak position in machinery indicates a lack of depth within key industry 
clusters. Most importantly, our analysis found little evidence that either 
the breadth or the depth of Canada’s major export clusters is increasing.
Taken together, this evidence is consistent with the brief macroeconomic 
picture, previously presented [low productivity growth, rising unit 
labour costs, rising unemployment, lagging investment in upgrading 
skills and technology, chronic government deficits and growing public 
debt], which point to an economy that shows limited signs of 
upgrading, and suggests that productivity growth -  the critical driver of 
prosperity -  may be increasingly difficult to achieve” (Op Cit, p. 21)
Moreover, the Canadian economy is presently being haunted by a particularly scary 
boogey man. According to Porter, within the context of Free Trade with the U.S. (and 
by extension NAFTA), many of the foreign-owned companies that dominate Canada’s 
major industries, and which had a raison d*être during the era of protectionism and
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insularity, might simply pack up their bags and go somewhere else, presumably South 
of one or two borders, in search of better “diamonds”.
Porter puts a great deal of the blame for fostering this inefficient economic order 
squarely on the shoulders of government, since government policy: 1) insulated 
industry from internal and external competition; 2) forestalled the need for upgrading by 
artificially constraining factor inputs; 3) intervened directly in the economy though 
subsidies and activist industrial policies; 4) concentrated on programmes to distribute 
wealth and improve welfare which “needlessly” (sic) undermined the economy; and 
5) had conflicting policies and objectives. Industrialists are also to blame. The 
tendency of Canadian industrialists to administer existing wealth instead of investing in 
the creation of new wealth has weakened the country’s competitiveness.
As far as what to do about all this. Porter’s prescriptions are “by the book” (his book, 
of course). According to Porter, Canada must respond to the forces of globalization, 
technology and free trade by developing a new paradigm of economic activity based on, 
as would be expected, productivity and innovation. The elements of a new economic 
vision are to: 1) become an innovation-driven economy; 2) increase the sophistication 
of the natural resource sector, 3) tackle barriers to upgrading throughout the economy; 
4) build on Canada’s regional strengths (as opposed to creating “sameness” through re­
distributive policies and diversification within the regions); 5) move quickly and 
decisively to achieve free trade within Canada; 6) transform foreign subsidiaries into 
home bases; and 7) create and maintain a supportive and stable macroeconomic 
environment Porter ends his report by creating a series of “to do” lists for the 
business, labour and government sectors.
5.2.3c O bstacles to Policy Implementation
For Porter, there are systemic barriers to change which must be overcome before his 
strategy can become a reality. Canada’s: 1) workforce is not well equipped for upgrad­
ing and change; 2) R&D stmcture is not aligned with the requirements for upgrading;
3) level of home demand sophistication works against upgrading; 4) firm strategy and 
structure and the extent of local rivalry have done little to enhance domestic produc­
tivity; and 5) business attitude must become less complacent and more competitive.
What remains to be seen is whether Mr. Porter’s recommendations can, in Lester 
Thurow’s words, “make a dent in the system”. Once again, while all in favour of 
competitiveness, the players themselves are likely to present a series of obstacles to the 
implementation and efficacy of Porter’s recommendations: 1) big business will resist
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calls for more domestic competition; 2) big labour will resist the suggestion of more 
“flexibility”; 3) the hay^ e not provinces will object to less activist regional development 
initiatives; 4) xht federal government, despite its assertions to the contrary, will resist 
calls for a diminished role in the economy; and 5) finally, Canadian citizens, proud of 
the extensive social welfare system which truly distinguishes them from Americans, 
will be suspicious of the vision of a leaner, meaner Canada.
The public sector -  Can the government actually Implement these policies?
While many observers agree that the problems of the Canadian economy identified by 
Porter and by Michael Wilson are certainly real and that the solutions outlined above are 
desirable, many doubt whether the government can move beyond rhetoric on the com­
petitiveness issue. The Financial Posfs analysis of “Prosperity through Competitive­
ness” is that the report “may be wishful thinking” {Financial Post, July 24,1991, p. 4). 
This view is supported by many other observers:
Their [the government’s] hands are tied. They can’t deliver on most of 
the problems they outline short of radical re-allocation of government 
spending.... What they are trying to do is simply shape public opinion.
They want to be seen as consulting with Canadians at large and divert 
attention from confrontational matters. But they are not much further 
ahead than they were a few years ago. They are asking the same 
questions, (quotes from various sources in Fagan 1991)
As has become evident in Eastern Europe and the Confederation of Independent States, 
one of the major obstacles to market liberalization is that the elimination of the state 
apparatus leaves a vacuum which the market is slow to fill. The central planning 
functions of price setting, establishing exchange relationships and distribution logistics, 
as well as the employment provided by state-subsidized firms were all part of a system, 
albeit an inefficient one, which actually “worked”. The move towards a free market 
economy has required dismantling this system and waiting for a new system to take 
form. The hiatus between the two systems is a political powder keg.
Similarly, one of the greatest obstacles to the retreat fiom activist industrial policies in 
developed capitalist countries like Canada is that the existing system has become 
responsive to certain signals, such as high levels of governmental employment and 
spending. Weaning the private sector from government cash, and reducing the size and 
budget of government bureaucracies will also create a vacuum which must be filled by 
“something”. The hope is that this something will be private investment and new 
ventures which can “soak up” redundant government workers and employees of pre­
viously protected inefficient firms. Without financial incentives the government, parti­
cularly the federal government, cannot have any real clout. This creates a Catch-22 -
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how to implement this new “market-driven” policy without adding to public spending, 
and how to become more competitive by relying more on market forces without 
resorting to activist industrial policies as a way to kick-start the process.
The fifth building block of competitiveness in Michael Wilson’s proposal deals with 
“competitive domestic markets and trade”. The meaning assigned by the report to 
“competitive domestic markets” leads one to ask whether the Canadian government is 
finally going to get serious about anti-trust legislation or if, once again, it will just pay 
lip service to it.
The first Anti-Combines Act of 1889 has been characterized as “pious anti-monopoly 
posturing that had no effect on anything (Bliss, quoted in Norrie and Owram 1981, 
p. 382). Even with the Combines Act of 1910 and with the new Competition Act of 
1986, Canadian regulators have proven to be relatively ineffective “trust busters”. “For 
most of the past century, competition legislation in Canada has been ineffective 
compared with the stringent antitrust laws in the United States” (Macleans, July 16, 
1990, p. 32). Speculation on the government’s new posture vis à vis the Competition 
Act suggests that further relaxation of the act is expected.
If Michael Porter is right, and vigorous domestic competition is the key element in 
competitiveness, Canada’s oligopolistic markets are in trouble. According to David 
Olive, editor of Report on Business magazine,
a survey in the mid-1980s revealed that nine Canadian families repre­
sented 46% of the total capitalization of the Toronto Stock Exchange 
300 composite index. That the cross ownership structure of Canadian 
Pacific, BCE Inc and other huge conglomerates effectively prevents 
foreigners -  or local entrepreneurs, for that matter -  from acquiring a 
significant stake in a wide variety of Canadian industries. (Olive 1991)
Diane Francis, hardly a radical journalist, has written a well documented account of the 
staggering level of economic concentration in Canada. Controlling Interests is replete 
with examples of the way in which “unchecked ‘free enterprisers’ destroy their own 
system, mopping up all opportunities and pushing political leaders towards socialist 
alternatives” (Francis 1987, cover page). The socialist alternatives alluded to allow the 
private sector to pass the buck to the public sector on issues such as unemployment 
insurance (resulting fi-om seasonal layoffs), retraining of employees, and employee 
benefits like health insurance and severance pay. In Canadian Corporate Power, 
Veltmeyer (1987) also examined, with more academic rigour than Francis, the extent of 
and the economic, political and social implications of Canadian monopolies. There is no
Chapters 119
Canadian level playing field. For all intents and purposes, the playing field is a private 
country club where the rules are made by the home team:
The Canadian economy is certainly not now based on open competition 
among more or less equal small business operators -  independent 
commodity producers or capitalists. It is dominated by huge corpora­
tions that, contrary to classical economic theory, engineer and control 
market forces, rather than respond to them. (Veltmeyer 1987, p. 18)
Some observers suggest that these “national champions” are a good idea. After all, the 
EC’s new wave of mergers is based on the idea that bigness is better in global compe­
tition. Others, like Porter, disagree and claim that these behemoths quickly become 
dinosaurs poorly suited to global competition. In Canada, the spectre of large U.S. 
corporations both south of the border and within Canadian territory (branch plants), has 
fostered a logic of acceptance and even reverence of large monopolistic Canadian 
concerns. Trust-busting is not a Canadian pastime. It is considered high treason.
One of the most curious strategies to address this large concentration of economic and 
industrial power was suggested by Olive (1991). He asserts that Canada’s conglomer­
ates are similar to Japanese Jderetsu and wonders “why these behemoths have largely 
failed to exploit the competitive advantage that size and diversity should give them” (Op 
Cit, p. 7) in exploiting global markets. Olive’s answer is that Canadian firms failed to 
emulate the “values that the Japanese bring to their conglomerates. Which are long-term 
planning, genuine sharing of resources among affiliates, and an unflinching dedication 
to achieving sound objectives” (Op Cit, p. 8). Well, why did they not do it? The irony 
is that Porterians would simply answer “Because size of conglomerate is not the point”. 
Dynamism of conglomerate is, and you cannot have that without vigorous domestic 
competition, exactly what Canadian keiretsus have managed to wipe out.
5.3 WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
COMPETITIVENESS DEBATES FOR THE “ HAVE-NOT” REGIONS?
In the Canada of the 1990s, both supporters and opponents of industrial policy agree 
on one point -  the major beneficiaries should be the “winners” not the “losers” in the 
economy. For example, Curtis, a supporter of industrial policy states that
^The problem is not how to choose winners,* says Curtis. The problem 
is getting rid o f the losers, finding a way to stop giving money endlessly 
to a steel company that has no future or to stop subsidizing the most 
expensive cows in the world. Then we should support the winners we 
already have. We should ask ourselves what we need to do to make sure 
that Canada has a position in the car industry in the late 90s and how to
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defend Canada’s place in the telecommunications industry. In most 
other countries, governments and industry act on such issues in concert 
but the Canadian government prefers a hands-off attitude. That 
approach is shortsighted*, says Curtis, ‘it is leading to a dead end’.
(Curtis, quoted in Stoffman 1990, p. 48, emphasis added by author).
D’Cruz and Fleck, opponents of industrial policy, state :
One of this study’s principal findings is that Canada’s manufacturing 
sector has not changed sufficiently to cope with this [global competitive­
ness] new environment.... The main cause of this rigidity in Canada’s 
manufacturing sector has been the national economic strategy pursued 
over the last two decades. The goals have been redistributional, and 
there has been insifficient emphasis on growth and development....
This political climate has been coupled with a prfference for policies of 
‘hands-on’ decision making by government in specific economic 
projects, to the detriment of market processes o f industrial transition....
(D’Cruz and Fleck 1985, p. xii)
In sum, whether in support or against hands-off or hands-on approaches, the policy 
emphasis has clearly shifted away from redistributional policies and towards “efficient 
markets”. Given Canadian regional economic disparities, the implications for disadvan­
taged regions of the recent national economic development strategies, whether for or 
against industrial policy, are quite serious. One only needs to ask: Where are the steel 
industries without a future, the world’s most expensive cows, and the automobile and 
telecommunications firms located? Where do the workers of “loser” firms go once these 
firms are “gotten rid o f’? What happens to the recipients of hands-on redistributional 
efforts when the hands decide to let go?
Regional development policy in disadvantaged regions has been largely a re-distributive 
policy designed to help the losers. While this approach might have only softened the 
blow of industrial restructuring rather than created thriving economies in once “have- 
not” regions, the success of the policy of “picking winners” in Ontario as well as in 
Newfoundland has been as elusive as in race-track betting. One can only wonder if this 
approach is still being proposed because it offers some sort of psychological comfort to 
both economic planners and to politicians to think that they are associating themselves 
with winners, not losers.
Michael Porter did not address the Atlantic region specifically in his national report. 
However, he addressed Atlantic Canadian academics, business and labour leaders, and 
government officials in June of 1992, in Halifax, Nova Scotia. His recommendations
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for improving the region’s economy followed the general outlines provided in Canada 
at the Crossroads. He recommended that the government concentrate on providing 
physical, human, and regulatory infrastructure, and leave the building of competitive 
industry clusters to the private sector. He touted the need for constant improvement in 
productivity and innovativeness, and so on. In his address he emphasized the 
importance of the local community in providing the unique characteristics that would 
determine the right set of industry clusters:
It is going to be the unique characteristics of the Atlantic Provinces, their 
tradition, their culture, their idiosyncrasies, their strangeness, their 
whatever, that’s going to be very important, I feel certain, in identifying 
the areas where diere is really a chance of success. (Porter, quoted in 
Schaefer 1992, p. 25)
Some of the unique Canadian, and certainly Atlantic Canadian, characteristics that he 
alluded to as problems were the lack of a risk-taking tradition, the tradition of govern­
ment smokestack chasing, and the tendency to encourage further concentration of assets 
in pursuit of the critical mass that is allegedly required for global success. Trust-busting 
is an act of heresy in Canada and in particular in the Atlantic region. Moreover, success 
comes to those who toe the line in either private or public bureaucracies, not to those 
who rock the boat with new ideas. Chapter 6 will discuss the “convenient” regional 
mythology of backwardness, the lack of truly indigenous articulateness in culture and 
politics, and the low level of political efficacy in Atlantic Canada. These shortcomings 
make it all the more difficult to find those unique characteristics that can guide the way 
to the creation of the right set of clusters, through either local entrepreneurship or the 
attraction of the “right” kind of foreign investments.
5.4 CONCLUSION
An evaluation of the success of industrial policies in Canada leaves the reader with a 
sense of unease:
The historical record as a whole shows that there has been little unity or 
coherence to Canadian industrial policy. Policies have sometimes been 
contradictory, sometimes complementary, sometimes simply confused.
Whether they have succeeded or failed, on balance, cannot be deter­
mined. Some of the specific policies have certainly been disastrous 
failures. It is difficult to determine whether Canadian prosperity is a 
legacy of visionary, effective government economic management, or a 
testimonial to the triumph of Canadian resources and enterprise over 
political mismanagement. (Bliss 1982, p. vi)
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As far as prospects for future industrial policies, I must once again agree with Michael 
Bliss’ conclusion:
The view that there can be some kind of ‘New National Policy’, which 
solves all Canadian industrial problems, misunderstands not only the 
present and future situation, but, as we have seen, is based on a mis­
reading of our past national policies. The likelihood is that policies will 
continue to be developed, as they were in the past, by real politicians 
dealing with real problems on a day-to-day basis. (Op Cit, p. 43)
The prominence of the industrial policy debate in the United States is also likely to 
affect Canadian economic policy-making. On both sides of the U.S/Canadian border 
the bureaucrats charged with maintaining the letter of the Free Trade Act are likely to 
argue over many gross and fine points; in particular, over the existence of non-tariff 
barriers such as those created by activist industrial policies. While the United States, 
through the FTA, might force Canada to dismantle its extensive network of assistance to 
business and individuals, the U.S. might, at the same time, be politically pressured to 
develop a more activist industrial policy, for reasons that have nothing to do with 
Canada, such as the election of Bill Clinton. As Canada becomes more like the U.S., 
the U.S. becomes more like Canada.
Unless the 1993 Canadian federal election brings about a U-tum in economic policies, 
national and regional economic policy in the 1990s is probably going to continue 
towards less government and a more pro-business stand. However, whether less 
government leads to a healthy and competitive “business climate”, or to oligopolistic 
markets, remains to be seen. But by far the greatest problem of Canadian economic 
planners in the 1990s will be determining the political unit they are planning for, and 
realizing that the success or failure of their economic policy prescriptions is key in the 
determination of the political fate of the country. As expressed by Valaskakis, Canada 
is like
a club in which the dues (taxes) keep going up while the services (links 
to Britain, the railways, CBC and Air Canada) keep being cut: no 
wonder the members are tempted not to renew their subscription. If, 
however, the enteiprise were a bit more successful, dissolution would 
soon be off the agenda. (Valaskakis cited in Economist^ June 29,1991, 
p. 14)
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ENDNOTES
 ^ Readers interested in Canadian industrial policy are advised to see inter allia Bliss (1982),
Govmiment of Canada. Department of Extonal Affairs (1983), Science Council of Canada (1979) 
and (1980), French (1980), and Wonnacott (1975).
 ^ The election of Bill Clinton in the U.S. on a platform of more activist industrial policies might
set the stage for a comeback of this approach to economic management in Canada.
 ^ The history of Maritime grievances against central Canada began with Confederation.
^ As Sir John A. McDonald, the federation's first prime ministo", once remarked "the place [Canada]
has too much geography and too little history” (McDonald quoted in Economist y June 29,1991,
p. 11).
 ^ For an examination of the concentration of wealth and economic control in Canada, see Francis 
(1987 ) and Veltmeyer (1987). Simpson (1988) examines the pervasiveness of patronage in 
Canada.
 ^ For example, one of the major industrial strategy initiatives of the 1970s established “23 sectoral 
task forces, charged with making recommendations fw 21 manufacturing industries, plus 
construction and tourism” (Norrie and Owram 1991, p. 606).
 ^ There are numerous examples of prescriptive works on Canadian competitiveness. See inter cdlia 
D’Cruz and Fleck (1985); ACOA (1988); Province of Nova Scotia (1984); the Canadian 
Manufacturers Association (1989); Wilson (1991); ISTC (1990); Stoffman (1990).
 ^ “One of our most popular national debates concerns whether or not Canada should have an
industrial strategy [policy]. The very question is beside the point because maintaining the UI 
[Unemployment Insurance] program in its current form, which encourages the use of seasonal 
labour, or dishing out agricultural subsidies that add 17% to total farm output, are quite potent 
applications of an industrial strategy. The important question is not whether to have a strategy, but 
what kind to have (Stoffman 1990, p. 48, emphasis added by author).
 ^ Canada’s biggest commodity export, pulp and paper, is losing its cost competitiveness vis à vis 
other developed countries. Tbe delivered cost of Canadian newsprint in 1989 was $573 a tonne, 
ccHnpared with $570 in Sweden and $485 in the U.S. {Economist, June 29,1991).
 ^® “Learning Well... Living Well”, which forms part of the “Prosperity through Competitiveness” 
report, suggests among other things that the federal government should take over aspects of the 
present provincial responsibility for education as part of a national effort towards competitiveness.
 ^  ^ The US$1.2 million report was commissioned in part by the Department of Industry, Science and 
Technology, and by the Business Council on National Issues, a private sector group.
PART
THE ATLANTIC CANADIAN CONTEXT. 
AILMENTS, PRESCRIPTIONS AND PROGNOSIS
INTRODUCTION TO PART III
Part n  has critically analyzed the debates surrounding the question How is a compe­
titive economy created in the global context o f the 1990s and what roles should the state 
and the market assume? Chapter 3 concluded that, within capitalist systems, deter­
mining the right balance between the role of the state and the role of the market in the 
achievement of national competitiveness has more to do with a realistic assessment of 
the particular set of internal and external conditions facing a particular economy at a 
particular time than it does with adherence to any economic orthodoxy, whether from 
the free markets/laissez faire camp or from the managed trade/industrial policy camp. 
Similarly, Chapter 4 concluded that as far as corporate competitiveness is concerned, 
size, administrative structure, or ownership etc. is not the key determinant of 
sustainable competitive advantage in the 1990s. The ability to "learn faster than one’s 
competitors” is.
Chapter 5 chronicled the various phases of Canadian industrial policy and concluded 
that, since Confederation, policy has swung from one end of the spectrum of the free 
markets/laissez faire vs. managed trade/industrial policy debate to the other, often with 
confusing results. In the 1990s, neo-liberal orthodoxy dominates the economic and 
political debate. The free trade and more competitive markets (i.e. less government 
intervention) that these policies suggest have put in question Canada’s traditional 
pursuit of regional "parity” and commitment to federal transfer and equalization 
payments. The message to the "have not” provinces from the Federal government and 
from the richer provinces is "Become more self-sufficient”. This message gains even 
more urgency when Canada’s federal and provincial fiscal crisis is considered.
Part m  of the thesis examines whether Atlantic Canada is equipped to meet the chal­
lenges outlined in Part U. It explores the fundamental questions: 2) What prescriptions 
for competitiveness are being presented in Atlantic Canadian economic policy 
documents? and 3) What impediments and advantages does the Atlantic Canadian 
political-economy present to the realization of this vision of a competitive economy? 
Like Part H, Part m  critically analyzes the literature of several disciplines in search of 
answers to these questions.
In order to provide an adequate background for the discussion of regional development 
policy in the 1990s, Chapter 6 first surveys the literature on the economic history of the 
region, the theories attempting to explain regional development and underdevelopment, 
and the history of regional economic development initiatives up to 1992. The first part
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of the chapter provides some general economic and demographic facts, a brief 
economic history of the region up to the end of the 19th century, and a review of the 
various interpretations of the region’s economic history up to the late 20th century.
This review of the core questions addressed by Atlantic Canadian economic historians 
is preambled by an examination of the theoretical frameworks that have guided these 
interpretations. The second part of Chapter 6 then examines regional development 
policy up to 1990. It chronicles the history of development initiatives and evaluates the 
effectiveness of these policy directives in general terms.
Chapter 7 begins by examining the Atlantic Canadian economy in 1991-1992, with 
special reference to Nova Scotia. It provides a set of economic, demographic and 
development policy success indicators. The chapter then takes a look at the various 
agencies charged with economic planning and at their major policy documents 
published between 1990 and 1992. It examines a variety of published documents, 
distills the main themes in the regional development literature and analyzes their various 
formulas for development. The discussion is organized around the three primary 
themes that are evident in this literature: 1) competitiveness, 2) cooperation, and 
3) constitution -  what I have termed the “3 Cs”. Chapter 7 further argues that the 
impediments presented by the political-economy of the region will seriously retard the 
chances of success of these development initiatives.
CHAPTER 6
HISTORY, INTERPRETATIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The region^ known as Atlantic Canada (see Exhibit 1) comprises the Canadian 
provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland 
and Labrador (henceforth referred to as Newfoundland). When the latter province is 
omitted, the region is known as the Maritime Provinces or the Maritimes. While the 
Maritimes were early members of Confederation, Newfoundland did not join until 
1949. In this chapter sometimes I refer to Atlantic Canada as a whole, and sometimes to 
the Maritimes and Newfoundland separately. Exhibit 2 provides some of the basic 
demographic facts about the Atlantic Canada.
Perhaps one of the most incisive and oft-quoted descriptions of the Atlantic region is 
that provided by Harris and Warkentin:
This is a very complex region. It has no unifying configuration of 
physical features, and even the surrounding sea provides a matrix rather 
than a focus. There is no centralization of economic activity or function, 
no rich heartland. If there is unity, it is a unity of mutual problems 
arising from the attempt to wresde from the modest resources a standard 
of living roughly equivalent to that of the rest of Canada and the United 
States. (Harris and Warkentin 1974, p. 10)
A generally accepted explanation of the dynamics of these “mutual problems” has yet to 
be developed, but while the explanations are in dispute, the facts certainly are not:
Atlantic Canada still remains at lower levels of development and income, 
and higher levels of dependence on government spending and transfer 
than any other part of the country. In this respect, the region remains 
underdeveloped. (APEC 1987, p. 125, emphasis added)
According to Norrie and Owram (1991), regional disparities were present in Atlantic 
Canada as early as 1890, and rapid national economic growth during 1897 and 1910 
accentuated these disparities into a pattern that still exists today. Various levels of 
government have frequently attempted to reduce these disparities through regional 
development programmes. This chapter provides an overview of the economic history 
of the region, the theories explaining its “underdevelopment”, and the regional 
development initiatives which have been implemented up to 1990.
127
Chapter 6 128
EXHIBIT 1
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The chapter is divided into two parts: history and interpretations from early colonial 
history to the 20th century; and regional development in Atlantic Canada from 1950 to 
1990.
The first part sets the stage by providing a brief history of the region up to the end of 
the 19th century, and then reviews the various interpretations of the region’s economic 
history up to the late 20th century. This review of the fundamental questions addressed 
by Atlantic Canadian economic historians is preambled by an examination of the 
theoretical frameworks that have guided these interpretations.
The analysis of the 19th century asks: l)What were the origins of development;
2) Was the decline inevitable? 3) What role did local merchants and entrepreneurs play 
in the decline? and 4) Were the policies of the federal government responsible for the 
marginalization of the region? The analysis of the 20th century asks: 1) What were the 
patterns of continued economic decline? 2) Is underdevelopment the result of market 
failure or the inevitable consequence of capitalism? and 3) Entrepreneurial failure -  
again?
The second part of this chapter examines regional development policy up to 1990.
It chronicles the history of development initiatives and evaluates the effectiveness of 
policy directives in general terms. This chapter sets the stage for the analysis of regional 
policy in the 1990s conducted in Chapter 7.
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EXHIBIT 2 
ATLANTIC CANADA FACT CHART
A. Population, Atlantic P rovinces and Canada, 1 8 5 1-1986
Newfoundland & 
Labrador (1)
Prince Edward 
Island
Nova Scotia New Brunswick Canada
1851
1861
1871
1881
1891
1901
1911
1921
1931
1941
1951
1961
1971
1981
1986
361.4
457.9
522.1
567.7
568.3
62.7(2)
80.9
94.0
108.9 
109.1 
103.3
93.7 
88.6
88.0 
95.0
94.8
104.6
111.6
122.5
126.6
276.9
330.9
387.8
440 .6  
45 0 .4
459.6
492.3
523.8
512.8
578.0
642.6
737.0
789.0
8 47 .4  
873.2
193.8
252.0
285.6
321.2
321.3
331.1
351.9
387.9
408.2
4 5 7 .4
515.7
597.9  
634.6
696.4
710.4
2.436.3  
3,229.6(3)
3.689.3
4 .3 2 4 .8  
4 ,8 33 .2 (4 )
5.371.3 
7,206.6
8.787.9 
10,376.8 
11,506.7 
14,009.4
18.238.2
21.568.3 
24 ,343 .2  
25,354.1
Notes:
(1) Censuses for Newfoundland before 1951 were not always held regularly. Population for Newfoundland in various 
years was 75,000 (1836); 124,000 (1857); 147,000 (1869); 161,000 (1874); 97,000 (1884); 202,000 (1891);
221,000 (1901 ); 243,000 (1911 ); 263,000 (1921); 290,000 (1936); 322,000 (1945); and 354,000 (1949).
(2) For 1848.
0) Includes Manitoba for the first time.
(4) Includes Saskatchewan and Alberta for the first time.
Sources: Censuses of Canada; Historical Statistics of Newfoundland and Labrador (1970).
B. Cumulative Percentage Rate of Population Growth, 
A tlantic P rovinces and C anada, 1 8 5 1-1986
3 0 0 % 1
Canada2 5 0 % -
N.B.
200%  - N.S.
P.EL150 % -
Nfld
100% -
5 0 % -
0%
1 8 5 1  1 8 7 1  1 8 9 1  1 9 1 1  1 9 3 1  1 9 5 1  1 9 7 1
Sources: Censuses of Canada; Historical Statistics of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1970.
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C. Rural-Urban Distribution of Population, Atlantic Provinces and Canada 
100%-,
Canada
^  Rural Farm 
B  Rural Non-Farm 
■  Urban
80% -
80% -
40% -
20%  ■
100% -
80%
60%
40%
20%
1951 1981 1971 1981
1951 1961 1971 1981
Newfoundland
100%
Prince Edward island
100% -
■80% -60% -
40% -
20% -
Nova Scotia
1951 1981 1971 1981
100%
80% -
80% -
40% -
20% -
1951 1981
Source; Censuses of Canada.
1971 1981
New Brunswick
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D. A pproxim ate Land and F reshw ater A reas, Atlantic P rov inces and  C anada
Land Freshwater Total % of Total
Newfoundland & Labrador 370,485 34,032 404,517 4.1
Island 106,614 5,685 112,299 1.1
Labrador 263,871 28,347 292,218 3.0
Prince Edward Island 5,657 - 5,657 0.1
Nova Scotia 52,841 2,650 55,491 0.6
New Brunswick 72,092 1,344 73,436 0.7
Atlantic Canada 501,075 38,026 539,101 5.4
Canada 9,167,165 755,165 9,922,330 100.0
Source: Canada Year Book 1980-81.
E. Ethnic Origin of Population, Atlantic P rovinces and Canada, 1981
P.E.I.
British/Irish
French
Other
1“
0%
— t—
40%20%
Source: Census of Canada
— r—
60% 80% 100%
6.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
The course of Atlantic Canadian development has been the subject of a great deal of 
academic study.^ However, given the existence of competing explanations of the 
economic fate of the region, some of these reviews focus on the literature of specific 
“schools” and either do not cover the literature of competing schools, or are organized 
with the purpose of establishing the superiority of a particular explanation. Cannon's 
(1984) comprehensive review is perhaps most useful because it categorizes the 
literature according to the alternative analytical frameworks on which they are based.
He organizes the literature around the two major competing paradigms for explaining 
development and underdevelopment: the liberal paradigm, which includes both the 
narrow neo-classical and the broader liberal political-economy interpretations, and
2) the Marxist paradigm, which includes both traditional class analysis and the analysis 
of other forms of unequal relationship (i.e. spatial).
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These paradigms are fundamentally different in their conception of the relationships 
between society, state and market Thus the adoption of a particular conceptual frame­
work profoundly influences explanations of regional development and underdevelop­
ment as weU as policy prescriptions. A brief look at these frameworks as they relate to 
the process of regional disparities and regional development can shed some light on the 
logic underlying the alternative explanations and policy orientations presented here.
The liberal paradigm is rooted in the industrialization experience of modem western 
nations. As such it shows an inherent belief in the “primacy of the market” and in the 
economic opportunities that capitalism can bring to individuals and nations. According 
to the liberal formulation, under “ideal” conditions (competitive markets for example) 
the economy moves towards an equilibrium and is able to distribute resources in an 
equitable and optimum fashion. Not all liberals regard this process as either efficient or 
fair, at least in the short run. Thus there are two approaches to policy based on, among 
other things, the view of the ability of the market to reach equilibrium: neo-classical and 
Keynesian economics.
Since the movement towards equilibrium is at times unacceptably slow for citizens and 
politicians alike, interventionist measures to ease the transition period, such as regional 
policy, are justified in the eyes of Keynesian liberals. On the other hand, neo-classical 
economists argue that these measures “distort” the market and retard the process of 
adjustment, and at times even cause the “dependence” of the recipient region on external 
assistance.^ The policy implications are obvious. While the neo-classical economists 
would encourage wage and price flexibility, labour mobility and unrestricted markets in 
order to solve the “market imperfections” which might be causing, for example, 
unemployment, the Keynesian economists would acknowledge that the market does not 
guarantee full employment and would therefore advocate government intervention in 
order to stimulate aggregate demand. In Atlantic Canada, “while neo-classical theory 
appears to have a considerable influence on most orthodox models there is no evidence 
of a wholehearted application of pure neo-classical principles. Policy has been tempered 
with Keynesian and political concerns for the most part” (Morley 1986, p. 34).
In terms of their understanding of the process of development, two main schools exist 
within the liberal paradigm: the liberal political-economics and the neo-classical. The 
liberal political economists take a more comprehensive or “broad” view of development 
which acknowledges the interdependence of economy, policy, society and its 
institutions. The neo-classical economists, on the other hand, treat development more 
“narrowly” as an economic process.
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The Marxist view of economic processes and of development is substantially different 
from the liberal view. While the liberal paradigm assumes that development is progres­
sive and that the market is a “good” thing, the Marxist paradigm suggests that the root 
of underdevelopment can be found in the workings of the capitalist system itself. Since 
the capitalist mode of production, with its emphasis on capital accumulation and on the 
appropriation of surplus value, exaggerates unequal relationships between classes and 
between spatial entities (e.g. between countries and between domestic regions), 
“underdevelopment” is simply the natural result, the flip-side of development Thus 
Marxist analysis focuses on the conflicts among groups in society, and on the 
mechanisms that produce uneven development.
Regional disparities in growth are in this view a natural and endemic 
characteristic of capitalism and can be directly related to the goal of 
accumulating wealth. Wealth is distributed unequally among classes.
The role of peripheral regions is as a supplier of resources, capital and 
labour. High unemployment in the exploited region represents a large 
reserve army of labour that can be drawn upon at lower cost when 
needed in the dominant area. A Marxist perspective on regional dispari­
ties would also focus on the presence of a regional government stripped 
of funds through infrastructure commitments [partly as a way to lure 
foreign direct investment]. These funds could have been used to 
stimulate indigenous growth. (Morley 1986, p. 40)
With this theoretical framework in mind, the analysis can now proceed to a review of 
the economic history of the region and of the various inteipretations.
6.3 HISTORY
Though there was intermittent contact between Europeans, such as the Vikings, and 
Newfoundland since around A.D. 1000, the period of uninterrupted European settle­
ment in Canada began in 1608 with Champlain’s founding of Quebec. According to 
Norrie and Owram, the central theme in the economic history of the Atlantic region is 
“the evolution of the area from its status as a fishery to that of a collection of colonies 
capable of supporting permanent populations” (Norrie and Owram 1991, p. 51). 
Among the major determinants of this development was the imperial rivalry between 
France and Britain, which took the form of economic, political, military and religious 
competition.
At the beginning of the 18th century, France had claim to the Maritime provinces, while 
British attention was concentrated in Newfoundland. However, Halifax in Nova Scotia 
had been established as a British garrison town. By the mid-18th century, the perma­
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nent settlements in the Maritimes were engulfed in the long-standing military conflict 
between France and England. In 1763, through the Treaty of Paris, France relinquished 
its 150-year old colonial presence in North America. The era of “competing mercantile 
claims ended, and Canada’s future now rested on how the British would reorganize 
their much-expanded North American empire” (Op Qt, p. 27).
The period from 1763 to 1850 saw the most dramatic growth in Atlantic Canada’s 
history. The small outposts were transformed into thriving economic centres. 
Newfoundland’s economy relied mostly on fishing, with some diversification into 
shipbuilding and trading. Maritime economies also depended on fishing, shipbuilding 
and trading. In addition. Prince Edward Island diversified into agricultural products. 
New Brunswick into timber exports, and Nova Scotia into mineral production. Small 
manufacturing existed in most settlements. The economic development that resulted in 
great part from the application of British mercantile policy was matched by political 
evolution -  Newfoundland attained colonial status in 1824, as had all three Maritime 
provinces by the 1850s. This thriving era is known as the “Golden Age” of Atlantic 
Canada.
By the mid-1800s, the idea of linking the British North American colonies together in 
some governmental system had been discussed for some time. However, proposals had 
been generally vague and the right set of circumstances for the formation of a new 
political entity had not yet arisen. In 1864, the Maritime provinces -  Prince Edward 
Island (PEI), New Brunswick and Nova Scotia -  called a conference in Charlottetown, 
PEI to discuss the possibility of a Maritime union. The Province of Canada (later to 
become Ontario and Quebec) managed to convince the Maiitimers to allow Canadian 
representatives to attend the conference and present their own views regarding the 
future of the British North American colonies. The Canadians’ idea of a Confederation 
of all provinces managed to generate tremendous enthusiasm, and the idea of Maritime 
union was swept aside.
While political considerations were certainly at work in Confederation, Norrie and 
Owram suggest that economic forces were perhaps even more influential:^
Without denying the importance of these political motives [the desire for 
greater colonial autonomy; fear of the forces being unleashed by the 
American civil war, the British interest in cutting back on the manage­
ment of colonial affairs; uneasiness about the effect of a strong U.S.; 
and the political stalemate in the province of Canada], it is possible to 
argue that Confederation was equally, perhaps even primarily, the 
product of two separate economic forces. In part, its roots lay in the
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mercantile period and in the attempts in the 1850s and 1860s to recreate 
that environment... [and]... The perception remained that commercial 
prosperity and industrial success were linked to an expanding resource 
frontier. (Norrie and Owram 1991, p. 275-6)
Thus the vices and virtues of the Confederation of the British North American colonies 
were often argued in economic terms, particularly with the puipose of determining if 
benefits would (or would not) accrue to the various participants. For example, propo­
nents of Confederation in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia saw two main advantages: 
1) the ports of Halifax and Saint John could be used for Canadian and even U.S. 
exports to Europe; and 2) with a rail connection, the Maritimes could share in the 
growth of the West. Both requirements were more easily met through coordinated 
action.^
Opponents of Confederation in the Maritimes and in Newfoundland, on the other hand, 
were afraid that Canada would “threaten the Maritime economy with a high tariff struc­
ture and with a high debt charge from profligate canal and railway construction” (Op 
Cit, p. 283). In 1867, Nova Scotia, New Bmnswick and the Province of Canada 
formed a Confederation. Prince Edward Island would soon join Confederation as an 
alternative to the bankruptcy brought about by massive railroad-building debts. 
Newfoundland chose not to join Confederation.
The effects of Confederation on the Atlantic Provinces is a widely debated subject. 
However, historical evidence does reveal that the Newfoundlanders were right about 
tariffs, and that the Maritimers were wrong about railways and ports. AU in all, central 
Canada benefited the most.
Another key formative event in Canada’s history was the “National PoUcy”.  ^It can be 
argued that Canada owes it inception as a modem nation^ to a 19th-century version of 
industrial poUcy. As Vernon Fowke remarked:
the national policy [the successful economic platform of the 1868 
election] predated the creation of a national government in Canada 
[Confederation in 1867] and envisaged the establishment o f such a 
government as one o f its indispensable instruments. (Fowkes, in Norrie 
and Owram 1991, p. 286, emphasis added by author)
In other words, the creation of Canada as a nation was de facto the creation of a 
“developmental state” with the mandate of designing an industrial structure for the new 
nation.
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The promise to introduce a “National Policy” of wide-ranging protectionism was 
essential in winning the 1878 election for the opposition Conservatives of the newly 
formed state. Nineteenth century industrial policy was based on the “mercantilist 
protectionist-nationalist notion of economic growth as being the construction of a 
secondary manufacturing sector in addition to or on top of the country’s basic primary 
industries” (Bliss 1982, p. 11). The policy initiatives included: tariff barriers; the 
promotion of primary industries; the stimulation of secondary industry;^ and the 
subsidization of transportation and other utilities.
The appeal of protectionism to Canadian politicians at this time can be attributed to:
1) the world-wide rise in protectionist sentiment in 1870s;^ 2) the demands of 
powerful local manufacturing lobbies which managed to overshadow the opposition of 
established interest in the Maritimes and in the West; and 3) the assumption of 19th- 
century Canadian governments that they had a responsibility to stimulate industrial 
development
6.4 INTERPRETATIONS
The next section examines the fundamental questions that have guided Atlantic 
Canadian economic historians in interpreting the data presented thus far.
6.4.1 Early History to 19th Century 
6.4.1a What W ere the Origins of Development?
Innis’ “Staple Theory”, a distinctively Canadian contribution to the field of political 
economy (Innis 1940; Watkins 1963), attempts to describe Canadian development by 
viewing natural resources as the engine for growth. Innis’ approach can be said to be 
“clinical” or patient-based. Rather than proposing a theory of universal applicability, 
Innis argued that “appropriate theory could only be developed on the basis of a 
thorough analysis of each unique situation” (Weaver and Gunton 1982, p. 7). Innis’ 
clinical approach has been criticized for failing to provide a clear theoretical framework. 
However, given that to date (1993) “there is no general theory which would enable us 
to deal with all cases and objectives of regional development and that it is unlikely that 
one will surface” (Higgins and Savoie 1988, p. 383), the clinical approach is still 
considered an effective methodology for regional economic analysis and planning.
Two versions of the staple concept have developed: a broad political economy, and a 
narrow economic version (Cannon 1984). McIntosh’s version of staple-based develop­
ment^® focuses more narrowly on economic events and holds a progressive view of
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history and development (Watkins 1963). For McIntosh, external demand for Canadian 
resources stimulated economic expansion and diversification through the creation of 
economic “linkages”: forward linkages into processing products before exports; back­
ward linkages into production of resource extraction machinery and equipment; and 
demand linkages into the production of consumer goods for workers of the staple 
industries.
Innis* broader interpretation is more careful in assuming that development would be 
progressive. Innis was aware of the centre-periphery nature and the relative weakness 
of the staple producer vis à vis its markets. Innis* version also considers the economic 
relationships that shaped the political and social structures of the staple economy (i.e. 
imperial rivalries). In some ways, Innis* interpretation anticipated the core/periphery 
formulations of the dependency theorists, where the production of staples is seen as 
having subordinated Canada to the interest of imperial nations.^ ^  For example, since 
Atlantic Canada is a peripheral region of Canada (the periphery of the periphery), the 
core/periphery analysis has also been applied to explain the region*s underdevelopment, 
with Toronto and Montreal interests at the core -  interests which are in turn subordinate 
to those in the major U.S. industrial centres.
The effect of staple production and linkage formation in the Atlantic region has been the 
subject of many academic studies. Historical analysis suggests that the production of 
fish and timber created hnkages such as shipbuilding, which in turn led to involvement 
in the international carrying trade. Despite these linkages, the export orientation of the 
economy made it vulnerable to shifts in international demand for its staple products.
“By the mid-1860s, it became apparent that the British colonial system was no longer 
capable of sustaining Atlantic Canada; nor had the promise of an alternative American 
market materialized [yet]” (Cannon 1984, p. 70).
While most observers agree that staples production was crucial to the region*s develop­
ment, there is ample disagreement about the origins of economic decline. The fact that 
the decline of the region*s staples markets, the shift to a new technology (steam ship­
ping), and that Confederation and the National Policy all occurred within a relatively 
short time has complicated the search for an explanation.
6.4.1b Was the Decline of the Atlantic Region Inevitable?
Saunders (1939/1984) linked the economic problems of the region to two major 
conditions:
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1. the decline of the markets for its staple products: a) the British market for timber 
and ships; b) the West Indies market for fish and the carrying trade; and c) the 
market for wooden ships and sail-driven carrying trade which was replaced by 
steam and steel ships; and
2. the natural disadvantage of the region in terms of geography and poor resource 
endowment with respect to new industries.
For Saunders, there could never have been diversification beyond the staple base -  the 
economy of “wood, wind and sail” -  because natural disadvantages were too great 
“No amount of tinkering with freight rates and tariffs would have made much differ­
ence, and no group of merchants, however astute, could have held off the inevitable 
decline for long^^ (Norrie and Owram 1991, p. 401). Many dispute this view. For 
example, some critics have pointed out that shipbuilding and shipping were not the 
“propulsive” industries that Innis made them out to be and that there was never a golden 
age of wood, wind and sail. If this interpretation of historical records is correct, then 
the appearance of steel and steam cannot be wholly responsible for the stagnation of the 
region (Memorial University of Newfoundland [MUN] study quoted, in Nowrie and 
Owram 1991).
6.4.1c W hat Role did Local M erchants and Entrepreneurs Play in the Decline?
One of the recurring themes in this debate is entrepreneurial failure. This line of 
argument links the region’s decline not to structural problems, but to the inability of 
local business concerns to adapt, diversify or invest. In other words, decline was not 
(and is still not) inevitable. It was (and still is) due to entrepreneurial failure.
One of the earliest versions of the “entrepreneurial failure” thesis links the surge in 
wooden ship-owning during the 1860s and 1870s not to a business-minded 
diversification into a profitable sector, but to the decline in demand for wooden ships in 
England which “forced” ship-builders into the carrying trade. This view is in turn 
refuted by those who maintain that “it was a noble and enterprising group that faced the 
end when it came, and not the myopic builders-cum-inadvertent-owners of ‘floating 
coffins’ that is sometimes supposed” (Norrie and Owram 1991, p. 400).
Acheson (1972/1988) has suggested that Maritime entrepreneurs responded positively 
to the opportunities after Confederation. Regional entrepreneurs became involved in 
iron and steel, textiles, sugar-refining and a range of manufactures. However, the long 
depressions of 1880 and 1890, coupled with the absence of the regional metropolis
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needed for the transition to an industrial economy, made adjustment too momentous. 
The result was that many businesses were forced to close or were purchased by outside 
interests, though ^ s  fate was not inevitable. According to Acheson, local business 
elites failed to adopt a leadership role in the industrial adjustment, preferring instead to 
invest in stocks and banks. For Saunders, decline was inevitable -  the obstacles to 
industrialization and diversification were insurmountable. For Acheson, it was a missed 
opportunity -  regional merchants chose to invest elsewhere in order to maximize short- 
run returns.However, Acheson’s conclusion is that ultimately, perhaps inevitably, 
the regional entrepreneur lost control to external forces which he could rarely 
comprehend, much less master (Acheson 1972).
6.4.1d W ere the Policies of the Federal Government Responsible for the 
Marginalization of the Region?
The economic difficulties of the Maritimes have often been linked to the deleterious 
effect of federal policy. The degree of “complicity” of the state in regional decline is of 
course dependent on the view one holds of the state. While the “view of the state as an 
‘active participant* on behalf of certain interests leads to the conclusion that policies 
were explicitly discriminatory*’, the view of the state as a ‘neutral mediator* leads to 
“the conclusion that the effects were an inevitable side-effect of nation building” 
(Cannon 1984, p. 73). Nevertheless, Confederation and the National Policy, as well as 
the subsequent national banking legislation, brought about centralizing effects through 
tariffs, railway rates (Forbes 1977) and banking policies (Frost 1982).
Tariff policy helped stimulate Maritime industry for a brief period after Confederation. 
However, the long-term effect of the policy was to favour metropolitan over peripheral 
regions. The development of transport policies and railway rates was guided by the 
principle of national symmetry. The fact that these policies were not designed to 
address specific regional needs, and that in the 20th century they would no longer offer 
the Maritime region preferential rates, compounded the economic problem of the 
Maritimes (Forbes 1977). With the passing of national banking legislation in the late 
19th century, the Maritimes became a source of “suiplus-funds” for investment in other 
parts of Canada. Whether railway rates and tariffs were designed to serve the interests 
of central Canadian constituencies to the detriment of peripheral regions, or whether the 
deleterious effects were an unintended consequence, is subject to debate. Similarly, 
whether the flow of surplus funds is seen as a natural consequence of capital seeking its 
best alternative (Frost 1982), or the result of the bias of national capital markets which 
ignored opportunities in the region is also a matter of opinion.
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That federal policy could have been more beneficial to the Maritimes is well established. 
However, as Alexander (1978/1988,1976/1988) has wisely pointed out, there is a 
danger in attributing too much to political factors. For example, attributing the decline 
of the Maritimes to joining Confederation, and the decline of Newfoundland to not 
joining Confederation, is illogical. Certainly, there must be other forces at work.
6.4.2 The 20th Century
6.4.2a W hat W ere the Patterns of Continued Economic Decline?
During the 1920s the economic decline of the Maritimes was further accelerated. The 
overall plight of the Maritimes at this time was summarized by S. A Saunders:
The decade of the 1920s started out badly for the Maritime Provinces, as 
it did for most other parts of the world, with all the major branches of 
industry severely depressed. Elsewhere in the North America and more 
significantly Canada, there soon came a fair amount of recovery and 
before the end of the decade a period of exceptional prosperity. In the 
Maritime Provinces, recovery from the acute post-war depression was 
long deferred, and the period of prosperity in most parts of the 
Dominion has not yet airived. (Saunders 1984, cited in Norrie and 
Owram 1991, p. 463)
The debate over the reasons for the dismal economic record of the Maritimes in the 20th 
century echoes the arguments presented earlier for the cause of decline. For example, 
the themes include^^ that: 1) the region was too peripheral to take advantage of indus­
trialization; 2) the primary resources of the region were no longer growth industries;
3) governmental decisions, especially in Ottawa, hampered the region rather than 
helped it; and 4) the changes in the rate structure of the Intercolonial Railway turned 
against the region and local manufacturers were not able to compete in central Canada.
Maritime grievances over the adverse economic policies of the central government led to 
the emergence of the Maritime Rights Movement in 1919. While some historians have 
characterized the movement as an opportunity for politicians of all ilks to gain some 
advantage while not addressing the real reasons for regional economic decline, Forbes 
suggests that the roots of this movement expressed the genuine sentiment of the 
populace. For Forbes, the Maritime Rights Movement
saw all classes united in their demands upon the rest of the country.
This did not mean that different classes did not have distinct aspirations 
of their own; on the contrary, they were probably more conscious of 
them in 1919 than in any other period before or since. Each class held a 
dream of progressive development in which its own collective interests
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were directly involved... But none of these aspirations was capable of 
realization with the continued decline of the economic and political status 
of the Maritimes in the Dominion. (Forbes 1989)
The 1926 Duncan Royal Commission established the legitimacy of Maritime 
grievances. However, bureaucratic stone-walling would, over time, nullify the positive 
effects brought about by the implementation of the Duncan Commission’s 
recommendations.
In Canada, most notably in the Prairie provinces, the advent of the Great Depression of 
the 1930s and early '40s gave rise to radical political and third-party movements. In the 
Maritimes, on the other hand, the responses were fundamentally apolitical and the 
central government was seen as an ally rather than a foe. According to Alan Wilson 
(1992), some of the reasons for this phenomenon include: 1) the region was already 
exhausted by the struggles of the 1920s (Cape Breton mining strikes and no post-WW I 
economic recovery); 2) a more rural and less industrialized economy that inhibited the 
formation of radical movements and which, at the same time, gave people a place to “go 
home to" during hard times; 3) no third-party traditions but instead fierce two-party 
loyalties; and 4) a tradition of resiliency in the face of economic hardship.
For many communities across North America, World War II offered a way to 
recuperate from the Great Depression, but for most Atlantic Canadians the only way to 
enjoy this prosperity was to “leave home". The fact that this recovery was not as deep 
or as long-lasting in the Maritimes as in other regions is also the subject of controversy. 
In his study of the Maritimes and the industrialization of Canada during the Second 
World War, Forbes paints a familiar picture:
While one can outline with precision the negative impact of the federal 
government’s role, its motives remain open to controversy. There was, 
of course, no conspiracy to de-industrialize the Maritimes... [but]
...their policies [e.g. withholding funds for modernization and expan­
sion of Maritime industries and drawing labour to Ontario and Quebec 
or into the armed forces],/ûr from helping to overcome trends toy/vards 
regional disparity of which some Canadians were conscious, served 
rather to accentuate and consolidate them, Howe may have sincerely 
believed, given his vision of Canada’s future development, that the 
decline of industry in the Maritimes was inevitable. If so, with the 
mobilized resources of the Canadian state at his disposal, including 
billions of dollars in direct investment, his was a powerfully self- 
fulfilling prophecy. (Forbes 1986, p. 407, emphasis added)
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In 1949 Newfoundland joined Canada. Its formal integration into the country’s political 
economy has not improved the lot of Newfoundlanders to any great extent For 
example, in 1949 personal income per capita in Newfoundland was 51% of the national 
average, while in Ontario it was 120% (Norrie and Owram, p. 594). Disparities have 
narrowed somewhat, but remain substantial. In 1982, Newfoundland had risen to 68% 
of the national average, while the richest province, Alberta, stood at 113%. However, 
if earned income rather than total personal income is taken as a measure, thereby 
excluding transfer payments, most of the narrowing disappears. Such convergence as 
there is apparently is mainly a result of transfer programmes; underlying relative 
economic strengths and weaknesses have not altered perceptibly.
6.4.2b Is Underdevelopment the Result of Market Failure, or the Inevitable 
Consequence of Capitalism ?
The liberal political economy model shares with neo-classical economics the view that 
underdevelopment results from some form of malfunction in the market, often 
attributed to a weakness in some essential economic ingredient. It is not surprising then 
that, as we have seen in the previous sections of this chapter, the Atlantic region has 
often been characterized as lacking the attributes necessary for development -  natural 
resources, capital, entrepreneurship, urban structure, skilled labour force and 
management talent. This conceptualization is also evident in many government reports. 
For example, following a neo-classical argument, the Economic Council of Canada’s 
Living Together (ECOC 1977) claims to explain the low levels of economic 
development in Atlantic Canada in terms of low levels of productivity, low levels of 
urbanization, and inadequate aggregate demand. However, this view is not without its 
critics: “while the labels have some appeal as explanatory variables, the nature of the 
explanation is less satisfying. Critics of this analysis would argue that the so-called 
explanatory variables are, in fact, the results rather than the causes of development” 
(Cannon 1984, pp. 67 and 69).
The strongest challenge to the traditional liberal paradigm of economic development has 
been posed by Marxist scholars. Since the mid-1970s, there has been a proliferation of 
writings based on this approach and alternative frameworks have been used to analyze 
the way in which capital accumulation processes create uneven regional development 
(Cannon 1984).^  ^Marxist explanations of underdevelopment can be categorized in 
most general terms as those that focus on the dynamics of class struggle and those that 
focus on other forms of unequal relationship. According to Cannon (1984), the funda­
mental research questions shared by most of the studies are: “1) how do peripheral 
regions contribute to the process of capital accumulation? 2) what are the mechanisms
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through which peripheral regions are exploited? and 3) what are the effects of the 
accumulation process on peripheral regions?”
Rather than a comprehensive literature review, analysis or categorization of the Marxist 
explanations of regional underdevelopment,this section highlights several relevant 
arguments.
Maritime de-industrialization in the 1920s has been attributed by some authors to the 
“concentration and centralization of capital in Montreal [which] produced a pattern of 
destruction and ‘branch planting’ of Maritime manufacturing [and] which led to the de­
industrialization of the region” (Clow 1984, p. 119). Clow follows a comprehensive 
approach in which the role of the Canadian state, the balance of social forces, and 
Confederation itself are seen as elements in the explanation of how uneven capitalist 
development worked itself out in the Maritimes. Clow warns of the dangers of either
1) assuming that “the process of centralization and concentration of capital is self- 
explanatory as a law of capitalist development (Sacouman 1984), or 2) romanticizing 
the process as one where “our” (“good”) Maritime capitalists were beaten by the 
(“bad”) ones from Central Canada (the view held by Forbes, Acheson and the authors 
of the “fairer-deal-within-Confederation school” as Sacouman has called them).
Frank’s (1976) work on the bitter struggles between capital and labour in the Cape Bre­
ton steel industry attempts to show how the capital accumulation process, facilitated by 
the state, resulted in the eventual redeployment of such capital to areas promising higher 
profit This work also provides a great deal of evidence for arguments supporting the 
view that Maritimers were far from passive in confronting the challenges of economic 
downturn. Instead, their struggles were simply defeated by capital and state.
Authors like Veltmeyer and Sacouman (various works) argue that “capitalist production 
has truncated and exploited domestic commodity producers [involved in pre-capitalist 
modes of production], directly through production relations and indirectly in trade 
relations” (Cannon, p. 78). However, Fairley’s (1984) work on the Newfoundland 
fishery suggests that independent commodity producers (the so-called pre-capitalists) 
are more capitalistic than was assumed, and that the struggle is better understood as that 
between small and big capital. In any event, the control of monopoly capital over 
various sectors of the economy has been well documented and has been shown to have 
a marginalizing effect on workers and on smaller competitors (Burril and Mckay 1987; 
Veltmeyer various works; Sacouman various works).
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Andre Gunder Frank’s model of underdevelopment as the result of unequal exchange 
relationships has been applied to Atlantic Canada. For authors in the “dependency” 
school, “underdevelopment is not natural but created... underdevelopment is a process 
as well as a condition. Most societies are not naturally underdeveloped; they are made 
underdeveloped largely through their contact with more developed ones” (Mathews 
1984, pp. 3-4). For these authors, assuming that the causes of underdevelopment are 
solely endogenous is akin to “blaming the victim”. The main culprits can be found in 
the exploitation first by British then U.S. interests as well as by “powerful central 
Canadian interests -  often acting in concert with and aided by the federal government, 
and too often armed with the theoretical models and justifications designed by 
‘establishment’ economists to legitimate their self interests” (Mathews, back cover, 
Archibald 1971). In a similar vein, Veltmeyer (1978) has argued that the “depressed 
conditions in peripheral regions are explained by the persistent attempts of capital to 
counter conditions [crisis] producing a falling rate of profit at the centre” (Cannon 
1984). Veltmeyer stresses the role of the “reserve army” in supplying a low-wage, 
mobile labour force which depresses wages in both the metropolis and the periphery.
The role of the intemational/inter-regional corporation as a mediator of uneven 
exchanges has been highlighted in many studies. Whether foreign investment is a 
source of technology transfer and a stimulant to the economy, or a way to exploit local 
workers and syphon off the profits from local resource exploitation is of course at the 
heart of this debate. Regardless of one’s ideological orientation, though, the evidence 
presented in case studies of companies like Michelin (Bradfield 1981) and Stora 
Kopaberg in the Round One series (Belliveau and de Marsh 1977, May, Nov.) cause 
the reader to wonder if the benefits of government locational programmes are worth the 
cost in dollars and in quality of life and work. Nevertheless, in a world of global 
integration, assuming that all foreign investment is detrimental to the region is an 
unrealistic and autarkic view. As discussed in Chapter 4, foreign companies can 
contribute to the local economy if they reinforce an existing cluster and if they are 
willing to relocate to the region higher order administrative, manufacturing and R&D 
jobs rather than just the traditional low-pay, low-skill jobs of a branch plant in an 
unrelated industry. Thus, the relevant issue is not who owns an industry, but whether 
the industry enhances the industrial structure by providing the right kind of jobs in the 
right clusters.
In Canadian policy circles, at both the national and Atlantic regional levels, the discus­
sion of “market imperfections” rarely takes into account the extraordinary degree of 
capital concentration, and horizontal and vertical integration that characterize the
Chapter 6 146
country’s industrial structure. Discussing the way in which this pattern of economic 
concentration tends to result in inefficient markets and uncompetitive practices is not 
considered polite conversation in mainstream Canadian politics or academe. However, 
it must be examined.
Francis^® (1987) has written a well-documented account of the staggering level of eco­
nomic concentration in Canada, She states that “one third of Canada’s wealth is in the 
hands of 32 families and five conglomerates” (Op Cit, back cover) whose officers also 
sit on the boards of the national banks. For Francis, “unchecked ‘free enterprisers’ 
destroy their own system, mopping up all opportunities and pushing political leaders 
towards socialist alternatives” (Op Cit, cover page). The socialist alternatives alluded to 
allow the private sector to pass the buck to the public sector on issues such as retraining 
of employees and employee benefits like severance pay.
Veltmeyer is one of the proponents of dependency theory as an explanation of 
underdevelopment in Atlantic Canada. In Canadian Corporate Power (1987) he 
examined, with more academic rigour than Francis, the extent of and economic, 
political and social implications of Canadian monopolies. His conclusions are pithy:
...what emerges... is a pattern of a giant national wheel with a Toronto- 
Montreal hub of five chartered banks dominating the many spokes” (Op 
Cit, p. 60) ...The Canadian economy is certainly not now based on 
open competition among more or less equal small business operators -  
independent commodity producers or capitalists. It is dominated by 
huge coiporations that, contrary to classical economic theory, engineer 
and control market forces, rather than respond to them. (Op Cit, p. 18)
This centralization of activity affects the region in many ways, but periiaps one of the 
most palpable is the inability of local manufacturers to sell their goods to the major retail 
conglomerates (e.g. The Bay, Zellers etc.) because their buying is done centrally.
This pattern of highly concentrated national ownership and control is replicated at the 
regional level. The extent of ownership, economic and political influence of large, 
family-owned or -controlled companies in the region is dramatic. For example, in New 
Brunswick, “one out of every 12 workers in the province is [in 1986] employed by 
Irving” (Francis 1987, p. 17). Those who do not work for the Irvings probably work 
for the McCains, given the degree of vertical and horizontal control of the industries 
they operate in. Veltmeyer quotes the National Farmers Union, The Spider and the Fly :
Here is how McCain does it [vertical integration]: First, they could 
either grow the produce themselves on [land owned by] McCain
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Produce, Valley Farms or McCain Farms (PEI)... o r ... sell you some 
seed from McCain Produce or Foreston seed to grow what they will 
later buy. Then they can sell you fertilizer from McCain Fertilizer to help 
it grow. To help you plant, harvest and cultivate your crop, they’ll sell 
you their own make of equipment, from Thomas Equipment or McBain 
Equipment. Once they’ve got your crop, they can either process it at 
McCain Foods or store it at Carleton Cold Storage while waiting and 
working for a better price through Hartland Potato brokerage. After the 
produce is processed they can ship it to Ontario, Quebec or as far west 
as Saskatchewan on their own Day & Ross trucks; or if it is a Maritime 
consignment they may use M&D Transport or one of their two other 
trucking companies. Finally, if you should decide to branch out into 
livestock, you could always buy a Holstein from McBain Sales Agency.
(quoted in Veltmeyer 1987, p. 38)
Vertical and horizontal integration bring many benefits to the companies that accrue 
them. However, when carried to the extreme, this pattern of ownership does not create 
an environment rich in entrepreneurial opportunities for those left outside of it.
Political economists are willing to ask the question: Who wields economic and political 
power and for what ends?^^ The fundamental purpose of the writings of the regional 
political economists, whether from a Marxist, dependency theory or populist perspec­
tive, seems to be to document the facts that will support their claim that “capitalism has 
failed in Atlantic Canada”. In general, the political economists blame the underdevelop­
ment of the region not on a lack of resources, talent or entrepreneurism, but on 
“capitalist development itself’ and they repudiate the capitalist system for its inability to 
provide economic efficiency with equity. Considering the evidence, maybe they are 
right -  capitalism has failed in Atlantic Canada, where neither efficiency nor equity have 
been accomplished. It appears that in Atlantic Canada the invisible hand has been tied 
with the double-strength rope of monopoly and patronage.
6.4.2c Entrepreneurial Failure -  Again ?
George (1970) suggests that modem regional underdevelopment in Nova Scotia is not 
due to differences in factor costs or to differential transportation costs, but rather to the 
region’s supply and quality of entrepreneurship. Similarly, Alexander and other 
members of the “Newfoundland School” refute the thesis that decline was inevitable. 
While acknowledging that the economic difficulties of Newfoundland were in part due 
to external causes over which Newfoundlanders had little control, the fact that Iceland 
and Norway were able to adapt successfully to similar vicissitudes suggests that 
effective action at a local level can counteract economic difficulties. Above all, these
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actions determine whether local control and models of economic development, as 
opposed to those of metropolitan regions -  national or foreign -  can be maintained In 
summary, Alexander “argues that the fundamental problems were internal and involved 
the inability and unwillingness of local leadership to adjust to changing conditions and 
the all too willing acceptance of external development initiatives” (Cannon 1984, 
p. 74). As in the case of the Maritimes described by Acheson, the legacy of this local 
“entrepreneurial failure” has been the loss of confidence in endogenous development 
initiatives, and the assumption that the solution to Newfoundland’s problems (from the 
19(X) to the present time), can be found in the promise of foreign direct investment
The alleged “complicity” of the federal government in the entrepreneurial failure of the 
Atlantic region is the source of a great deal of regional resentment. Central Canada is 
seen as having benefited from structural policies that favoured indigenous growth and 
access to a large market, while Atlantic Canada was denied such assistance. McMillan 
(1990) quotes some modem examples: quotas on autos (manufactured by U.S. 
subsidiaries in Canada for export to the U.S.) as a subsidy to Ontario workers; an 
expenditure bias in procurement on the part of the federal government in favour of 
central Canada; federal development spending is skewed towards central Canada 
(McMillan 1990, p. 25).
Contrary to the view that Atlantic Canadians are not entrepreneurial and that they are 
“inherently conservative creatures, basically satisfied with their way of life”, Brym and 
Sacouman argue that
...if formally political attempts at improvements have not been as 
successful as in, say, the Canadian west, this is due less to any inherent 
conservatism than it is to the fact that the character of regional under­
development has, at least until recently, distributed political resources so 
unevenly as to militate against widespread success.... (Brym and 
Sacouman 1979, p. 13)
In his examination of the alleged political conservatism of the region, Brym concludes:
Overall... the citizens of Atlantic Canada know well that they have little 
political power. Indeed, they manifest by far the lowest sense of what 
political scientists call ‘political efficacy’ of any group of Canadians.
‘The Little Man’, Alden Nowlan quotes his Nova Scotian father as 
saying, ‘had better learn to keep his mouth shut and his arse low’. The 
social bases of this entirely rational assessment of capabilities, and not, 
as is fi^uently claimed, any stubborn clinging to tradition or any 
illusory sense of satisfaction with one’s lot, are largely responsible for
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the long history of political conservatism in Atlantic Canada, (Brym 
1979, p. 33)
For Barret “as long as the social structure [which condones exploitive working 
conditions] and power relations remain unchanged it is utopian to think that the 
entrepreneurial class will be the harbinger of progress” (Barret 1980, p. 277).
6.5  REGIONAL DEVELOPIVIENT IN ATLANTIC CANADA - 1 9 5 0  TO 1990
There is probably no other field of government expenditure in which so 
much public money is committed but so little is known about the 
success of the policy. (Savoie 1986, p. 3)
It was not until the 1950s that academics and government officials began to look at 
economic development from a regional perspective. Since that time a substantial amount 
of public funds have been spent under the banner of regional development, not only in 
Canada, but also in most parts of the world. According to Higgins and Savoie (1988), 
the nature of federal systems makes them particularly susceptible to the call for regional 
equity. For example, in Canada “one of the most regionalized of the industrial market 
economies” (Op Cit, p. 21), the alleviation of regional disparities became a prime 
concern of federal-provincial relations. The debates over national unity have been 
closely linked with the need to lessen the disparities between the “have” and the “have 
not” provinces. In Canada, as well as in other federations,
the liberal view has come to acknowledge that particular national policies 
may have uneven impacts. Thus in a dynamic federal system, the 
principle of compensating disadvantaged regions to satisfy national 
distributional and equity goals and to assure the maintenance of certain 
economic standards has become entrenched. (Cannon 1984, p. 73)
Regional policy in Canada has traditionally had two components -  regional equity in 
services and regional economic development
The logic behind providing regional equity in services rests on the theory that demand 
can be propped up by transfer payments to individuals and by fiscal equalization 
schemes. These transfers give residents the increased purchasing power necessary to 
spur the economy, and allow “have not” provinces to provide the same level of services 
and basic standard of living as other regions. While some claim that these transfers are 
a form of “charity” that creates dependence in the recipients, others point out that it is 
the recipients* right to be treated as equals in terms of government services, regardless
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of where they live in Canada. Arguments also erupt over whether or not these transfers 
help national efficiency in terms of labour migrations.
Regional economic development policies are aimed at creating equity in employment 
and earned income among the regions by promoting economic growth. In Atlantic 
Canada, spending for structural policies to promote economic growth has been much 
less than spending in the kinds of transfers designed to compensate for lack of 
economic growth discussed above (APEC Nov.-Dee. 1990). Given that these two types 
of transfers are considered as “substitutes” -  the more the Atlantic economy expands 
through regional development spending, the less equalization or unemployment 
insurance expenditures are required -  this expenditure pattern only serves to reinforce 
the image of the region as a welfare basket case.
The next section deals with regional economic development efforts in Atlantic Canada, 
up to 1990.
6.5.1 Theories and Program s 
6.5.1a The 1950 and 1960s
Margaret Conrad suggests that the 1950s saw an “Atlantic Revolution” in terms of the 
public sector’s responsibility over the amelioration of regional disparities:
Although the Atlantic revolution fell short of its aims... it left a legacy 
which is still with us. It established the goal of regional equity within 
Confederation which is now enshrined in the Charter of Rights of 1982; 
it created a bureaucratic apparatus to fight the intercine battles that 
regional policy demands; and it sanctioned the role of the interventionist 
state at both the provincial and federal levels in dealing with regional 
disparity. (Conrad 1988, p. 61)
The 1950s and ’60s are known as the ad hoc years. Policies and programmes were 
created to deal with issues as they arose, there was no coordinated effort and the 
emphasis was on poor regions. For example, the Agricultural Rehabilitation and 
Development Administration (ARDA) and the Fund for Rural Economic Development 
(FRED) were created to deal with rural areas facing dislocation because of 
industrialization.
In the early 1960s, the federal government realized there were specific regional 
structural problems, so programmes were created to concentrate efforts on a region.
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The Atlantic Development Board (ADB) was designed to initiate major public works in 
areas of high unemployment in the Atlantic Provinces.
6.5.1b The 1970s
In 1969, the ADB was disbanded and the Department of Regional and Economic Expan­
sion (DREE) established. DREE's original mandate was to stimulate economic develop­
ment east of Trois Rivières, Quebec. Its policy initiatives were guided by Perroux’s 
“growth pole theory” ®^ and the perceived need to create “scale economies”,^  ^therefore 
efforts were concentrated in “special areas’*. The development instruments used by 
DREE included regional industrial incentives, particularly for infrastructure projects, and 
location grants. Concentration of efforts east of Trois Rivières and the design of 
projects adhering to the guidelines suggested by the growth pole theory, such as 
families of projects designed to create linkages and to foster economies of scale or the 
scale economies approach were soon abandoned.^ The enormous political pressure 
exerted on DREE resulted in the extension of the “special area designation” and the 
funding of all kinds of projects. This dilution of efforts was exacerbated by the effects 
of the 1970 Quebec crisis and the global recession.
Policy shifted again in the early 1970s. The theoretical underpinnings of policy initia­
tives shifted away from the growth pole theory towards that provided by the concept of 
“comparative advantage”^  in trade theory. Broad federal-provincial agreements called 
General Development Agreements (GDAs) were negotiated. This new approach enabled 
all sectors and all regions to qualify for assistance. Given the nationwide access to 
money, a gradual shift away from spending in Atlantic Canada began to take place. 
Despite the assertion of politicians and bureaucrats alike that policy initiatives were 
being modeled according to the exigencies of the theory of comparative advantage, an 
examination of the record suggests that there were no real policy directions, programme 
criteria or targets.
6.5.1c The Early to Mid-1980s
In 1981 DREE was combined with the Department of Industry Trade and Commerce 
and the new Department of Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE) was created. The 
principal instruments of DRIE were the Industrial and Regional Development Programs 
(IRDP) which allowed companies anywhere in Canada to apply for assistance, although 
the level of assistance varied according to a Development Index and Economic and 
Regional Development Agreements (ERDA), which replaced GDAs (mostly in name). 
DRIE was centrally managed and the new emphasis on national priorities and industrial
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incentives favoured spending in Atiantic Canada even less than under DREE. Atlantic 
Canadian development initiatives were centred on resource-based megaprojects, 
particularly in offshore oil and gas.
There were some Atlantic region-specific efforts like the Atiantic Enterprise Program 
which provided subsidies and other forms of assistance, and Cape Breton Development 
Corporation (DEVCO) whose mandate was to diversify Cape Breton’s coal and steel- 
dependent economy. Other programmes also provided incentives like cash grants, tax 
breaks and the construction of industrial parks.
6.5.1d The Mid to Late 1980s
In the mid to late 1980s, emphasis began to move towards spending in Atlantic Canada 
again. In June 1987, the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA) was 
announced. The fact that ACOA was locally rather than centrally managed was con­
sidered a great leap forward- It took over the initiatives and the staff of DRIE and other 
regional programmes, but with a $1.5 billion budget to manage. ACOA’s role was one 
of: policy advocacy (promoting local development), coordination of joint development 
projects), cooperation (managing cost-shared programmes) and action (assistance to 
businesses, particularly to small and medium-sized businesses with projects worth $20 
million or less). ACOA funded a wide range of programmes and initiatives and in 
general terms was guided by a Schumpeterian vision of the primacy of entrepreneurship 
in development and growth (ACOA 1988). In 1989, the federal budget was drastically 
cut, severely hampering the range of initiatives that could be undertaken under ACOA 
sponsorship.
In the 1980s there was a perceptible shift in the definition of development from one 
where development was synonymous with growth in the output of goods and services 
towards a more holistic view of development emphasizing societal well-being.^ The 
concern over endogenous solutions to development problems, the dignity of workers 
and citizens in less-developed countries and regions, and the need to foster self-reliance 
through entrepreneurship came out of the realization that it is people who make a 
development strategy work.^ Moreover, not only were individuals important in the 
success of development initiatives, but so was the “community’s cohesion”.
In this view, “disadvantaged regions” were defined as those not using their local 
resources well. Therefore, development initiatives were designed to mobilize the econo­
mic and social potential of communities, promote efficiency and equity, prevent the per-
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petuation of a brain drain, and create stable and self-sustaining growth. Ideas and 
capital did not have to be imported; the community could generate them themselves by 
initiating and managing projects that met community objectives. Communities needed to 
be given the opportunity to build on their strengths. Also, within this approach, devel­
opment did not have to be centred in urban or industrial areas, but could take place in 
rural or semi-rural settings where a considerable percentage of the Atlantic population 
live.
Policy initiatives subscribing to this view were generally classified under the rubric of 
Local Development and Community Economic Development The range of projects is 
quite broad. For example, in Nova Scotia alone: 1) several Community Development 
Corporations were established with the purpose of organizing communities (geographic 
communities and ethnic groups), and 2) the Coady Institute carried on with the social 
gospel work of Moses Coady, not only locally but internationally. The Antigonish 
Movement^ which Coady founded during the Depression, advocates self-help and 
dignity through education, cooperatives, credit unions, and joint work programmes.^
The Economic Council of Canada hailed this approach as the new direction of develop­
ment and concluded their study of community economic development by remarking that
this approach can revitalize the economies of small and isolated commu­
nities, some of the regions that are themselves depressed.... The activities 
that have the best chance of success are those which build on local human 
resource and information infrastructure, so that the community begins to 
respond to market opportunities and to foster entrepreneurship in a diverse 
array of projects... public sector assistance [should be applied] in ways 
that do not stifle the enthusiasm and innovativeness of local development 
organizations ... o r ... local control. (ECOC 1990, p. 18)
6.5.2 Have These Efforts Been Successful?
According to APEC (1987), efforts aimed at creating regional equity in services have 
been relatively successful. However, regional economic development efforts have not 
fared as well. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Atlantic Canada is still 
underdeveloped -  it is dependent on transfers and has lower levels of development and 
income. Thus, traditional approaches to regional development have come under strong 
criticism because they have not managed to close the economic gap between the 
provinces. Critics claim that the federal government does too little (APEC 1989), too 
much (Courchene and Melvin 1986), or something in between, such as spending in too 
dispersed a manner (Savoie 1986). Some of the criticism centres on the theories and
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policies being advanced, while other critics highlight the inefficiencies in the adminis­
tration of economic development programmes (Savoie 1987,1990).
6.5.2a To Aid or Not to Aid?
The pursuit of parity among the provinces, which has been for several decades the 
driving force behind the economic development initiatives of the various levels of the 
federal and provincial governments of Canada, has come under strong criticism. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, some critics claim that the concern over parity in national 
economic policy has blurred the line between economic and social policy (D’Cruz and 
Fleck 1985), and has resulted in considerable “market imperfections” which have made 
market adjustment mechanisms inoperative. These critics also maintain that “economic 
policy should be directed towards baking more pie, not towards how the pie is to be 
divided among the country’s regions and income groups” (Op Cit, p. xiii). The return 
to the “market driven” economy that they advocate will require a rethinking of economic 
development strategy, where government intervention and assistance in the Atlantic 
region is likely to be further curtailed and supplanted by “a hands-off resource 
allocation process” (Ibid), and where the competitiveness and productivity of the 
private sector become the new engine for growth. Opponents of the “restructuring” that 
a return to a market-driven economy demands warn that, for the Atlantic region, 
“baking more pie” might become analogous to “let them eat cake”.
The distorting effect of government subsidies on the competitiveness of markets is well 
documented and can perhaps be described by using a Darwinian analogy. Assuming 
that the level playing field of a free market has the ability to reward successful 
adaptation to the vagaries of environmental change, what the past development policies 
have created in Atlantic Canada is a distorted jungle.
Once upon a time, all the animals in the Jungle were concerned with 
adapting to their habitats and did the “normal” things that adapting spe­
cies do. In order to reduce inequities among the subjects and keep the 
Jungle together as one nation, the King of the Jungle decided to make 
contributions to some of the animals in order to reduce their plight For 
example. Giraffes were given GRP grants. Being a small Jungle, the 
Hippos soon heard there was free food for Giraffes (GRP grants), and 
they decided to dress up like Giraffes in order to get GRP grants. They 
were so successful at getting GRP grants that they gave up behaving like 
Hippos. Soon after. Elephants lobbied effectively for their share of 
Royal largesse and the GRP grants had to be discontinued. By Royal 
decree, the GRP food was to be supplanted by Grants for Elephants 
(GFE). After a brief crisis. Hippos realized that they had become adept at 
the art of impersonating Giraffes and receiving GRP grants, and that they
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stood a good chance of obtaining GFEs too. They realized they could 
look like Elephants if they managed to turn their newly acquired Giraffe 
necks into trunks, if ever so awkwardly. Soon, there was a Jungle of 
impersonators involved in short-term trickery to take advantage of a 
Jungle Development programme or two. They were no longer evolving 
and adapting to the real changes in the environment. Hippos with 
Giraffe necks as Elephant trunks cannot adapt — or compete. Their long­
term survival will be based on acknowledging these distortions, 
shedding their trappings and remembering who they are -  Hippos.
(Sagebien 1990)
6.5.2b The Public Sector Report Card
Perhaps one of the most compelling arguments for the failure of economic development 
policies, regardless of their theoretical basis or the structure or locus of control of the 
administrative delivery apparatus (centralized vs. locally managed bureaucracy), has 
been presented by Savoie in his various treatises on politicians and the politics of public 
spending in Canada (Savoie 1987,1990). He points out that
the failure of Canada’s regional policies results as much from the way 
they [the policies] have been applied as from the incomplete theories on 
which they were based [Savoie 1987, p. 227].. .Regional development 
theories and approaches, it seems, are something to be trotted out for 
press conferences but should not be expected to interfere with how 
decisions are actually made... [Op Cit, p. 225] [And] the provincial 
premiers have obviously mastered the rhetoric of regional alienation and 
national industrial strategy has been shaped by the often conflicting 
interests of 11 interventionist governments. (Tupper, in Savoie Op Cit,
p. 216)
The result is that policies lack coherence and the theories that underlie them have been 
stretched beyond recognition. Like Lithwick before him, Savoie reminds us that the 
“marriage of good analysis and good administration” has yet to take place in Canada:
As a result, Canada has never been able to mount effective and coherent 
development planning. It is also impossible to test how the various 
theories or approaches have worked in Canada because the necessary 
requirements have never been respected, even in their broadest terms.
Thus, Canada has not been able to pursue a comprehensive strategy 
because it has never been determined which of the elements of a particu­
lar programme should be retained or discarded. (Savoie Op Cit, p. 226)
There are many regional examples of good analysis and good policy frameworks. For 
example, the dual call made by the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council in The Atlantic 
Vision -1990  (APEC 1980), for a regional alliance that can facilitate interprovincial
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cooperation in trade and policy-making, and for the improvement of our “develop­
mental software” (human skills) is still being made a decade later. But it has not been 
answered in terms of results.
The concluding chapters of Savoie’s (1986) Regional Econome Development -  
Canada* s Search for Solutions are an impassioned plea for better management of 
programmes in terms of objectives, organizational design, adequate instruments and 
measures of effectiveness. While the design of ACOA incorporated some of Savoie’s 
recommendations, the disappointing fate of the programme stands instead as further 
evidence of the government’s inconsistent approach to development In 1989, federal 
government budget cuts severely hampered the Agency’s effectiveness by extending its 
mandate for two years with no corresponding increase in funding, and making signifi­
cant adjustments to eligibility requirements. Thus, the government made the “old 
mistake of changing regional policy horses in mid-stream... ACOA never really got off 
the ground before its wings were clipped” (APEC 1989, p. 3). Criticisms of the Agency 
include: that its overhead consumed a great deal of its resources even though the 
programme was severely understaffed; that in the initial excitement too many funds 
were committed early on and with little analysis of the projects involved; that taxpayers’ 
money was used to fund dubious projects which resulted in high-profile business 
failures; that the tourism infrastructure was overbuilt to the detriment of the industry as 
a whole; and that investment was discriminatory to those that did not receive assistance. 
ACOA has met its mandate of job creation though. According to an ACOA official “about 
20,(XX) jobs had been created in its [the Agency’s] first three years {Globe and Mail, 
Oct. 17,1991). Unfortunately, in 1991, the unemployment rate in all four provinces 
increased and the GDP change rate for the region was negative.
Perhaps it is in the administration of the policies, and in the structure of the delivery 
mechanisms themselves, that the obstacles can be found. McNiven has shown how the 
federal/provincial funding formulas actually tend to retard development because the 
regions are not given the right incentives to develop:
Not only are individuals subject to the welfare trap; so are the poor pro­
vinces.... The [equalization] payments are based on a complex formula 
that is related to the indicators of fiscal capacity. If a recipient province’s 
economy were to improve relative to national averages, then the equali­
zation payments would be reduced. There is no real incentive to get ‘off 
the dole’. In fact, there may be a disincentive, since there is no guaran­
tee that the relative prosperity of the recipient province’s economy will 
generate tax returns that would be equivalent to the lost equalization
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revenues that otherwise would be realized through a federal formula and 
payments. (McNiven 1986, p. 81)
In The Politics o f Public Spendings Savoie (1990) explains how regional development 
has degenerated into a grab bag for federal funds where: 1) governments lobby for their 
“share of the waste” in order to spend public funds in every conceivable commercial 
activity and, 2) where most businessmen, even though they do not believe these 
programmes will lead to broad-based economic development, justify participating in 
subsidy grabbing because of a mixture of entitlement to their “share of the waste”, and 
of fear that if they do not get the grant, their competitors will. In his review of The 
Politics o f Public Spendings Michael Bliss (1990) warns that “The enemy is us: As a 
people we seem to have lost the discipline fundamental to the survival of a healthy 
nation.... The mania among Canada’s people and politicians to secure a place in the 
public trough is slowly, but surely, destroying the country” (Ibid).
The end result is that the public sector lacks the incentive to manage regional develop­
ment programmes effectively because the funding formulas work against such an 
approach, and the private and public sector “culture” that surrounds the delivery of 
these programmes is counterproductive.
As far as alternative models of development are concerned, while this approach has 
many inherent advantages and shows great potential, the effects of community and local 
development initiatives will usually be limited if the programmes are not supported by 
overall economic policy or given power and resources to implement recommendations. 
These programmes must be tied to a larger vision of development and adequately 
supported by the public sector in order to avoid becoming a “nation of souvenir 
makers”. In sum, hitching the wagon of development to the engines of community 
corporations without “leveling the playing field”, by providing adequate public support 
and by redressing their relative weakness vis à vis banks and the highly concentrated 
private sector, is likely to result in a vehicle breakdown. Moreover, the rationale for 
supporting these programmes must not be used as a justification of government 
retrenchment in overall economic development spending. Community economic 
development without the adequate level of public policy support could quickly qualify 
this strategy for inclusion in the inventory of development follies along with growth 
poles, cargo cults and megaprojects.
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6.6  CONCLUSION
6.6.1 The Historical Analysis
As the earlier analysis has shown, there is a plethora of interpretations of Atlantic 
Canadian decline. Nevertheless, several themes recur throughout the literature of the 
various schools. Among them: 1) entrepreneurial failure to adapt to new technologies 
and develop new markets (Saunders); to invest in local industrial interests (Acheson 
and Alexander); to maintain local control of resources (Alexander); to use resources 
efficiently and innovatively (George, ACOA documents); 2) soft markets for resources 
and labour (Saunders; Veltmeyer); 3) capital drain (Mathews; Frank; Frost; Clow);
4) the co-existence of various modes of production (so called pre-capitalists vs. capita­
list; or small vs. big capitalists) (Veltmeyer, Sacouman); 5) the effects of government 
policy (Acheson; Frank; Frost; Forbes; almost all Marxists writers consider the state to 
be an agent for capital; and while most liberal economists recognize the uneven spatial 
effects of government policy there is considerable debate about the desirability of 
economic intervention ); and 6) centralization of power and control and colonial legacy.
All of these themes contain some truth, but none can convincingly claim to be the key, 
major or root cause of underdevelopment. The composite picture reveals a syndrome of 
symptoms or a dysfunctional system. Addressing any one of these symptoms through 
policy initiatives without addressing the rest is likely to result in failure. Moreover, 
ignoring the contributions of authors whose explanatory frameworks one does not 
subscribe to is counterproductive because each of these explanations is a point in this 
composite picture. Thus, a useful analysis of these historical interpretations would be 
incomplete without an examination of the contributions and shortcomings of the various 
theoretical approaches.
The Marxist paradigm shares with the liberal political economy approach what I 
consider to be a sensible and necessary regard for the context of economic analysis and 
policy making. Its understanding of the unequal power relationships between classes 
and regions, the deleterious effect of monopoly capital (foreign or domestic) and of 
compliant governments and local elites cannot be simply ignored, as it often is by 
orthodox economists. However, the “complicity” of the capitalist class, of trans­
national corporations and of the state in the underdevelopment of the region is once 
again a matter of whether one regards them as “active participants” in a “conspiracy” to 
drain the region of its resources and keep its workers powerless, or as rational econo­
mic agents somewhat “naively” out to safeguard their own interests with unfortunate
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consequences for others. The fact remains, though, that capitalist rationality has had 
deleterious effects on the development of the region, whether unintended or not
Nevertheless, I find three major weaknesses with the “application” of the Marxist 
analysis: 1) an excessive theoretical rigidity^® which attributes all ills to Capitalism with 
a capital “C* and is therefore unable to articulate a solution within existing structures 
(e.g. there is no manual for dependency theory economic development); 2) the fact that, 
short of revolution, traditional Marxist policy prescriptions are not feasible in the 
Atlantic Canadian context; and 3) that the experience of the Asian Dragons in “getting 
the prices right”, when contrasted to that of Latin American countries pursuing “import 
substitution policies”, suggests that the participating in the international market is, after 
all, a good idea.
While I consider myself firmly planted in the liberal camp, and in general favour market 
solutions over government intervention, I also consider neo-classical economic analysis 
impractical and unrealistic as long as it is based solely on econometric exercises and 
divorced from the realities of its socio-political and historical context. Thus the issue for 
the proponents of liberal solutions is to make sure that in the pursuit of neo-classical 
economic models realism is not abandoned for the sake of theoretical and analytical 
elegance. As the political economists of both ilks (liberal and Marxist) will attest, we 
unfortunately live in a world of irrational people with fuzzy emotions, organized in 
groups with uneven power.
6.6.2 In Which Direction is the Policy Pendulum Swinging?
As was examined in the national context in Chapter 5 and will be examined in the 
regional context in Chapter 7, in the 1990s Keynesian policies have lost much of their 
appeal. In addition, the policies advocated by the Atlantic Canadian left -  more state 
control, union power, centralized planning, more generous equalization transfers, 
resistance to structural adjustments -  have also fallen into disrepute. The direction that 
regional development policy has taken in the late 1980s and early ’90s is certainly that 
advocated by Courchene -  policy has moved “towards adjustment (efficiency), towards 
decentralization, and towards reliance on private sector participation” (Courchene and 
Melvyn 1986, p. 66).
But how was this direction set? According to Higgins and Savoie (1988),
In many ways, the influence of each paradigm has waxed or waned
more in tune with general economic circumstances and prevalent poli-
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tical mood of the country than on its own merits. It seems that in times 
of growth, and when governments place a priority on redistributive 
policies, government measures for promoting regional development are 
favoured. When governments retrench on redistributive policies, 
regional development programmes tend to be cut back, and observers 
invariably point to the neo-classical approach as the way ahead for 
regional policy. (Higgins and Savoie 1988, p. 381)
Unfortunately, as discussed in Chapter 5, the current emphasis of national industrial 
policies on the winners rather than the losers could prove disastrous to the “have-not” 
provinces.
6.6.3 The State of the Art in Regional Economic Development
Higgins and Savoie (1988)^9 have characterized the current state of regional analysis 
policy and planning as “yeasty” and “transitional”. There are debates associated with 
political/economic orientation; people vs. place prosperity; national efficiency vs. 
regional equity etc.^ ® Higgins and Savoie state that there is no single economic theory 
that can explain regional disparities or a proven model for ameliorating them. They trace 
some of the disappointment with regional development models and initiatives in part to 
earlier exaggerated expectations about the effect of government intervention on the 
regional economy and to the naïve belief that some sort of panacea or wonder drug 
could be found. As Nigel Spence of the London School of Economics suggests, any 
one of the regional development instruments by itself -  infrastructure projects, 
subsidies, tax breaks, training centres etc. -  is “necessary but not sufficient” to spur 
development (Spence 1990). It is as if regional policy-makers were being asked to 
replicate the work of Dr. Frankenstein^^ -  first assemble all of the parts of the body and 
then activate them with that mysterious spark that can give it life. As for regional 
economic development, so far the parts have been assembled, but the spark of life is 
proving to be more elusive.
Higgins and Savoie also note that recently there is more of a willingness on the part of 
politicians, policy-makers and citizens alike to realize that there will always be regional 
differences and that these disparities need not always be eliminated (at least in theory) 
through policy interventions. As Richard Lipsey puts it:
For all the concern about regional area development and regional prob­
lems in Canada, we do not really have an underlying theory. We do not 
know what we would have to do, what are the conditions under which 
there would be regional equality, however we define equality. (Lipsey, 
in Savoie 1986, p. 5)
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Despite all the debates, the disappointments, and the lack of conclusive evidence point­
ing towards effective regional policy frameworks, two things can be concluded: 1) that 
should some form of federal structure with or without Quebec continue, federal and 
provincial regional development initiatives will not disappear completely firom the 
Canadian scene for the simple reason that they are an aspect of national cohesion, and
2) that the “have not” regions, which were probably better off thanks to regional policy 
expenditures than they would have been otherwise, will have to do a lot of serious 
thinking about surviving the retrenchment of public expenditure in regional develop­
ment. Unfortunately, as far as theories and approaches which might guide the future of 
regional development policies, Savoie points out that senior researchers in the field 
admit that considerable uncertainty still exists. He quotes the Economic Council of 
Canada:
Doctors used to try to cure syphilis with mercury and emetics. We know 
that mercury works but emetics do not and, moreover, that penicillin is 
best of all. We suspect that the regional disparity disease is presently 
being treated with the mercury and emetic-type remedies, but we don’t 
know which is which. Perhaps one day an economic penicillin will be 
found. (ECOC, in Savoie 1986, p. 21)
6.6.4 What Does Quebec Have that Atlantic Canada Does Not? -  Quebec Inc.
In the 1960s, French Canadians in C^ebec earned 64% of the national average income. 
Over half of those aged 20 and over had not reached grade 8 and only 2% of students 
went to university. In spite of constituting 80% of the population, they owned only 
20% of Quebec’s manufacturing sector and 47% of the total commercial sector (Fortin
1990). In the 1990s, however, two-thirds of the productivity gap with Ontario has been 
closed, almost all teenagers go through grade 8 and over 20% of students make it to 
university. The income gap between Francophones and others is no more than 10%. 
Francophones own 40% of the manufacturing and 62% of the total commercial sector, 
and run 27 of the 50 fastest-growing public companies in Canada, and Quebec com­
panies spend more on R&D than the rest of the country. How did they do it?
There are, of course, many explanations for this phenomenon. However, Fortin’s list 
of the key factors in the economic modernization of Quebec provides a good overview 
of the province’s development experience:
1) The educational revolution with its emphasis on economics and 
business, and the development of a strong, self-reliant, market oriented 
mentality.
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2) The shrewd evolution of the provincial government from being the 
main engine of economic progress in the 1960s to becoming the oil 
which helps the business engine run smoothly in the 1980s.
3) The widespread understanding that competitiveness in the long run is 
the product of four key ingredients: (i) the quality of manpower, (ii) 
technological innovativeness, (iii) the stability of the financial environ­
ment, and (iv) a reasonable level of taxation; and the willingness to act 
decisively upon the environment to make them happen.
4) The very strong sense o f community across regions, industries, and 
social groups, which is r^ected  in tightly knit cooperative institutions.
(Fortin 1990, emphasis added)
The experience of Quebec is a bright spot in the picture of Canadian regional develop­
ment. As will be examined in the next chapter, regional development policy in Atlantic 
Canada has incorporated Mr. Fortin’s first two key factors and most of the third. 
Unfortunately, if Fortin’s four elements are part of a synergistic whole, Atlantic 
Canadian economic development policy will once again result in failure, in part because 
policy-makers and politicians alike have not managed to incorporate the last element of 
the third key factor- the willingness to act decisively. Fortin’s fourth key factor could 
be regarded as Quebec’s projet de société, or in economic terms, Quebec Inc. In 
Atlantic Canada regional institutions -  provinces, counties, universities, small 
communities -  are instead characterized not by their cooperativeness or common 
purpose, but by their petty squabbles for territory, and their demands for their “share of 
the waste”.
In order to achieve the elusive dream of economic development, Atlantic Canadian 
scholars, artists, politicians and populace, will have to face the challenge of discovering 
the inherent base of the region’s confidence, and then articulating a new vision based 
on this rediscovered confidence. In the words of Fleming (1988), Atlantic Canadians 
must move beyond
mere ‘anger’ about de-industrialization, central Canadian exploitation, 
capitalist underdevelopment, federal government recalcitrance, or top 
down arrogance and stupidity... [as well as beyond].. .mere ‘longing’ 
for communities past and missed or present and threatened [Fleming 
1988, p. 12]... [and instead]... actively and collectively create their 
own circumstances. (Ibid)
The shift towards self-reliance and endogenous development is examined in the next 
chapter.
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ENDNOTES
 ^ Regionalism has always played an important part in Canadian social, cultural and ectmomic 
history. The country as a whole has often b e^  compared to a collection o f regionally based 
societies, and to a mosaic o f cultures. While the question of what constitutes a region (geography, 
language etc.) is of some importance to this analysis, for the sake of simplicity and te^vity I will 
not explore the subject in this work. Instead, I have taken the existence of Canadian regions, of 
which Atlantic Canada is one, as a given. For a discussion of regionalism in Canada see: Westafll 
(1980); Lithwick (1980) and Stevenson (1980).
2 See inter alia Cannon (1984), Norrie and Owram (1990), Weaver and Gunton (1982), APEC (1987), 
Morley (1986), Barret (1980).
3 See the works of Thomas Courchene.
4 Soderlund et al. (1990) rate the importance of the political, economic, cultural and geopolitical 
dimensions differently. Their ccxitent analysis o f the debates o f the Confedoation era concluded that 
"our analysis discloses the primacy of political consideration [over the other three] in the process 
of Confederation in decision-making in Canada.
5 The Canadian predilection for activist industrial policies can also, in part, be attributed to its 
daunting geography. While in the U.S. the westward expansion was fueled by the myth of rugged 
individualism, in Canada the hardships of opening up the Canadian Rockies and and the Canadian 
Shield necessitated a more collective endeavour fostered by the state {Economist, June 29,1991).
 ^ Michael Bliss (1982) has been careful to point out that the term Naticxial Policy was used in the 
19th century to refer exclusively to the tariff barriers that were erected between the U.S. and 
Canada. He suggests that historians have mistakenly assumed that the National Policy was a 
coha^ntly designed industrial policy which included railway constructicxi and the development of 
manufacturing behind tariff walls. While these policies w ^e implemented, they happened in an ad 
hoc manner and were not part of a grand national design: "The imputation of a clear, planned and 
effective relationship between a National Policy of protective tariffs and Canada’s other national 
policies is actually an intellectual construct, imposed after the fact by economists looking 
backward through glasses tinted by a pref^ence for rationality and clarity” (Bliss 1982, p. 18). 
However, whether coherently design^ or ad hoc, the result of this collection of policies could be 
said to qualify the new Dominion as a "developmental state” engaged in the pursuit o f activist 
industrial policies.
 ^ Canada did not change its legal status as a colony to that of a fully indqwndent sova^eign state 
within the British Commonwealth until 1931.
 ^ It is interesting to note that in the late 1800s constituencies already competed fîercely with each 
other in attracting foreign branch plants through a system of "bonuses” to industry. This pattern is 
still in effect in the 1990s and was a primary "development tool” in the 1970s.
 ^ Reciprocal free-trade agreements between Canada and the U.S. were being explwed even during this 
period of pxotectionist sentiment, but it would take ovct a century to establish a mutually 
agreeable treaty. In an interesting twist of fate, in the 1980s, it was the Conso-vative party that 
argued fœ  free-trade, rather than for protectionism.
 ^^  McIntosh’s narrow version of the staple theory is similar to Douglas North’s "economic base” 
^^ jToach.
 ^  ^ At first to those of Britain and then of the U.S.
 ^^  Rates, tariffs and mtrepreneurs form part o f alternative e?qplanations of regional decline.
 ^^  It can be argued that if regional mâchants had had a long^-run perspective the investment required 
for the industrialization of the Atlantic region would have occurred. Apparently, merchants in the 
19th century suffered from the same short-run mentality that afflicts modem managers. Efforts to 
create local venture capital pools and investment vehicles that invest in local stocks have failed 
repeatedly.
 ^^  See Norrie and Owram (1991), pp. 452-463.
 ^^  Atlantic Canada shares with the Western and Prairie povinces the tradition of grievances against 
central Canada. According to Arsenault (1991) "what interlocks the Atlantic and Prairie regions is 
the belief that they are outgunned in national politics, and that as a consequence they have been 
economically exploited by central Canada” (p. 14). While the lack of political voice can be seen as 
the result o f a lack o f economic power in Atlantic Canada and in the Prairies, in the case o f the 
West the economic power gained in the 1980s has not been convoked into political power for
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Western and Prairie provinces during prosperous years. Western alienation has “persisted and 
intensified in Alberta and Saskatchewan”.
16 See Cannon (1984); Barret (1980) and Sager (1987).
 ^^  This theme is addressed in a subsequent section.
18 Diane Francis is a journalist not associated with the left
1 ^  See Burrill and McKay (1987), Brym and Socouman (1979).
2 0 The theory of “Growth Poles” was advanced by Francois Perroux and later refined by Boudeville. In
general tom s the theory suggests that growth does not occur naturally and evenly, but at poles of 
growth with various intensities, and that certain propulsive industries act as the “engines” for 
growth in these poles. The policy implications of this theory are to encourage clustering in urban 
“special areas” in retarded régirais that wrae deemed to have the potential for n^id and sustained 
growth. The growth pole theory resembles Porter’s clusters discussed in Chapter 4. See Perroux 
(1988) for a recent discussion of the notion o f poles o f development
21 Another way to increase the effects of clustering is to encourage industries in various sectors to 
develop close together and be accessible to each other as buyers and suppliers. H iis “one stop 
shopping” enables better access to labour, resources and infrastructure. The policy responses centre 
around the creation of industrial parks.
Critics of both of these approaches maintain that there are also dis-economies of size, that quality 
of life suffers during agglomeration, and that there is no need for large-scale projects in a post­
industrial economy. Savoie further suggests that waiting for development to happen by simply 
building an industrial park is analogous to the “Cargo Cult” in the South Pacific where natives 
built airplane runways and waited for the silver birds (U.S. military planes) that had once brought 
food and supplies to return.
23 The notion of “comparative advantage” is part of the “export-base” model of growth, where 
development depends on increased exports, which in turn create linkages to the service sector, 
multiplying the growth effect Whether dealing with a region or a country, its economic potential 
can be best realized by concentrating on its economic strengths -  its comparative advantage. 
Exports also create foreign currency for imports. While intuitively appealing, this model also has 
its critics. See the discussion of comparative vs. competitive advantages in Chapters 1 and 2.
24 See for example Doug Houses’ work on Newfoundland (1988).
25 The roots of this view of development can be traced to Schumacher’s (1973) seminal work Small 
is Beautiful. Economics as if people mattered. Schumacher advocated development policies that 
fostered participatory development, bottom up planning education and training, and the transfer and 
use of adequate technology.
2 6 The Antigonish Movement in Nova Scotia bears great resemblance to the Sarvodaya Movement in 
Sri Lanka. They are both self-help social gospel movements, the former based on Christian 
principles and the latter on Buddhist ones.
27 Wilson (1992) suggests that the Antigonish Movement failed to translate its objectives beyond a 
social gospel and into a broader political dialogue which could have increased the movement’s 
power base and impact on the region.
2 8 For example, some authors in the most radical camp reject growth in the peripheral region as a 
possibility, despite empirical evidence to the con tr^  (e.g. the NICs).
2 9 This work can be considered representative of the “state o f the art” in regional economic develop­
ment in the late 1980s. It is based rai a collection of papers presented by distinguished Canadian 
and international scholars at a conference organized by the Canadian Institute fra Research on 
Regional Development, held in Grand Pré, Nova Scotia, in 1985.
3^ See Lithwick (1982) fra a critique o f Canadian regioanal policy-making.
31 Accrading to Hindle (1985), Mary Shelley’s classic novel Frankenstein expresses Mrs. Shelley’s 
view of the idealism that characterized hra husband Pracy as well as many of their contemporaries. 
This romantic idealism with its overarching heroes is “based in man’s, or more correctly men*s 
‘divine’ or creative powers. It is Mary Shelley’s critique of where such highly abstracted creative 
powers can lead when put in a ‘realizing’ scientific context and thrai driven along with ‘lofty 
ambition’ and ‘high destiny’ that we see in the pages of Frankenstein"* (Hindle, introduction to 
Frankenstein, 1985 edition, p. 19)
CHAPTER 7
THE 3  C s -  CO M PETITIV EN ESS, COOPERATION AND CONSTITUTION. 
REGIONAL POLICY IN ATLANTIC CANADA IN THE 1 9 9 0 s
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Regional development policy-making in Atlantic Canada has become a very difficult 
exercise in the 1990s. On the economic front, planners must simultaneously grapple 
with: 1) the forces of globalization; 2) the impact of the U.S./Canada Free Trade Agree­
ment (soon to be NAFTA); 3) the Canadian and U.S. recessions; 4) increased world­
wide competition in commodities; 5) crisis conditions in the resource sectors; 6) the 
rippling effects of the tight monetary policy of the late 1980s; and 7) the 1991 Goods 
and Services Tax. On the political front, they must contend with: 1) the recent Canadian 
constitutional crisis; 2) the continuing threat of a sovereign Quebec; and 3) a growing 
distrust of both politicians and the private sector as leaders. Compounding the problem 
is the fact that planners also face uncertainty over which development policies are more 
effective, just at the time when policy options are severely restricted by fiscal restraint 
in Ottawa. In sum, the economic and political problems of the region are reaching crisis 
proportions, confidence in economic prescriptions of the past is faltering, the federal 
and provincial coffers are empty, and there is not yet a person, group or sector that can 
take charge of leading the region through the messy years ahead.
Responses to these vicissitudes have come from all quarters of Atlantic Canadian soc­
iety. The federal government, the various provincial governments, the private sector, 
labour and academics have all developed plans and initiatives. This chapter examines 
the major themes of development policy developed at the Atlantic Canadian, Maritime 
and provincial levels from 1990 to 1992. In this way it sets the regional planning 
context in which “Creating Our Own Future” was developed, and introduces some of 
the arguments that will be used in the evaluation of Voluntary Planning in Part IV.
The chapter begins by presenting a composite picture of the Atlantic Canadian economy 
in the early 1990s. Chapter 7 then examines the nature of regional development policy 
finom 1990 to 1992 by taking a look at the development policy documents prepared by 
the major agencies charged with economic planning: the Atlantic Provinces Economic 
Council, the Council of Maritime Premiers and the four Atlantic provincial govern­
ments. The chapter organizes the discussion around the three primary themes evident in 
these policy documents: 1) competitiveness, 2) cooperation, and 3) constitution -  what
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I have termed the “3 Cs”.^  These descriptive sections are followed by an analysis of the 
3 Cs within the Atlantic Canadian political economy. Chapter 7 ends with a discussion 
of the “learning disabilities” that hinder development in the region. This section couches 
the arguments presented in Chapters 6 and 7 in the language of Senge’s (1990) 
“learning organizations” presented in Part II of the thesis, and sets the rationale for 
several of the recommendations presented in Chapter 12.
7.2 THE ATLANTIC CANADIAN ECONOMY
The basic demographic statistics of the Atlantic region were presented in Chapter 6. 
Section 7.2 complements this overview by providing a summary of the Atlantic 
Canadian economy. It presents the main economic indicators for 1990-1992, a near- 
term forecast and a more detailed outlook for Nova Scotia, the setting for the case 
study. The section draws heavily from several documents prepared by APEC. The rest 
of Chapter 7 catalogues and analyzes the responses that regional policy-makers have 
given to these vicissitudes.
7.2.1 1990-1992
Disparities between Atlantic Canada and the rest of the country have remained wide for 
several decades. Most of the narrowing in these disparities has been due to transfers 
from Ottawa rather than to greater productivity, or to increases in GDP. Personal and 
earned income remain below the Canadian average (Exhibits 1 and 2) as does real per 
capita GDP (Exhibit 3). Regional unemployment has also remained higher than the 
national average (Exhibit 4).
EXHIBIT 1
Personal Incom e per P erson  of Atlantic Provinces, a s  a  Percen tage  of Canada, 1926-1984
120%
100%
Canada -  100%
Atlantic Provinces
60%
1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985
Source; Statistics Canada 13-213
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EXHIBIT 2
Earning Income per Person of Atlantic Provinces, 
a s  a  P e rcen tag e  of C anada, 1 9 2 6 -1 9 8 4
120%-
100%
80% -
60% -
40%
Canada = 100%
Atlantic Provinces
— I---------1---------- 1--------- 1----------1----------1----------1----------1----------1----------1----------'----------1
1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985
Source: Statistics C anada 13-213
EXHIBIT 3
C anada and A tlantic C anada 
Real Per-C apita  GDP
$ thousands (1981)/year
20
15
CANADA
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Atlantic Region
5
0
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88
Source: Provincial Economic Accounts; Bank of Canada
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EXHIBIT 4
U nem ploym en t Rate, A tlantic P ro v in ces  an d  C anada, 1 9 6 6 -1 9 8 6
Percent of Labour Force
Newfoundland/
Labrador
Prince Edward 
Island
Nova Scotia New Brunswick Canada
1966 5.8 - 4.7 5.3 3.4
1967 5.9 - 4.9 5.2 3.8
1968 7.1 - 5.1 5.7 4.5
1969 7.4 - 4.9 6.7 4.4
1970 7.3 - 5.3 6.3 5.7
1971 8.4 - 7.0 6.1 6.2
1972 9.2 10.8 7.0 7.0 6.2
1973 10.0 - 6.6 7.7 5.5
1974 13.0 - 6.8 7.5 5.3
1975 14.0 8.0 7.7 9.8 6.9
1976 13.3 9.6 9.5 11.0 7.1
1977 15.5 9.8 10.6 13.2 8.1
1978 16.2 9.8 10.5 12.5 8.3
1979 15.1 11.2 10.1 11.1 7.4
1980 13.3 10.6 9.7 11.0 7.5
1981 13.9 11.2 10.2 11.5 7.5
1982 16.8 12.9 13.2 14.0 11.0
1983 18.8 12.2 13.2 14.8 11.9
1984 20.5 12.8 13.1 14.9 11.3
1985 21.3 13.2 13.8 15.2 10.5
1986 20.0 13.4 13.4 14.4 9.6
Note: Not available for Prince Edward Island in most years before 1975. 
Source: Statistics Canada Catalogue 71-201
Services, which account for 70% of the value of output, are either government- 
spending related (military, hospitals, universities etc.) or dependent on resource and 
manufacturing performance (Exhibit 5). They are rarely exported. In 1991 and 1992, 
publicly-funded services like health care and education were hit by spending cuts and 
the tourism sector suffered. The Atlantic region is still heavily resource-based. Most of 
these resource exports undergo very little value-added, a factor that makes them even 
more vulnerable to swings in the volatile, and often depressed, commodities markets. 
In 1991, “the fisheries remain mired by pressures on stocks or low prices for some 
important species. Pulp and paper in North America has too much capacity in the face 
of soft markets. Mining inevitably suffers when consumers stop spending” (APEC, 
Dec. 1991, p. 3). Non-resource base manufacturing is not well developed.
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EXHIBIT 5
G oods and Serv ices Production by S ec to r -  Atlantic C anada and Canada, 1989
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Source: Conference Board of Canada
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12%
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The region is hampered by a shortage of capital. There is very little equity financing 
available due to both problems in the quality of the demand (the level of sophistication 
of the seekers of investment capital) and the supply of capital.^ According to Venture 
Economics Canada Ltd., only 1% of Canada’s available pool of professionally 
managed venture capital was invested in Atlantic Canada in 1987 (quoted in V.P., Nov.
1991). Sixty-three percent of those surveyed by Voluntary Planning in a Start-Up Busi­
ness Survey reported that their growth was seriously constrained by a lack of equity 
capital. While Atlantic Canadians have a relatively high rate of savings, most of these 
deposits are syphoned out of the region for investment in other areas of Canada, in part 
because there are few instruments designed to invest these funds in the region. By 
some estimates, there is $20 billion worth of private Maritime capital tied up in pension
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funds and retirement savings plans, which are neither managed nor invested locally 
(Ross 1992). There is no regional securities commission. Provincial governments have 
a combined public-sector debt of $20 billion (McMillan 1989). Debt charges as a 
proportion of provincial revenues are burdensome (Exhibit 6).
EXHIBIT 6
Debt C harges a s  a  P ercen t of Provincial R evenues 
20%
15% -
10% -
5%-
0%
All Provinces Nfld. P.E.I. N.S. N.B.
Source: Departments of Finance
Skill levels in the region are low. For example, 48% of the people aged 16 to 69 cannot 
meet everyday reading demands, compared with a national average of 38%.^ This low 
level of skill is in part due to the region’s chronic out-migration. Besides lowering the 
skill base of the work force, this brain drain of the “fittest” and the “best” also 
depresses average income for the region and hampers efforts to attract or retain high- 
skill job companies in the region. The Atlantic Canadian private sector is characterized 
as lacking competitiveness and entrepreneurship; [having] poor management; lower 
productivity [the lowest in Canada, due in part to a low-tech, low skill industrial 
structure]; slower adoption of new technologies; inadequate skill and lack of training; 
fewer scale economies; and there is little risk-taking tradition (APEC Nov.-Dee. 1990).
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, national macroeconomic policies were far from 
helpful to the region. Fiscal policy has been restrictive in order to fight fiscal deficits 
and until late 1991 a counter-inflationary monetary policy has been applied equally 
across Canada, although inflationary pressures emanated from Ontario. In 1991, the 
high interest rates that supported a high Canadian dollar dampened the export potential
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of Atlantic Canadian goods. In 1992, the lower interest rates and lower dollar exchange
rates have yet to help the region out of recession. The 1991 Goods and Services Tax
placed a short-term heavy burden on the Atlantic economy which is 70% services.
Atlantic Canada is highly dependent on several kinds of transfers finom Ottawa.^
Federal spending in the region includes:
1) Equalization and unemployment insurance programmes which compensate for 
lower levels of economic opportunities. Of the $8.4 billion paid out nationally in 
equalization payments in 1991-92, $3.1 billion will flow to the Atlantic region. Of 
the $39 billion dollars spent nationally on transfers to persons in 1989, the Atlantic 
region accounted for $4.7 of this total. Atlantic Canada generally accounts for one- 
fifth of all unemployment payments and the region’s residents receive more in 
benefits than they pay in premiums.
2) Subsidies and regional development programmes aimed at spurring economic 
growth (ACOA etc.). Atlantic Canada generally received higher transfers per person 
up to the early 1980s, but has consistently fallen behind other parts of Canada, 
especially the West Transfers to Atlantic Canada decreased for almost a decade and 
then have steadily increased since the mid-1980s due to the activity of ACOA. Real 
(in constant dollars) regional development spending began to decline in the Atlantic 
region in 1969. Regional development spending as a percent of total programme 
spending was as high as 1.3% in 1970-71 and fell as low as 0.2% in 1981-82. The 
upward trend in Atlantic regional development spending in the late 1980s associated 
with the ACOA programme has been short-lived, with spending once again sliding 
in the 1990s (Exhibit 7).
3) Tranter to provincial governments, primarily Equalization, Established Programs 
Financing (EPF) and Canada Assistance Plan (CAP). The proportion of provincial 
revenues coming in the form of federal transfers in 1991-92 ranges from 37 to 
44%. This compares with 12% in Ontario and 20% in Quebec. Equalization as a 
proportion of provincial revenue has been declining in recent years, however.^ 
Federal spending through CAP has assisted the provinces with spending on social 
assistance on a 50:50 basis. EPF spending has assisted with provincial health care 
and post-secondary education programmes. Growth in the CAP and the EPF have 
been reduced in the 1990 and this pattern is likely to continue as part of federal 
deficit control efforts.
4) Spending on goods and services (e.g. military personnel, preferential purchasing). 
Of the $20 billion dollars of federal spending on wages and salaries in 1989-90, 
$2.8 billion were spent in Atlantic Canada. Nationally, federal employment declined 
by only 0.7% from 1985-86 to 1989-90. In Atlantic Canada, it declined by 3.7%.
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EXHIBIT 7
Regional D evelopm ent Program  Spending, Atlantic Canada, 1970-71 to  1989-90
Millions of Constant (1981) Dollars
Years end on March 31 of the following year 
Data for years from 1989 on are esfimates.
70 72 74 76 78 80  82 84  86 88
Sources: Departments of Regional Economic Expansion; Industry, Trade and Commerce; 
Regional Industrial Expansion.
7.2.2 Forecasts for the Atlantic Economy
According to APEC, the prospects for the economic future of the region will depend in 
great part on: 1) the American recovery; 2) the recovery of Ontario; 3) the interest and 
dollar exchange rates; 3) the return of consumer confidence; 4) political uncertainty in 
Canada; 5) the possibility of further spending restraint by the public sector, 6) whether 
the Hibernia project (offshore oil) gets off the ground given the withdrawal of Gulf 
Canada Resources Limited and delays in funding; and 7) the effect of the dramatic 
decline in northern cod stocks. Exhibit 8 provides a comparison of main indicators for 
the U.S., Canada and Atlantic Canada.
In the uncertain global and national climate of the 1990s, the future economic well­
being of Atlantic Canada will depend in great measure on the region’s ability to become 
less dependent on transfers from Ottawa by becoming more self-sufficient. From 1990 
to 1992, regional policy-makers concentrated their efforts on: 1) developing an interna­
tionally competitive economy; 2) leveraging the efforts of the individual provinces by 
fostering regional cooperation; and 3) negotiating a constitutional arrangement that 
could benefit its residents. In 1993, regional planning documents will most likely 
continue seeking competitiveness and regional cooperation, as well as some form of 
federal/provincial arrangement, outside of the constitutional arena, that best suits 
regional needs.
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EXHIBIT 8
S u m m ary  of Main Ind icato rs, United S ta te s , C anada and  th e  A tlantic P ro v in ces  1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 3
1991 1992 1993
United States
Real GDP (% change) 
Canada
-0.7 2.5 3.7
Real GDP (% change) -1.5 2.0 3.6
Unemployment rate ( %) 10.3 10.8 10.5
Employment (% change) 1.8 0.0 1.7
Retail sales (% change) -6.3 2.5 5.5
Housing starts (thousands) 156.0 175.0 195.0
CPI (% change) 5.6 1.8 2.4
Prime business rate (%) 10.0 7.25 7.25
Canadian dollar in U.S. cents 87.3 83.5 83.5
Newfoundland and Labrador
Real GDP (%) -0.5 -1.0 1.0
Unemployment rate (%) 18.4 21.0 20.0
Employment (% change) -2.0 -5.0 1.0
Retail sales (% change) -2.7 1.7 4.0
Housing starts 2,836.0 2,300.0 2,500.0
CPI (% change) 6.2 1.2 2.0
Prince Edward Island
Real GDP (% change) -1.5 2.0 3.0
Unemployment rate (%) 16.8 17.0 17.0
Employment (% change) -4.2 -0.2 1.5
Retail sales (% change) -10.0 5.0 4.0
Housing starts 553.0 600.0 625.0
CPI (% change) 
Nova Scotia
7.5 1.5 2.1
Real GDP (% change) -1.0 0.4 2.5
Unemployment rate (%) 12.0 12.7 12.4
Employment (% change) -2.1 -2.0 1.1
Retail sales (% change) -5.4 2.5 4.5
Housing starts 5,173.0 4,900.0 5,000.0
CPI (% change) 6.1 1.5 2.1
New Brunswick
Real GDP (% change) M 1.0 3.0
Unemployment rate (%) 12.7 13.0 12.8
Employment (% change) -1.7 0.5 1.3
Retail sales (% change) -6.0 2.5 5.5
Housing starts 2,872.0 2,900.0 3,200.0
CPI (% change) 6.5 1.8 2.3
Source: a p e c, June 1992.
7.2.3 The Outlook for Nova Scotia
Since Part IV of the thesis focuses on Nova Scotia Voluntary Planning, a closer look at 
the prospects for the province is called for. From 1990 to 1991, the average 
unemployment rate rose from 10.5% to 12% and is expected to become even higher in 
1992. The province’s fisheries, manufacturing plants and public sectors experienced
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large lay-offs. Declines in federal transfers and revenue shortfalls did not permit a 
stimulative provincial budget, and further public sector lay-offs are expected. Prospects 
for the end of 1992 and for 1993 are for modest recovery. See Exhibit 9 for a summary 
of leading indicators for the province.
EXHIBIT 9
Nova Sco tia  -  Leading Indicators
Latest Data Year Earlier % change from year earlier 
N.S. Canada
Labour force (May/92) 413,000 421,000 -1.9 -0.2
Employment (May/92) 357,000 370,000 -3.5 -1.2
Unemployment rate (May/92) 13.6% 121% - 112%*
Participation rate (May/92) 59.9% 61.3% - 65.4%*
Unemployment insurance beneficiaries 
(Apr/92) 76,640 74,050 3.5 -2.7
Total wages and salaries ($ million, 
Jan-Apr/92) 2,746 2,765 -0.6 -2.5
Consumer Price Index (all items, 
1986=100, May/92) 125.71 24.5 1.0 1.3
Value of retail trade ($ million, 
Jan-Apr/92) 1,786 1,723 3.7 21
Value of domestic exports ($ million, 
Jan-Apr/92) 721.67 16.4 0.7 8.1
Value of manufacturing shipments 
($ million, Jan-Apr/92) 1,625 1,752 -7.2 -0.4
Cargoes shipped through Port of Halifax 
('0001, Jan-May/92):
Imports 3,123 3,090 1.1 N/A
Exports 2,698 2,834 -4.8 N/A
Note * Actual rate, Canada. May 1992. Labour force data are adjusted for seasonal variation. 
Sources; Statistics Canada; Ports Canada.
7 .3  THE AGENTS OF CHANGE-  
THE INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR PLATFORMS
Despite the bleak economic conditions revealed by traditional economic indicators 
presented in this chapter, “quality of life” is often cited as the primary reason for living 
in the Atlantic region, and for wanting to return to it. As stated by APEC, “the consen­
sus, both in the region and in Canada as a whole, is that intangible social and environ­
mental qualities make Atlantic Canada a better-than-average place to live” (APEC 1987, 
p. 19). Crime, suicide and divorce rates are lower than the national average. The region
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is a pleasant, clean, peaceful, non-aggressive, friendly and beautiful place to live. Well- 
paying, year-round, stable jobs are hard to come by, but the safety net provided by the 
welfare state in part compensates for this lack of opportunities. Given that the decline of 
the economic region began in the mid to late 1800s, one could posit that by-and-large, 
except for a few industrial areas, the region somehow missed the industrial revolution. 
The result is a certain level of social and community “wholesomeness” and cohesion 
that is quite rare in a world where, in the Cold War terminology: 1) the “first world” 
must contend with congested and violent mega-cities and inter-bloc fiiction caused by 
lower national economic growth rates; 2) the ex “second world” is threatened by 
regional warfare and “ethnic cleansing”; 3) and the “third world” must pay the social 
costs of structural adjustment programmes.
From the point of view of the intangible and elusive indicator “quality of life”, the 
Atlantic Canadian political-economic system has actually worked quite well. The region 
might lag behind the rest of Canada in some indicators, but the inhabitants in general 
feel that these economic disparities are offset by other more important socially-based 
advantages. Unfortunately, the system is showing signs of stress. A combination of 
external factors over which the region has little control is threatening this cherished 
“quality of life”. As stated in Chapter 1, the three major factors affecting the region are: 
1) the reduction of federal transfer payments, subsidies and expenditures; 2) the 
political instability resulting from Quebec separatism; and 3) the economic pressures of 
the FTA and soon those of NAFTA. The general distrust of the political system’s ability 
to manage these challenges effectively is a contributing factor to the rate of system 
failure. In the years to come, the key questions for regional planners, academics and 
politicians will be How can the good aspects of the old system, “the quality of life of 
the region”, be salvaged while at the same ameliorating the hardships that can be 
expected from the transition between the old system and the new? Section 7.3. 
examines some answers to this question.
Section 7.3 catalogues the major economic development policy documents produced, 
from 1990 to 1992, by the principal policy-making agencies at the Atlantic, Maritime 
and provincial levels -  the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (APEC), the Council of 
Maritime Premiers (CMP) and the four provincial governments respectively. The 
analysis is organized around the three major themes evident in this literature -  
competitiveness, cooperation and constitution -  what 1 have termed the 3 Cs. This 
descriptive section is followed by an analysis of the 3 Cs within the political economy 
of the Atlantic region and within the framework of “systems thinking” presented by 
Senge (1990).
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7.3.1 The Atlantic Provinces Economic Council
APEC is certainly the voice of authority in regional economic matters, and its many 
publications and conferences are considered the “state of the art” in Atlantic Canadian 
regional economic planning. Formed in 1954, APEC is
an independent not-for-profit, private corporation... [whose] objective is 
to promote the economic development of the four Atlantic Provinces... 
through development of public policy, analysis and comment on 
emerging issues, delivering unique information service to members, and 
promoting economic cooperation among the Atlantic provinces and the 
federal government. (APEC 1987, p. ii)
APEC pubhshes scores of reports on subjects of importance to the regional economy. 
However, from 1990 to mid-1992, a substantial amount of their work focused on the 
3 Cs. Section 7.3.1 examines their major policy documents and annual conferences 
with special attention to the treatment of these themes.
APEC’s 1990 conference, held in St. John’s, Newfoundland, during the Meech Lake 
constitutional debates, marked the transition towards a more wholehearted commitment 
to a different approach to regional development Rather than focusing on the alleviation 
of regional disparities, and calling for more government intervention in the economy, 
the conferences key argument was that the development goal for the region in the 1990s 
was to achieve
self reliance and increased productivity ... [through a more]... 
adaptable, flexible, innovative, risk taking private sector... [which in 
turn requires] ...improvement to fiscal, monetary and exchange rate 
policies and by elimination of some of the need transfer payments 
through successful development programme for the region. (APEC 
Nov.-Dee. 1990).
The conference discussion paper and follow-up report, “Strategies and Options for the 
1990s” (APEC Oct. 1990; Feb.-Mar. 1991), established the twin themes of self-reliance 
through competitiveness and regional economic cooperation as the key elements of 
regional economic development strategy. While the constitutional theme was not 
addressed directly, the call for increased regional self-reliance can be seen as a response 
to the uncertain national political climate of the times. APEC’s “Strategies” for achieving 
these goals included: inteiprovincial cooperation; federal policy negotiations; 
community economic development; infrastructure expenditures; adequate capital; export 
orientation; good management skills; human resource development; and environmental 
considerations.
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While the theme of cooperation was championed by the Council of Maritime Premiers, 
APEC has strongly supported the CMP proposals which are examined in more detail in 
section 7.3.2. For example, APEC published “Inter-provincial Barriers to Trade and 
Shared Infrastructure: Two Aspects of Atlantic Economic Integration” (APEC July 
1991), and made regional cooperation the theme of its 1991 annual conference (APEC 
June 1991). APEC’s support of regional integration and of the CMP proposals is based 
on its assessment of the benefits it would bring to the region. APEC states that,
the potential benefits of the removal of inteiprovincial barriers to trade 
are between 0.5% and 1% of gross domestic product. This would 
amount to between $200 and $4(X) million annually [in static gains 
alone]... [The additional gains brought about by] dynamic effects could 
be more important over time... Further benefits can also come from 
cooperative action in areas of shared infrastructure [transportation, 
investment funds, energy, bureaucracy, health care and education, 
common data corporation, and coordination]. (APEC, July 1991, p. 6)
The subsequent document “The Atlantic Economy Beyond 125: Some Key Influences” 
(June 1992) included an assessment of the progress of the CMP on their regional 
cooperation proposals. APEC’s July Newsletter (APEC July 1992) contained a “report 
card” (Exhibit 10). Some of the possible causes for the somewhat disappointing 
performance evidence by the report card are addressed in section 7.4.
While the call for competitiveness and cooperation is clear in aU Maritime provincial 
government documents and in those prepared by the CMP, in Atlantic Canada APEC has 
been the champion on constitutional matters (see APEC Jan. 1992; Sept-Oct 1992;
Oct 1992a and b)^. APEC’s stance on constitutional issues and on federal/provincial 
negotiations is consistent with Finbow’s assessment that
the region’s position is one of support for federal power when it suits 
the regional interests, normally economic policies, and demands for 
change when the federal policy is perceived as hurting the region.
Typically this has meant strong central economic control (to maintain 
regional development programmes) but reforms to increase the 
province’s input into central decision-making, including greater access 
to federal fiscal decision-making. Certainly they seek reforms that 
would aid them in shedding their “have-not” status. The Atlantic’s 
preferred vision is that of a strong region in a united, regionally 
sensitive Canada. (Arsenault’s summation of Finbow, in Arsenault 
1991, p. 17)
APEC (June 1990 Newsletter) reprinted a series of articles prepared in 1980 during an 
earlier “constitutional crisis”. These articles (Winter 1980/1990 and Sinclair 1980/1990)
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speculated on the economic consequences for Atlantic Canada should Quebec separate 
from Canada. Four possible scenarios were outlined by Winter (1990) and implied in 
the arguments of the other three contributing authors:
1. The Romantic Solution -  Separation from Canada. This option is generally 
considered the most traumatic option because all transfers would cease, the region’s 
economy would not be able to support its population, international trade and 
transportation agreements would have to be worked out from a weak power base, 
and substantial out-migration would likely result However, since the retrenchment 
of transfers might occur in any event within either a highly decentralized or 
fractured Canada, this option should not be automatically dismissed.
2. The Anti-Loyalist Solution -  Union with the United States. Transfers would also be 
forfeited in this option. While there is a sector of the region’s population that would 
consider this a viable option,^ critics are quick to point that there is no indication 
whatsoever that the United States is interested in annexing any part of a fragmented 
Canada, particularly a poor “welfare dependent” region like Atlantic Canada. 
Economic ties with New England, Atlantic Canada’s largest foreign trade partner, 
are increasing steadily. Thus a shift from an east-west to a north-south axis is 
occurring, but in economic rather than political terms.
3. The Bangladesh Solution -  Remain Part o f a Fragmented Canada. Some more 
optimistic observers would rather look at it as an “Alaska” rather than a “Bangla­
desh” scenario where being geographically separated from the “rest of Canada” 
(ROC )^ is not a particular problem. The Alaska scenario owes its workability in part 
to the fact that the territory in between it and the rest of the U.S. -  Canada -  is 
“friendly territory”, and also to the fact that Alaska is a rich state, and is thus 
fiscally self-sufficient Whether Atlantic Canada follows the example of either 
Bangladesh or Alaska will perhaps depend on whether Quebec remains friendly to 
the region and to the ROC and on whether transfers are continued.
4. The Unthinkable Solution -  Union with Quebec. Winter concludes that this would 
be the most sensible option because it would give Quebec access to the east and 
Atlantic Canada access to the west, it would eliminate any worries about trade and 
transportation barriers being built between Atlantic Canada and the ROC, it would 
build on a strong history of trade relations between the two regions. Winter’s 
argument is based mostly on the pull of geographical proximity and the economic 
benefits of open trade with Quebec. However, the various political/economic 
experiments of the 1990s suggest that political and economic integration can operate 
at different levels simultaneously. An independent Atlantic Canada within NAFTA 
could enjoy similar economic benefits without the political trauma of transferring 
allegiance from Canada to a new state, particularly a French-speaking one.
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Moreover, if geographic proximity and trade relations are the key elements in 
choosing a partner, one would imagine that Quebec and Ontario would certainly 
find each other highly attractive mates.
The APEC Newsletter (June 1990) quantified the negative consequences of a loss of 
transfer payments. Without transfer payments, income levels in Nova Scotia will drop 
21%, in New Bmnswick 19%; in Newfoundland 30%; and in Prince Edward Island 
36%. If unemployment rises, the drop will be even worse. The barriers to trade and 
mobility that would likely arise between the new political entities could exacerbate the 
economic situation by making it more difficult for Atlantic Canadians to sell their goods 
in Central Canadian markets, or to escape the poverty by moving somewhere else.
In the Fall of 1991, during the national constitutional consultations and negotiations that 
preceded the Charlottetown Accord,^ APEC conducted a forum on the constitution and 
published “Restructuring Federalism: Impacts on Atlantic Canada” (APEC, Oct 1991). 
The report examined the hypothetical effects on Atlantic Canada of five possible consti­
tutional scenarios ranging from the status quo to limited or extensive decentralization to 
separation of Quebec from Canada, with and without association. While the preferred 
option for the region, in terms of tangible economic benefits, was seen as the status 
quo,i® the constitutional proposals at the time suggested that substantial changes might 
occur. APEC reasoned that the more likely outcome was some form of decentralization 
or separation. Unfortunately, any one of the decentralization or sovereignty options 
was expected to impose, to a greater or lesser extent, high costs on Atlantic Canada. 
The more decentralized or the more acrimonious the separation, the higher the cost for 
the Atlantic region.
The general consensus in the region’s academic and policy-making circles about the 
negative consequences of either extensive decentralization or separation is based on an 
assessment of: 1) the region’s dependence on transfers and the likelihood that they will 
be eliminated; 2) its weak economic base; 3) the difficulties that provincial legislatures 
would face if they were to assume the management of more powers while at the same 
time losing the support of federal transfers; 4) the negative effects in terms of the 
business climate and possible out-migration that would result from either a drop in 
living standards or the higher tax rates that would be required to provide services 
without federal transfers; and 5) the fear that the “have” regions might not want to 
support the “have not” regions anymore.
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“Restructured Federalism and its Impacts on Atlantic Canada” (APEC Oct. 1991) 
provides a vivid example of the way in which the 3 Cs have been linked in policy 
documents. The report concludes by suggesting three “paths which Atlantic Canada 
may choose to follow”:
(i) negotiate flexibly but firmly for retention o f the equalization structure 
and for maintenance support for social programmes (CAP)
(ii) Recognizing that other forces will cause ongoing reduction in fiscal 
transfers to the provinces, follow strategies designed to restructure the 
region’s economy effectively
(iii) To strengthen both the negotiating position of the region in 
constitutional discussions and the efforts to restructure the economy, 
pursue the option of regional economic integration more aggressively.
(APEC, Oct. 1991, p. 30)
In sum, the three paths address: (i) constitution; (ii) competitiveness and 
(iii) cooperation.
In 1992 (APEC Sept.-Oct. 1992) APEC’s stance on the Charlottetown Accord was made 
crystal clear. The Council indicated that the agreement was “mostly good” and that the 
region would gain in a “number of areas including limited decentralization, enhanced 
commitments to equalization and regional development, and opportunities related to the 
new Senate” (APEC, Oct. 19,1992 press release, p. 1). The report concluded that this 
was the best, or nearly the best a^em ent that the region was likely to achieve. 
Apparently, Atlantic Canadians agreed with APEC’s assessment. On October 26,1992, 
the region overwhelmingly voted Yes on the referendum on the Charlottetown Accord: 
Newfoundland (62.9%); PEI (73.9%); New Brunswick (61.3%). Nova Scotia voted 
No by a close margin (51.1%). Unfortunately, except for the Northwest Territories and 
Ontario which also voted Yes, the rest of Canada voted No (54.4% overall).
In 1992, the discussion paper for the annual conference entitled “The Atlantic Economy 
Beyond 125: Some Key Influences” (APEC June 1992) updated their stance on the 3 Cs 
and reviewed federal and provincial development efforts. The paper also contained a 
section on business assistance programmes in the U.S. and Canada. This latter section 
suggests that while the private sector is still being charged with the responsibility of 
becoming more competitive, the public sector is once again being asked to assist in this 
process.
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7.3.2 The Council of Maritime Prem iers
Established in 1971 as a follow-up to the “Deutsch report*’^  ^(1970), the CMP created a 
“permanent interprovincial structure for negotiating and implementing various agree­
ments among the Maritime provinces (Tombhn 1991, p. 101). In 1988, the CMP 
commissioned Dr. Charles McMillan to review the key issues currently facing the 
Maritime provinces and to propose a plan to the Council on those issues. McMillan’s 
report “Standing Up to the Future; the Maritimes in the 1990s” (McMillan 1989) 
presented a blueprint for the “strategic revitalization” of the CMP.
For McMillan, the lack of coordinated efforts among the Maritime provinces is at the 
heart of the region’s dismal economic fate. For example, the report states that
Maritime policy coordination... remains a distant goal on the most 
important issue -  industrial development. Parochialism, a short term 
horizon, lack of vision, institutional inadequacies and federal provincial 
squabbling -  all these factors have played a role in reducing the potential 
for a visionary plan of action for the Maritime provinces... the ebb and 
flow of cooperation and coordination among the Maritime provinces 
relate to a number of factors, including provincial priorities, not the least 
of which is reelection... partisan political concerns will dominate over 
non-partisan Maritime cooperation. (Op Cit, p. 1)
While the report suggested many administrative revisions to the Council, in this 
chapter I will focus the discussion on the recommendations for economic revitalization. 
In the section entitled “A Vision Option: A Competitive Maritime Canada”, McMillan 
proposes that an “outward looking virtuous circle of profitability, export trade, learning 
skills and productivity” should replace the “vicious circle” of the status quo. In order to 
bring about this change, he suggests that three “dramatic examples” be incorporated 
into the Council’s agenda:
1. Removal of all inter-provincial barriers; 2. A Maritime Savings Fund; 
and 3. A trade promotion strategy to increase the level of exports from 
the Maritime region by 50% in five years... [with the aim of making] 
the Maritime region a ‘have’ area of Canada by the year 2000.
(McMillan 1989, p. 30)
“Maritime Economic Cooperation” or “Maritime Economic Union”^^  has become a 
major theme of the Council, championed by the premier of New Bmnswick, Frank 
McKenna, and, as already discussed, fully supported by APEC. Subsequently, the CMP 
prepared a follow-up report on the subject entitled “Challenge and Opportunity: A
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discussion paper on Maritime economic integration” (CMP, May 1991) which detailed 
its regional cooperation proposals.
At an Atlantic Canadian level -  APEC’s “Strategies and Options for the 1990s” (APEC 
Oct 1990) and “Interprovincial Barriers to Trade and Shared Infrastructure (APEC July
1991) -  and at a Maritime level -  McMillan’s “Standing Up to the Future” (McMillan 
1989), and the Council’s “Challenge and Opportunity” (CMP, May 1991) -  bear 
remarkable similarities in their understanding of the political and economic problems of 
the region (Atlantic and Maritime) and in the elements of the solution of these problems.
7.3.3 The Provincial Governments^^
Each province has developed its own economic development document. The oldest. 
New Brunswick’s “Towards 2000: An Economic Development Strategy for New 
Brunswick” (Province of New Brunswick 1988) is being revised in late 1992. The 
most recent document is Newfoundland’s “Change and Challenge”, released in mid- 
1992 (Province of Newfoundland 1992). Both of these documents were prepared by 
their respective provincial governments. PEI’s “Building an Island Economy:
Strengths, Opportunities and Challenges”, prepared by Donald Savoie, a leading expert 
in regional economics, was released in January 1992 (Province of Prince Edward 
Island 1992). Nova Scotia’s strategy “Creating Our Own Future” was developed by 
Voluntary Planning and released in November 1991. The papers were exposed to 
various levels of public consultation, with Newfoundland and Nova Scotia conducting 
the most extensive consultations.
According to APEC (June 1992 and Nov. 1992), these documents have many common 
themes. Similar problems and challenges were identified. Among them:
the influence of global forces; lagging productivity; persistent dispari­
ties; declining traditional industries; inadequate infrastructure; human 
resource difficulties; slower adoption of technology and lack of R&D; 
dependence on transfers; changes to confederation; the lack of risk 
taking tradition; and the changing role of government. (APEC June 
1992, p. 27)
Common advantages included:
opportunities for value added and import substitution; a good quality of 
life; a reasonably clean environment; access to European and America 
markets; some highly developed centres of natural and applied sciences; 
and cultural and linguistic assets. (APEC June 1992, p. 27)
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Given the shared problems and opportunities described by these documents, there are 
also common elements in all of their articulated goals, such as increased self-reliance, 
increased competitiveness, market or private sector orientation, and the environment 
The policy instruments recommended in each strategy also bear broad similarities. They 
generally include mechanisms to promote business development; measures to support 
community economic development; economic building blocks [e.g. human resources, 
infrastructure] and programmes to help with the economic environment and attitudes”. 
However, APEC also points out that there were “interesting” differences in terms of the 
specific applications of, and the priorities given to, these more generic policy 
instruments. For example, the role given to government in each strategy is somewhat 
different -  Nova Scotia and New Brunswick are looking for a “partnership” with the 
private sector, Newfoundland’s charges the government with the responsibility of 
creating a good business environment, while PEI asks the government, particularly the 
federal government, to continue playing a key role in its development. In terms of 
monitoring and evaluation. New Brunswick’s strategy has been carefully monitored 
and a great many initiatives actually implemented. Nova Scotia’s Action Plan and report 
card are discussed in Part IV. Newfoundland’s strategy suggests that specific goals be 
measured, and PEI’s is vague in terms of criteria for evaluation.
As far as the 3 Cs are concerned: 1) the preoccupation with private sector competitive­
ness is a key issue in these documents; 2) all Maritime premiers support Maritime 
economic integration, and Newfoundland has kept a close watch on these develop­
ments, occasionally flirting with the notion of a closer working relationship with the 
CMP; and 3) while these documents did not, by and large, deal explicitly with the 
various constitutional proposals, the call for cooperation and competitiveness was in 
great part a response to the spectre of constitutional failure.
7.4 DISCUSSION OF THE 3 C s
Section 7.4 analyzes the policy prescriptions presented in section 7.3 within the context 
of the Atlantic region’s political economy. Once again, the arguments are organized 
thematically around the 3 Cs.
7.4.1 Com petitiveness
As examined in Chapter 3, the fundamental tenets of neo-liberal orthodoxy (i.e. free 
trade and laissez-faire) are currently being challenged by those who propose more acti­
vist industrial policies and managed trade. As presented in Chapter 5, in Canada 
however, the policy pendulum has swung the other way, towards neo-liberal stances.
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as it returns from the interventionist and redistributive policies of the past. If one adds 
to these policy debates the sorry record of government-led regional policy initiatives 
presented in Chapter 6, and the retrenchment of federal spending examined earlier in 
this chapter, one arrives at the context in which the call for a competitive Atlantic 
Canada is being made. Given the severity of the patient’s condition and the economic 
ailments that competitiveness can allegedly cure, it is no surprise that Atlantic Canadian 
policy-makers would want to try some of i t
Grant (1989) postulated that regional planning in Nova Scotia failed because it ignored 
“the political culture of the region and the realities of the modem political economy” -  
patronage, territoriality, conservatism, and distrust of Upper Canada (Op Cit, p. 274). 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 6 and in this chapter suggest that an economic 
development strategy for the Atlantic region based on both public and private sector 
competitiveness is likely to encounter serious obstacles and structural impediments, 
beyond those postulated by Grant, including: 1) monopoly; 2) patronage; 3) the low 
political efficacy of Atlantic Canadians; 4) province-building; and 5) a vacuum of 
leadership. In sum, the right set of incentives is not being provided to the various 
agents of change. A detailed discussion of these structural impediments follows.
7.4.1a Monopoly
While there is a great deal of anecdotal information on the management practices and 
corporate culture of Atlantic Canadian corporations, there is very little academic litera­
ture on the subject. Research into the modus operandi of corporations in the region 
tends to be regarded with a great deal of suspicion by the host companies. There is a 
general atmosphere of secrecy and fear of leakage of confidential information, particu­
larly because it is usually quite easy to determine in such small markets which specific 
companies are being referred to when discussing any one sector in general terms. The 
fact that many of these companies are privately owned and do not have to go through 
the exercise of public disclosure makes the walls of these institutions a lot less perme­
able than those of their publicly-traded counterparts. The local business press tends to 
be somewhat superficial and self-congratulatory, and rarely provides the necessary 
tools for critical analysis of the issues. The fact that the media are in many instances 
owned by the business barons themselves, and business biographies are often com­
missioned by those being studied, certainly does not encourage investigative reporting.
Research has concentrated on the small-business sector. Two primary examples are 
O’Farrell’s (1990) report on the competitiveness and performance, by international
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standards, of the small manufacturing sector in Nova Scotia and ACOA’s^ *^  (1992) The 
State o f Small Business and Entrepreneurship in Atlantic Canada, According to O’Far- 
rell (1990), the small business sector is far from competitive. His report concludes that 
“It is clear that it is not labour costs but lower productivity and a less competitive 
market that contribute to the lack of price competitiveness of most Canadian products in 
New England. Such problems, in addition to quality, will need to be addressed if more 
Canadian firms are to successfully penetrate the U.S. market” (Op Cit, p. 17).
Despite the dearth of material on the larger and more influential companies in the Atlan­
tic region in the mainstream press and in academic journals, as examined in Chapter 6, 
the literature of Atlantic Canadian Marxist political economists does provide a disci­
plined and well-documented critical analysis of the local private sector. This literature 
reveals a pattern of highly concentrated economic assets resulting in a corporate and 
civic culture of paternalism and patronage respectively. However, in almost every 
circumstance, mainstream academic research and public documents do not examine the 
effect of local monopolies, an aspect of the local political economy of the region which, 
according to the competitiveness gurus like Porter (1990a), will thwart all long-term 
competitiveness.
The “magic of the market” requires capital. The policy documents in the 1990s have 
addressed with urgency the need for new private-sector investment and financing 
vehicles which can take over the gap created by the ever-increasing cuts to public 
funding and by the likely ultra-conservatism of bankers in a crisis environment But 
where are the funds going to come from? Given that the names that now represent local 
capital (McCain, Irving, Sobey, Jodrey etc.) developed their empires on the ruins of the 
industrial economy left by the Great Depression, one wonders if this new reduction in 
capital availability, could result in further concentration and control -  what is referred to 
in the management literature as Vulture Capital rather than Venture Capital. For that 
matter, wül these even larger monopolies survive in the face of “meaner and leaner, 
quality and service oriented” international competition? Will new wealth be created, or 
will the monopolies simply change hands? Globalization and free trade might have 
brought Atlantic Canadian monopolists a surprise — barbarians are at the gate.
As revealed during the Voluntary Planning consultations examined in Chapter 7, and as 
I have argued on previous occasions,^® any policy orientation that gives carte blanche 
to the private sector in the search for competitiveness is bound to meet with a great deal 
of resistance from Atlantic Canadians for three primary reasons: 1) the appeal to the 
private sector is a reaction to the failure of the public sector more than a true com­
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mitment to “private-sector-led solutions”;!  ^2) in Atlantic Canada, the private sector is 
far from trustworthy. It is characterized by monopoly capital (local, central Canadian or 
foreign) and bad labour relations; and by its dealings with government, by patronage 
and political favours; and 3) that the gains of the redistributional welfare state were 
gains fought for by ordinary citizens demanding their fair share of the country’s riches, 
riches which were increasingly falling in the hands of the few. Ordinary citizens fear, 
and with good reason, that without the public sector to defend their interests, the private 
sector will most likely save itself the trouble and the expense of the welfare state. They 
fear a return to the exploitative company town conditions and to the marginalized 
existence that characterized earlier periods in the region’s economic and labour history.
7.4.1b Patronage
Jeffrey Simpson (1988) has carefully documented the extensive use of the practice of 
patronage in Canadian politics.^o In the Atlantic region patronage is endemic, and the 
examples numerous. But while many ordinary citizens probably derive their livelihood 
from such practices, many feel that patronage is a “problem’’. Surveys suggest that 
many Atlantic Canadians believe that patronage is one of the top problems in the 
provincial government and that the problem will not go away if the government 
changes. There is nothing “wrong” with patronage per se, or particularly nefarious 
about Canadian patronage. But once again, these practices certainly discourage the 
pursuit of excellence, quality and innovativeness.
7.4.1c Low Political Efficacy
Perhaps one of the most useful aspect of the political economic perspective for the dis­
cussion of the region’s competitiveness is that which documents the powerlessness felt 
by many Atlantic Canadians in terms of their ability to affect their economic and politi­
cal destinies and on the circumstances and mechanism that originated and perpetuate 
that powerlessness. As examined in Chapter 6, Atlantic Canadian economic and labour 
history does not reveal a pattern that would encourage the entrepreneurship, competi­
tiveness and innovation that policy documents of the 1990s are trying to stimulate. 
Burril and McKay’s documentation of the state of the Atlantic Canadian primary 
resource sector supports this view:
Whether we are watching the North American fishermen trapped in a 
capitalist boom-bust cycle from which neither capital nor the federal 
state can rescue them; the landowners of Cape Breton trapped into 
taking environmental risks [spraying] they neither choose nor accept; or 
potato growers caught in a vice of debt, rising costs and restrictive 
contracts, we come up with the same patterns of development... Their
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[primary producers] struggles have been made immensely difficult by 
the paternalistic approach of the state and the unrestrained anti-labour 
strategies of capital. (Burrill and McKay 1987, p. 3)
The direst impact of the long crisis of the regional economy has been its 
effect on workers and primary producers. Sympathetic outsiders 
frequently wonder why, given the weight of the evidence against the 
region’s present path of development, the people of the region do not 
rise up and demand something else. They forget the dampening effects 
that out-migration and unemployment have on those who might protest 
Economic decline weakens die workers’ ability to fight back by under­
mining their bargaining position. It also inflicts on them the less tangible 
but very real cultural wounds o f dependency: a cynical, ‘clientelisf 
attitude to politics: a sense o f powerlessness in the face o f paternalistic 
employers; and a pervasive despair over the prospects o f change.
(Burrill and McKay 1987, p. 6, emphasis added by author)
In sum, as argued here and in Chapter 6, the “low political efficacy” of the citizens of 
the region is not the result of an inherently conservative character^^, but rather a rational 
response in the face of their powerlessness vis à vis capital and the state.
7.4.1d Province-building
As discussed in detail in the section 7.4.2, the province-building habits of the premiers 
of the four provinces and of the CMP puts in question their ability to bring about the 
static and dynamic benefits of integration or a more competitive climate for reasons 
already discussed.
7.4.1e A Vacuum of Leadership
The study of regional development initiatives in Atlantic Canada reveals that the region 
has seen its share of shattered dreams, broken promises and dust-collecting initiatives. 
There are a few bright spots though. In the early 1990s, New Brunswick’s economy is 
showing some signs of recovery ahead of the other three provinces, and it is the only 
province to have seen its credit rating upgraded in the last two years (Gherson 1992). 
While many reasons can be given for this relative dynamism, one most often heard is 
that it is mostly due to Premier Frank McKenna’s leadership. Mr. McKenna’s political 
style “fits no conventional mould: policies that reflect a strong streak of liberal idealism; 
a political manager who rules his province with an iron grip; and an earnest 
populism...” (Op Cit, p. 9). His economic policies reflect firugality in government; 
good federal/ provincial relations; a strong industrial promotion programme; and a fairly 
activist industrial policy designed around certain key industries. He has championed the 
cause of Maritime Economic Union, and since the failure of the Charlottetown Accord
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has taken up the cause of national inteiprovincial free trade {Globe and Mail, Nov. 24,
1992). According to APEC (June 1992), the monitoring system and the record of 
implementation of the economic strategies developed by his government are excellent
What this record indicates is that strong leadership makes an enormous difference. 
However, a review of the political economy of the province also indicates that the 
extent of the economic advances that McKenna will be able to realize in New Bruns­
wick will, in part, reflect his ability to stay clear of the interests of the Irving and of the 
McCain families. Should his policies impinge on their fiefdoms, trouble will surely 
arise since there is no reason to think that these feudal dynasties would act differently in 
defending their empires now than they have in the past
The design of a competitive economy in New Brunswick and elsewhere in the Atlantic 
region will require the careful examination of the impact of regional monopolies on the 
economy. It will leave regional planners and politicians with the choice of either “trust- 
busting”, or making these business elites much more responsible for the development 
process. Interprovincial cooperation will require giving up some political “turf’. 
Unfortunately, either action in the present political economy of most provinces would 
be considered business and political suicide.^
7.4.2 Cooperation -  Economic and Poiitical
The idea of Maritime “union” has been discussed since before Confederation. In the late 
1960s and in the early 1990s, both times of political instability in Canada/Quebec 
relations, the subject has come to the fore again. In 1968, the “Maritime Union Study” 
(Deutsch 1968) was commissioned by the governments of the three provinces. The 
study’s final report, known as the “Deutsch Report” (1970), concluded that the 
principal weakness of economic planning in the Maritimes stemmed from lack of 
interprovincial cooperation and coordination. In the 1990s the same causal agent was 
established by McMillan and seconded by APEC.
However, while the Deutsch report fully endorsed the economic and political union of 
the Maritimes, the CMP and APEC proposals for inter-regional cooperation in the 1990s 
have recommended only Maritime economic union or cooperation. McMillan (1989) 
states that “Maritime [political] Union is a non-starter... Maritime cooperation can only 
build on this premise” (Op Cit, p. 16). Accordingly, McMillan’s policy initiatives 
centre on the reduction of inteiprovincial barriers^ to goods, services, labour mobility 
and capital, and the harmonization of policy, coordination of efforts or joint action in
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several sectors. But why this change of heart from the endorsement of a proposal for 
both economic and political union to one proposing only economic uition? The answer 
can be found in the fact that while the gains and losses of economic integration are well 
established in economic theory, the gains and losses of political union are, however, 
less clear and therefore, open to debate and political influence.
According to traditional economic theory, economic cooperation is beneficial because it 
increases productivity and reduces production costs. The harmonization of policy 
between the cooperating political entities further reduces costs. There are also dynamic 
improvements to economic performance that result from the increased competitiveness 
in public and private sectors. Unfortunately, the benefits of integration are not evenly 
distributed throughout the various groups in society and there will be losers along with 
winners. Thus, the need to protect some of these losers or to give some extra assistance 
to possible winners is what motivates governments to interfere. As shown earlier in this 
chapter, APEC states that Maritime economic union would bring benefits to the region in 
quantifiable static terms as well as in dynamic terms. Even though these gains are 
small, the proposal for a Maritime economic union allows provincial governments to 
leverage their efforts in the move towards greater regional self-sufficiency. For regional 
politicians, the call for interprovincial cooperation and for economic union is a relatively 
“safe” way to position themselves in the eyes of their constituents as doing “something” 
about the economy. Safe, because the way the proposal is articulated does not impinge 
upon their provincial “sovereignty”.
According to McMillan, Maritime cooperation, “must be a creature of political 
leadership”. Nevertheless, for him as well as for the CMP and APEC, this does not 
imply, presume or require political union. Change is to be brought about through a 
quasi-functionalist^ approach, where bureaucrats develop the habit of working 
together by tackling non-political and technical issues before moving on to more 
sensitive areas. Maritime political union has been opposed on several grounds: 1) that 
in federal-provincial relations one voice and three votes is better than just one voice and 
one vote; 2) that the alleged gains fix>m the elimination of overlapping bureaucracies are 
not well established; 3) that there is a need to protect provincial political sovereignty (à 
la Thatcher); and 4) that cultural or linguistic minorities might suffer from further 
amalgamation (i.e. Acadians).
On the other hand. Winter maintains that the Maritimes “do not have the political will at 
the present time, nor some of the institutional structures to carry it [some beneficial 
level of Maritime integration] out, unless you go to full political union” (Winter quoted
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in Daily News, Nov. 4,1990). Winter, one of the authors of the Deutsch report, 
echoes the report’s conclusion, which stated:
Our study of the problems and the evidence of experience has convinced 
us that the three individual governments of the region, even if supported 
by greater efforts to achieve voluntary co-operation, will not be able to 
overcome in substantial ways the disabilities that have operated for 
many years. (Deutsch 1970, p. 67)
Several major questions remain to be answered regarding the prospects for successful 
Maritime integration. Primary among them is whether the CMP can truly facilitate 
integration. If the answer is No, the success of the entire initiative would also be in 
question. As discussed earlier, the CMP was created as a “permanent inteiprovincial 
structure for negotiating and implementing various agreement among the Maritime 
provinces” (Tomblin 1991, p. 101). However, Tomblin’s analysis reveals that the CMP 
has been used to “reinforce and defend province building tendencies in the Maritimes” 
rather than to integrate the concerns of the provinces into a united firont. According to 
Tomblin,
originally the CMP and the idea of Maritime union went hand in hand 
[following the guidelines of the Deutsch report]... Through time, how­
ever, the CMP has been tran^ormed from a supra-provincial govern­
ment into a coordinator o f regional programmes, and the regional 
confederacy now reinforces province building tendencies in the 
region.., the provinces [have] seized control o f the institution to ensure 
territorial and jurisdictional interests were well defended against Ottawa 
and a group o f reformers. (Tomblin 1991, p. 100, emphasis added)
No wonder Maritime political union is such a “non-starter”. The CMP, founded to 
promote this very same concept, now protects its very own province-building-based 
existence by opposing the idea.
The success of Maritime economic cooperation will rest on the ability of the various 
provincial governments to work together and rise beyond province-building habits. In 
early 1992, the Maritime provinces are making significant progress in their drive 
towards Maritime economic cooperation, mostly through the reduction of trade barriers. 
However, there has been “little or no progress on some important policy areas” (APEC, 
July 1992, p. 3).
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EXHIBIT 10
R eport Card on Policy A reas
Grades have been assigned by APEC based on Information available in early June. It is offered as a guide only, and 
is subject to change and interpretation. The grades are:
A-goals reached.
8 -  progress well underway, timetables set 
C -  reports to be issued, no goals or timetables.
F -  neither progress nor timetable.
Interprovincial barriers to trade:
1. Govemment procurement B
2. Employment mobility C
3. Regional Securities Commission 0
4. Cooperatives/Credit Unions C
5. Liquor Commissions B
6. Fisheries B
7. Agriculture B
Shared infrastructure:
8. Health care C
9. Electric utilities C
10. Higher education C
11.Geomatics B
1Z Science and technology C
13. Savings development F
Policy harmonization:
14. Environmental Accord A
15. Investment promotion F
16. Transportation B
17. Sales Tax B
18. Corporate registration B
APEC suggests that a change in the process -  such as the appointment of independent, 
arms-length bodies with authority to hold consultations and make proposals directiy to 
the Premiers -  may now be necessary to get things moving in low-scoring areas. The 
recommendation to appoint a Secretariat is a way to overcome the impediments inherent 
in the economic union-only proposal.
In his discussion of EC integration during the 1960s, Finder suggests that “negative 
integration^ is unsatisfactory, and may well prove to be objectionable, unless it is 
accompanied by a substantial measure of positive integration” (Finder 1972 in Hodges 
1972, p. 149). While positive integration can happen at either an economic (e.g. GATT) 
or political level, the mechanisms that bring about positive integration are political and
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therefore require a high level of political cooperation. What the “independent, arms 
length bodies” are substituting for is this level of political cooperation. They are 
providing the structure for positive integration that the CMP does not seem able to 
provide because the provinces are afraid to lose political turf in the process.
Critics of the economic union-only option believe that “a bad attitude”, parochial and 
provincial biases, a lack of vision, patronage, decades of govemment intervention, 
interprovincial squabbling for federal favours and the need to serve one’s jurisdiction 
regardless of loftier objectives will prevent significant changes from happening. For 
them, probably nothing is going to change until things get bad enough (e.g. Quebec 
separation, extensive decentralization, cessation of transfer payments etc.)^^ for 
political union to enter the dialogue again.
But should planners and politicians really wait until things get “bad enough”? A review 
of the current challenges facing the region suggests that things have already gone from 
bad to worse. Thus an examination of all options is called for. Even though there has 
yet to be a document that can convincingly refute the findings of the Deutsch report on 
the desirability of both economic and political union -  the designation of political union 
as a non-starter, meaning no debate required -  says more about the province-building 
tendencies of the Atlantic governments and of the CMP than about good policy-making 
in the region. Political “union” as such is not the issue -  political solutions that are 
appropriate to the task at hand are. If political configurations represent a response to the 
challenges and opportunities facing a people at a certain point in time and space, then 
the radical change of these conditions suggests that the debate on the optimum political 
configuration of such an entity must be re-introduced. Provincial governments, minor 
jurisdictions, cultural, ethnic and linguistic minorities -  in essence, all the various com­
munities that form not just the Maritimes, but Atlantic Canada -  will have to come to 
terms with their shared economic and political destiny. The “non-starter” might have to 
get kick-started in order to take control of the region while it is rapidly going downhill.
7.4.3 Constitution
In late 1992, the agony of the Charlottetown Accord has finally ended and constitu­
tional matters have been “put on the back burner” by the Tory govemment of Brian 
Mulroney.2^ However, the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord does not mean either the 
return to or the approval of the status quo. It simply means that the issues that framed 
the failed constitutional Accord will now need to find new fomms for debate and new 
venues for policy action.
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For Atlantic Canadians, it’s “back to square one”. They still face: 1) the threat of a 
politically fractured Canada; 2) the continuing loss of fiscal support from Ottawa; 3) the 
need to secure greater national political leverage through venues such as a reformed 
Senate; and 4) the need to secure federal commitment to the alleviation of regional 
disparities. For regional planners, this means “back to the drawing board”.
Federal/provincial negotiations for a “better deal” have been going on since Confedera­
tion. But if the Charlottetown Accord was in fact the “best deal” the region could 
expect, the political and economic future is most certainly disconcerting. The citizens of 
the Atlantic region had a lot at stake in the issues that surrounded the constitutional 
debate, but the agenda for the 1991-92 round of proposals and référendums was hardly 
set by them. For all the local roundtables, conferences and reports, fundamentally the 
Charlottetown Accord was a matter of waiting to see how to benefit from whatever deal 
everyone else negotiated. The region was a constitutional “taker” not a constitutional 
“maker”. Fortunately, the Accord turned out to be “mostly good” for the Atlantic 
region. Unfortunately, the resounding Atlantic Canadian “Yes” vote for the Accord had 
little impact on the final outcome “No” of the 1992 referendum.
If Canada’s political configuration remains intact, Atlantic Canadian regional planners 
will probably be able to just “muddle along” as usual. However, should the country 
break into two sovereign constituencies, they will have to put on their thinking caps 
very quickly because all bets with Canada would be off. At that point, the choices 
would really boil down to only two: 1) to be “saved” by the ROC, the U.S. or Quebec; 
or 2) to figure out how to pull up one’s socks on one’s own.
7.5  A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT
Senge’s (1990) notion of “systems thinking” discussed briefly in Chapter 4, is 
presented in this section of Chapter 7 as a way to comprehend the systemic forces that 
bind the political, economic and social structures of the Atlantic region to habitual 
patterns of behaviour. This analysis suggests some reasons for the inability of 
economic planners to effect change and prepares the ground for the recommendations 
presented in Chapter 12. Most importantly though, the systems thinking perspective 
couches the analysis of the dysfunctions of the Atlantic Canadian political economy 
presented in Part in, traditionally the realm of the political left, in the management 
language of the political right presented in Part II. This is particularly important 
because, as I have argued in Chapter 6 and in earlier works, I believe that policy design 
in Atlantic Canada should be guided by the view that “while the [political] left might be 
right about what is wrong, the [political] right might be the only vehicle left to do what
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is right” (Sagebien 1990). The left is systemic in its analysis. The right is proactive in 
its approach. While the right has access to policy instruments, its analysis tends to be 
limited. The converse is true for the left. Senge’s framework of “systems thinking” 
provides a way to present the seemingly opposing arguments of the political left and 
right outside the traditional polarized political discourse. Moreover, it suggests that 
these perspectives are complementary. In sum, Senge’s framework is useful because it 
illustrates the impediments to change in the region, as well as the possible areas of 
policy intervention and leadership in planning.^®
Many of the Atlantic Canadian regional development documents of the 1990s discussed 
in this chapter share with Senge’s (1990) theory of “learning organizations” the notion 
that individuals are able to meet the challenges that face them, make optimum choices 
and thus create their own future as desired. However, Senge is quick to point out that 
enthusiasm for “creating the future” is not enough. Change requires the ability to 
discover the structural or systemic causes of behaviour and the way in which the 
structure is in turn perpetuated by the habitual mental models of the participants in the 
system or its “learning disabilities”. It also requires leaders than are able to make the 
shift in thinking that is necessary to recognize the systemic nature of behaviour, who 
can break the mental models or archetypes that perpetuate systemic dysfunction and 
who can recognize and utilize areas of high-leverage change.
Like any other system, the Atlantic Canadian political-economy responds in certain 
“learned” ways to cues, incentives and sanctions. Learned responses pre-condition the 
system to function in certain ways. When the learned behaviour becomes habitual and 
entrenched, the ability of the system to adapt to changes is thwarted. Using the lan­
guage of Senge’s “learning organizations”, this results in “learning disabilities”. This 
thesis has similarly argued that the citizens, business people, politicians and bureaucrats 
of Atlantic Canada will perpetuate the old political economic system characterized by 
uncompetitive practices such as monopoly, patronage, etc. because they have not col­
lectively learned how to respond differently. Repeating the mantra of competitiveness 
and parroting fashionable management clichés such as quality and productivity is not 
enough. If the desired change is to occur, participants in the system wül have to begin 
by addressing the way in which their participation in the system works against change.
Senge suggests that organizations with “learning disabilities” exhibit certain types 
thinking patterns that affect their behaviour. For example, individuals tend to focus on 
defending their administrative “turf”; problems are blamed on outsiders; “reactive” 
responses to the perceived “enemy out there” are veüed in the mantel of taking action; a
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fixation on short-term events results in an inability to see the long-term patterns that 
shape collective behaviour, slow, gradual change thwarts the ability to respond to crisis 
effectively; etc.
These patterns of behaviour are evident in Atlantic Canadian economic development 
policy circles. Several examples illustrate these points. One of the most oft-heard words 
in regional public consultations is the word “t u r f T h e  private and public sector 
agents in the region are involved in desperate struggles to defend their territory -  a job, 
a market, a social programme, a department, a budget level etc. The unfortunate result 
is that the entirety of the problem remains hidden and most of the energy is used trying 
to maintain the dysfunctional system that supports one*s small piece of the action, 
rather than finding comprehensive solutions. The tendency of Atlantic Canadians to 
blame Ottawa, or Upper Canadian business, or recently, Mexican workers, for the poor 
economic conditions in the region is a prime example of this tendency to feel powerless 
in the face of an unspecified “enemy out there”.
The behaviour of regional economic planners also exhibits learning disabilities. When 
they get “proactive” they often make matters worse because they are generally reacting 
to the perceived threat of the enemy out there rather than seeing how their own actions 
affect the whole. In fact, the most common characterization of govemment policy in the 
region is that it distorts the market as well as the dynamics of the very social problems it 
is attempting to redress. For example, efforts to attract “footloose” companies to the 
region have often caused more problems in the communities they were intended to help 
than they have delivered the promised benefits bought with taxpayer dollars. Rather 
than seeing the long-term systemic nature of change, planners and politicians constantly 
flip-flop between crisis management and complacency. For example, the notion that the 
constitutional crisis “went away” with the 1993 referendum is an illusion fostered by 
media quite aware that people are just sick of the whole constitutional debate and do not 
want to hear about it any more. However, sentiments in Quebec are still inflamed and 
the 1993 provincial election is likely to result in an upset win by the separatist elements 
in the province. The consequences of this victory for the Atlantic region are still as 
severe as the last time separatism reared its ugly head. But do we care? Well, not yet, 
again. While the dramatic threats posed to the region by the constitutional crisis, the 
closing of a major industrial employer, or the fisheries crisis get the attention of the 
media, planners, academia etc., it is the slow process of decline and paralysis of the 
political economy of the region which prevents change from happening because, after 
all, “it’s always been that way” and “better the devil you know than the devil you 
don’t”.
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The conflict between the short-term political timefiame that dominates policy-making 
and business decision-making, and the long-term timeframe of social and economic 
development is also illustrative of learning dysfunctions. More often than not, narrow, 
politically-driven, short-term solutions are applied to broad, endemic, long-term 
problems. Also driven by this short-term orientation is the low value-added, low-cost, 
and environmentally destructive business strategies of many of the region’s major 
industrial producers. As a consequence, the region’s forests are rapidly losing their bio­
diversity, the fisheries have become exhausted and the woikfbrce is poorly trained to 
face new challenges.
According to Senge’s framework, in order to effect significant change in an 
organization, the set of “archetypes” that guide the fundamental dynamics of the system 
must first be understood. These archetypes are made up reinforcing, balancing and 
delay processes. When one looks at organizations and at systems fix>m the perspective 
of these fundamental archetypes, one discovers the generic structures at play, as well as 
a set of management principles that suggest the areas of high- and low-leverage change. 
Two of Senge’s archetypes and corresponding management principles are most 
germane to the discussion of Atlantic Canadian economic development planning:
Senge refers to the “Limits to Growth” archetype as a reinforcing or amplifying process 
which once set in motion produces a desired result. It creates both a spiral of success as 
weU as inadvertent effects which eventually slow down the success. This balancing 
process either slows down the rate of improvement, comes to a standstill or even runs 
in reverse. In order to eliminate this limit to growth the management principle suggests 
that change agent identify the “limiting factor” to growth and then “Do not push growth; 
[rather] remove the factors limiting growth” (Op Cit p. 95). As presented in Chapter 6, 
in the Maritimes the Golden Age of wind, wood and sail of the mid-1800s has degener­
ated into the welfare case of the 1990s. That chapter presented theories that attempt to 
describe the amplifying forces at work in the initial economic growth of the region, as 
well as those that resulted in its eventual decline. Chapter 7 and Part IV are devoted to 
identifying the limiting factors that prevent renewed growth and competitiveness. I have 
argued that the political economy of the region presents serious obstacles to the success 
of regional development policies based on competitiveness and that these limiting 
factors must be addressed directly for the policy prescriptions to work.
A second archetype, one which Senge calls “Shifting the Burden” is also illustrative of 
the Atlantic Canadian predicament In this scenario, an underlying problem generates 
symptoms that demand attention. Since the underlying problem is difficult to address.
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either because it is obscure or costly to confront, individuals ‘shift the burden’ of their 
problem to other solutions -  well intentioned, easy fixes which seem extremely efficient. 
Unfortunately, the easier ‘solutions’ only ameliorate the symptoms and leave the 
underlying problem unaltered. “The underlying problem grows worse, unnoticed because 
the symptoms apparently clear up, and the system loses whatever abilities it had to solve 
the underlying problem** (Op Cit p. 104, emphasis added). Rather than providing 
fundamental solutions, symptomatic solutions not only atrophy the system’s ability to 
correct itself over time, but foster a cycle of dependency on the short-term fixes provided 
by the symptomatic solution itself. Shifting the burden type structures tends to create 
organizations where: 1) long-term fundamental goals are allowed to decline in favour of 
“quick fixes”, and where participants in the system never learn how to deal with the 
problems themselves because they become dependent on “the cure”. Correcting these 
tendencies requires strong leadership that can stick to the vision and empower the 
participants of the system to help themselves. “Dealing effectively with shifting the 
burden structures requires a combination of strengthening the fundamental response and 
weakening the symptomatic response” (Op Cit p. 110).
This “shifting the burden” scenario is, in generic systems terminology, the most basic 
argument of my thesis. I believe that regional economic development initiatives are 
providing symptomatic solutions that leave untouched the real nature of the problem -  
an uncompetitive political-economy. The helplessness felt by ordinary citizens in the 
face of paternalistic public and private sectors, and the dependence of provincial 
governments on Ottawa are prime examples of the effects of this archetype. Regional 
development policy in Atlantic Canada has concentrated on symptomatic responses.
The fundamental problems that impede competitiveness -  lack of venture capital 
(neither vulture capital nor charity); the domination of entire vertical and horizontal 
industries by a few jealous and combative giants; the granting of contracts through 
patronage and nepotism -  are rarely dealt with through policy. Instead, vast sums of 
money have been spent propping up failing industries and attempting to set up an 
“entrepreneurial culture”. The burden has been shifted and the goals eroded. Moreover, 
as the parable of the distorted jungle presented in this chapter has suggested, these 
efforts have only resulted in a system incapable of adapting to the challenges it faces.
The system has become addicted to the quick fixes of regional development funds and 
transfer and equalization payments. The goals have been eroded and instead of a high 
level of political efficacy in achieving them, one encounters either apathy or a clientelist 
“share of the waste” mentality.
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To address these learning disabilities and reverse the deleterious effects of these 
systems archetypes, Senge suggests that managers, and by extension in this case 
planners and politicians, must become adept at five disciplines in order to create change 
through organizational learning. The evidence of failed and poorly performing 
economic development initiatives suggests that economic planners are not adept at these 
five disciplines -  developing their personal mastery (joining vision and practicality), 
examining their own mental models, building teams, building shared visions, and 
adopting a systems perspective.
As far as personal mastery is concerned, economic planners have not been able to 
balance the juxtaposition of vision with a clear picture of current reality. The 
unwillingness to deal with realities of the local political economy will present very real 
“limiting factors” to change. Without this creative tension between vision and reality, 
the practical high leverage points that facilitate change in the system cannot be found.
Because economic planners, politicians, managers and even union representatives have 
not examined their mental models -  the way in which their work perpetuates the 
existing structure -  they cannot truly bring about change. For example, as presented in 
detail in Chapter 8, Voluntary Planners were surprised to find that ordinary citizens 
resist words such as “competitiveness”, “private sector” and “privatization”. A review 
of Nova Scotia’s labour history would have predicted this response.
Since regional planners are new at the game of team building, they have not been able 
to establish the dialogue necessary to build shared visions at a scale large enough to 
effect significant change. For example, once again, as will be shown in Chapter 8, 
Voluntary Planning has been quite successful in building sectorally-based teams with a 
vision of industrial competitiveness. However, Chapter 11 argues that a second 
dimension must be added to the industrial sector dimension in order to create the matrix 
through which problems can be seen systemically. This second dimension is the 
community dimension -  whether communities are defined by race, age, gender, 
religion, ethnic origin, geography, organizational affiliation, clan membership, etc. 
People are not simply managers and workers; they are members of communities. A 
vision that is not consistent with values that people live by day to day will not only fail 
to inspire genuine enthusiasm, it will likely foster outright cynicism. “Creating Our 
Own Future” promotes a business-based society which is not quite representative of the 
values held by most Nova Scotians. Simply stating in the text of the document that the 
strategy’s vision is based on Nova Scotian values is not enough to overcome the 
decades of mistrust towards big business and govemment.
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Finally, because economic planners do not have a systems perspective the structures 
that underlie the political economy of the region are not sufficiently exposed as the most 
significant determinants of individual and collective behaviour. Since these subtle 
structural feedback loops remain hidden, areas of high leverage for change are hard to 
identify. As critical theory would suggest, the way in which the existing structures 
perpetuate the status quo is not exposed, and therefore real change is difficult to effect.
7.6 CONCLUSION
A review of the regional planning documents of the 1980s and ’90s leaves the reader 
with a sense of déjà vu. Voluntary Planning’s “Creating Our Own Future” (V.P. 1991) 
was written as a replacement for the 1984 Nova Scotia provincial govemment report 
“Building Competitiveness” (Province of N.S. 1984). APEC’s “Strategies and Options” 
(APEC 1990) updated the data on Atlantic Canada today (APEC 1987) and re-framed 
the discussion presented in Atlantic Vision: 1990 (APEC 1980). McMillan’s “Standing 
Up to the Future” (McMillan 1989) trod the same ground as the “Deutsch Report” 
(Deutsch 1970). Many of the same themes are examined, many of the same problems 
are identified, many of the same recommendations are made. Two major differences are 
evident though between the policy platforms of the 1970s and 1980s and those of the 
1990s: 1) the private sector now plays a more prominent role; and 2) political union is 
no longer coupled with economic union. This juxtaposition of similarities and 
differences begs the question Does the retrenchment of the public sector in creating a 
competitive environment and the abandonment of political solutions to regional 
integration mean that the private sector and the market alone are supposed to deliver a 
better tomorrow for the region in the face of a today that is even worse than yesterdayl 
The analysis presented in Part IE suggests that this prescription for economic recovery 
is likely to result in failure.
The slogans that best captured the mood that dominated Atlantic Canadian regional 
economic planning from 1990 to 1992 were: “The only certainty is that the status quo is 
no longer an option” (V.P, Nov. 1991, cover page) and “The status quo is not an 
option” (McMillan 1989, p. 3). The assertion that the only certainty in the region is 
change was repeated in every policy document examined. However, in order to make 
the strategies for coping with this change real, the least savoury parts of the regional 
economy must also be examined. Otherwise these slogans will be as useful as stating 
“Toto, I have a feeling we’re not in Kansas anymore” (Dorothy in “The Vizard of Oz”, 
MGM, 1939). Atlantic Canadians have been Going Down the (yellow brick) Road to 
Prosperity for almost 40 years. After battling many a Wicked Witch of the West, the
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only thing we can conclude is that the powers of the Wizard of Ottawa were vastly 
exaggerated In the 1990s regional development planners are wishing for the right 
things. They want to have a Brain -  a competitive economy. They want to have a Heart 
-  a caring and cooperative sense of community. They know Atlantic Canadians can 
always Go Home — when the economy gets bad, they can still hunker down on the 
farm. But unfortunately, they still have not mustered the Courage to address through 
remedial policy actions the major structural impediments in the political economy of the 
region such as monopoly capital, patronage and province-building. We might not have 
any option.
Part IV evaluates Voluntary Planning’s “Creating Our Own Future” with a systems 
perspective of economic planning and in search of high-leverage areas of change.
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ENDNOTES
1 An earlier set of “3 Cs” dominated Atlantic Canadian development planning in the 1950s. In tune 
with the development orthodoxy of the time, the “Cs” referred to a series of infrastructure 
construction projects: 1) the Chignecto Canal; 2) the Prince Edward Island Causeway, and 3) a 
Corridor Road through Maine to Quebec (see Conrad 1988).
 ^ See ECOC (1989) for an analysis of the demand and supply problems of the investment capital
industry in Newfoundland.
3 See “ACOA focuses on Training”, Globe and Mail, OcL 17,1991.
4 Most of this information was taken verbatim from APEC’s Dec. 1992 report I have not made 
specific page references in order to simplify presentation of the data.
5 While there is talk of furth» spending cuts, Ottawa has promised to raise equalization payments by 
$600 million over the next two fiscal years beginning in 1992. The proposal program, designed to 
help the poorer provinces with sufficient revenue to finance roughly equivalent services, is to last 
only two years instead o f the usual five, because all transfw payments are pesently und* review. 
In any event, government critics wonder where Ottawa is going to find the extra $600 million to 
spend. See “Ottawa raises equalization payments $600-miUion”, Globe and Mail, Jan. 31,1992, 
p. A3.
 ^ See also Government o f Canada (Sept 1991) and The Globe and Mail's Constitutional Primer
series (Jan 1992).
7 In what observers have qualified as an “unguarded moment”. Nova Scotia’s premia  ^John Buchanan
made headline news in 1990 by declaring that Nova Scotia “would not have any option” but to 
join the United States if the Meech Lake talks failed and Quebec separated. The premia* retracted 
the statement See “N.S. may eye 51st statehood”, Chronicle-Herald, April 19,1990.
® The terms “Anglophone Canada” or “English Canada” are no longer considered applicable because
of the growing cultural diversity of the country.
 ^ The constitutional proposal that was subjected to a national referendum on October 26,1992.
 ^^  The French-speaking Acadians, who make up about one-third of New Brunswick’s population and
a smaller percentage of the population in the other Atlantic provinces, are among the strongest 
supporters of the status quo -  a united, asymmetrical Canada with official bilingualism, multicul- 
tumlism, and redistributive programs. They are concerned about three major issues: 1) the pHX>gres- 
sively hardening stand of anti-bilingualism groups in the ROC; 2) the effect a Canada without 
Q uel^  would have on the country’s official bilingualism policy; and 3) the fact that Acadians 
would become an even smaller minority than they are now in New Brunswick in a politically 
amalgamated Maritime or Atlantic Canada. However, the Acadian community is examining all of 
its options, including the formation of an Acadian province, annexation to Quebec and an 
assembly of communities, similar to Belgium’s, where each linguistic minority has control over 
key areas such as language and culture. See Telegraph-Journal, June 14,1991, pp. 21 and 9.
 ^  ^ This view was supported by the Eccmomic Council of Canada’s 28th Annual Report (ECOC 1991).
 ^^  Savoie presents a “nightmare scenario” where the rich provinces cast the poor ones adrift: “O.K. 
this is going to be a pretty hostile environment. We cannot continue the status quo. Everything is 
on the table. Equalization and transfer payments, we’re not sure if we can continue that So, the 
Maritime provinces, we’ll give you a five-year transition grant to get your act together but after 
that you’ll be on your own hook and your hospitals, your universities, your institutions have to 
be financed from your own wealth” (Savoie quoted in “Atlantic Economy in for a Major Jolt”, 
Chronicle Herald, May 20,1991). There is a minority that suggests, however, that the ROC would 
still be willing to support regional transfers in order to foster its new unity sans Québec. The good 
news for Atlantic Canadians in this scoiario is that, this time, most o f the money sent eastward 
would not stay in Quebec’s coffers as it has in the past
 ^^  To be discussed later in this chapter.
 ^^  One such suggestion is that Newfoundland and Labrador become a “full parm^” in the Council.
 ^^  Maritime “union” is a misnomer since Canada is already an economic and political union.
 ^^  Only Nova Scotia’s document “Creating Our Own Future” was directly examined by the author. 
This section was drawn from APEC’s “The Atlantic Economy Beyond 125: Some Key Influences” 
(July 1992) and “The challenge of change in Newfoundland’s economy”, Commercicd News, Sept 
1992.
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17 ACOA has funded numaous small business-related research and training projects. Howev^, the 
study of the political economy surrounding this sector is looked at with suspicion or simply 
neglected.
 ^® See Sagebien (1991).
19 Canadians are ''setting aside what historians and political scientists have regarded for decades as a 
deeply rooted national characteristic: their reliance on government to protect the livelihoods of 
ordinmy citizens... Decima researchers asked Canadians whom they depended on most 'to look after 
your best economic interest: government, businesses or unions?* Fifty percent o f those polled 
replied 'business’. Only 25% answered 'government*. Another 15% said 'unions*, and 10% 
expressed 'no opinion*... Rather than being enamoured c f  business, it is really people being 
disillusioned with government^ (Wood and Bethune 1990, p. 22, emphasis added by author). 
Jeffrey Simpson is a journalist not associated with the left.
 ^^  See Howell (1978) for an examination of the Maritime and Canadian political cultures.
The problem is analogous to that presented in a traditional Spanish children’s story. In this story, 
the mice gather to address the need to safeguard themselves from the vicious housecaL After much 
deliberation, they decide to put a bell around the cat’s neck to act as warning o f its approach.
Happy and proud to have conceived such a brilliant strategy, the mice decide to celebrate. But the 
festivities come to a sudden end when a small mouse innocently asks Who is going to put the bell 
around the neck of the cat?
The Canadian M anufacture Association identified 500 b arrie to interprovincial trade (CMA 
1991, quoted in APEC, June 1991, p. 9). McMillan’s list is more modest: 1. Government 
procurement contract; 2. Wine, beer, liquor boards; 3. Highway construction tenders; 4. Product 
labelling, protection, safety programs; 5. Supply management boards; 6. Crown Corporation 
policies; 7. Professional credentials; 8. Direct grants and subsidies to companies; 9. Provincial 
advotising contracts, including tourist promotion campaigns; 10. Provincially funded loan boards; 
11. Provincial trucking regulations; and 12. Provincial incentive programs for industrial 
development
Only "quasi-functionalist” because in this case the ultimate result o f the cooperative exercise is not 
political union, as was the case with the EC functionalists, but rather economic union.
Negative integration is the removal of barriers to trade and mobility, while positive integration is 
the creation of administrative vehicles etc. that facilitate the integration.
See Globe and Mail "Will anything change on the basis of this report?”, Nov. 2,1990, and Daily 
News (Halifax) "A bad attitude, parochial and provincial biases and a lack of vision will prevent 
Maritime union from becoming a reality”, Nov. 4,1990.
Other issues now preoccupy politicians: 1) the 1992 recession in Canada and the U.S.; 2) the 1993 
federal election; and 3) the series of upcoming provincial elections, particularly Quebec’s.
It would, of course, be quite useful to test this framework first in order to determine its inner 
consistency, as well as its applicability to regional economic planning. However, such a test 
would be outside the scope of this thesis. Since the purpose o f using Senge’s framework in this 
thesis is merely illustrative and heuristic, I feel that it is appropriate to use it in this case without 
any further testing.
See the results o f Voluntary Planning’s 1993 Community Revisits presented in Chapter 11.
_______  PART IV____________
A NOVA SCOTIA CASE STUDY
HOW CAN THE ECONOMIC POLICY PLANNING AND 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES BE IMPROVED?
INTRODUCTION TO PART IV
As Part m  has demonstrated, while a wholly satisfactory explanation of the causes of 
the continued economic decline of the Atlantic region has not been found, since the 
1950s a multitude of initiatives have been carried out in an attempt to reverse this trend 
of decline. Economic development policy-making in the region has passed through a 
variety of phases in terms of policy orientation and administrative programme structure. 
Earlier periods were characterized by a reliance on state-centted development strategies 
usually involving megaprojects and regional development funds and agencies 
dependent on federal largesse. Since the mid-1980s and particularly since 1990, 
economic development policy in the region has instead emphasized the key role that the 
private sector plays in development and has stressed greater regional economic self- 
reliance and cooperation, as well as community-based endogenous development 
initiatives. While federal financial development assistance is still certainly welcome 
(e.g. the ACOA), these funding programmes have also come under fierce attack, 
primarily because they allegedly “distort” the market and “waste” taxpayers* money.
In terms of the debates presented in Part II, in the 1990s regional policy in Atlantic 
Canada has moved fi’om away firom a reliance on industrial policy towards a reliance on 
private sector-led development strategies. The aim of these recent policy documents -  
to transform Atlantic Canada from a “have not” region into a dynamic, entrepreneurial 
and competitive region -  is not all that different from the aim of earlier policy 
documents. What is different are the prescriptions for how to do i t  In the 1990s, they 
echo the rhetoric of the management discipline and of the neo-liberal stances presented 
in Part II -  quality, productivity, learning, economic integration, fi-ee markets, less 
government, etc. This thesis argues that the political economy of the Atlantic region 
presents serious obstacles and impediments to the achievement of these policy aims, 
and that policy makers are not being realistic in their assessment of the magnitude and 
counterproductiveness of these impediments. Furthermore, since the right set of 
incentives for change is not being provided to the agents of change, little change can be 
expected. Repeating the word “competitiveness** as a mantra is not enough. As Porter 
and others have attempted to demonstrate, competitiveness is systemic^ (i.e. the 
diamond). Therefore, as argued in Part HI, the assessment of competitive advantages or 
disadvantages, as well as the strategy for achieving competitiveness, must also be 
systemic. Practices that retard competitiveness like monopoly, patronage, etc. cannot 
simply be glossed over because they are politically sensitive issues or because the 
critical analysis of the deleterious effect of these practices on the economy generally 
comes fix)m the political left
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Given the normative objectives of the thesis, though, arguing as Part m  did, that 
policies will not work, is only half the job. Part IV empirically tests these conclusions 
and attempts to answer the fourth fundamental question -  how can the policy planning 
and implementation processes be improved? (see page 10).
While Parts II and in focused on issues of regional policy content and on the global, 
national and regional political-economic context, Part IV focuses primarily on the 
process of planning, implementation and control (monitoring and evaluation) 
undergone by a representative Atlantic Canadian economic planning organization -  
Nova Scotia Voluntary Planning. Nova Scotia Voluntary Planning (Voluntary 
Planning) and its economic development strategy ‘‘Creating Our Own Future” (the 
economic strategy), briefly examined in Chapter 7, provide an excellent case study for a 
variety of reasons. First, because of all the Atlantic Canadian economic development 
documents of the 1990s, Voluntary Planning’s “Creating Our Own Future” goes the 
furthest in advocating a private sector-led development model. In addition, the 
organization itself is not just a part of the provincial government, but is also an 
independent forum of volunteers committed to creating a partnership between business, 
labour and government^ The organization’s ability to affect government policy and the 
actions of the private sector comes not from legislative authority, but from the 
influential nature of its membership.
Several other reasons make Voluntary Planning an appropriate case study. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 8, regional development documents are regarded by the majority 
of Nova Scotians (and quite likely by many Atlantic Canadians) as exercises in futility 
meant to promote short-term political objectives and then be shelved to “gather dust”. 
This assessment is understandable given the lack of results from the previous provincial 
economic blueprints. To counteract this cynicism and attempt to change the record of 
implementation failure, “Creating Our Own Future” carefully lays out an implementa­
tion plan and a yearly monitoring of progress along the lines set out by the strategy. 
Moreover, as a result of the public consultation process that led to the publication of the 
economic strategy. Voluntary Planning went beyond the role of planner and committed 
itself to be a “catalyst” for change in the “non-govemment sector”. This approach to 
planning, with a focus on implementation and control, allowed me to empirically test 
the fundamental hypothesis of the thesis -  that the regional political economy tends to 
checkmate the chances of success of economic development initiatives, and that policy 
success would be vastly improved if the process of policy planning and policy 
implementation itself was designed to address the checkmating nature of this context. 
Through the case study I could now look at a specific initiative and ask:
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1 . Is the economic strategy working?
2 . Why or why not?
3 . How can the chances for its success be improved?
Two opportunities greatly facilitated this research project One was participation in 
Voluntary Planning’s Communications Committee, 1993 Community Consultations 
and Strategic Planning Review process. The other was participation, on an informal 
basis, in the Secretariat to the Monitoring Committee’s evaluation of Voluntary 
Planning’s and the government of Nova Scotia’s record in Year One of implementation 
of “Creating Our Own Future”. While there was a definite conflict of interest because 1 
participated in both Voluntary Planning and Secretariat activities, 1 was able to perform 
my duties in both committees by maintaining the confidentiality of the meetings and 
deliberations of both groups. The policy research and cooperative inquiry methods of 
social research described in Chapter 2 provided extremely useful guidelines for my dual 
role as both participant and researcher.
In sum, as a case study. Voluntary Planning provided me with: 1) the “purest” example 
of a private sector-led development initiative in the region in which to test the 
hypothesis of this thesis; 2) the opportunity to observe and actively participate in a 
regional policy monitoring and evaluation exercise; and 3) a chance to directly affect the 
planning process.
Part rv  describes the methodology design and the results of the various evaluations that 
were conducted as part of the case study. The social policy evaluation literature 
describes four main types of evaluations: 1) effectiveness, 2) model appropriateness,
3) efficacy and 4) efficiency evaluations. The first type of evaluation is fundamentally 
performance-oriented and suitable for a Short-Term/Plan-Specific evaluation exercise. 
The other three types of evaluations are more analytical and suitable for a Long- 
Term/General/Organizational evaluation exercise. Given the overall argumentative 
thrust of the thesis, a multi-dimensional evaluation design was required. The first three 
types of evaluations were conducted for the thesis. Each evaluation served a specific 
purpose and adopted a different methodology. In terms of the case study questions 
posed earlier, the Short-Term/Plan-Specific effectiveness evaluation attempts to answer 
the question Is the strategy working? The other two Long-Term/General/Organizational 
evaluations attempt to answer the questions Why or why not? and How can the chances 
for its success be improved? In other words, the performance-oriented effectiveness 
evaluation tested whether, given the hypothesis of the thesis, my prediction that policy
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prescriptions would be ineffective was correct or not. The other two sets of evaluations 
then tested whether the reasons for ineffectiveness were consistent with the analysis 
previously provided in support of the hypothesis.
Part IV is divided into four chapters. Chapter 8 provides a description of Nova Scotia 
Voluntary Planning and summarizes the tenets of “Creating Our Own Future”. 
Chapter 9 presents the methodological details of the various evaluations conducted. 
Chapter 10 presents a more detailed description of the methodology followed for the 
Year One effectiveness evaluation conducted by the Monitoring Committee and then 
reports and discusses the findings of this report. Chapter 11 presents the analysis 
conducted for the model appropriateness and efficacy evaluations. Part V, Chapter 12, 
provides a set of case-specific and region-wide conclusions and recommendations and 
addresses the effects of the 1993 change in the Federal and Provincial administrations 
on the implementation of the economic strategy. Appendix A provides information 
regarding the membership of the Voluntary Planning Board and staff and other relevant 
committees mentioned in Part IV. It also lists the organizations, individuals and groups 
consulted as part of the 1993 Voluntary Planning Strategic Planning Review.
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ENDNOTES
The words “systemic” is used in Part IV to indicate that the issue under consideration must be 
viewed as part o f an entire system. The words “systems thinking” and “systems perspective” are 
used in Part IV to refer to this holistic way of examining phenomena.
While Voluntary Planning maintains that it is an arm*s-length advisory organization to 
govMTiment representing the int^ests of the “non-govanment sector^ (the private sector and the 
general citizenry), critics are quick to point out that this assessment of itself is not entirely true. 
Voluntary Plaiming’s small administrative staff and its operational costs are funded by the 
provincial government, so it is not wholly independent of govanmenL However, the majority of 
its activities are carried out by its voluntea" members outside o f the confines o f govaiunait.
CHAPTER 8
NOVA SCOTIA VOLUNTARY PLANNING
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The long-standing economic difficulties of the province of Nova Scotia have resulted in 
the formation of non-govemmental organizations aimed at mobilizing the human 
resources of the province for the purpose of economic revitalization. These movements 
have taken various forms -  from social gospel movements (e.g. the Antigonish Move­
ment), to lobbying groups, to militant labour organizations, to community economic 
development initiatives, to regional rights advocacy groups within the Canadian federa­
tion (e.g. the Maritime Rights Movement). In recent years, the distrust of politicians 
and the sense that public sector economic blueprints are created to ‘‘gather dust” have 
raised the profile of corporatist solutions to economic problems. Nova Scotia Voluntary 
Planning (V.P.) is one of the most well-organized and advanced of this type of organi­
zation in Atlantic Canada. It has been at the forefront of private sector-led economic 
development planning in Nova Scotia for almost three decades. It therefore provides an 
excellent case study through which to examine the content, context and process of a 
private sector-led economic development strategy within Atlantic Canada.
Chapter 8 examines the 30-year planning history of Voluntary Planning. It provides an 
overview of the organization and a summary of its major economic planning activities 
broken down into three major periods: from 1963 to 1987, from 1988 to 1991, and 
firom late 1991 to 1993. The focus of the Chapter is on the last two planning periods.
8.2  NATURE OF THE ORGANIZATION i
Voluntary Economic Planning (VEP), as the organization was known until 1969, was 
founded in 1963 through the efforts of the Progressive Conservative^ government of 
Premier Robert Stanfield. The purpose of the organization was to provide a province- 
wide consultative forum with the mandate of planning the province’s economic future. 
Until 1969, the organization was the only economic planning body in the province.
Since its inception VEP’s organizational structure has reflected a corporatist modeP of 
economic development -  the partnership between business, labour and government. 
While governments world-wide regularly enlist the advice of the private sector in 
economic planning. Voluntary Planning’s uniqueness comes firom the fact that the
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organization operates through enduring standing committees representing “sectors” of 
the economy rather than through short-term advisory task forces.
With the exception of a small number of civil service staff and a salaried Executive 
Director, the organization is composed entirely of volunteers. Voluntary Planning is 
structured to include a Board of Directors and standing committees comprising Sector 
and Cross-Sector Committees, an Executive Committee and a Nominating Committee 
(see Exhibits 1 and 2). The Board, comprising volunteer Sector chairs and members at 
large, provides decision-making authority and administrative direction for the organi­
zation. The Executive Committee is the chief operating body of the Board. A small staff 
of civil servants supports the day-to-day activities of the organization. (See Appendix A 
for composition of the Board and staff.) The Board reports to the Premier and the 
Cabinet (see Exhibits 1 and 2). Funding for Voluntary Planning’s activities and its 
administrative staff comes from the provincial Department of Economic Development.
Sector Committee members are recruited by the Sector members themselves for their 
expertise in particular fields of endeavour and for their ability to provide a well-informed 
balanced opinion on issues. A staff Sector Coordinator offers support services to the 
Sector Committee. The chairs of the Sector Committees sit on the Board. Other Board 
members are recruited through a Nominating Committee. The Chairman and Vice 
Chairman of the Board are appointed by the government, even though they are not 
government employees.
Despite its direct funding and reporting relationship, and the fact that its highest officers 
are government appointees. Voluntary Planning has strived throughout the years to 
maintain an arm’s-length, non-partisan relationship to government. Its structure as a 
volunteer organization provides a counterweight to government influence. The Executive 
Director’s role is to maintain this delicate balance.
The primary objective of Voluntary Planning is
To provide for the effective involvement of the non-govemment sector in 
planning and development. Within this general definition two specific 
functions are seen: i) to facilitate identification of problems by the non- 
govemment sector and to relate appropriate private and public sector 
resources in an attempt to resolve these problems; [and] ii) to involve the 
non-govemment sector in the analysis of govemment planning proposals 
during the process of their development, and prior to final approval.
(V.P. Orientation Manual, p. 7)
Chapter 8 211
EXHIBIT 1 
Voluntary Planning Organizational Chart
Deputy Minister
Director
Premier and Cabinet
Executive Committee
Coordinators (4)Sectors and Committees
Minister
Econom ic Developm ent
Voluntary Planning Board
S ecto r C hilfe  end M embere e t Lerge
Source; Voluntary Planning. Strategic Review binder, 1993.
EXHIBIT 2
The Voluntary Planning P ro cess  -  How It W orks
YES NO
YES
NO
Issue
Arises
Issue
Dropped
Informal
Submission
Board
Suggests
Changes
Issue Arises
Presentation 
to Board
Formal
Submission
Action
Decided
Sector Considers 
Issue
Government Board Considers Issue
Board Recommendation
Source: Voluntary Planning. Strategic Review binder. 1993.
The activities of the organization are proactive^ in that Voluntary Planning implements 
measures within the private sector and raises issues for the government to consider, and 
reactive^ in that Voluntary Planning responds to requests from the govemment for 
advice on matters of policy. In the latter case, confidentiality is strictly observed Sector 
Committees prepare papers and proposals which then flow up to the Voluntary 
Planning Board for consideration and approval.
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The Sector Committees have considerable contact with govemment departments on an 
informal basis. For example, govemment technical and research resources are available 
to the Sectors and regular meetings with their corresponding Ministers are encouraged. 
However, the Board, in its advisory capacity, is the primary contact for govemment 
and is responsible for forwarding Sector Committee proposals to the appropriate 
govemment agencies.
Voluntary Planning’s deliberations are characterized by confidentiality and consensus. 
These traits offer both benefits and obstacles. For example, while the respect for 
confidentiality has allowed govemment to share sensitive policy matters with Voluntary 
Planning, it has also given the organization a low public profile as well as an elitist 
image.^ Voluntary Planning is known by those who are aware of the organization’s 
existence -  mostly powerful individuals in business and govemment involved in the 
economic policy matters -  as “Nova Scotia’s Best Kept Secret”. Similarly, the 
consensus decision-making process of the Sector and Board deliberations enables the 
organization to inspire a diverse group of individuals from the many communities and 
economic sectors of the province to reach consensus on policy matters. Unfortunately, 
consensus decision-making is time consuming and frustrating, requiring enormous 
patience and dedication on the part of participants.
In 1993 there were 14 active Sector Committees^ and over 600 members in the 
organization. The Board, originally composed of 32 white establishment males, is now 
far more representative of the various communities of Nova Scotia. Its 40 members 
now include male and female representatives of the various geographic, racial and 
ethnic communities of the province. While the original Voluntary Economic Planning 
was concerned solely with economic issues. Voluntary Planning currently has a 
broader mandate which includes social and environmental issues. For example. 
Voluntary Planning currently has a Race Relations Committee and an Environment and 
Economy Sector. Communications within the organization are maintained through 
regular reporting procedures (e.g. minutes), a newsletter, an Annual Report and an 
Annual Meeting, and are supported by a Communications Committee.
As the rest of Chapter 8 will demonstrate, the organization’s influence and power has 
fluctuated considerably during its 20 years of existence as a consequence of either the 
nature of its working relationship with govemment or of its internal ability to capture 
and direct the efforts of its volunteer membership.
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8.3  PLANNING HISTORY - 1 9 6 3  TO 1987
In its 30-year history. Voluntary Planning has been involved in scores of public 
consultations and economic sector planning meetings and has advised the govemment 
on many issues relevant to the economic well-being of the province. However, for the 
purposes of this thesis, I will focus my examination of Voluntary Planning’s planning 
history on its involvement in the preparation of major economic planning documents 
and initiatives for Nova Scotia.
The “First Plan for Nova Scotia Voluntary Planning”, originally intended as a five-year 
plan, spanned only the 1965 to 1968 period. This document concerned itself solely 
with economic matters and did not delve into social issues. Voluntary Economic 
Planning’s task was to “identify the challenges confronting the province and to prepare 
a reasonable set of economic objectives as a framework into which the plan would fit” 
(Lamport 1988, p. 31). The plan identified the main problem in the economy as one of 
“inertia” (Ibid). The objectives of the plan included: higher rates of growth in per capita 
income, higher employment levels, increases in productivity, more efficient resource 
development, and the achievement of an economic and political climate that would 
encourage industrial growth. The core philosophies guiding the plan reflected the 
economic thinking of the time. For example, while moderate growth of the resource 
industries was expected to continue, real opportunities were envisaged in the growth of 
the service and secondary manufacturing sectors. The strategy also supported the 
notion of specially designated growth centres and the attraction of certain industries to 
the area through the lobbying and promotional efforts of organizations such as 
Industrial Estates Limited. In a region with a long-standing history of govemment 
support for ailing industries (e.g. coal and steel), the strategy’s most controversial 
policy statement revolved around the notion of supporting competitive businesses while 
terminating those industries that were not viable.
Implementation of the plan was relatively “successful”, though “patchy and inconsis­
tent” (Op Cit, p. 45). The greatest success of the plan was that it legitimized the concept 
of planning all together. However, many aspects of the plan were not implemented for 
a variety of reasons, primarily resistance within the civil service to a plan crafted by 
outsiders, and the conflict of interest between Voluntary Economic Planning and the 
provincial govemment resulting fiem political pressure for the continued support of the 
Cape Breton coal and steel industries, which were not competitive. In sum. Voluntary 
Economic Planning
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...had prepared a superb plan that no one could implement.... The very 
creation of a document that articulated goals for the province’s economy 
was an outstanding achievement It established at once both the power 
of planning as a persuasive medium and its accessibility as a tool of the 
private sector. The problem was that the plan established goals but not 
specific means. It showed where to go but not exactly how to get there.
(Op C it p. 46)
In 1969 the development of a second plan was considered by Voluntary Economic 
Planning and the provincial govemment. This time, Voluntary Economic Planning’s 
“proper place in the planning process” was identified (Op Cit, p. 49). The mission 
statement of the new organization known as Voluntary Planning was “to provide for the 
effective involvement of the private sector in development planning” (Op Cit p. 50). 
Voluntary Planning was distinguished firom its predecessor. Voluntary Economic 
Planning, by two key propositions: 1) it would not plan/<?r the govemment but with 
the govemment” (Op Cit p. 51), and 2) it would involve social and environmental 
issues along with economic ones in the broader scope of development planning.
In the early 1970s, relieved of the task of developing a second plan. Voluntary 
Planning sponsored an innovative experiment in participatory planning -  “The 
Encounter on Urban Environment”. The Encounter process, modeled after Prince 
Philip’s 1968 Australian Conference on Industrialization and Urbanization”,
was to be psychologically unsettling, a calculated and controlled assault 
on a particular society’s assumptions about itself and its future [Op Cit, 
p. 54]... [and]... was to evolve development goals based on social, 
economic and physical realities of the region, shaped and widely 
understood by the community. These would then become the reference 
points whereby the private and public sectors could evaluate planning, 
decision-making and action. (C^ Cit, p. 56)
The enthusiasm generated by Encounter Week in Metro Halifax demonstrated the 
general public’s interest in participating in planning and government. Follow-up 
activities and other “mini-encounters” took place around the province. Several metro 
area planning agencies sprang up in the wake. However, the fanfare also increased the 
government’s wariness of such open-ended participatory strategies. Further Encounter 
programmes were not funded.
The early and mid-1970s, referred to by Voluntary Planning members as “the dark 
days” (Op Cit, p. 61), were characterized by an ebb in Voluntaiy Planning activities 
and enthusiasm, and by a lack of direction and purpose. This period of low activity was
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in part a result of both the election of a new Liberal provincial govemment suspicious 
of Voluntary Planning’s claim to non-partisanship, as well as of the loss, in the early 
1970s, of a direct planning mandate. To compound the problem, the organization’s 
credo as “a partnership between labour, business and govemment” had been tarnished 
by the lack of participation in the organization by labour and women, and by the 
association of Voluntary Planning with govemment interests in the long-term crisis of 
Cape Breton’s coal and steel industries. The board resolved to involve labour and 
women more directly in Voluntary Planning’s activities and held a series of public 
meetings around the province to improve public relations at a “grassroots” level.
It was not until the late 1970s that Voluntary Planning again became involved in an 
integrated long-term planning effort. The notion of “developmental planning” -  “the 
recognition of the inter-connectedness of all sectors of the economy as well as the 
quality, strength and vigor of daily life” (Op Cit, p. 76) guided the new plan. In this 
collaborative effort between Voluntary Planning and the Department of Development, 
“Voluntary Planning listened as much as it spoke and advised rather than proclaimed” 
(Op Cit, p. 77).
The strategic objectives of the plan were: 1) self reliance, and 2) the redirection of 
development policies and programmes away firom hardware and infrastmcture and 
towards productivity improvement, management development, manpower needs 
identification, training and development, technological innovation and adoption of new 
products and processes, and marketing and trade development Two major documents 
resulted from this effort. The first discussion paper, “The Green Paper”, was prepared 
by civil servants. Unfortunately, it looked at the economy solely from the points of 
view of govemment policy and govemment intervention. This approach was rejected as 
insufficient because it did not address the need for private sector participation. The 
White Paper, subtitled “Building Competitiveness” (Province of N.S. 1984), reflected 
a major shift in planning thinking in the province. While the Green Paper asked ‘What 
can we [govemment] do for you?”, the White Paper was more “What can we [private 
and public sectors] do together?” (Op Cit, p. 155). The private sector was attempting to 
go “beyond the philosophy of handouts” (Ibid).
The White Paper included the insights gathered fix)m the Green Paper as well as input 
from other policy and planning documents. It stated that
the focus o f the development strategy was competitiveness, not new 
economic programmes. The key to raising employment opportunities 
and incomes lay in improving die position of Nova Scotian firms in
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local, Canadian and international markets. The govemment role would 
be two-fold: 1) to improve the business environment through procure­
ment policies, regulation, taxation, information etc.; and 2) strengthen­
ing human resources by concentrating on manpower initiatives, 
entrepreneurship and management. (Op Cit, p. 80, emphasis added)
Both Voluntary Planning and the govemment were charged with monitoring the 
progress of the strategy. According to Lamport, 31 of the 35 strategies recommended 
by the White Paper had been implemented by October 1984. However, the fact that the 
expected positive impact of the strategy on the economy has not yet materialized 
suggests that APEC’s assertion that the document was, for the most part, simply 
ignored is perhaps a more accurate account of the implementation record of the strategy.
The mid-1980s were once again difficult years for Voluntary Planning. Membership in 
the organization had declined from over 6(X) members to under 4(X) and the tumover in 
the Executive Director’s position had recently become extremely high (several directors 
in eight months). Organizational change had become very difficult to implement For 
example, the most recent director had tried to make major changes in the organization 
(e.g. number and kinds of sectors, administrative procedures etc.) but was unable to do 
so because of organizational resistance to her ideas and to her leadership style. These 
conflicts had led to her dismissal. Moreover, as stated previously, “Building 
Competitiveness” had been simply ignored by the bureaucracy. Voluntary Planning’s 
role in planning as well as the purpose of its very existence were in question.
In mid-1987, Elizabeth Mills was hired as Executive Director of Voluntary Planning. 
She is still in this post at the time of writing (1993). As a condition of employment she 
stipulated that an On-Site Analysis be conducted in order to address some of the 
problems facing the organization at that time.
The On-Site Analysis is
a problem-solving model developed by Robert Myers and introduced by 
him as a programme of United Way/Centraide Camada in 1979. It is a 
process whereby the people doing similar work in other organizations 
join the staff in an organization to help them analyze their operations on 
site. Together they assess the organizational performance, discover and 
priorize (sic) problems and develop solutions. (Lamport 1988, p. 89)
Through this type of evaluative exercise, essential questions of organizational 
effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, credibility, and accountability to its members.
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governments and taxpayers could be examined. Ms. Mills felt the On-Site Analysis 
would: 1) help establish a common purpose for all Voluntary Planning volunteers, the 
Board, administrators and staff; 2) assist in establishing a set of clear administrative 
guidelines and protocols for the organization; and 3) bring about changes that could be 
supported by all stakeholders. Given that 1987 marked the 25th anniversary of 
Voluntary Planning’s formation, it seemed most appropriate to conduct this exercise.
The major result of this intensive five-day evaluation, contained in a report written by 
both the On-Site team and Voluntary Planning (V.P. 1988), was the identification of 
two key areas for change. One was the need to do more on-going orgartizational 
planning (long-range and operational). The second was the need to develop an effective 
communications strategy that could publicly establish Voluntary Planning as a key 
player in the non-govemment sector. The logic of the latter recommendation was simple 
-  Voluntary Planning had to be “known, understood and respected in order to attract 
and involve key private, non-govemment sector participants” (Op Cit, p. 90).
Once the organizational infirastmcture was felt to have some cohesion, Ms. Mills’ 
attention tumed to setting a direction for the main thmst of Voluntary Planning activities 
which would allow her to implement the main recommendations of the On-Site 
Analysis. The possibility of developing a plan to replace “Building Competitiveness” 
(Ibid) seemed a promising option. The feeling in economic circles was that the previous 
strategy was outdated because it had been overtaken by events such as the US.-Canada 
Free Trade Agreement, the uncertainty surrounding GATT, concem over sustainable 
development etc. Worst of all, as stated earlier, the document had, for all intents and 
purposes, been largely ignored by the bureaucracy. Therefore, it was felt that a new 
plan that could set out mutually agreed upon and implementable objectives was needed. 
The preparation of a new plan would also allow Voluntary Planning to further the 
organizational cohesiveness that had resulted from the On-Site Analysis.
8.4 AN ECONOMIC STRATEGY FOR THE 1 9 9 0 s  - 1 9 8 8  T 0 1991
8.4.1 The G enesis of a New Plan
In mid-1988, Voluntary Planning invited a union, the Nova Scotia Federation of 
Labour, and two private sector advisory councils to govemment -  the Nova Scotia 
Council of Applied Sciences and Technology (CAST) and the Nova Scotia Trade 
Council (TC) -  to join Voluntary Planning in an appeal to the Premier for a new 
economic development blueprint The Federation of Labour expressed interest in the 
project but did not participate directly. The two Councils joined in the effort The aim of
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the plan was to involve the private sector more directly in the process of improving the 
economy of the province. In June of 1988, an appeal for a new plan was made to 
Cabinet. In January of 1989, the Premier approved the project and asked Voluntary 
Planning to lead the effort. A CORE Committee composed of Voluntary Planning 
members, CAST and TC members, and academics was formed to coordinate the activities 
of the three planning partners and of all other potential stakeholders such as labour 
groups and the Department of Economic Development. The Deputy Minister of 
Economic Development was appointed as an ex-officio member (see Appendix A for 
composition). Individuals were chosen for their knowledge and expertise in economic, 
business and community matters as well as for their commitment to better economic 
prospects for Nova Scotia. Sectoral and geographic diversity was also sought.
From the beginning the CORE Committee was concerned about Premier John 
Buchanan’s commitment to a dynamic and concerted economic development plan. The 
Premier had not distinguished himself for careful planning nor for earnest implementa­
tion, but rather for finding ways to increase his political profile in a somewhat oppor­
tunistic manner. Thus the planning partners felt it was necessary to base the plan on 
sound and credible research that could withstand pohtical interference. While the 
support and advice of APEC was requested, Canada Consulting, an Ontario consulting 
firm, was appointed as the economic research consultant. Canada Consulting was 
chosen primarily because the firm was already conducting an economic development- 
related study for CAST and because the firm’s qualifications were considered adequate 
given their preparation of Ontario’s economic blueprint.
Canada Consulting faced several obstacles in its work. It needed to undergo a 
considerable learning curve on the province’s economic challenges very quickly, local 
stakeholders were suspicious of an Ontario firm, and it did not have a reliable network 
of contacts for data gathering. The result of these impediments was that the majority of 
its reports^  (V.P. 1990) were considered by some critics in economic circles as being 
somewhat “lightweight”, “too general” and a “good background lacking in-depth 
analysis”. Some critics actually considered Canada Consulting’s analysis “flawed”.
On the other hand, many of the side reports contracted to individuals and to other private 
and public agencies (e.g. the Department of Industry, Trade and Technology) received 
accolades. For example, O’Farrell’s^  (March 1990) report on the competitiveness of 
small manufacturers in Nova Scotia, while not widely circulated, was extremely well 
received. Perhaps this negative evaluation of Canada Consulting’s work is accurate. 
However, it could also be unduly harsh and due in part to the fact that the Consultants 
met with considerable resistance from some of the provincial players, particularly from
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the Department of Economic Development (DED). The relationship between DED and 
Canada Consulting had been strained; DED had been asked to abandon the project 
because some CORE Committee members did not consider previous DED submissions 
to be of sufficient quality. In addition, it was felt that the strategy would best be 
developed by the “private sector^’ without govemment interference.
In retrospect, some CORE Committee members now feel that APEC would have been a 
much better choice of economic research consultant because: 1) APEC was an “expert” 
on the region’s economic challenges and as such would have had a very short learning 
curve; 2) it was respected by all stakeholders and it had an established network of 
contacts for data gathering; and 3) it was already preparing a major economic analysis 
study and development plan for the region* so duplication of efforts and expenses 
could have been avoided while obtaining what proved to be a more sound study. 
However, while not a formal consultant, APEC provided a great deal of pro bona work 
and advice to the CORE Committee. Regular quarterly meetings involving three to five 
APEC staff were held for the two years of the planning process. APEC’s input ranged 
from editorial suggestions to criticisms that the strategy’s recommendations were not 
grounded in proper analysis and theory. For example, at one point the draft strategy 
recommended that telephone rates be lowered. While this might seem like a good policy 
in terms of reducing transaction costs for firms, the recommendation was being made 
without a cost-benefit analysis of the impact of this change on all involved parties 
(utilities, private sector and tax revenues) or a comparative study with other regions to 
determine alternative cost structures. On APEC’s suggestion the recommendation was 
changed from a call for lower telephone rates to “identifying the concerns” about rates 
raised during the consultations. APEC’s guidance and support were greatly appreciated 
in light of the problems that Canada Consulting encountered during the research phase 
and the fact that the DED did not remain an active participant throughout the entire 
planning and strategy-making process.
As far as relations with the Council of Maritime Premiers (CMP), Voluntary Planning 
had very little interaction with the CMP itself. Voluntary Planning’s CORE Committee 
spent considerable time examining “Standing Up to the Future”, McMillan’s report to 
the CMP (McMillan 1989) and exploring ways to incorporate some of the report’s major 
tenets into its own plan. As discussed in Chapter 7, McMillan’s primary message was a 
call for Maritime interprovincial cooperation or “economic union”. APEC’s support for 
interprovincial cooperation was also instrumental in the incorporation of this notion into 
Voluntary Planning’s plan.
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On September 12,1990, John Buchanan resigned as Premier of Nova Scotia. On that 
same day, he was appointed to the Canadian Senate by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. 
This move was severely criticized as a blatant example of patronage by Prime Minister 
Mulroney and was considered an ironic expression of Premier Buchanan’s own 
predilection for pork-barrel politics. The office of Premier was filled in the interim by 
Roger Bacon until a new leader of the Progressive Conservative party could be chosen. 
Donald Cameron was elected conservative leader on February 9,1991 and was sworn 
in as Premier on February 26,1991. The CORE Committee saw the change in 
leadership in the Progressive Conservative party as an opportunity to conduct the 
planning and strategy-making process more along the lines it had originally intended.
CORE Committee members had felt that the articulation of a legitimate vision of the 
economic future of the region, and the implementation of the strategy to follow, 
required the support of all Nova Scotians and the direction of the private sector. While 
the CORE Committee had considered both the possibility of conducting province-wide 
consultations before releasing its final document and having the planning and strategy 
process “driven” by the private sector (both management and labour), as opposed to by 
government, there had been considerable resistance to these ideas. On the one hand. 
Premier Buchanan’s administration was not comfortable with the notion of 
consultations or of less govemment control. Since the activities of the CORE Committee 
did not have an independent budget, the process remained well within the confines of 
govemment making a private sector-driven report and strategy highly unlikely. On the 
other hand, labour groups doubted the ability of the planning and strategy-making 
process to truly represent their views and concerns. During the research phase 
organized labour audited the research process but was not willing to be a full participant 
in the deliberations. It remained on the sidelines and was often negative.
At the request of the CORE Committee, Premier Cameron approved a budget for the 
consultative process. The fiscal independence and the fact that the govemment (i.e. the 
DED) was no longer directly involved in the planning process, gave the CORE 
Committee a large measure of control over the planning process and the editorial 
content of the strategy documents. Armed with this newly found independence and the 
commitment to province-wide consultations, the CORE Committee was able to success­
fully recmit labour’s participation. The new 12-member CORE Committee, composed 
of representatives of labour, business, academe and community economic development 
groups, with the govemment being represented solely by the Deputy Minister of 
Economic Development as an ex-officio member, felt that the planning and strategy-
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making process was now legitimately a private sector-driven process that could solicit 
the views of all Nova Scotians.
The major philosophical issue facing the CORE Committee at this point was whether the 
consultations were intended as a learning exercise for those consulted in terms of their 
ability to comprehend the initial consultation document; or a learning exercise for the 
CORE Committee on what Nova Scotians thought about the economy with the purpose 
of incorporating their views into the final strategy. The consultation process was 
conducted with both learning objectives in mind.
When it came to writing the initial consultation document based on the Canada 
Consulting research, the CORE Committee felt that it was best to hire a local writer to 
prepare it because the proper “tone” for the report could not be established by Canada 
Consulting. Thus the Ontario consultant’s participation in the planning process came to 
an end. A well respected local writer, academic and journalist prepared the initial 
consultation paper “Our Province. Our Future. Our Choice” (V.P., Mar. 1991). In 
March of 1991,20,000 copies of the paper were printed and distributed. The paper was 
subjected to a province-wide consultation involving interviews with over 1,000 major 
players in the provincial economy, public consultations held in 10 communities,^ and 
feedback from 1,563 Nova Scotians. Two consultation teams of three members of the 
CORE Committee, each representing industry, labour and academe, were recruited and 
sent “on the road” to conduct province-wide consultations. A subsequent document -  
“Report on the Public Consultation Process” (V.P., May 1991) -  detailed the feedback 
provided through the consultations.
8.4.2 The Results of the Public Consultations
The consultation process revealed not only what Nova Scotians thought should be 
added to or deleted fi’om the proposed strategy. It also revealed a deep-seated cynicism 
regarding the implementability of the programme by either the public or private sectors, 
as well as a cognitive dissonance between the neo-liberal values and interpretations of 
economic history underlying the strategy, and those of “ordinary” Nova Scotians. 
Private sector elites in Nova Scotia, both management and labour alike, were anxious to 
bring about better economic prospects for the province. However, the majority of the 
citizens of Nova Scotia were just as suspicious of them as they were of the provincial 
and federal governments. As Chapter 11 will argue, a review of the literature presented 
in Chapters 6 and 7 of the thesis on the labour history and political economy of the 
region would have predicted this outcome.
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The input from the consultations were summarized by Voluntary Planning in a report 
entitled “Report on the Public Consultation Process” (V.P., May 1991). Section 8.4.2. 
presents some of the highlights of the report most germane to the arguments presented 
in the thesis and shows how these inputs were incorporated into the final strategy 
document, “Creating Our Own Future” (V.P., Nov 1991).
The “Summary of Meetings” section of the consultation report states that
Nova Scotians are disillusioned with politicians and do not trust 
govemment (regardless of political affiliation); Nova Scotians do not 
trust business and industry; Nova Scotians have become over-dependent 
on govemment to solve our economic difficulties. However, govem­
ment does have a role to play; In addition to infrastructure impediments, 
‘attitude’ is a real part of our problem; Removal of barriers to perform­
ance must be a major part of the government’s role of implementation;
Active partners and supporters for non-govemment implementation 
must be brought into a coordinated initiative; The task of evaluating the 
‘larger provincial agenda’ above all private agendas and making it real to 
everyday Nova Scotians will be enormous. (V.P., May 1991, p. 9)
The report also documents a high level of resistance to the use of the terms 
competitiveness, private sector and privatization.
The consultations revealed that the word competitiveness
conjured up images of labour exploitation, plant closures and policies 
that sacrificed the quality of life of all Nova Scotians for the short term 
profit of the few.... [the word] naturally implies there would have to be 
losers as well as winners, and that any gains Nova Scotians made 
would come at someone else’s expense. (V.P., May 1991, p. 14)
It was argued, particularly by the labour sector, that the ethic of competitiveness needed 
to be replaced with the equally important ethics of cooperation, consultation and 
collaboration. Voluntary Planning’s (Nov. 1991) final document responded to this 
concem by stating that it “maintain(s) our commitment to ever-increasing global 
competitiveness while recognizing and acknowledging the role Nova Scotian traditions 
of cooperation should play in achieving that objective” (Ibid).
Similarly, the term private sector
while intended to encompass business, labour and all other outside 
govemment, [was] ... equated ... by many ... with business alone...
[It] evoked images of smokestacks, closed plants, job losses and ‘big, 
bad, ugly foreign-owned business’. (V.P., May 1991, p. 14)
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It is interesting to note that in the final Voluntary Planning report the words ‘‘foreign 
owned” were added to the description of “big, bad and ugly business”. The interim 
“Report on the Public Consultation Process” does not specify ownership and suggests 
instead that the resistance to a private sector-led initiative revolved around: 1) the long 
history of adversarial relationships between labour and industry, and 2) the need to 
have all sectors -  public, private (big and small business), labour and “the people” -  
working together to ensure participation by all concerned and to prevent another dust- 
collecting document. In Voluntary Planning’s final document, “the term private sector 
has been altered by using the term non-govemment sector” (V.P., Nov. 1991, p. 14). 
In addition, the grassroots links were strengthened by the recognition of “the impor­
tance of the community economic development approach as a vehicle for the implemen­
tation of an economic development strategy at a community level” (Op Cit, p. 47).
Resistance to the private sector was also evident in the discomfort felt by many Nova 
Scotians regarding the possibility of wholesale privatization of public corporations. 
Voluntary Planning’s response was to frame the discussion around strategic privatiza­
tions and thus recognize the need for appropriate consultations before any decisions are 
made regarding privatization.
The most salient recurring theme in the history of Voluntary Planning is the concem 
over the implementability of its economic blueprints. The 1990 public consultations 
revealed this concem. As stated in the preface to “Creating Our Own Future”:
Given the reality that many Nova Scotians are skeptical about the ability 
or willingness of Govemment to translate economic blueprints into 
action -  something that was made clear to us over and over again during 
our public consultation process -  the question of how to make sure this 
strategy is implemented is now the most important one we face. Our 
success in answering it will, in fact, be the ultimate test of the useful­
ness of this process. (V.P., Nov. 1991, p. 4, emphasis added)
The fear of creating just another dust-collecting document is most certainly well 
founded considering that neither the 1960s nor the 1980s documents had reached their 
desired goals. Of primary concem was the fact that the themes and general planning 
approaches presented in the White Paper “Building Competitiveness” bore a great 
resemblance to those in the 1991 discussion paper and, if anything, the economic 
conditions in the region had worsened over the eight-year span. The 1960s plan had 
identified the main problem in the economy as one of inertia. If the record of past plans 
was to serve as an indicator of forward movement in the economy, the only logical 
conclusion was that this inertia was still at work.
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The consultation process also clearly revealed concem over the quality of the leadership 
of the province as well as a desire for a more open participatory style of governing.
On behalf of the Nova Scotians who had attended the consultations and asked for a 
reliable implementation and monitoring process, the CORE Committee requested from 
Premier Cameron that a Monitoring Committee be established as part of the economic 
strategy. Funding and the agreement to support an internal governmental monitoring 
process through the establishment of a Deputy Minister Committee were secured. In 
turn, Voluntary Planning made a commitment to act as a “catalyst for change in the 
private sector” and agreed to be monitored and evaluated for its part in the implementa­
tion of the strategy. In April of 1992, a Monitoring Committee was appointed (see 
Appendix A for composition). Five of the six CORE Committee members who had 
travelled the province in the consultations were selected for membership in the 
Monitoring Committee. While conflicts of interest could have arisen from having the 
planners and strategists also be the evaluators, this choice was made because it insured 
continuity and awareness of the entire process, particularly direct knowledge of the 
fervent desire of Nova Scotians to have a well-monitored process. Several other 
individuals were chosen to serve on the Monitoring Committee in order to have 
representation from women and the govemment.
In order to further insure the implementation of the strategy, an Action Plan was drawn 
by the CORE Committee. The Action Plan involved the coordinated actions of several 
provincial govemment departments and of private sector agents representing various 
sectors of the economy. CORE Committee members were aware that the Action Plan 
being proposed was flawed in two ways: 1) the support of all parties mentioned in the 
Action Plan had not been explicitly obtained, and 2) benchmarks and evaluation criteria 
that would allow the Monitoring Committee to judge whether the implementation 
process was on-track had not been developed. While publication of the final economic 
strategy could have been delayed in order to increase partnership and participation and 
to develop an evaluation methodology and criteria at the outset of the implementation 
process, the strategy was released in November 1991 because the CORE Committee felt 
pressured by its commitment to Nova Scotians to produce a report within the shortest 
possible time after the May 1991 consultations. In any event, it was felt that an Action 
Plan, however flawed and mshed, was better than no Action Plan at all. In hindsight, 
some CORE Committee members now feel that it would have been appropriate at that 
time to contract the services of a technical advisor with experience in public policy 
evaluation to set up an effective monitoring process at the onset of the implementation 
phase.
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In sum, the most important result of the process of public consultations was the explicit 
commitment by all parties to the implementation of the economic strategy. The 
commitment was supported by several actions:
1. Voluntary Planning committed itself to act as the “catalyst” for change in the non­
government sector (mostly the private sector and labour);
2. The provincial government established a Deputy Ministers* Committee and assigned 
to it the task of overseeing the implementation of the strategy within government;
3. An Action Plan specifying who was committed to do what, by when, was to be 
included as part of the economic strategy; and
4. A Monitoring Committee composed of public and private sector leaders 
(management and labour) would be established to oversee implementation by both 
Voluntary Planning and the provincial government.
This latter result is perhaps the most significant. The establishment of a non-partisan, 
arm’s-length monitoring body committed to overseeing and evaluating strategy 
implementation was unique in the history of Atlantic Canadian economic planning. The 
evaluation of economic programme success or failure, if conducted at all, had generally 
fallen prey to partisan schemes by all levels of government -  federal, provincial, and 
municipal -  designed to justify or attack party policy platforms. The evaluation exercise 
proposed by a Monitoring Committee would provide an unusual opportunity for a more 
objective determination of not just the effectiveness, but also the opportunities and 
impediments that any economic strategy would encounter in the Atlantic Canadian 
political economy. The findings of a Monitoring Committee would provide a sober, 
legitimate and credible reference point from which to judge progress.
8.4.3 The Final Document
On November 13,1991, the document entitled “Creating Our Own Future: A Nova 
Scotia Economic Strategy” (V.P., Nov. 1991) was released jointly by Voluntary 
Planning Chairman Allan Shaw and by Nova Scotia’s Premier Donald Cameron. In 
order to maintain the non-partisanship of the report the CORE Committee obtained the 
support of the opposition Liberal party for the economic strategy.
“Creating Our Own Future” is a well laid out and easy-to-read document. While it 
contains some of the analysis conducted by Canada Consulting, most of its content 
came frx>m the deliberations of the CORE Committee and from the results of the 
provincial consultations.The model appropriateness evaluation conducted in Chapter 
11 of the thesis “locates” the content of the final economic strategy document “Creating
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Our Own Future” within the context of the reports published by ATCC and the CMP 
during the same planning period.
“Creating Our Own Future’s” vision of Nova Scotia is one where the province becomes 
“more and more economically self-reliant while maintaining and enhancing the 
province’s natural environment” (V.P., Nov. 1991, p. 18). The economic strategy was 
developed as a way to make that vision a reality. Its goal is “to build an economy that is 
based on competitive success so we [Nova Scotians] will be able to sell more goods 
and service in the global marketplace” (Op Cit, p. 19). Underlying this goal is a series 
of “core values”: strengthened non-govemment sector, outward looking; value-added; 
technologically advanced; performance oriented; environmentally sustainable; and 
regionally sensitive (to the needs of smaller and larger communities). The document’s 
detailed Action Table^^ clearly defines what needs to be done, by whom in the public 
and private sectors, how in general terms and by when.
The document’s “Strategic Approach”, “Vision”, “Levers” and “Action Plan” are 
summarized in Exhibit 3.
EXHIBIT 3 
“Creating Our Own Future” -  Summary
[“Strategic Approach”]
Based on Nova Scotian t)eiiefs— to be successful not only on our natural resources and opportunities, 
but aiso on Nova Scotian values and beliefs. These include respect for a caring society, enhancement of the 
Nova Scotian vyay of life, concern for our environment, utiiization of a cooperative approach, and a 
community-driven approach.
Strategic concentration on export sa les— only new, earned commercial revenue will sustain and enhance 
the Nova Scotian way of life. That revenue must come from the development and sale of value-added 
tradable goods and services including tourism, and by learning to trade at home in our domestic mari@t 
through import replacement, commercial linkages and strategic procurement 
Competitiveness, the Nova Scotian approach— the achievement of competitiveness will be the result 
of doing many things differently and better than we presently do. Nova Scotian competitiveness must be 
achieved by calling upon the best and most constructive of Nova Scotian values: fair play, quality 
workmanship, customer satisfaction, protection of our environment and satisfying, weil paying jobs.
Quality as a cultural ethic —- Nova Scotia must adopt a cultural passion for quality performance in all 
aspects of society. We are lagging in this matter and immediate, wide scaie action is urgently needed as a 
key part in the strategy.
[“Vision”]
The strategy’s vision for Nova Scotia is to become more economicaliy self-reliant whiie maintaining and 
enhancing the province’s natural environment The goai is to build an economy based on competitive success 
so we will be able to sell more goods and services in the globai market
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[“Levers”!
The strategy has 10 levers -  strategic areas in which specific action can achieve a lasting change in our 
economic development prospects. These are:
People— skilled and motivated people are the single most important lever for competitive success;
Quality— providing customers with quality goods and services must involve a never-ending effort 
Productivity— we must dedicate ourselves to continuously improving productivity in relation to our 
competition;
Labour/Management Relations— workers and unions can play a critical role in innovation and economic 
prosperity. Our potential for success will increase greatly if Government, Labour and Business work 
together,
Technology— technology has become an increasingly critical lever which all companies can use to achieve 
competitive success;
Trade— Nova Scotia businesses must place more emphasis on entering out-of-province markets, and must 
undertake the research and necessary investments to access outside markets;
Infrastructure —  effective trade, and a strong, competitive economy requires efficient transportation, 
telecommunications and energy systems;
Creating and Developing Business— Nova Scotia must ensure a positive provincial climate where 
entrepreneurship is enhanced and responsible risk-taking encouraged;
Community Economic Development— the province's economic development programs should be 
designed for delivery at the community level and to build the capacity required for increased economic 
activity to occur in smaller communications;
Government Role— Government must change; it must stop spending more than it receives and it must 
evolve to being a partner with strengthened non-govemment sectors.
Under each lever there are one or more objectives; in turn each objective may have one or more actions 
associated with it Within each action an attempt was made to identity “who” would be primarily responsible 
for undertaking the initiative, by when and with whom -  potential partners.
[“Action Plan”!
The Strategy in its “Call to Action” chapter suggests the following general structure to deal with 
implementation of the “Action Plan”:
— An overall Monitoring body;
— A catalyst within government composed of a small committee of deputy ministers;
— Voluntary Planning as the catalyst for the non-govemment actions.
These structures are currently in place; however there is much work left to do to ensure the strategy’s 
actions do not gather dust, to ensure all Nova Scotians are made aware of the challenges, and to ensure the 
long-tenm economic growth of our province. To date we have focused our efforts in three separate, but 
complementary, ways:
—  Creating awareness
—  Building partnerships
—  Economic Strategy Actions
Source: Voluntary Planning (1992) Annual Report 1991-1992.
“Creating Our Own Future” marked the culmination of a two-and-a-half-year planning 
process. This economic strategy was the third major plan produced by Voluntary 
Planning in almost 30 years of history. As stated in the preface of the document,
‘The biggest part of the process,* as someone attending the public 
consultations for this economic strategy pointed out forcefully ‘is still
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ahead of us....’ The job is nothing less than turning the words, and 
objectives, and proposed actions on the pages that follow into concrete 
actions that will make Nova Scotia an economically vibrant, more self- 
reliant province. (V.P., Nov. 1991)
Thus the question now was -  would the plan work this time? The evaluations conducted 
in Chapter 10 demonstrate the successes and failures of the strategy in its 18 months of 
implementation. The evaluations conducted in Chapter 11 provide some preliminary 
analysis of this record. One-and-a-half years is of course a very limited time in which to 
judge the merits of such an exercise in planning. However, these evaluations set the 
parameters, processes and methodologies for longitudinal tracking of the strategy’s 
performance.
8.5 EVALUATIONS, CONSULTATIONS AND REVIEW - 1 9 9 1  TO 1993
8.5.1 The Year One Evaluation
The monitoring of the implementation of the economic strategy was organized around 
two primary sets of activities: 1) the on-going review of reports forwarded to the 
committee by Voluntary Planning and by the Deputy Ministers’ Committee, and 2) the 
preparation of a year-end public report indicating progress by the government 
ministries and by Voluntary Planning along the guidelines set by the Action Plan 
outlined in the economic strategy.
While there was great enthusiasm in both government and non government circles for 
the establishment of a Monitoring Committee to review implementation of the economic 
strategy, implementation of the Committee’s mandate became somewhat difficult. The 
Committee was scheduled to publicly release the Year One (November 1991-1992) 
evaluation of the progress of both Voluntary Planning and the provincial government 
on strategy implementation by early 1993. By late 1992, both the government and 
Voluntary Planning were aware that many of the initiatives outlined for Year One in the 
Action Table of “Creating Our Own Future” would not be met. The various government 
and private sector agents charged with the responsibility to bring about these changes 
had not been able to develop either a monitoring process or an evaluation methodology. 
While many meetings had taken place, concrete progress towards the desired changes 
was not evident in most instances. Compounding the problem was the fact that guide- 
hnes for measuring progress along the lines laid down in the Action Table had not been 
established by the Monitoring Committee prior to the evaluation exercise. Thus the 
evaluation process suffered from the lack of both an agreed-upon methodology for
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measuring change and a monitoring process that assured progress towards the specific 
objectives. In November 1993, the Monitoring Committee contracted the services of 
Dalhousie University’s Henson College as Secretariat to the Committee.
The Monitoring Committee retained all decision-making responsibilities and charged the 
Secretariat with: 1) gathering, analyzing and preparing data fiom the Deputy Ministers’ 
and Voluntary Planning’s reports for Monitoring Committee review; 2) developing a 
process for organizing report content and the review; 3) assisting in the development of 
a public report; 4) assisting in the development of a communications strategy; and 
5) preparing agendas and providing administrative and logistical support for Monitor­
ing Committee meetings. In sum, the Secretariat’s mandate was to design an evaluation 
methodology and to facilitate the process of producing the Monitoring Committee’s 
“Year One” progress report. The report, the summary of which is presented in Chapter 
10, was published in February 1993.
8.5.2. The 1993 Community Revisits
The objectives of the 1993 community revisits were: 1) to fulfill the promises made 
during the 1991 consultations to return to the communities to discuss the progress on 
implementation; 2) to discuss the Monitoring Committee’s Year One report; and 3) to 
gather community input regarding priorities for Year Two of implementation.
For the meetings: 1) 14,500 copies of the Monitoring Committee report were distri­
buted; 2) meetings were advertised in newspapers and 2,000 invitations were sent;
3) town hall meetings took place in 10 communities, from March 22 to March 30,
1993; 4) local chairpersons and local panelists conducted the meetings; 5) proceedings 
were recorded and transcribed for the purpose of preparing a public report; 6) written 
submissions from participants were accepted; and 7) the input gathered from the 
meetings was to be presented to Voluntary Planning’s executive board and to the 
Premier and his Cabinet
Attendance in the community revisits was extremely low. However, close to 40% of 
the audience participated in the discussions (234 people attended, 90 people spoke, and 
a number of written submissions were received). One-fifth of the attendees expressed a 
desire to remain involved in the Voluntary Planning process. The meetings revealed that 
poor attendance was in part due to a lack of awareness and understanding of what 
Voluntary Planning was and of the exact purpose of the meetings.
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Common themes in all meetings were: 1) government's role in the economy; 2) feed­
back on the Community Economic Development discussion paper, 3) education; 4) the 
economy; 5) citizens seeking a way to “claw” back citizenry responsibility; 6) the need 
to improve labour/management relations; 7) the need for Voluntary Planning to expand/ 
change; and 8) that future community meetings should have a workshop^roblem- 
solving format.
The preliminaiy assessment of the results of the meetings conducted by Voluntary Plan­
ning staff revealed that: 1) participants felt that the pace of implementation was too slow 
and that urgency was required; 2) there is very little truthfulness in government commu­
nications or effectiveness in their actions; 3) there is disillusionment with government 
regardless of political affiliation; 4) government policies cause distortions in the market­
place and in the resolution of social problems; 5) it is not that Nova Scotians are bad 
entrepreneurs, but that the business environment is not conducive to entrepreneurial 
activity; 6) there was too much “turf” protection on the part of government agencies, 
community groups and companies; therefore, there is a need to cooperate with each 
other in order to compete in the global market; and 7) change in the way business and 
government are conducted is imperative and Nova Scotian citizens are seeking a way to 
become involved in this process.
Overall comments regarding “Creating our Own Future” indicated broad-based support 
for the strategy. However, comments also indicated that: 1) the goal statement should 
be based on quality of life versus competitiveness; 2) the cooperative sector was left out 
of the strategy; 3) the strategy does not consider the needs of the black communities, 
other minorities or youth; and 4) there is a need to broaden focus from private sector to 
non-govemment sector (i.e. non-govemment is not a euphemism for private sector).
Voluntary Plarming’s staff stated that the fundamental lesson leamed from the revisits 
was that the organization needed to raise its profile to create better understanding and 
more involvement It would also need to be more aggressive and action-oriented in its 
communications strategy and in the implementation process. As far as the Actions 
scheduled for Year Two, the staff felt that Voluntary Plaiuiing should make clear to the 
Monitoring Committee that certain Actions were clearly the responsibility of other non- 
govemment organizations. It also needed to broaden its role to provide a community- 
based vehicle for public participation beyond the business/labour/govemment elites.
For example, it should continue its work on race relations and consider establishing a 
youth sector. These themes are addressed in Chapters 11 and 12.
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As in the case of the publication of the Action Plan, the way in which the community 
revisits were conducted was recognized as “flawed” from the outset. The Year One 
report was authored by the Monitoring Committee, not by Voluntary Planning and 
should have been publicized by the former, not the latter. However, Monitoring 
Committee budget constraints and the fact that Voluntary Planning, not the Monitoring 
Committee, had promised to return to the communities consulted in 1991 with Year One 
results, resulted in Voluntary Planning going “on the road” instead of the Monitoring 
Committee. This only aggravated the existing confusion in the minds of bureaucrats and 
citizens alike regarding the difference between Voluntary Planning, the government and 
the Monitoring Committee. For example. Voluntary Planning, which had not conducted 
the evaluations and which had itself been evaluated by the Monitoring Committee, 
received a lot of plaintive phone calls from disgruntled civil servants whose departments 
had been harshly graded in the Year One report. If the confusion on the part of the 
bureaucrats was that great, one can only imagine how confused citizens were.
8.5.3 Phase II and the Strategic Planning Review
In March 1993, in response to the Monitoring Committee’s Year One evaluation report 
and the input from the community revisits, a Phase II Economic Strategy Management 
Committee was established. The mandate of the Committee was to coordinate sector, 
board and communication’s^  ^involvement in strategy implementation. In order to 
facilitate the work of this committee, a sub-committee was established with the purpose 
of conducting an internal Strategic Planning Review.
The mandate of the resulting Strategic Planning Committee (see Appendix A for 
composition) was to conduct “a critical and strategic analysis of the purpose, structure 
and effectiveness of Voluntary Planning and to make recommendations about its 
future” (V.P., Nov. 5, 1993). The committee solicited input from over a dozen business, 
labour and special interest groups in the province, from the Board, staff and Sector 
Committees of Voluntary Planning, from the Premier and close to 40 elected officials, 
and from APEC (see Appendix A for consulted individuals and groups). These groups 
were asked to state their perception of Voluntary Planning’s effectiveness and to 
recommend an optimum role and process for the organization. Since the deliberations 
and results of this Strategic Planning Review fell outside the data gathering phase of the 
thesis, they are not formally reported as part of this work. However, reference is made to 
some of the findings resulting from this process in Chapters 11 and 12.
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EXHIBIT 4 
Voluntary Planning Chronology
Date Event/D ocum ent
1963 Voluntary Economic Planning founded
1964 Rrst Economic Plan
1969 Second Economic Plan
1969 Name changed to Voluntary Planning
1970s (early) Encounter Week and Mini Encounters
1970s (mid) The “dark days”
1984 “Building (k)mpetitiveness”
1988 On-Site Analysis and New planning process begins
March 1991 “Our Province, Our Future, Our Choice”
May1991 “Report on the Public Consultation Process”
November 1991 “Creating Our Own Future”
February 1993 “Progress Report on the Implementation of the Economic Strategy. Year One”
March 1993 Community Revisits (Consultations)
March 1993 Phase II Committee established
June 1993 Strategic Planning Review
8.6  THE CORE COM M IHEE -  PLANNING AS SOCIAL LEARNING
The planning process that led to the publication of “Creating Our Own Future” took two 
and a half years and involved the participation of thousands of Nova Scotians. As the 
coordinators of the effort, the CORE Committee underwent a comprehensive learning 
curve in relation to the notion of “planning as social learning”. Since the initiative 
involved the cooperation of business people, labour representatives, academics and 
community advocates, the process was chracterized by debates, discussions, 
irreconcilable differences, understandings and compromises. The learning process was 
valuable because not only did these individuals receive the advice of economic and 
business “ e x p e r t s ” ,  they also listened to each other and, most important of all, 
they also listened to the “average Nova Scotian”. This listening was “effective” in three 
ways. The individuals involved: 1) managed to transcend the limitations inherent in the 
perspectives that characterize the respective constituencies from which they were 
drawn; 2) were able to understand the perspectives of the other participants; and 
3) were able to establish a “common discourse” which became reflected in the final 
strategy document. This section of the thesis presents some of the debates that 
dominated this two-and-a-half-year planning process and how these debates changed 
over time. It draws from the narrative sections presented earlier in Chapter 8, the critical
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planning theory presented in Chapter 2, and the discussion of the political economy of 
the region presented in Chapters 6 and 7.
According to Elizabeth Mills (Mills 1994), the themes that dominated the debates 
sunounding the two-year strategy planning process were: 1) the role of the private 
sector, labour unions and the government in economic development; 2) the value and 
possible role of community-based economic development initiatives; and 3) the need for 
an improved educational system, from primary education through university.
As Chapter 7 discussed, in the late 1980s and early 1990s there was a consensus at the 
Atlantic, Maritime and provincial levels that the record of failure of govemment-led 
economic development initiatives could be redressed through the application of private 
sector-led economic development models. Thus the fundamental discussions that 
dominated the CORE Committee deliberations and the original discussion paper centred 
on issues of competitiveness, privatization, value-added, quality etc. discussed in Part 
n  of the thesis. The enthusiasm of the CORE Committee members was, nevertheless, 
somewhat dampened by two events -  the results of the O’Farrell report commissioned 
as part of the background research for the economic strategy plan, and the input from 
the consultaions. The O’Farrell Report demonstrated that the Nova Scotia private sector 
was far from competitive and that provincial managerial capacity left much to be 
desired.Thus the private sector would have a difficult time leading the region out of 
economic stagnation. During the consultations, the CORE Committee was quite 
surprised to discover that it was not regarded as the “white knight” it thought itself to 
be, but instead was regarded as an untmstworthy robber baron. As mentioned earlier in 
Chapter 8, this led to some changes in the language in the final document from “private 
sector” to “non-govemment sector”, fiom “privatization” to “strategic privatization”, 
and to the addition of the word “cooperation” as a balance to the use of the word 
“competitiveness”. More importantly, the CORE Committee gained a new respect for 
the ordinary citizens of the region and a new appreciation of the role of communities in 
development Initially, the CORE Committee had shown a marked resistance to the 
community-based economic development perspective, perhaps as a result of the type of 
specialized discourse engaged in by the community economic development 
professionals on the committee. However, the consultations established a common 
reference point and the reality behind the discourse became evident This resulted in the 
community economic development perspective being enthusiastically incorporated in 
the final plan. Also, the business people and the community economic development 
advocates were able to understand each other and the grassroots constituencies in the
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region by (unknowingly) applying the types of communicative strategies suggested by 
critical planners as aids in planning.!^
Labour groups had originally been quite wary of the Voluntary Planning-sponsored 
planning process because they identified the notion of private sector-led development, 
as well as Voluntary Planning itself, with the ineterests of management. They neverthe­
less joined the CORE Committee as an active participant in the province-wide consulta­
tions since they felt that the consultations somewhat legitimized the planning process 
and because they could not afford to remain on the sidelines of such a broad-based 
planning exercise. Labour’s participation was extremely valuable not only because it 
“rounded-out” the private sector perspectives on the economy, but also because the 
need for a less confrontational and more regular dialogue, as well as the necessity to join 
forces in a globally competitive marketplace, became evident to both groups. In addition, 
the comradeship that developed between labour and management leaders led to the 
subsequent formation of various labour-business forums within Voluntary Planning 
intended to continue the dialogue initiated during this provincial “road-show”.
While the original intention to include academics in the CORE Committee came from the 
recognition that these individuals could contribute particular types of expertise to the 
process (e.g. business, economics and technology experts), the efforts of these scholars 
often became focused on the problems affecting the delivery of the entire educational 
system of the province. Thus their expertise was called upon not only as scholars, but as 
educators. The way to improve the quality of “teaching” at all levels continues to be a 
key issue in public policy debates world-wide.
The various Voluntary Planning sectors reacted in different ways to the comprehensive 
perspective developed by the members of the CORE Committee and reflected in the final 
strategy document. Some sectors were quite supportive. Others were expecting a more 
traditional economic strategy document outlining specific policies to be followed by 
each economic sector and were somewhat put off by the general statements that 
characterized the presentation of the Levers (e.g. quahty, productivity etc.). However, 
over time, the way in which these Levers could be apphed across all sectors became 
more obvious through internal sector reports. This discomfort with the general and 
abstract nature of the Levers was also expressed by many business, academic, 
community and government individuals outside the CORE Committee.
Unfortunately, both by choice and by exclusion, the government sector, particularly the 
Department of Economic Development, was not a full participant in this “planning as
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social learning” exercise. As Chapter 10 will discuss, the alienation of government 
officials and departments from the workings of the CORE Committee and from the 
development of the content of the final report is perhaps a major reason why the 
performance of the government sector in Year One was so poor.
When the long-term effects of the planning and strategy-making process on the 
economic prospects for the province are analyzed, the process-oriented results were 
perhaps more positive than the results of the policy prescriptions themselves (to be 
discussed in Chapter 10). For example, the five major results of the two-and-a-half- 
year process described in this chapter were: 1) the first steps towards a “systems 
perspective” of economic underdevelopment that could take into consideration the 
various parts and players that make up the whole of the economy; 2) the establishment 
of a comprehensive research- and consultation-based planning, implementation and 
evaluation process; 3) the establishment of a strong working relationship between 
business and labour, 4) the enforcement of a monitoring and evaluation process aimed 
at insuring implementation and public accountability; and 5) the revitalization of 
Voluntary Planning as a more public and independent agency.
Part of the discussion of the CORE Committee revolved around the need to change the 
attitudes of Nova Scotians and around the notion of dependency on government “hand­
outs” and the way in which these expenditures distort the incentives structures for 
businesses and individuals alike. As the discussion of Senge’s work in Part II showed, 
the acknowledgement of the “dysfunctions” of the systems and the need to take 
personal responsibility and command of change is only the first step in change. The 
check-mating nature of dysfunctional systems wül tend to work against any sort of 
change. Only through consistent, committed, deliberate and high-leverage change 
strategies led by individuals who have understood how their own actions contribute to 
this check-mating and who are willing to change themselves, can the system begin to 
“leam” again. As Chapters 11 and 12 will discuss, the process has only just begun.
The legacy of the comprehensive planning process that developed through trial and 
error during planning exercises can serve as a guideline for future planning exercises. 
The 10 steps involved in the model are: 1) recruitment of experts on the regional 
economy and leaders in the public, private, academic, union and community sectors as 
members of a coordination committee; 2) preparation of economic research background 
papers; 3) discussion of research results by the coordinating committee; 4) preparation 
of an initial consultation paper, 5) community consultations aimed at effective listening 
to community concerns rather than at “selling” the discussion paper; 6) development of
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a final document incorporating consultation input and establishing deadlines, responsi­
bilities and a monitoring process; 7) monitoring and evaluation of implementation plan; 
8) public reporting of monitoring; 9) consultations; and 10) review of plan and process 
for subsequent year.
The continuity of the labour/business cooperation has been insured by the formation of 
a Labour Management Fomm within Voluntary Planning. The continuity of the 
monitoring and evaluation process has been insured through the establishment of an 
independent Monitoring Committee. Lastly, “Creating Our Own Future”, put Voluntary 
Planning “on the map”, and thus the need to further establish Voluntary Planning’s 
independence and visibility has become one of the themes dominating the 1993 
Strategic Planning process.
While it cannot be firmly established at this point, chances are that the effects of better 
labour-management relations, monitoring and evaluation of economic plans and an 
advocacy organization on the economy are likely to be positive. At the very least, as the 
Postscript will discuss in more detail, the learning curve undergone by several dozen 
business, labour, government, academic and community leaders will serve as a 
valuable resource in the preparation, evaluation and implementation of any future 
economic development plan in the province.
8 .7  WILL NOVA SCOTIANS BE ABLE TO CREATE THEIR OWN FUTURE?
Voluntary Planning has come a long way since its inception. It has participated in 
several planning rounds and has survived the organizational doldrums of the “dark 
days”. It has kept up with the beat of the times by advocating a private sector-led 
development strategy. “Creating Our Own Future” suggests that the market and the 
private sector are the true heroes of competitive economies, and that the government 
should limit its involvement to playing only a supporting role. The notions that levers 
of competitiveness can be manipulated, and that the individual acts of corporate compe­
titiveness add up to a competitive economy, have a Porterian ring. Moreover, the name 
of the document suggests that the citizens of Nova Scotia can participate in private and 
public “learning organizations” to jointly achieve the province’s economic development 
objectives. In sum, “Creating Our Own Future” demonstrates that Voluntary Planning 
has adapted the market-oriented rhetoric of the 1990s to suit its organizational mandate 
and its policy implementation mechanism.
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“Creating Our Own Future” stresses the importance of skilled and motivated people, the 
upgrading of technology, the pursuit of quality, innovativeness and productivity, good 
labour-management relations and the search for global niche markets. But how are 
these desirable qualities to be achieved? Will Nova Scotian companies encounter either 
the right incentives (active competition, favourable tax structure, good communications 
infrastructure, the synergistic effects of clustering etc.) or the right resources (adequate 
capital, skilled people etc.) to achieve this vision? Moreover, Chapter 4 concluded its 
review of the management debates by suggesting that the creation of a corporate 
environment where workers and managers can creatively solve problems together is 
perhaps the most important requirement for competitive success in the long run. This 
requirement stands in sharp contrast to the paternalistic, monopolistic and bureaucratic 
corporate culture of the Atlantic region.
The prominent role given to the private sector in the pursuit of competitiveness can be 
seen as a result of both frustration over the past failure of government initiatives and of 
the popularity of market-oriented economic solutions of the 1990s. In the economic 
strategy, government’s role is seen as that of partner rather than a doer and the main 
responsibilities assigned to it are the provision of human and physical infrastmcture, 
community development policy and regulatory reform. Despite its diminished role, the 
Catch-22 of private sector-led development strategies is that if the government does not 
provide an “enabling environment” for the private sector to thrive in, national and 
regional competitiveness are elusive goals. In short, the government must be proactive, 
it must be a doer, in order to be a good partner. Can the Nova Scotia government 
become proactive? Will it be effective? If its past record is an indication of future 
success, inertia and inefficiency can most certainly be expected.
Chapters 9,10 and 11, as well as Part V of the thesis examine the questions and issues 
raised above through the analysis of a series of evaluations.
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ENDNOTES
1 The sections in this ChaptCT on the organization and planning history of Voluntary Planning are 
based on Lamport (1988), on the review of Voluntary Planning documents and on interviews with 
Elizabeth Mills (1993) from Voluntary Planning and with Fred Morley (1993) from APEC.
2 There are three major political parties in Nova Scotia - Progressive Consovative, Liberal and New 
Democratic parties.
3 Nova Scotia Voluntary Planning can be seen as belonging to a “corporatist” view o f political, 
social and economic organization. In corporatism, large segments of society, labour unions, 
business leaders, academics, special intaost groups, the state, the church etc. join together to 
govern a political unit While tiiis approach would be considered more “participatory” by its 
proponents, it does violate the fundammtal tenet of liberal democracy -  decisions are not made by 
elected public officials, but by the non-elected cwporatist players. Corpwatist solutions gained a 
bad name during the years of fascism, but have recently been returned to favour because, allegedly, 
corporatism is at the root of the great economic successes of Japan, Korea and Quebec Inc’s.
4 These widely-held perceptions were noted during the consultations held as part of the strategic 
planning process.
5 The Sector Committees are: Agriculture, Community Development, Construction, Enwgy, 
Environment and Economy, Fisheries, Forestry, Human Resources, Land Resources Cowdinating 
Council, Manufacturing, Mineral Resources, Taxation, Tourism, Transportation.
 ^ All Canada Consulting reports are filed in Voluntary Planning’s intamal library in a binder Mititled 
“Nova Scotia Economic Strategy Project Background Information.” This binder includes a series 
of reports prepared by Canada Consulting directly, repwts subcontracted to other agencies and 
individuals, as well as several reports prepared by the provincial Department of Industry, Trade and 
Technology and by Dunn and Bradstreet This series of rqx)rts is referenced in this work as 
Voluntary Planning (1990) Background Information.
 ^ This study was commissioned by the Department of Economic Development The findings of this 
report were discussed in Chapter 7. The rq>ort was not included in the binder mentioned in the 
previous footnote.
® APEC (1990 Oct.) Strategies and Options for the 1990s.
 ^ Consultations were conducted in the communities of 1) Colchester/East Hants/Truro; 2) Cape 
Breton, Victoria, Sydney; 3) Cumberland, Amherst; 4) Pictou, Antigonish, New Glasgow;
5) Richmond, Guysborough, Inverness, Part Hawkesbury; 6) Annapolis, Kings, Hants, Kentville; 
7) Queens, Lunenburg, Bridgewater; 8) Digby, Yarmouth, Shelburne; 9) Halifax; 10) Dartmouth 
Eastern Shore.
This report was written by the same local author of the initial consultation paper.
 ^  ^ See Chapter 10 for a copy of the Action Table.
 ^^  The Communication’s Committee is now a sub-group of the Phase II Committee.
 ^^  Even Sir Graham Day, a Nova Scotian by birth, was invited to contribute his knowledge of the 
U.K. privatization experience as a possible model for provincial privatizations.
^  ^ See Chapters 2 and II.
CHAPTER 9
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
9.1 INTRODUCTION
As stated in Chapter 8, the most important result of the 1991 public consultation 
process that led up to the publication of “Creating Our own Future” was the 
commitment to the implementation of the strategy expressed by all of the governmental 
and non-govemmental parties involved In order for the implementation of “Creating 
Our Own Future” to remain on target and on schedule, a clear set of Objectives and 
Actions had been developed and a monitoring and evaluation process had been set in 
place. The questions now facing Voluntary Planning, the provincial government and 
the Monitoring Committee were -  Would the strategy work? Why or why not? How 
was progress to be measured?
This thesis has argued that the political economy of the Atlantic region presents 
considerable impediments to the successful implementation of regional policy initiatives 
as currently envisioned and articulated in policy documents. Empirical data supporting 
this assertion would strengthen my argument, and direct involvement with planning 
agencies that gather the data would allow me to meet some of the normative objectives 
of the thesis. Since the types of questions facing Voluntary Planning, the government 
and the Monitoring Committee were exactly the kinds of questions that my research 
was exploring, I welcomed the opportunity to have Voluntary Planning and the Year 
One evaluation of “Creating Our Future” serve as the case study for the thesis.
Chapter 9 describes the overall evaluation methodology designed to test the effective­
ness, efficiency, model appropriateness and efficacy of Voluntary Planning and of 
“Creating Our Own Future”. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first describes 
the types of evaluative activities I conducted in conjunction with Voluntary Planning 
and the Secretariat to the Monitoring Committee, and presents an outline of the overall 
evaluation methodology. The second part discusses the requirements of the evaluation 
design vis à vis a similar monitoring and evaluation effort proposed for the North West 
of England.
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9.2 EVALUATING VOLUNTARY PLANNING 
AND THE ECQNOIVIIC STRATEGY
9.2.1 Chronology of Evaluation Activities
In the Fall of 1992, Elizabeth Mills, Executive Director of Voluntary Planning, became 
aware of my research interest in Atlantic Canadian economic development planning and 
invited me to join Voluntary Planning’s Communications Committee to assist in 
developing a methodology that could be used as part of the evaluation of Year One 
(November 1991-1992). As mentioned in Chapter 8, by this time both Voluntary 
Planning and the government of Nova Scotia were well aware that very little progress 
had been made along the lines stipulated in the Action Table of “Creating Our Own 
Future”. Moreover, the evaluation process itself was complicated by the fact that the 
Monitoring Committee had not established at the outset of the implementation phase 
either a clear set of criteria to measure change or a monitoring process that assured 
progress towards specific objectives. While the Monitoring Committee had regularly 
reviewed the reports submitted by Voluntary Planning and the Deputy Ministers’ 
Committee, it had been unable to analyze or evaluate these submissions. Dalhousie 
University’s Henson College was hired as the Secretariat to help the Monitoring 
Committee develop a methodology for the Year One evaluation report
My first task as a member of the Communications Committee was to delve into the 
public policy evaluation literature and suggest an overall framewoik for evaluating the 
activities of Voluntary Planning. This process raised a number of questions regarding 
not only the effectiveness of Voluntary Planning and the provincial government as 
implementers of the economic strategy, but also about whether this or any similar 
strategy was feasible at all in Atlantic Canada. In other words, the evaluation of the 
short-term and plan-specific details of the strategy required for the Year One evaluation 
highlighted the need to examine the more long-term and organizational issues 
surrounding the strategy document, as well as the various organizations involved in the 
implementation. Given the multiple set of frameworks, players and purposes involved, 
a multi-dimensional evaluation design was developed to address two levels of analysis 
— Short-Term/Plan-Specific and Long-Term/General/Organizational. In October of 
1992, the evaluation design described in Chapter 9 was presented to the 
Communications Committee.
Since Voluntary Planning’s request for an overall evaluation methodology coincided 
with the start of the Monitoring Committee’s Year One evaluation process, my first 
suggestion to Voluntary Planning was that in Year One it use whatever evaluation
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format the Monitoring Committee developed for that year. For Year Two, as well as for 
subsequent years (Years Three and Four), the evaluation design should follow a 
Strategic Planning Review of the organization’s past and proposed future activities. In 
other words, once a set of desired activities for the year had been decided upon, an 
evaluation component with clearly established criteria could be built in as part of that 
activity.
The evaluation plan presented to the Communications Committee assumed that the task 
of conducting the Short-Term/Plan-Specific evaluations would be the responsibility of 
the Monitoring Committee, and that once the Year One results were made public I would 
then analyze them through a series of Long/Term/General/Organizational evaluations. 
However, in early November 1992,1 was invited by Mary Morrissey, Head of the 
Monitoring Committee Secretariat, to participate in the Year One evaluation process; 
thus I was able to directly participate in this evaluation exercise. Ms. Morrissey has 
documented that the author of the thesis was involved in the great majority of the 
meetings and deliberations that led to the findings presented in the “Progress Report on 
the Implementation of the Economic Strategy”. Moreover, my contributions to the 
Secretariat were instmmental in the choice of the evaluation methodology. In sum, while 
I personally did not write the text for the report and cannot, therefore, claim 
“authorship”, I can confidently consider its findings a legitimate part of my thesis 
research. A summary of the report is presented in Chapter 10.
Once the Year One effectiveness evaluation had been completed, I then proceeded to 
analyze the results of the report through a model appropriateness, and an efficacy 
evaluation of Voluntary Planning. The arguments presented in Parts II and III of the 
thesis were used to examine the appropriateness of the economic strategy model used in 
“Creating Our Own Future”. The data for the efficacy and efficiency evaluations were 
gathered through participation in the 1993 Community Revisits and in the 1993 
Strategic Planning Review Committee. Elizabeth Mills, Executive Director of Voluntary 
Planning, and Rene Quigley and Brian Ives, Co-chairs of the Strategic Planning 
Committee have documented my active participation in these two activities. The results 
of the two analytic evaluations described above are presented in Chapter 11.
I had originally intended to perform an efficiency evaluation also. However, this would 
have required the incorporation of the Strategic Planning Review data into the thesis, an 
activity which occurred outside of the data-gathering phase of the thesis.
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9.2.2 Overall Evaluation Design
As presented in Chapter 2, the literature on the critical theory approach to planning and 
evaluation, mediating structures, cooperative inquiry and policy research, and planning 
as social learning provided the theoretical firamework and research orientation for the 
conceptualization of the entire thesis. Handbooks on evaluation methodologies,^ as 
well as academic literature and textbooks^ on social policy and social programme plan­
ning, implementation and evaluation provided the guidelines for the practical evaluation 
design of the case study. This literature suggested that the evaluation process should 
include the steps outlined below.^ This list is quite similar to that provided in Chapter 2 
on policy research guidelines. However, while the list in Chapter 2 was presented to 
establish the action and decision-making orientation of the overall thesis research, the 
list in this chapter shows the steps that were followed in the actual case study 
evaluation.
Given the various time frames, users and objectives of the proposed evaluation 
exercises, the description of the evaluation design given below is organized under two 
main subheadings -  Short-Tenn/Plan-Specific and Long-Term/General/Organizational 
evaluations. This organization was helpful in framing the discussion around discrete 
and manageable sets of information.
Steps in Evaluation Methodolpoy Desion 
1. underslanding the programme and the environment in which it is operating
The critical analysis of the literature conducted for Parts H and HI of this thesis 
provided me with a context for the design of the overall evaluation of Voluntary 
Planning. Empirical data were collected through participation in Voluntary Planning’s 
Communications Committee and Strategic Planning Review Committee and through 
direct involvement with the Monitoring Committee’s Secretariat
2. identifying users and purposes of tfie evaiuation study
S h o rt-T erm /P lan -S p ec ific
The main “users” of the Monitoring Committee’s yearly reports would be the citizens of 
Nova Scotia since they were intended primarily as public accountability vehicles. The 
reports would also be used by the provincial government and by Voluntary Planning as 
feedback on their performance and as a guide to planning for the next year of 
implementation.
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L onQ -T erm /G enerai/Q raanizational
For the purposes of this thesis, I would have to conduct additional evaluations that 
could give the case study the broader perspective needed to address the more general 
kinds of questions posed by the thesis.
3. identifying potentiai evaiuation questions
S h o rt-T erm /P lan -S p ec ific
In terms of the case study questions posed in the introduction to Part IV, the Short- 
Term/Plan-Specific effectiveness evaluation attempts to answer the question Is the 
strategy working? Evaluation questions included:
a) How effectively have Voluntary Planning and the government met the objectives 
outlined in “Creating Our Own Future”? What is the overall impact of the strategy 
on the economy?
LonQ -T ernV G eneral/O raanizational
In terms of the case study questions, the Long-Term/General/Organizational evaluations 
attempt to answer the questions Why or why not? and How can the chances for its 
success be improved? Evaluation questions included:
b) Where do the arguments presented in the document come from in terms of the 
debates presented in Parts n  and m  of the thesis? What agencies and theories 
influenced the document? Does the economic strategy make sense within the local 
and global political economy? Are the goals and objectives feasible within this 
context? How can a more realistic view of the context help programme performance?
c) Is the role of all Voluntary Planning well defined? Has a “plausible” relationship 
between the programme activities outlined in the economic strategy for Voluntary 
Planning and expected results been established? Is Voluntary Planning tmly able to 
meet the Objectives it set for itself in the economic strategy? How should roles and 
responsibilities be more clearly established in order to insure greater success?
4. determining evaiuation approacties
Given the three sets of questions posed above, three types of evaluation approach were 
proposed to answer them:
Short-Term/Plan-Specific
a) An Effectiveness evaluation would focus on outcomes by measuring the external 
impact of the strategy against its established goals. It would establish the record of 
strategy implementation by the provincial government and by Voluntary Planning. 
The Monitoring Committee Secretariat chose a Report Card approach for each of the 
four years of the strategy. A complementary econometric analysis was suggested by
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me to the Nova Scotia Department of Economic Development, but was not 
conducted by the Department
L onQ -T erm /G eneral/O roanizational
b) A Model Appropriateness evaluation would analyze the results of the effectiveness 
evaluation in terms of whether the goals and objectives of the strategy made sense 
in the political economic context in which the economic strategy operated. A critical 
theory model of planning would provide the evaluation guidelines and the critical 
analysis of the literature conducted in Parts II and m  of the thesis would provide 
the data.
c) Voluntary Planning’s Efficacy -  its “power to produce effects”'* -  was examined in 
terms of its ability to meet the objectives it set for itself in the economic strategy, as 
well as in terms of its role as a mediating stmcture between the various publics of 
the province. The literature on mediating structures and on critical theory provided 
the guidelines for the analysis. The preliminary analysis of the results of Voluntary 
Planning’s 1993 round of consultations (the “community revisits”) and of the 1993 
Strategic Planning Review provided empirical support for the findings of this 
analytical evaluation.
5. estimating resources avaiiabie -  peopie, time, costs etc.
S h o rt-T erm /P lan -S p ec ific
The Monitoring Committee contracted the services of Henson College as a Secretariat 
for the organization of the evaluation process. Henson College was chosen over the 
Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (APEC) because the Monitoring Committee was 
concerned with getting more than just an economic impact evaluation. They were also 
concerned with issues of public administration, such as the process by which the 
strategy was being implemented and monitored. In Year One, the Monitoring 
Committee’s report was scheduled to be released early in 1993. Therefore, all 
evaluation activities had to occur between November 1992 and January 1993. A crucial 
contingency in planning design was the unknown timing of the 1993 Federal and 
Provincial elections. Even though the economic strategy was presumably a “non- 
partisan” document, the elections could affect the longevity of the strategy and the 
process of implementation. Moreover, electoral campaign “noise” could drown out 
efforts to communicate strategy goals.
LonQ -T erm /G enerai/O roanizationai
The activities to be evaluated had to fall within the data-gathering timeframe of the 
thesis and be relevant to the overall argumentative thrust of the work.
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6. determining specific options -  questions and approaches -  for the evaiuation 
study
Chapter 10 describes the methodology and the results of the Short-Term/Plan-Specific 
evaluation. Chapter 11 describes the methodology and results of the Long-Term/ 
General/Organizational evaluations.
7. formuiating recommendations
Short-Term/Plan-Specific
Two sets of recommendations were developed: 1) those of the Monitoring Committee 
Secretariat directed to the Monitoring Committee itself, and 2) those of the Monitoring 
Committee directed to Voluntary Planning and to the government of Nova Scotia.
The recommendations of the Monitoring Committee Secretariat directed to the Monitor­
ing Committee itself had to address issues of process and content in order to improve 
future implementation performance. In addition, while the Year One evaluation focused 
on Actions and Objectives that had been assigned to specific government departments 
and to Voluntary Planning sectors for implementation in Year One, the recommenda­
tions had to be made with the larger context of the overall strategy in mind. The recom­
mendations of the Monitoring Committee directed to Voluntary Planning and to the 
government of Nova Scotia had to provide practical and implementable recommenda­
tions. In addition, they had to be presented in a format accessible to the general public.
Lona-Term/General/Oraanizational
The recommendations made by this thesis had to address the overall effectiveness, 
efficiency, model appropriateness and efficacy of Voluntary Planning. These recom­
mendations would then have to be generalized in order to be applicable within the larger 
Atlantic Canadian context
The recommendations to Voluntary Planning had to address questions such as: How 
well was Voluntary Planning doing its job? Did it have the power to produce the 
desired results? Would it be credible or effective? Could the organization position itself 
as a mediating stmcture between the various sectors of the economy and government, 
and between the various geographical, ethnic, religious communities etc. and the 
government? Could it provide a legitimate forum for non-partisan participatory 
democracy in planning? If it positioned itself this way, would it still have the support of 
management and labour leaders? Would the government of Nova Scotia, which funded 
Voluntary Planning, approve of this broadened mandate for the organization?
Region-wide recommendations had to address whether private sector-led models of 
economic development were suited for the region and, if so, what kinds of organiza­
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tions could lead these efforts. High-leverage areas of inteiprovincial cooperation also 
had to be identified.
8. reporting the findings and recommendations of the assessment study
S h o rt-T erm /P lan -S p ec ific
The Progress Report on the Implementation o f the Economic Strategy. Year One. was 
made public at a press conference in early 1993. Fourteen thousand five hundred copies 
of the report were printed for distribution. Voluntary Planning organized a media 
relations campaign to accompany the Report Card release, even though it was evident 
from early on that results for Year One (grades assigned) would be rather negative. 
Voluntary Planning would also publicize the results of the evaluation through a series 
of consultations. This communications campaign reinstated the organization’s 
commitment to implementing the strategy through its role as a “catalyst” for private 
sector action and as a forum for public participation.
L o n a-T erm /G eneral/O roan izational
My recommendations were provided in the manner of internal reports to Voluntary 
Planning’s Communications Committee, in the forthcoming Strategic Planning Review 
Report, and in the form of this thesis in Chapters 11 and 12.
9.3  REGIONAL POLICY EVALUATION
In order to establish an effective, efficient, appropriate and efficacious regional and 
provincial economic planning “process” that can embody the notion of planning as 
social learning outlined in Chapter 2, plans must not only be developed, but also 
monitored, evaluated and strategically recast over time. However, this comprehensive 
approach to planning is rare in economic development circles, particularly in the 
Atlantic region. As shown in Part IQ of the thesis, Atlantic Canada has been the subject 
of a plethora of regional and provincial economic development plans. The fact that few 
development plans have put much emphasis on careful monitoring and evaluation is 
perhaps one of the major contributing factors to the failure of these initiatives. The 
historical dissonance between plans and results is also the source of much skepticism 
about the likelihood of success of any economic development initiative in the region. 
Chapter 8 chronicled how Voluntary Planning came to address this lack of results by 
making a commitment to the monitoring and evaluation of the implementation process.
As presented in Chapter 2, the evaluation design for the thesis case study was guided 
by social policy evaluation models, in part because the state of the art in regional 
planning monitoring and evaluation is not as well advanced. However, an attempt to
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ensure implementation and strategic control (monitoring and evaluation) in regional 
planning^ similar to that followed by Voluntary Planning was proposed by Wedgwood- 
Oppenheim et al. (1976). A brief review of their proposal provides a reference point for 
the evaluation design presented in this chapter.
Wedgwood-Oppenheim et at. proposed the formation of a Performance Evaluation and 
Policy Review (PEPR) Unit for the North West region of England that “could play an 
active part in transforming the regional planiting process and make it an informed 
influential reality” (Wedgwood-Oppenheim et al. 1976, p. 5). According to the authors, 
the PEPR could perform a number of roles, including that of “regional sensor, 
advocate, plaiming co-ordinator and catalyst” (Op Cit, p. 4). It could supply planrting 
agencies with “current information in a utilizable form”, as well as increase policy 
“leverage” (rather than control) over implementing agencies “through the systematic 
development of public influence” (Ibid). Given the desired dynamism, the PEPR 
monitoring and evaluation process would have to allow for both the evaluation of 
previous performance and the review of existing and proposed policy. In sum, it would 
perform many of the same types of activities that Voluntary Planning, the government 
of Nova Scotia and the Monitoring Committee had set out to perform.
The authors suggest that given the level of stability of the plaiming environment and of 
control over the issues planned for, as well as the number of fields of interest involved, 
any one of three types of monitoring approaches is appropriate. In ascending order of 
environmental complexity faced, they are: 1) implementation monitoring (insures 
implementation takes place according to plan in relatively stable environments);
2) impact monitoring (associated with managerial control and resource reallocation as a 
way to address variances in forecasts); and 3) strategic monitoring (requiring on-going 
planning and review to address complex, rapidly changing environments).
In terms of the specific design of any monitoring and evaluation unit, Wedgwood- 
Oppenheim et al. stressed the importance of “contextual matters” and state that their 
proposed unit, for example, would be appropriate “at this particular time for this 
particular region on the basis of our study of other regions, our case studies, and our 
discussions with decision makers in the North West” (Op Cit, p. 8). However, the 
authors also suggest that, in general, monitoring must be more closely linked with both 
planning and implementation if regional planning is to succeed; that the regional 
planning process must include a learning component that allows for a more flexible 
control process; and that the gap between planners, governments and those “planned 
for'* should be bridged.
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9.4  CONCLUSION
The discussion of Voluntary Planning as a case study for the thesis, as well as the 
evaluation design presented in this chapter, echo many of the concerns examined by 
Wedgwood-Oppenheim et a i In the case of Nova Scotia, the task of evaluating pre­
vious performance was undertaken primarily by the Monitoring Committee. The task of 
reviewing the strategic direction of strategy implementation was the responsibility of the 
two “partners” in economic development -  Voluntary Planning and the provincial 
government Voluntary Planning has also taken on the roles of regional sensor, 
advocate and planning coordinator, as well as that of catalyst for change in the non- 
govemment sector. The importance of contextual case-specific issues, the role of plan­
ning as social learning and the need to bridge the planning gap has been stressed in this 
thesis. In addition, the evaluation design presented in this thesis involves all three levels 
of monitoring -  implementation and impact monitoring (Short-Tenn/Plan-Specific 
evaluations), as well as strategic monitoring (Long-Term/General/Organizational 
evaluations).
Even though the arguments presented above in support of the establishment of 
monitoring and evaluation components in regional planning are quite compelling, 
political imperatives are often capable of derailing the best intentions of planners. The 
PEPR Unit was never established in England. While a definitive study of why the 
recommendations of the Wedgwood-Oppenheim study were not implemented does not 
exist at this point, the fact that a PEPR Unit was most likely regarded by politicians as a 
nuisance rather than as a helpful tool suggests one possible explanation. In Nova 
Scotia, the Monitoring Committee was able to conduct its Year One evaluation. 
However, the long-term effects of the evaluation are not known and the longevity of the 
Committee is not assured. The demand for public accountability brought about the 
Monitoring Committee. Continued demand for public accountability will most likely 
determine the Committee’s long-term impact and permanence. In sum, the adoption of a 
comprehensive approach to “strategic planning” in the realm of public policy, with all 
of its planning, evaluation and control components, will require a political as much as a 
technical and an academic process. Chapters 10 and 11 examine in more detail the 
various dynamics of regional policy evaluation initiatives in Nova Scotia in the 1990s. 
The Postscript to the thesis details the effects of changes in Federal and Provincial 
administrations on the implementation of the economic strategy.
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1 Office o f the Comptroller Gaieral of Canada (198Q. M l Auburn Associates (1987). Herman et al. 
(1987).
2 Patton and Sawicki (1986). Pal (1987). Barret and Fudge (1981). Goggin et al. (1990). Lichfield 
(1970). Glass (1973). Alterman (1982). Diamond (1984). Diamond and Spence (1983). Herman 
and Fitz-Gibbons (1987). Davis and Salasin (197^.
 ^ This list was adapted from Office of the Ctxnptroller General of Canada, 1986, p. 7.
^ New Expanded Webster Dictionary, 1989 edition, P.S.I & Associates, p. 104.
 ^ In this case, for land planning rather than for ectxiomic develq;)ment planning.
CHAPTER 10
EVALUATION RESU LTS.  
S H O R T -T E R M /PL A N -S PE C IFIC  EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATIONS
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 9 described the overall evaluation methodology designed to test the effective­
ness, model appropriateness and efficacy of Voluntary Planning and of “Creating Our 
Own Future”. The evaluation design took into consideration both Short-Term/Plan- 
Specific perspectives as well as a Long-Term/General/Organizational perspectives. 
Chapter 10 describes in detail the methodology and the results of the Monitoring 
Committee’s Short-Term/Plan-Specific “Progress Report on the Implementation of the 
Economic Strategy. Year One”. The Chapter presents a summary of the findings and a 
part of the report’s analysis of the results of the evaluation. Given my active participa­
tion in the deliberations of the Secretariat, Chapter 10 presents a great deal of the 
material contained in this report verbatim. As mentioned in Chapter 9, while I cannot 
claim authorship of the report, I can certainly consider the findings and analysis 
presented in the report as a legitimate aspect of my thesis resulting from my own 
extensive contributions to the evaluation process. My independent analysis of the 
findings of the Year One report is initiated in Chapter 10 and continued in Chapter 11.
10.2 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODOLOGY
Once the overall evaluation design for Voluntary Planning described in Chapter 9 had 
been established, my next task was to work closely with the Monitoring Committee 
Secretariat in the design of the Year One evaluation strategy. This design was to be 
followed in subsequent years of strategy implementation and evaluation.
As mentioned in Chapter 8, the monitoring process had been organized around two 
primary sets of activities: 1) the on-going review of reports forwarded to the committee 
by Voluntary Planning and by Deputy Ministers, and 2) the preparation of a. year-end 
public report indicating progress by the government ministries and by Voluntary 
Planning along the guidelines set by the Objectives and Action Plan outhned in the 
Economic Strategy. Given the difficulties experience by the Monitoring Committee in 
evaluating this flow of data, a Secretariat was hired. I joined the Secretariat as an 
informal researcher/evaluator in November 1992.
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The Monitoring Committee retained all decision-making responsibilities and the 
Secretariat was charged with: 1) gathering, analyzing and preparing data from the 
Deputy Ministers* and Voluntary Planning’s reports for Monitoring Committee review; 
2) developing a process for organizing report content and the review; 3) assisting in 
developing a public report; 4) assisting in developing a communications strategy; and 
5) preparing agendas and providing administrative and logistical support for 
Monitoring Committee meetings.
As mentioned in Chapter 8, there was some concern in policy circles over possible 
conflicts of interest within the Monitoring Committee because some Committee mem­
bers had also participated in the CORE Committee and would, therefore, be evaluating 
their own implementation record. The appointment of the Secretariat gave considerable 
credibility to the Monitoring Committee’s claim that it was capable of objectively 
evaluating the record of Year One implementation. The expertise of the Secretariat also 
brought public policy evaluation experience to the process. As the subsequent sections 
of Chapter 10 will demonstrate, the Monitoring Committee was a harsh judge of the 
government of Nova Scotia’s and Voluntary Planning’s performance in Year One.
While the Monitoring Committee had received several reports from the provincial 
government and from Voluntary Planning throughout the year, a generalized format for 
the organization of information had not been established and progress along the lines 
established by the economic strategy was difficult to determine. In November 1992, the 
Monitoring Committee asked both the government of Nova Scotia and Voluntary Plan­
ning to submit comprehensive progress reports specifically detailing their success in 
achieving the Actions and Objectives for which they had been assigned primary respon­
sibility in the economic strategy. The Secretariat reviewed, analyzed, summarized and 
presented^ to the Monitoring Committee the reports prepared for that committee by the 
provincial government^ and by Voluntary Planning.^
The Secretariat also prepared an additional “Action Table Report”"* evaluating in more 
detail the progress along the specific “Immediate” (six months) and “One Year” Actions 
outlined in the Action Table included in the economic strategy. This report cross-tabu­
lated the Action Table Actions with the relevant economic strategy Objectives and with 
the government and Voluntary Planning progress reports submitted in December 1992.
On December 10,1992 both Voluntary Planning and the government presented the 
highlights of the progress reports^ they had previously submitted to the Monitoring 
Committee and which the Secretariat had analyzed. The Secretariat then presented to the 
Monitoring Committee its analysis of the government and Voluntary Planning reports
Chapter 10 252
along with the Action Table Report mentioned previously.^ At this meeting, the 
Monitoring Committee approved the evaluation process, schedule and methodology 
suggested by the Secretariat The evaluation process and schedule assigned 
responsibilities and deadlines to all the involved parties.
The methodology chosen for the preparation of the final report centred on the applica­
tion of a grading scale (Exhibit 2) to the “Immediate” and “Year 1” Actions listed in the 
Action Table (Exhibit 3). The grading system was an adaptation of the “Report Card” 
given by APEC to the CMP on the latter’s progress on Maritime economic integration.^ 
The “Report Card” evaluation methodology was chosen for the Year One report for two 
primary reasons: most importantly, because the report card format provided all involved 
parties, including the Nova Scotia general public, with a simple, understandable and 
clear guideline of the provincial government’s and Voluntary Planning’s success or 
failure in achieving the specific Objectives and Actions committed to for Year One in 
“Creating Our Own Future”; secondly, because the time constraints facing the Moni­
toring Committee did not allow for a long period devoted to evaluation methodology 
design. The thorough analysis of the reports had been conducted by the Secretariat 
already, and what was being sought was a succinct method for organizing and 
communicating the results of the analysis. While I had personally reviewed other 
evaluation approaches for the purposes of the thesis,^ once I made the suggestion to 
use the report card format, no other methods were examined.
To complement this process-oriented evaluation and findings, I suggested that an 
econometric evaluation of the aggregate impact of the strategy on the overall economy 
of the province in terms of traditional economic indicators (unemployment, wages etc.) 
be prepared by the Nova Scotia Department of Economic Development (DED). The DED 
evaluation would address whether these efforts amounted to anything in terms of a 
change in the overall economic condition of the province. This recommendation was 
not followed.
The grades assigned to the accomplishment of these Actions were based on the 
following scale:
EXHIBIT 1 
Grading Scaled
1 = Goal/Objective reached.
2 = Progress well under way, timetables established.
3 = Goals and timetables unclear, some evidence of work completed, reports to be issued.
4 = Neither progress nor timetables.
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The Immediate and Year-One Actions to which this grading scale was applied were:
EXHIBIT 2 
Action Table
Legend Group(s) or Department(s) responsible for action
• Indicates specific responsibility
IMMEDIATE
Business Associations
• Attract U.S. carrier to provide increased jet services to Halifax
Business Associations, Labour
• Promote increased training for worlcers in the workplace
Community Economic Development Groups, Industrial Development Com m issions, Union of Nova 
Scotia Municipalities
• Community economic development groups accept and give priority to their role in the implementation of the 
strategy
Department of Education/Advanced Education
• Complete implementation of the Community College Program
Deputy Ministers
• Conduct a quality enhancement program in government to improve customer orientation
Individual Companies
• Companies must find ways to develop new products that emphasize value-added and niche markets
M anagem ent Board
• Create an arm's-length review committee to evaluate all business assistance programs (and re-justify their 
existence) on a three-year basis
Minister and Deputy Minister Responsible for Education
• Launch a concerted effort to improve the high school science and math programs
M.S. Federation of Labour, N .S. Council of Labour, Business Associations with Voluntary Planning 
acting as catalyst
• Establish a joint Labour/Employer forum to promote a greater sense of partnership in the workplace and 
the economy
Voluntary Planning
• Identify concerns raised during Voluntary Planning’s “Encounter on the Nova Scotia Economy” to Maritime 
Telephone and Telegraph re; the cost of long distance charges, the small size of local area calling markets, 
the need of high volume transmission services to all parts of the province
Voluntary Planning, Environment and Economy Round Table
• Coordinate with the Provincial Round Table on Environment and Economy (public consultation currently in
progress)
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ONE YEAR_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Business Associations, Labour, Community Economic Deveiopment Groups
• Promote the adoption of productivity management practices and good industrial relations in order to 
produce superior products and services to consistently meet customer satisfaction
Research Institutions
• Review the mandates, policies, and practices of the major public and quasi-public R&D establishments 
Department of Education/Advanced Education
• Ensure community colleges remain accessible for vocational training to those without a grade 12 diploma
• Publish the results of standardized achievement tests given to school children
• Improve the availability of literacy training in the workplace 
Department of industry. Trade and Technology
• Develop a comprehensive policy for facilitating community economic development
• Promote coordination of existing local economic development programs sponsored by federal, provincial 
and municipal governments
• Ensure entrepreneur and business programs and services information are readily available at the local 
level
• Modify provincial trade assistance to centralize infomiation about federal and provincial trade programs 
in one office; focus on encouraging the trade readiness of business; focus attention on tradable goods; 
support training programs in the trade field
intergovernm ental Affairs
• Achieve greater coordination among all levels of government 
M anagem ent Board
• Give managers in Government greater authority and accountability over their operations 
Policy Board
• Establish a coordinated process for government consultations
Source; Voluntary Planning (Nov. 1991), “Creating Our Own Future"
In order to provide the Monitoring Committee with as much information as possible on 
progress along the Immediate and Year One Actions and Objectives, the Secretariat 
drew up a list of supplemental questions^® to be answered by government and by 
Voluntary Planning. The responses^! to these questions were analyzed by the 
Secretariat and forwarded to the Monitoring Committee for consideration in assigning a 
grade. Several ad hoc communications finom Voluntary Planning staff and from 
government officials were received by the Secretariat and included in their analysis of 
progress along the Action Table.
On January 14,1993 the Monitoring Committee met to prepare the Report Card. Each 
Monitoring Committee member assigned his or her own grade on an Objective-by- 
Objective/Action-by-Action basis using the scale provided above. The final grade was 
assigned by consensus of all Committee members. The Secretariat subsequently pre­
pared a Report Card^^ and the first draft of the Year One progress report.!^ The latter 
report was sent to the Monitoring Committee members, government and Voluntary 
Planning.
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The Report Card was formally presented to all parties by the Secretariat on January 21, 
1993. At this meeting both the government and Voluntary Planning were invited to 
comment on the grade assigned to them, to correct any factual errors and to provide 
feedback on the development and release strategy of the public report. Grades assigned 
by the Monitoring Committee were not subject to negotiation.
A second draft Year One progress report was sent to the Monitoring Committee for 
final approval on February 1,1993. The final report -  “Progress Report on the Imple­
mentation of the Economic Strategy. Year One” -  was released by the Monitoring Com­
mittee on February 18,1993. The highlights of the report are presented below.
10.3 THE REPORT CARD
Most of the text of this section of Chapter 10 is taken directly from the Monitoring 
Committee’s “Progress Report on the Implementation of the Economic Strategy. Year 
One” (Monitoring Committee 1993, pp. 3-12). The report evaluates the implementation 
of the objectives identified for completion in Year One by the provincial government 
(G) and by Voluntary Planning (VP) under eight of the levers: People, Trade, Com­
munity Economic Development, (Quality, Technology, Labour-Employer Relations, 
Infrastructure, and Government Role. This section of the report also highlights efforts 
to coordinate the Economic Strategy with the Sustainable Development Strategy. The 
section of the report justifying the grades received has been omitted since it provided 
more detail than necessary for this thesis. A general discussion of the grades received is 
presented in Section 10.4.
EXHIBIT 3 
Report Card R esults
PEOPLE (EDUCATION AND TRAINING)
Action Rating Responsibility
Launch a concerted effort to improve high school science and math programs. 1 G
Publish the results of standardized achievement tests given to school children. 1 G
Complete implementation of the Community College Program 2 G
Ensure Community Colleges remain accessible for vocational training to those 
without a Grade 12 diploma.
4 G
Improve the availability of literacy training in the workplace. 2 G
Promote increased training for workers in the workplace. 3 VP
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TRADE
Action Rating Responabilify
1 ) Modily provincial trade assistance.
2) Focus on encouraging trade readiness of business.
3 ) Focus attention on tradable services.
4 ) Support training programs in trade field.
4 G
To achieve greater value added in goods and services products. 3 VP
COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Action Rating Responsibflity
Develop comprehensive policy for facilitating community economic development 4 G
Promote coordination of existing, local economic development programs 
sponsored by federal, provincial and municipal governments.
4 G
Ensure infomiation about entrepreneur and business programs and sen/ices 
available.
4 G
Development of a comprehensive policy for facilitating community economic 
development
4 VP
QUALITY
Action Rating Responsit)ility
Promote adoption of productivity management practices and good industrial 
relations in order to produce superior products and services to consistently 
meet customer satisfaction.
3 VP
TECHNOLOGY
Action Rating Responsibility
Review the mandates, policies and practices of the major and quasi-public R&D 
establishments.
3 VP
LABOUR-EMPLOYER RELATIONS
Action Rating Responsibilify
Establish a joint labour/employer forum to promote a greater sense of 
partnership in the wori<place and the economy.
1 VP
INFRASTRUCTURE
Action Rating Responsibility
Identify Maritime Tel & Tel concerns, raised during Voluntary Planning 
Encounter on the Nova Scotia Economy, over the cost of long distance charges, 
small size of local area calling markets and the need for high volume 
transmission service to all parts of the province.
1 VP
Attract U.S. carrier to provide jet service to Halifax. 3 VP
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Action Rating Responsibility
Coordination with Sustainable Development Strategy 2 VP
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GOVERNMENT ROLE
Action Rating Responsibillly
Give managers in Government greater authority and accountability over their 
operations.
3 G
Achieve greater coordination among all levels of govemment 3 G
Establish a coordinated process for govemment consultations. 4 G
Conduct a quality enhancement program in Govemment 4 G
Create an ann's-length review committee to evaluate all business assistance 
programs.
4 G
10.4 ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS
Why were the results of the Year One evaluation so dismal? How come some govern­
ment departments received low scores while others scored highly? Why did Voluntary 
Planning do well in some areas and badly in others? Was it because the government and 
Voluntary Planning had simply not done their part? Was it because, at least in the case 
of Voluntary Planning, there was no plausible relationship between what the organiza­
tion had committed itself to do and what it actually had the power to do? Or was it 
perhaps because the kinds of Objectives and Action s outlined in the economic strategy 
were simply not feasible in the context of Nova Scotia? The next section of Chapter 10 
looks at these questions. It first presents the Progress Report’s assessment of the 
results developed by the Secretariat with some contributions from me. It then initiates 
my individual analysis of the government’s and Voluntary Planning’s performance. 
Chapter 11 then continues my independent analysis of the Report Card results.
10.4.1 The Report’s  Analysis of the Results
As stated in the executive summary of the report, “of the twenty three objectives, a 
small number (7) have either been accomplished or show significant progress; action on 
the majority of objectives (16) was judged as inadequate given the time-frame and the 
urgency of the need for completion” (M.C. 1993, p. i). In 14 Actions, the Government 
scored: two Is; two 2s; two 3s; and eight 4s. In nine Actions y Voluntary Planning 
scored: two Is; one 2; five 3s and one 4. Overall, the Government performed worse 
than Voluntary Planning.
The conclusion section of the Progress Report addresses these results. Below are some 
highlights (Op Cit, pp. 14-15).
In assessing the first year of implementation the Monitoring Committee 
found both achievements and disappointments. Under the most impor­
tant lever People, the Monitoring Committee found solid evidence of 
progress. The Department of Education has set an example of what can
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be done in the implementation of objectives. Significant gains have also 
been made in the development of the Community College system. These 
achievements, however, must be maintained and even surpassed if we 
are to realize any long term change.
The intensity of change and progress must be maintained within the 
public school system for at least another five years. The Community 
College system must focus on developing a curriculum relevant to 
current learning needs and improving the level of accessibility to 
vocational and technical training for a wider range of Nova Scotians.
In the workplace both labour and employers must focus on issues of 
quality, productivity and innovation. Levels of training must increase 
and include training for managers and supervisors, as well as workers.
Business, labour and community groups must be prepared to assume a 
greater level of responsibility and leadership if they are to become a 
driving force in the implementation of the Strategy. Many issues in the 
areas of technology, trade, infrastructure and sustainable development 
as well as in quality, innovation and labour-employer relations demand 
the committed and sustained attention and action of these groups.
The Labour/Management Fomm must be able to move far beyond its 
current position to begin to shape the new approaches and the new 
relations that are required in the workplace of tomorrow. The role of 
labour in the implementation of the Economic Strategy must be clarified 
and supported if a new and productive partnership in the workplace is to 
result.
For Nova Scotians to live in ‘economically vibrant communities 
throughout the Province* as suggested by the Strategy, community 
economic development must find a place in the priorities of Govem­
ment. The objectives of developing and facilitating community economic 
development must receive more serious attention. Trade education and 
support for business development must be relevant and accessible in 
ways that are judged to be meaningful by the consumers of the service. 
Programs finom all levels of govemment must be streamlined, coordi­
nated, and accessible if they are to provide support at the ground level.
The Economic Strategy stipulates that ‘government has a critical role to 
play as facilitator or enabler towards strengthening our economic cli­
mate. Its role must evolve from “doef* to “partner” with a strengthened 
non-government sector.* For this to be accomplished, changes within 
govemment must assume greater importance if they are to affect the 
delivery of services to, and the quality of relationships with, its partners 
in the non-govemment sector.
As with Govemment, the role of Voluntary Planning is cmcial to the 
success of the plan. Voluntary Planning accepted a massive task in the 
role of providing leadership to the non-govemment sector. As the
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second year of the plan begins, the Monitoring Committee would 
recommend that Voluntary Planning reassess its role in ‘implementing' 
the Strategy. Voluntary Planning has an important and increasingly 
sophisticated role to play, if it is to act as a catalyst for change. Such a 
reassessment might include the role of the Voluntary Planning Board, 
the sector committees, constituencies, and the organization’s overall 
relationship to Govemment.
To retain its credibility, the Monitoring Committee must remain 
independent and operate at arm’s length fix>m Voluntary Planning and 
Govemment. It is the Monitoring Committee’s job to evaluate progress 
on the basis of the reports it receives. It is not the Committee’s role to 
re-evaluate the Strategy or give advice on how to implement i t  The 
Monitoring Committee must assume that Govemment and Voluntary 
Planning already have, or are developing, a dynamic understanding of 
what needs to be done and are engaged in doing i t
In future reports the Monitoring Committee will seek greater clarity 
about goals, altemative approaches, plans, timetables, and indicators for 
measuring success. Through these measures it is expected that Govem­
ment and Voluntary Planning’s expertise in ‘enabling' and ‘mobilizing' 
widespread economic revitalization will become increasingly apparent 
and effective.
The Monitoring Committee report also included an “Additional Observations and 
Comments” section that acknowledged and highlighted some of the accomplishments of 
the provincial govemment and Voluntary Planning not scheduled for review until Year 
Two, and thus not taken into consideration in the assessment of Year One progress.
In addition to noting achievements not accounted for in the Year One Review, the 
Monitoring Committee drew attention to key components of the Strategy which 
required attention if future objectives were to be realized:
For Govemment these include increasing the availability of investment 
funds, and developing tax incentives to encourage investment. Both of 
these fall under the lever Creating and Developing Business^ and will be 
reviewed at the end of Year Two.
Key components requiring sustained attention by the non-govemment 
sector in the second year include: increased emphasis on workplace 
training and the creation of a private sector venture capital mechanism.
The Monitoring Committee would encourage Voluntary Planning, 
business and labour groups to focus on ‘increasing training require­
ments for supervisors and managers' (People) as the skills of manage­
ment are directly linked to product and service quality, innovation, and 
work productivity. The Monitoring Committee encourages Voluntary
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Planning in its efforts to put together a working group on venture capital 
in Year Two. (M.C., pp. 13-14)
These recommendations are addressed in more detail in Chapter 12.
10.4.2 Additional Analysis
The works of Diamond (1984) and Diamond and Spence (1983) referenced in Chapter 
2 stress the importance of evaluating the political and administrative bureaucratic 
context of regional planning. This section of Chapter 10 provides a brief analysis of 
this context vis à vis the results of the Report Card. Primary data were gathered through 
interviews with Elizabeth Mills (1993), Executive Director of Voluntary Planning, Fred 
Morley (1993), Senior Policy Analyst for APEC and govemment sources who 
requested they remain unnamed
10.4.2.3 The Government of Nova Scotia
One possible explanation for the dismal performance of the govemment in Year One is 
that even though Premier Cameron supported the strategy, most of his administration 
was not committed to it, in part because of the likelihood that the Progressive 
Conservative party would not win the next election. Premier Cameron inherited Premier 
Buchanan’s Cabinet during a time when the Progressive Conservative administration 
was deeply unpopular and had exhausted its credibility and tmstworthiness. The 
administration was demoralized and the citizenship angry. The fact that an election 
would have to be called within the next two years did not augur well for Premier 
Cameron’s govemment in these circumstances. Despite the Premier’s support for the 
economic strategy, according to sources close to govemment, the implementation and 
intemal monitoring process entmsted to the newly formed Deputy Ministers’
Committee became an exercise in paper shuffling without vision or practicality.
In terms of actual ratings, the Department of Education scored highest. This is the direct 
result of the Minister of Education’s committing himself and his department to 
achieving the goals set out by the Action Plan,, In contrast, the scores for the DED in 
the Year One Report are embarrassingly low (mostly 4s). These scares reflect the fact 
that the active support and cooperation of the DED was never obtained. This was most 
likely a result of the “bad blood” that had developed between the DED and Canada 
Consultants during the planning phase. As Chapters 7 and 11 address, issues of 
leadership are at the heart of positive changes in govemment performance.
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Even though Premier Cameron had made some efforts to bring a measure of good 
policy management and accountability to Province House, his govemment was 
overwhelmingly defeated in May of 1993. As the Postscript to this thesis presents, the 
new govemment of Liberal Premier John Savage has yet to determine the fate of the 
economic strategy. Voluntary Planning and the Monitoring Committee.
A comprehensive study evaluation of the effectiveness of the govemment of Nova 
Scotia vis à vis regional economic development initiatives has, to my knowledge, not 
been published. However, as presented in Part in ,  there is an extensive literature on the 
politics of public spending in Canada. A brief review of this literature is helpful in 
analyzing the poor results obtained by the govemment.
Savoie’s many works have convincingly established that the failure of regional econo­
mic development policies in Canada, regardless of their theoretical basis (e.g. industrial 
policy debates) or the stmcture (centralized or diversified) or locus of control of the 
administrative delivery apparatus (federal vs. provincial vs. local), has as much to do 
with the way in which the policies have been applied as from the incomplete theories on 
which they were based. Political imperatives have distorted the requirements for 
effective policy implementation and evaluation to the point where it has become impos­
sible to determine which elements of a particular program should be retained or 
discarded. Govemment ineptitude and political shortsightedness have created an 
environment where the effectiveness of theories and approaches cannot be determined.
Compounding the problem is the fact that the federal/provincial funding formulas 
actually retard development because the regions are not given the right incentives to 
develop (McNiven 1986). There is no real incentive to get “off the dole” since the 
recipient province’s economy might not generate tax retums that would be equivalent to 
the lost federal equalization revenues.
The end result is that regional development has degenerated into a grab bag for federal 
funds where the public and private sectors feel entitled to their “share of the waste” 
even though they do not believe these programs will lead to broad-based economic 
development. Moreover, the public sector lacks the incentive to manage regional 
development programs effectively because the funding formulas work against such an 
approach, and the “culture” that surrounds the delivery of these programs is counter­
productive. Widespread patronage presents yet another possible obstacle on the road to 
competitiveness.
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The Monitoring Committee does express its optimism for better results in Year Two. 
This optimism is based primarily on the belief that the public nature of these yearly 
Report Cards should act as an incentive for achieving the Objectives and Actions 
delineated in the “Action Plan”. There is some evidence to support this belief. For 
example, while the progress reports submitted to the Secretariat/Monitoring Committee 
by the responsible govemment ministries and, to a lesser extent, by Voluntary Planning 
were at first somewhat vague and nebulous, as the evaluation process gained impetus 
and credibility a flurry of additional reports detailing progress were received. Thus the 
simple act of carefully monitoring and evaluating “Creating Our Own Future” seems to 
have unleashed a “flurry of activity”!^  related to the strategy’s Actions in the various 
departments of the provincial government. In addition, the fact that Voluntary Planning 
discussed the results of the Report Card in public community consultations should put 
even more pressure on the govemment to achieve results in Year Two.
10.4.2.b Voluntary Planning
In terms of actual scores. Voluntary Planning performed well in areas fully within its 
mandate and power to produce effects. For example, it scored Is in the formation of a 
labour-management forum and in initiating negotiations with the telephone company 
with the aim of reducing rates. However, it did not do well (mostly 3s) in areas where 
it could only “influence” the final decision maker. For example. Voluntary Planning 
scored poorly in the Actions related to workplace training, greater value added in goods 
and services, adoption of productivity management practices etc. In sum, it had been 
unable to “catalyze” the private sector into action. On policy matters, such as the 
community economic development policy, it received a low score (4) because, while 
this Sector of Voluntary Planning had developed a policy, it had been unable to 
influence govemment policy in terms of content or schedule. Voluntary Planning had, 
however, successfully coordinated its own efforts with the govemment’s sustainable 
economic development policy and thus received a score of 2 on this Action. Despite 
some of the low scores, as Chapter 8 argued, perhaps the greatest success of the 
strategy was that it established a comprehensive approach to planning and brought 
together various sectors of the economy as a working group.
I believe that Voluntary Planning’s performance was affected primarily by its lack of 
efficacy -  the power to bring about a desired result While it committed itself to be the 
catalyst for the private sector, Voluntaiy Planning had neither the power nor the 
resources to legislate or influence change in private sector agents. Additionally, as is the 
case for most volunteer organizations. Voluntary Planning is not particularly efficient in
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its workings. Lastly, as the hypothesis advanced in this thesis suggests, the results of 
the effectiveness evaluation were expected to be poor because the economic strategy did 
not directly address the impediments to change inherent in the political economy of the 
region. These arguments will be examined in detail in Chapter 11.
10.5 CONCLUSION
Apparently, the concern of most Nova Scotians over the implementability of the 
economic strategy that became evident during the consultation process was well 
founded. Not much was accomplished in Year One and the “grades” received by 
Voluntary Planning and the govemment were indeed poor. In conclusion, one can give 
two answers to the question Is the strategy working? The first is simply no. The second 
and more optimistic answer is not yet. I prefer the latter. At least the monitoring process 
has created a sober reference point for the determination of progress, motivated action 
along the lines specified by the economic strategy, and provided a vehicle for public 
accountability. Unfortunately, despite the best intentions of the provincial govemment 
and Voluntary Planning to bring about the vision of a competitive economy for Nova 
Scotia, the strategy is bound to encounter serious obstacles along the way. Consistent 
with my interest in positively affecting the implementation process of “Creating Our 
Own Future”, Chapter 11 presents an analysis of these obstacles within both an 
organizational-dynamics and a political-economic firamework.
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EVALUATION R E SU L T S. 
LO N G-TERM /G ENERAL/O RGA N IZA TION A L EVALUATIONS
11.1 INTRODUCTION
As stated in Chapter 9, Voluntary Planning, the provincial govemment and the Moni­
toring Committee were primarily interested in the Short-TemVPlan-Specific perform­
ance effectiveness evaluations. In order to analyze the results of this kind of evaluation 
within the broader perspective taken by the thesis, Chapter 11 conducts a model 
appropriateness evaluation and an efficacy evaluation. These two evaluations are based 
on the conclusions of the critical analysis of the literature presented in Parts II and in of 
the thesis, and are supported by personal observations made diuing the preparation of 
the Year One Report Card, the 1993 Community Revisits and the 1993 Strategic 
Planning Review. As stated earlier, the results of these evaluations are by nature 
tentative given the short time that the strategy has been in operation and the long time 
required for the process of planning as social learning to take root.
The chapter is divided into two parts, one corresponding to each of the two evaluations. 
Part V, Chapter 12 provides conclusions and recommendations largely based on the 
discussions presented here.
11.2 MODEL APPROPRIATENESS EVALUATION
The model appropriateness evaluation critically analyzes the dissonance between 
generic visions of a competitive Atlantic Canadian economy based on global models 
and the particular regional realities that must be factored in if the plans are to be 
successful. It attempts to provide a “reality check” for the aspirations for a competitive 
Atlantic economy articulated in “Creating Our Own Future”, as well as in other Atlantic 
Canadian economic development documents. As described in Chapter 9, the evaluation 
looks at questions such as: Does the economic strategy make sense within the local and 
global political economy? Where do the arguments presented in the document come 
from in terms of the debates presented in Part II and HI of the thesis? What agencies 
and theories influenced the document? Are the goals and objectives feasible within this 
context? How can a more realistic view of the context help programme performance?
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This evaluation exercise is organized around a summary of the answers that have been 
given in Parts II and HI of the thesis to the fundamental thesis questions -  How are 
competitive economies created? What are the policy prescriptions? and What impedi­
ments and advantages are present in the region? (see page 10). The evaluation revisits 
the conclusions of Chapters 3 through 7 in Parts II and IE, and then examines these 
conclusions from the perspective of the literature on critical planning and evaluation 
presented in Chapter 2. Through this comparative exercise, the thesis demonstrates 
how the right set of incentives is not being provided to the various agents of change 
charged with bringing about a competitive Nova Scotia or Atlantic Canada and offers 
some suggestions for the causes of this dissonance.
Most of the literature presented in this section as evidence of the impediments to the 
achievement of a competitive economy in Nova Scotia is regional in scope. However, 
the similarities between Nova Scotia and the other Atlantic provinces far outweigh the 
differences. Therefore, the regional arguments presented by this literature are 
considered valid in the analysis of Nova Scotia and of “Creating Our Own Future”. 
Similarly, the recommendations made to Voluntary Planning have regional applications.
11.2.1 How are Competitive Economies Created?
11.2.1.a To Plan or Not to Plan?
As stated in Chapter 3, the loss of U.S. hegemony over the liberal economic order 
combined with the end of the Cold War has ushered in an era of increased global 
instability while a new balance of economic, political and military power is sought The 
debates over industrial policy in the developed world revolve around the determining 
optimal strategies for adjustment to these vicissitudes. What advocates of industrial 
policy and managed trade in the developed countries want to achieve is not all that 
different from what advocates of the more traditional liberal approach to trade and 
national economic management, such as laissez-faire and free trade, want. They both 
want to be “competitive” in global markets. Thus the ends of their policies -  a healthy 
economy and an economic structure that can give the nation a competitive edge in global 
trade -  are not disputed. What is being debated hotly, though, are the means of keeping 
a winning pace in this endless neck-and-neck race. The most contentious issue in the 
debate is determining the proper roles of the state and of the market in the pursuit of 
competitiveness.
Like Schultze and Porter, many critics of the merits of industrial policy and of the new 
strategic trade theories generally:
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do not so much dispute the theoretical possibility that carefully calibrated 
govemment trade intervention might, in certain circumstance, bring 
gains to the United States [or any country adopting them], but princi­
pally... [argue]... that the potential gains were small [the promised 
rents and technological advantages]; and that political pressure would 
convert an initially well-meaning intervention policy into a boondoggle 
o f special interests. (Lawrence and Schultze 1990, p. 5, emphasis 
added)
In addition, they argue that protectionism takes the competitive pressure off producers 
and often denies the economy access to new technology in the form of imports.
On the other hand, proponents of a more activist approach to trade and economic 
management, like Lester Thurow, point out that findings and policy prescriptions such 
as those provided by Porter, are not much different 6om those of other experts in the 
field whose writings have not “made a dent in the system” (Thurow 1990). Thurow 
does not expect this inertia to be overcome by more pronouncements of the merits of 
less govemment as best govemment. He bemoans the lack of presidential leadership 
and of a political system that can support initiatives aimed at reversing the relative 
decline of the U.S. economy.
In the mid-1990s, the industrial policy debates are likely to intensify, and a great deal of 
experimentation with hybrid approaches by all governments, large and small, developed 
and not, can also be expected. In this context, perhaps the most sober recommendation 
for countries trying to adopt any economic development model — state- or market-centred 
-  is that both intemal and extemal conditions must be right for either model to succeed. 
For example, it is highly unlikely that the exact intemal and extemal conditions under 
which the hybrid model of development (where some aspects of the market were mixed 
with aspects of state control) practiced in Japan and the Asian Dragons arose can be 
replicated elsewhere. Whether parts of the model can be exported and result in success­
ful development is also not yet clear. In other words, simply adopting a developmental 
state model is not enough. In order for this model to lead to “development”, favourable 
conditions -  such as the U.S. preferential trading status enjoyed by Japan and the Asian 
Dragons, the post-WW II Japanese drive to rebuild from the ashes, the chance to “get 
the prices right” in an open world market etc. -  are in place.
The chaotic economic reform experiences of the former Soviet empire and Eastem 
Europe also provide a caveat to the wholesale adoption of free markets and democracy. 
These experiences seem to indicate that adopting the market-based systems that have
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brought the U.S. and the EC countries their great fortunes is also fraught with massive 
difficulties. What is becoming evident in the process of economic reform is that 
privatization does not automatically result in a “private sectori*; that entrepreneurship 
and enterprise building are two different things because no amount of business 
chutzpah can compensate for entering the global competitive arena without adequate 
capital, technology, worker training and managerial knowledge; and that open markets 
at home facing closed markets abroad, particularly those of the U.S. and the EC, do not 
result in much benefit to the newly converted adherent of free trade, but rather in 
economic neo-colonialism.
In addition to the right set of intemal and extemal circumstances, a great deal of disci­
pline will be required on the part of politicians, bureaucrats, elites, managers, workers 
and citizens in order for any model to result in both efficient and equitable growth. In 
the 1990s the danger is that the need for political discipline and clear leadership during 
times of radical economic transition is more likely to result in fascism than in 
democracy.
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, in Canada, national and regional economic policy shifts 
cyclically from interventionist to non-interventionist and back without any clear 
evidence of the superiority of one approach over the other. In the early 1990s, 
economic strategy is based on a private sector-led development model along the lines of 
that recommended by Porter. Since in this model the relevant level of analysis is the 
industry/firm level, rather than the national economic management level, an examination 
of Porter’s conclusions and my conclusions regarding the managerial debates is helpful 
at this point
11.2.1.b The M anagem ent Debates
In order to develop both a realistic and rigorous understanding of the firm and the 
elements of corporate and national competitiveness, economists, business leaders and 
management academics must attempt to close the gap in understanding between the 
models used by economists and those used by management experts. This is of parti­
cular importance because in the 1990s national and regional policy initiatives have 
taken a definite turn towards private sector-driven solutions.
As discussed in Chapter 4, authors like Porter, Olson and Peters are all involved in the 
search for a dynamic model that can explain growth and competitiveness. Their 
prescriptions for healthy economies and corporations boil down to the need to welcome
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pressure, disruption and change. For Porter, the secret lies in a system that fosters 
vigorous domestic competition in world-class products. Peters tends to concentrate on 
the kind of management and structure that makes “excellent” companies. His recipe for 
success is “people oriented” (Peters 1983) and process oriented; change is the name of 
the game (Peters 1987). For those who are hopeful about Eastem Europe’s transition to 
a market economy, political and economic freedom (read capitalism and democracy) are 
seen as the “switch” that can turn on entrepreneurial vision and discovery. For the 
“small is beautiful” and the flexible specialization supporters, human scale and flexibil­
ity are key. For Olson (1982) the tendency of democratic nations under laissez-faire 
economic models to degenerate into cartelization must be acknowledged and counter­
acted. Others (Scott 1985) believe that comparative advantages must be redefined in a 
way that incorporates an active managerial element -  strategic decision making. Ohmae 
(1990) believes that breaking the ties to nationalism will bring the benefits of a truly 
global economy. Senge (1990) focuses on the creation of learning organizations -  
places where people are continually discovering how they create reality and how they 
can change it
What all these authors are in some way saying is that stability causes inertia, that stand­
ing still is likely to result in quick paralysis and atrophy. Thus the most fundamental 
conclusion that can be drawn from the discussions presented in this chapter and in 
Chapter 4 is that size, management structures or style,! global or local focus, competi­
tion or cooperation are not per se important. What is important is the design and man­
agement of organizations that can keep pace with the frenetic level of change occurring 
in the world. In the words of De Geus, “the ability to learn faster than your competitors 
may be the only sustainable competitive advantage” (quoted in Senge 1990, p. 4).
What the literature on the management of chaos or learning orgartizations suggests is 
that while tyrarmical bosses, abusive organizations and dictators can exact great 
sacrifices from workers and citizens in the short run, in the long run motivated workers 
and citizens are more flexible, productive, dedicated and responsive to change than 
coerced or unappreciated ones. Therefore, human dignity and wakefulness must be 
fostered in the workplace, and in society at large -  all of which can most certainly be 
done without endangering the bottom line. Similarly, economic planners attempting to 
improve economic conditions by relying on the entrepreneurship of the private sector 
should consider the words of Bill O’Biian, CEO of Hanover insurance:
We believe that there is no fundamental trade-off between the higher 
virtues in life and economic success. We believe we can have both. In 
fact, we believe that, over the long term, the more we practice the higher
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virtues of life, the more economic success we will have. (O’Brian, 
quoted in Senge, p. 143)
11.2.1.C Can Entrepreneurs Be Created?
The proponents of private sector-led development strategies in Nova Scotia and else­
where assume that entrepreneurship can be created, that public policy has a role to play 
in such a creation, and that the availability and quality of entrepreneurs is in part related 
to the regional industrial culture. While the ^ e c t  of lively entrepreneurship activity in 
economic development is not disputed, the causes of such dynamism as well as its 
replicability in underdeveloped countries and regions still present baffling research 
questions.
In developed capitalist economies, public policy aimed at developing entrepreneurship 
does not seem to show dramatic results. While a conclusive study has not yet been 
conducted, my review of the evidence of such programs in Canada and the U.S. has 
led me to agree with Mokry’s (1988) conclusion that while govemment plays an 
integral part in entrepreneurial development, activist govemment has produced neither 
the positive effects hoped for by its proponents nor the dire consequences predicted by 
the critics of govemment. As far as the types of programs that have shown some 
positive results and which can guide future policy, Mokiy’s literature review suggests 
that in order to raise the level of entrepreneurship in the community, governments must 
either engage in support programs on a scale many times larger than states or 
communities have tried or sharply target their efforts to selected individuals. The appeal 
of policies to promote “entrepreneurship” has so far been strong enough to counteract 
negative findings about their success. However, in order not to succumb to a “quick-fix 
mentality that only wastes public funds (and private hopes), policy-makers must 
continually ask themselves the critical questions regarding what it is that is expected to 
be accomplished through entrepreneurial development, what resources are required to 
achieve these goals and how achievement is to be measured (economic growth, 
community self-sufficiency etc.).
While regional factors such as industrial stmcture and corporate culture affect the 
entrepreneurial spirit, and these in turn affect the nature of economic development in a 
given region (Weiss 1988), it must be emphasized again that entrepreneurship is neither 
a factor that can be lacking in a region (Kirzner 1980) nor a force that can be unleashed 
merely by summoning i t  Entrepreneurship is inherent; however, the right “diamond” 
must be present in order to nurture the spark of enteiprise. Still in question, therefore.
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is whether public sector initiatives have the capacity, or the political will, to alter the 
“diamond” significantly.
11.2.2 W hat are the Prescriptions for Com petitiveness?
The first part of the model appropriateness evaluation presented above provided a 
summary of the competitiveness debates presented in Chapters 3,4 and 5 of the thesis. 
Section 11.2.2 now “locates” the policy content of “Creating Our Own Future” within 
these global theoretical debates as well as within the national and regional planning 
contexts presented in Chapters 5,6 and 7. This second part of the evaluation exposes 
the influences, theories and assumptions dominating the formulation of “Creating Our 
Own Future”. The third and last part of the model appropriateness evaluation, presented 
in section 11.2.3, provides a critique.
Section 11.2.2 first locates “Creating Our Own Future” within the context of the 3 Cs 
and then within the context of the competitiveness debates.
11.2.2.3 The Economic Strategy and the Three Cs
Part m  argued that three primary themes evident in the Atlantic Canadian regional 
economic development literature of the early 1990s are: 1) competitiveness,
2) cooperation, and 3) constitution -  what I have termed the “3 Cs”. The latter two 
themes were seen as inextricably tied to the first one. As far as competitiveness is 
concerned, the primacy of the private sector in achieving a healthy economy is 
enshrined in all public documents at the Atlantic, Maritime and Provincial level. 
However, “Creating Our Own Future” goes furthest in promoting a private sector-led 
economic model of development and in making “competitive success” an explicit goal 
of the economic strategy (V.P. Nov. 1991, p.21). The interprovincial economic 
cooperation theme, championed by the Council of Maritime Premiers is explicitly 
supported in “Creating Our Own Future”.  ^Lastly, the constitution theme, as was the 
case in most Atlantic Canadian economic development plans,^ was not explicitly dealt 
with in “Creating Our Own Future”. Only APEC addressed this theme in detail. 
However, the urgency to find a more self-sufficient and endogenous model of 
development is in part a response to the spectre of constitutional failure.
Given the close interaction between APEC and the CORE Committee described in 
Chapter 8, and the fact that the latter reviewed the work of the CMP carefully, it is not 
surprising that the major economic development reports published by these three 
planning agencies between late 1989 and late 1991 show remarkable consistency in
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terms of their treatment of the three major themes of Atlantic Canadian regional policy 
discussed in Chapter 7. All three reports are intended to provide pathways to 
competitiveness and suggest that interprovincial economic cooperation is one such path 
in an environment clouded with worry about the constitutional future of the region.
Given the shared problems and opportunities described by Voluntary Planning, APEC 
and the CMP, as well as by the governments of the other three Atlantic provinces, there 
are common elements in all of their articulated goals. For example: increased self- 
reliance, increased competitiveness, market or private sector orientation, and the 
environment. The policy instruments recommended in each strategy also bear broad 
similarities. They generally include mechanisms to promote business development; 
measures to support community economic development; economic building blocks 
[e.g. human resources, infrastructure] and programmes to help with the economic 
environment and “attitudes”.
The Council, APEC and the three Maritime provincial governments see a Maritime 
“economic union” as a way to increase economic growth and competitiveness through 
integration. Political union, a concept that has been discussed on several occasions in 
Maritime history, was termed a “non-startef * in this round of proposals for regional 
integration. According to the CMP, APEC, Voluntary Planning and the other two 
Maritime provincial governments, economic integration can be achieved without 
political integration.
Exhibit 1 illustrates this parallelism in policy content between APEC, Voluntary 
Planning and the CMP.
EXHIBIT 1 
Comparative Chart of the Them es of “Competition” and “Cooperation” in APEC, 
Voluntary Planning and CMP Economic S trateg ies (1989-1991)
APEC S tra teg ies Voluntary Planning “Levers” CMP Actions 
C oop eration_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Inter-provincial cooperation The Government Role Removal of interprovincial
barriers
Trade
Quality
Creating and Deveioping Business 
Federal policy The Govemment Role
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APEC S tra teg ies Voluntary Planning “Levers” CMP Actions
Competitiveness
Community Economic Development Community Bxmnic Development
Infrastructure Infrastructure
Adequate capital Creating and Developing Business Regional investment Fund
Export orientation Creating and Developing Business
Quality
Productivity
Technology
Trade
Export Promotion Strategy 
(Virtuous cycle)
Good management skills People
Quality
Productivity
Labour Employee Relations
(Virtuous cycle)
Human resource development People
Quality
Productivity
Technology
The Role of Govemment
(Virtuous cycle)
Environmental considerations (Core value)
NOTES;
All three documents suggest the need for “attitudjnal" change from an Inward looking, govemment dependent 
and protectionist mentality towards an outward looking, entrepreneurial, free-trading spirit
The CMP “Actions” were part of the creation of a “an outward looking”, “virtuous cyde” which 
incorporated “profitability, learning skills, productivity, and export trade”.
As examined in Chapter 7, there are major differences in the reports, however. For 
example, there are differences in terms of the specific applications of, and the priorities 
given to, the policy instruments. Additionally, the role given to govemment in each 
strategy is somewhat different and the attention given to monitoring and evaluation also 
varies. “Creating Our Own Future” is the most private sector-oriented document and 
the one with the most developed monitoring and evaluation process. Given the different 
fundamental orientations and membership structures of these different agencies, their 
plans view the process of economic change differently. APEC has a more traditional 
economist’s view of Atlantic Canadian regional problems and solutions; the CMP 
suggests a series of Maritime economic integration strategies that can be brought about 
by a revitalized CMP; and Voluntary Planning sees the process as being private sector- 
driven and thus proposes a plan that leverages the cooperation of business, labour and 
govemment as partners.
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11.2.2.b The Economic Strategy and the Industrial Policy D ehates
The preamble to the presentation of the economic strategy (Section HI) addresses much 
the same issues that were presented in this thesis in the background section of Chapter 
3 and summarized in section 11.2.1.a. The chaotic and rapidly changing nature of the 
international political economy (e.g. trade bloc formation etc.) is seen as one of the 
primary reasons why a new approach to economic strategy-making is needed in Nova 
Scotia. The second reason given for this need for change, is the likelihood of a further 
retrenchment of the Canadian welfare state resulting in reduced transfer payments to the 
province. What is being alluded to in these passages are the consequences, in terms of 
regional policy options, of the national economic policy swing towards neo-liberal 
theories discussed in Chapters 5,6 and 7. Since, “the only certainty is that the status 
quo is not an option” in terms of global stability or govemment support, the economic 
strategy’s fundamental aim is to enlist the assistance of all Nova Scotians in a process 
that can turn these threats into a challenges and an opportunities.
While protectionist measures have been adopted by some advanced economies as a way 
to defend their gains, in terms of the debates presented in Chapter 3 of the thesis, the 
arguments put forth in “Creating Our Own Future” fall clearly in the laissez faire/free 
market camp. Increased levels of foreign and interprovincial trade are advocated as a 
clear turn away from an actively managed industrialAcgional policy is made. Arguments 
in favour of any aspect of the developmental state described in Chapter 3 (Japan and 
NICs) and Chapter 5 (Canada’s historical predilection for interventionist national and 
regional economic policies) are not even referenced in the document as a discussion 
point As in the case of the new market economies of the former Soviet bloc, perhaps 
the province simply did not have anything to lose, and hopefully much to gain, from 
becoming more market-oriented. In Canada, so far the only manifestation of the kind of 
political chaos that has accompanied the transition to open markets in the former Soviet 
empire has been the persistent threat of a sovereign (Quebec.
As summarized in section 11.2.2.a, critics of the merits of industrial policy do not dis­
pute the possibility that these policies might be beneficial in some circumstances. What 
they object to is the way political pressures distort well-meaning govemment interven­
tionist policies. A review of the reasons for the disappointing record of regional policy 
initiatives in Atlantic Canada presented in Chapter 6 would most certainly strengthen 
their case. As a reaction to this record of ineffectiveness, “Creating Our Own Future” 
casts the private sector as the “driver” of the strategy and the govemment as “partner” 
rather than “doer”. What the CORE Committee did not realize until the 1991 consulta-
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tions, though, was that there was no grassroots show of support for the private sector 
either. Moreover, given the poor results of the private sector-led strategy proposed by 
Voluntary Planning, one could conclude that perhaps Thurow is right in his assertion 
that the more traditional liberal approaches to economic development “have not made a 
dent in the system” and that some form of active government policy is needed.
11.2.2.C The econom ic strategy and the m anagem ent debates
“Creating Our Own Future” does not directly frame its prescriptions for economic 
recovery in Porter’s “diamond” model. However, there is strong parallelism in 
theoretical orientation between Porter’s model and “Creating Our Own Future”. For 
example, they both: 1) enshrine the role of the private sector in bringing about the 
competitive advantage of nations; 2) assign government the role of investing in human 
and physical infrastructure, and suggest that direct intervention is often harmful; and
3) assume that the economic condition of a nation or a region can be improved through 
the proper understanding and manipulation of a dynamic set of elements such as 
Porter’s “Diamond” or Voluntary Planning’s “Levers for Competitive Success”.
Porter’s influence in Canadian national economic circles was already being felt at the 
time of the publication of “Creating Our Own Future”. As described in Chapter 5, 
Porter’s “Canada at the Crossroads” was instrumental in providing support for Michael 
Wilson’s “Prosperity Through Competitiveness”, the government’s national economic 
strategy. At a Maritime level Porter participated in the “Atlantic Partners” conference, 
organized by Norm Schaeffer of the University of New Bmnswick to discuss the 
application of Porter’s work to the region (Schaeffer 1992). A follow-up conference is 
being held in November 1993 to advance regional economic development plans along 
Porterian lines. More importantly though, as of August 1993, APEC has been involved 
in a major review of the Atlantic Canadian economy using a Porter-like model 
developed by DRI McGraw ffill. According to Fred Morley of APEC (Morley 1993) the 
two-phase project should deliver an analysis of the economy and a policy orientation. 
DRI’s model is considered similar to Porter’s in that: 1) the objective is to develop 
regional comparative advantage by analyzing the economy in terms of six elements 
(e.g. human and physical infrastructure, role of government etc.); 2) it is based on a 
dynamic conception of the economy ; and 3) it assumes that the economy can be 
improved by facilitating linkages and “clusters” in the private sector and by investing in 
human and physical infrastructure. According to Morley, this project is more detailed in 
its analysis and practical in its recommendations than was Porter’s Canada-wide report, 
which was considered somewhat general and generic.
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In sum, if Voluntary Planning were drafting an economic strategy in 1993, a Porterian 
view of the economy would most likely find its way into the document. Whether or not 
such a follow-up document is ever written, the climate of opinion in regional economic 
circles encourages the adoption of Porter’s views on economic policy and competitive­
ness, and thus affects current opinion on the appropriateness of “Creating Our Own 
Future” in meeting Nova Scotia’s current economic challenges.
The vast majority of the arguments and policy prescriptions presented in “Creating Our 
Own Future” presume the direct involvement of the private sector. As a quick glance at 
Exhibit 3 in Chapter 8 would show, the language of the document, particularly that of 
some of the “Levers” -  People, Quality, Productivity, Labour-Employee Relationships, 
Technology, Creating and Developing Business, Trade -  has more to do with manage­
ment theory than with economic or planning theory. Thus the debates reviewed in 
Chapter 3 of the thesis are particularly germane to the discussion of this document. The 
next section presents a summary of the arguments contained in the “Levers for Compe­
titive Success” and relates them to the debates presented in Chapter 4 and to the discus­
sion of the political economy of the Atlantic region presented in Part m  of the thesis. In 
order to be more succinct, “Creating Our Own Future” is referred to as “the strategy”.
• People — This Lever addresses the need for a “seamless web of fiilly integrated 
educational and training opportunities” as well as the notion of “life-long learning” 
in school and in the workplace (V.P. Nov. 1991, p. 25). These concepts are akin to 
the notion of the “learning organization” presented in Chapter 4. In both cases the 
core notion is that the ability to learn faster than one’s competitors is the only 
sustainable competitive advantage at the micro level of the classroom or the shop 
floor, and at the macro level of the regional economy.
• Quality -  This Lever presents the highlights of the O’Farrell Report (1990), one of 
the side reports that was commissioned by the Nova Scotia government as part of 
the research conducted by Canada Consulting. O’Farrell’s study of the Nova 
Scotian small manufacturing sector, summarized in Chapter 7 of this thesis, 
concluded that Nova Scotian products are inferior in quality and price to comparable 
New England products and that managers of Nova Scotian companies are unaware 
of this differential. O’Farrell also concluded that the quality performance of foreign 
subsidiaries in Nova Scotia suggests that with better managers, local resources can 
produce superior quality. Thus the Lever suggests, as does Chapter 4, that people 
and quality are inextricably tied because it is people who make quality happen 
through the judicious application of technology and through commitment to bench­
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marks of product and service quality. The Lever calls for the establishment of a 
quality ethos in all Nova Scotian companies supported by a government-funded 
“Performance Enhancement Service”. The need to improve the quality of govern­
ment service delivery is also mentioned. However, as mentioned in Chapter 7, 
neither this economic strategy nor any other discussions of regional competitiveness 
address the deleterious effect of monopoly and patronage on the incentive to 
produce quality products and services in both the private and public sectors.
• Productivity -  This Lever also mentions OTarrell’s report O’Fairell concluded that 
low productivity is the most crucial shortfall in the relative performance of Nova 
Scotian firms against their American competitors and that manufacturing produc­
tivity is well below that of other industrial nations. The Lever links this lower 
productivity with lower levels of technology, but primarily with poor management 
practices. Thus one of the objectives of the “Performance Enhancement Service” 
mentioned above would be to improve managerial quality. While the discussion in 
Chapter 4 about the ability of small firms to compete effectively in global markets 
through some form of Flexible Specialization is welcome news to the myriad of 
small firms in the province, the criticism of Fordism made in Chapter 4 (rigidity in 
responding to market changes, authoritarian managerial culture, excessive emphasis 
on economies of scale and scope) also applies to the few vertically integrated giants 
that dominate entire sectors of the economy such as forestry, fisheries, oil refining 
and goods distribution. Once again, the strategy fails to link productivity with what 
is considered by Adam Smith, Porter and others the fundamental incentive for 
achieving higher levels of productivity -  vigorous domestic competition.
• Labour Employer Relations -  This Lever makes a commitment to improving the 
record of labour-employer relations in the province. While the thesis did not 
address the literature on labour-employer relations directly. Chapters 6 and 7 high­
lighted the long history of labour problems in the region, and Chapter 4 addressed 
how managerial culture and style is a key issue in competitive success. As sum­
marized in section 11.2.1.b, humanist management is, in the long-run, positively 
correlated to improvements in the bottom line. Thus the strategy’s efforts to 
improve these relationships should show positive economic results in the long run.
• Technology -  This Lever mentions that the “technology paradox of Nova Scotia is 
that the province has a disproportionally large share of Canada’s basic and applied 
research activity but it also has a relatively low level of commercial applications of 
science and technology”. If necessity is the mother of invention, scientists and 
academics must feel a need to invent However, the private sector must lack the
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incentives to commercialize the technology or the resources (financial and mana­
gerial) with which to do i t  The latter is more likely the case since, as Chapter 7 has 
discussed, there is a severe lack of venture and investment capital in the region. The 
technology paradox might also be related to the fact that regional development funds 
have distorted market signals in the region so profoundly that it is often extremely 
difficult to establish businesses that can compete outside the region. The lack of 
capital and the distorting effect of government policy on the market is also 
mentioned by the strategy in the Creating and Developing Business Lever.
• Trade -  As the strategy’s neo-liberal orientation would suggest, this Lever is 
supportive of increased inteiprovincial and export trade. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter and in Chapter 7, the strategy addresses the need for Atlantic/Maritime 
economic cooperation in much the same way as the APEC and CMP reports -  pro 
economic cooperation without any mention of political union. The analysis 
presented in Chapter 7 concluded that this formulation for interprovincial 
cooperation is not likely to result in any significant increase in economic growth. 
The thesis did not directly address the effects of the U.S./Canada Free Trade 
Agreement or the North American Free Trade Agreement on the province’s 
economy. Future research should address this gap.
• Infrastructure -  This Lever addresses the inadequacies of the provincial physical 
infrastructure. Consistent with Porterian and neo-liberal logic, the task of 
redressing this problem is seen as the government’s primary role. Since this Lever 
is not related to the management debates it will not be examined further.
• Creating and Developing Business -  This Lever focuses on entreprenuership, 
strategic procurement and industrial promotion. The latter two strategies have 
shown a serious record of failure since they were first experimented with in the 
1960s. There is, however, a need to include industrial promotion and procurement 
strategies in economic planning because, as many regional development documents 
suggest, the economic condition of the province would probably have been worse if 
these efforts had not been made. In other words, any one of these strategies is 
“necessary but not sufficient” (Spence 1990). Additionally, Porter’s evidence 
shows that attracting the right kind of branch plant jobs (i.e. managerial, decision­
making or highly technical positions) is beneficial in transferring to the host country 
technical and managerial know-how. As far as motivating entreprenuership. Chap­
ter 4 concludes that while entrepreneurship is inherent, and in fact not something 
that can be lacking in any particular place, the right “diamond” must be present in
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order to nurture the spark of enterprise. Moreover, Chapter 4 offers an admonition 
that if “entrepreneurship” is used as a quick fix for economic development needs, 
neither the vociferous cheerleading of business leaders nor the generic piecemeal 
approach of government is likely to be any more effective than “snake oil”.
• Community Economic Development -  The document suggests that “Nova Scotia’s 
economic strategy cannot be thought of as applying in only a few areas of the 
economy -  individuals and communities across the province must adopt, support 
and implement it” (V.P. Nov. 1991, p. 46). It therefore strongly supports the 
bottom-up approach of community economic development groups as a complement 
to the other Levers. As Chapter 6 suggests, it is perhaps the traditional lack of 
cohesiveness within and between Atlantic Canadian communities that has thwarted 
the spirit of many economic development initiatives in the past. If the citizens of the 
region are to move beyond mere “anger about de-industrialization” and “longing for 
communities past or missed” (Flemming 1988), its citizens must commit 
themselves to a vision of self-reliant and endogenous development What Quebec 
has that Atlantic Canada does not is Quebec Inc., the industrial reflection of its 
projet de société. Unfortunately, as Chapter 7 suggested, such a collective process 
will remain wishful thinking until strong leadership is found and the right kind 
incentives to change offered.
• Government Role -  The role suggested for the government follows the standard 
neo-liberal prescriptions presented in Chapter 3. For example, the strategy states 
that in order to build a strong economy,
the government must strive constantly to improve the economic climate: 
by its collaboration with business labour and other concerned groups; 
by its programs to support business; by its own efforts to enhance inter­
nal quality and productivity; and by reducing deficits and ‘strategically 
privatizing’ suitable operations after appropriate ‘consultations’. (V.P.
Nov. 1991, p. 49)
Similarly, the report also suggests measures the government should follow to reduce 
“redundancy and waste of scarce government resources” (Op Cit, p. 50). Given the 
“share of the waste” scenario argued by Savoie’s (1987,1990) various treatises on the 
politics of public spending in Canada, these recommendations are at the heart of 
positive change in government efficiency and effectiveness. One suggested way to 
reduce waste is to improve the management of provincial business assistance 
programmes, the “Distorted Jungle” presented in Chapter 6 (Sagebien 1990).
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Now that “Creating Our Own Future” has been located in the context of the literature 
presented in Parts II and m , the third part of the model appropriateness evaluation 
conducted in section 11.2.3 takes a look at how the political economy of the region is 
likely to present impediments to the success of these policies.
11.2.3 What Impediments are  P resent in the Region?
Nova Scotia’s economic strategy is predicated on two primary statements: that the 
status quo is no longer an option; and that Nova Scotians can create their own future 
through the adoption of a private sector-based economic strategy supported by an 
“enabling” public sector. While the former statement is certainly true, the latter remains 
to be supported by the facts. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, the assertion that the only 
certainty in the region is change was made not only in Nova Scotia, but was repeated in 
every policy document examined. However, this thesis argues that in order to make the 
strategies for coping with this change “real”, the least savoury parts of the regional 
economy must also be examined. Otherwise these slogans will be as useful as stating 
“Toto, I  have a feeling we’re not in Kansas anymore” (Dorothy in “The Wizard of Oz”, 
MGM, 1939).
Part m  concluded that the political economy of the Atlantic region is characterized by:
1) monopoly; 2) patronage; 3) low political efficacy; 4) province-building; 5) a vacuum 
of leadership; 6) antiquated management practices reflecting an anti-labour stance; 7) a 
severe lack of investment capital; 8) a “share of the waste” clientelist mentality to public 
spending held by both the private and the public sectors; 8) government policies that 
distort the market and impede the resolution of the very social and economic problems 
they are intended to address; 9) the perception by public and private sector entities that, 
at all costs, they must protect their “turf’; and 10) high illiteracy rates and low invest­
ment in worker training.
The characteristics mentioned above stand in sharp contrast to the requirements for 
creating and sustaining competitive economies and firms presented in Chapters 4 and 5 
and summarized in section 11.2.1. As stated earlier, all these authors are in some way 
saying that stability causes inertia, that standing still is likely to result in quick paralysis 
and atrophy. In Atlantic Canada, stability has degenerated into atrophy over the past 
100 years. Moreover, change is difficult to bring about because, as the examination of 
the Levers has once again demonstrated, the core institutions and practices that maintain 
the status quo are never questioned. Better quality, increased productivity, technologi­
cal commercialization and business start-ups and growth cannot be brought about
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through the repetition of these words as mantras. There have to be economic incentives 
to compete, resources to put towards these goals that expedite the process rather than 
distort it, and a playing field level enough to inspire would-be entrepreneurs. The 
reasons for these persistent errors of omission in policy documents are examined in a 
later section.
The ability of the Maritime provinces to achieve the economic cooperation called for in 
“Creating Our Own Future”, and in all other economic policy documents of the time, 
has been quite slow. Progress has been impeded, as predicted, by the province- 
building tendencies of the provincial governments and of the CMP itself, as well as by 
the well-entrenched tradition of patronage. Once again, a review of the works of Pinder 
(1972) on European integration and of the Deutsch (1970) “Report on Maritime Union” 
presented in Chapters 6 and 7 would have suggested that the economic union only 
model was not likely to be effective. This thesis argues that, given the counter­
productiveness of these forces, the political integration of the region is the sine qua non 
of economic integration, not the “non-starter” that it was deemed to be by the CMP and 
others. Unfortunately, since political integration is highly unlikely unless “things get 
bad enough”, economic integration is also bound to falter until then.
Because the region’s population is so small and its economic and political power so 
weak, Atlantic Canadians are constitutional takers, not constitutional makers. The 
constitutional fate of the region will be determined by Upper Canada, Quebec and the 
Western provinces, not by Atlantic Canada. Since the constitutional uncertainties of 
Canada are likely to continue for some time, particularly now that the Bloc Québécois is 
the official national opposition party, the call for endogenous development initiatives 
and a competitive economy that can survive without government largesse are also likely 
to continue.
In sum, while I strongly endorse the aims and aspirations of the private sector-led 
development models advocated by Voluntary Planning and by other Atlantic Canadian 
agencies and governments, I believe that these initiatives, as they are presently being 
implemented, are bound to have a poor track record. The Year One report card most 
certainly supports this assertion. This thesis argues that the characteristics of the 
political economy presented above will present serious impediments to the creation of 
the competitive private and public sectors articulated in the economic development 
documents of the 1990s. Moreover, while these characteristics are common knowledge 
-  even a part of the regional folklore -  the inability of economic planners to 
acknowledge them formally in their plans as impediments to competitiveness is, in my
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judgement, what repeatedly thwarts attempts to improve the economic condition of the 
region. Economic planners can certainly “think globally” in modeling their economic 
development strategies after the fashionable truisms of the 1990s -  competitive econo­
mies, entrepreneurial companies etc. Unfortunately, they will never be able to effec­
tively “act locally” because they are not acknowledging the dynamics of where they are.
11.2.4 Critical Theory Analysis -  The Emperor’s  New Clothes
This analysis reveals a sharp dissonance between the requirements for competitiveness 
and the political economy of the region, a dissonance that is by and large ignored in the 
economic development documents. If the impediments to Atlantic competitiveness are 
so serious, why do we ignore them? Why do we not acknowledge, and for that matter 
“do something about”, monopoly, patronage etc. in economic planning? Critical theory 
provides answers to these crucial questions.
Critical theory analysis suggests that the current economic strategies based on 
competitiveness: 1) serve the economic and political interests of the present ruling elite 
since they have the most to gain; 2) are designed to maintain the status quo since they 
do not challenge the structure and dynamics of power relationships; and 3) ignore the 
structural impediments presented by the political economy of the region, and in that 
way prevent the strategies from actually working.
Fortunately, these contradictions between the aims of the economic strategy and the 
likely lack of results are not inevitable. Kemp (1982) suggests that through the 
application of “critical planning theory” the relations of political and economic power 
which constitute, and are constituted in, the planning process can be understood and 
therefore can be altered.
By acknowledging the nature and dynamics of “what is”, and by reflecting on how it 
could be different, the planner can redress some of the deleterious consequences of this 
political-economic context on those for whom they are planning. In this way, regional 
economic planners can: contribute to the “achievement, through critique, of a society 
free from all forms of domination” (Kemp 1982, p. 59); be tme to Dyckman’s assertion 
that the “very purpose of planning is to release human abilities, to broaden the field of 
opportunity, and to enlarge human liberty” (Dyckman 1978, quoted in Muller 1982, 
p. 255); and provide planning guidance and knowledge to disadvantaged groups in 
order to progressively promote self-sufffciency (Muller 1982).
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These egalitarian social goals are generally desirable. However, there are other more 
pragmatic reasons why the critical planning analysis should be conducted. As stated 
earlier, in Atlantic Canada the dis-empowering effects on workers and citizens of the 
polarized nature of power distribution in the political economy is in itself a major 
contributor to regional underdevelopment The design of a competitive economy in the 
Atlantic region will leave regional planners and politicians with very tough choices. For 
example, it will require careful examination of the impact of regional monopolies on the 
economy and suggest either "trust-busting" or making these business elites much more 
responsible for the development process. Similarly, interprovincial cooperation will 
require giving up some of the political “turf* of planners, bureaucrats and politicians 
alike. Dismantling the patronage system would leave a political/administrative vacuum.
Any of these actions in the present political economy of most Atlantic provinces would 
be considered business and political suicide. Strong leadership, an informed and 
politically efficacious public, or a major crisis in the system will be required to bring 
about change. The latter will most likely be a necessary requirement. The first two are 
desirable and should be experimented with in the meantime by change agents such as 
Voluntary Planning.
11.3 EFFICACY EVALUATION OF VOLUNTARY PLANNING
The Model Appropriateness evaluation presented in section 11.2 analyzed the results of 
the effectiveness evaluation in terms of whether the goals and objectives of the strategy 
made sense in the political economic context in which the economic strategy operated. 
The Efficacy evaluation will build on the analysis of the Report Card results presented 
in section 10.4.2.b by looking more carefully at Voluntary Planning’s ability to meet 
the objectives it set for itself in the economic strategy, as well as its role as a mediating 
structure between the various publics of the province. The literature on mediating 
structures and on critical theory provided the guidelines for the analysis. The 
preliminary analysis of the results of Voluntary Planning’s 1993 round of consultations 
(the “community re-visits’’) and of the 1993 Strategic Planning Review provided 
empirical support for the findings of this analytical evaluation.
The model appropriateness evaluation has established that the model of economic 
development proposed in “Creating Our Own Future’’ will continue to encounter serious 
impediments to success because of the nature of the political economic context of the 
region. Regardless of whether or not the model is appropriate for the region, it is 
important to determine what Voluntary Planning’s proper role, if any, should have been
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in implementing the economic strategy. The efficacy evaluation now looks at whether 
this role was well defined and tries to determine whether a “plausible” relationship 
between the programme activities outlined in the economic strategy and expected results 
was established. In other words, it asks whether Voluntary Planning was ever truly able 
to meet the Objectives it set for itself in the economic strategy. Moreover, the evaluation 
asks -  how should its roles and responsibilities be more clearly established in order to 
insure greater success? In this way, it meets the normative objectives of the thesis.
As stated by Flemming, the citizens of the region must move beyond
mere * anger* about de-industrialization, central Canadian exploitation, 
capitalist underdevelopment, federal government recalcitrance, or top 
down arrogance and stupidity... [as well as beyond] ...mere ‘longing* 
for communities past and missed or present and threatened” (Flemming 
1988, p. 12)... [and instead]... ‘actively and collectively create their 
own circumstances*. (Flemming 1988, emphasis added)
This exhortation captures the spirit of Atlantic Canadian regional economic development 
initiatives in the 1990s. As presented in Chapter 7, these documents all point to the 
need to move beyond the resentment and nostalgia that characterize the explanations for 
the long history of regional underdevelopment presented in Chapter 6 towards an era of 
greater regional self-sufficiency and self-determination. “Creating Our Own Future” is 
Nova Scotia’s response to this call. Voluntary Planning is the organization attempting 
to lead the way. In order to do so, however. Voluntary Planning must find an organiza­
tional model that can address the questions:
1 . How can it be most efficacious in implementing the economic strategy?
2 . How can it make government accountable for its part of the implementation?
3 . How can it motivate the private sector to implement the strategy?
4 . How can it encourage Nova Scotians to identify with and implement the 
strategy in their lives?
In Year One, Voluntary Planning, a neophyte at strategy implementation, had 
committed itself to a series of Objectives and Actions in the economic strategy that it did 
not truly have the means to bring about.^ For example, not being a government agency. 
Voluntary Planning did not have at its disposal policy instruments such as taxation and 
financial incentives. It could only try to communicate with and persuade those in charge 
of the change (e.g. top managers of firms and labour union representatives) to bring 
about these changes. The results of the Year One Report Card attest to this inability to
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produce results. In addition, the 1990 consultation process and the commitment to 
revisit these communities in 1993 had changed the nature of the organization from an 
elite advisory body to government to a vehicle for participatory democracy in planning. 
Thus, a process of “re-positioning” of the organization vis à vis feasible and 
measurable Objectives and Actions for subsequent years of strategy implementation 
were required. This re-positioning would have to address the questions posed above.
The analysis provided below is based on data gathered through a series of meetings 
with the Secretariat and with Voluntary Planning’s staff, and through the preliminary 
assessment of the 1993 community revisits.
11.3.1 How Can Voluntary Planning Be Most Efficacious 
in implem enting the Economic Strategy?
In 1991, Voluntary Planning evolved from being simply a planning organization in an 
advisory role to government into one that was committed to implementing change 
through an advocacy role. Given the characterization of the private and public sectors of 
Nova Scotia presented earlier. Voluntary Planning’s task is indeed a difficult one. As a 
partner with the public and private sectors in the economic development process. 
Voluntary Planning accepted the responsibility for being the “catalyst for change” in the 
non-govemment sector. Voluntary Planning’ efficaciousness, however, is seriously 
hampered by the organization’s lack of legal authority or regulatory mechanism to offer 
the incentives or impose the sanctions that can expedite this change.
The Monitoring Committee recognized this fact and suggested that in Year Two 
Voluntary Planning reassess its role in the implementation of the strategy:
Voluntary Planning accepted a massive task in the role of providing 
leadership to the non-govemment sector. As the second year of the plan 
begins, the Monitoring Committee would recommend that Voluntary 
Planning reassess its role in implementing* the Strategy. Voluntary 
Planning has an important and increasingly sophisticated role to play, if 
it is to act as a catalyst for change. Such a reassessment might include 
the role of the Voluntary Planning Board, the sector committees, 
constituencies, and the organization’s overall relationship to Govern­
ment (Monitoring Committee 1993, p. 15, emphasis added)
Voluntary Planning’s press release addressing the results of the Report Card captures 
this fundamental dilemma facing the organization as well as the direction it is taking in 
response:
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Voluntary Planning’s role in the strategy changed when implementation 
began from that of facilitator to acting as a catalyst for change in the 
non-govemment sector.... Voluntary Planning is no longer an 
advisor.... We are using communication strategies and partnerships to 
change long-held attitudes and relationships, to bring these partners to 
implement changes.... Voluntary Planning can not dictate to 
government, business or labour what needs to be done. Voluntary 
Planning has no carrots and no sticks. We work through cooperation, to 
bring together these partners to implement changes.... At our last board 
meeting, we initiated a Strategic Planning Review process for Voluntary 
Planning. We will be looking at our role, structure sector work, and 
positioning.... (V.P. Press Release, Feb. 18, 1993, emphasis added)
At the heart of the Strategic Planning Review process was the examination of Voluntary 
Planning’s “positioning” as a mediating structure. While the organization has neither 
carrots nor sticks, it does have the ability to establish two-way communication between 
the various sectors of the province. On the one hand it can take a persuasive role aimed 
at attitudinal change -  it can translate the abstract economic objectives of the economic 
strategy into specific actions implementable at the government, corporate, union and 
individual citizen level. More importantly. Voluntary Planning’s non-partisan as well as 
joint public/private/labour sector identity can provide a legitimate forum for the 
articulation of common values across the fragmented and “particular^’ communities of 
the province (ethnic, geographical, religious etc.). As a mediating structure. Voluntary 
Planning would be integrating “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches to planning by 
providing a communications and interaction loop between the various constituencies 
and governments.
During the Strategic Planning Review consultations, perceptions had arisen that 
Voluntary Planning’s policy-making ability was “lightweight” and that it created policy 
mostly thorough “anecdote”. To counteract these perceptions. Voluntary Planning 
should expand its ability to conduct more traditional economic policy research.^ The 
APEC model, which incorporates considerable independence from government despite 
partial government funding, as well as credibility and accuracy in its research and 
recommendations, should be emulated. This will require that Voluntary Planning add 
strong research capabilities to support the work of the Sectors and become more 
independent from government by not being funded through a line department but as a 
separate not-for-profit, publicly-funded agency.
As far as the Report Card and the monitoring and evaluation processes for subsequent 
years are concerned, Voluntary Planning must first establish its proper role in the
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process of economic planning and development before appropriate measures of its 
effectiveness and efficacy can be developed. It must realistically reassess its ability to 
carry out the Actions it committed itself to in the Action Table for the next three years of 
implementation. While the commitment to these specific Actions is important, as this 
chapter argues, the organization’s role as a mediating structure is perhaps its most 
valuable contribution to the implementation of the strategy. Regardless of its scores in 
the achievement of these Actions, the organization’s intrinsic “worthwhileness” comes 
from its ability to provide the necessary communication and participatory infrastructure 
for the process of change through consultations, creating awareness and building 
partnerships. The importance of “worthwhileness” as an intrinsic aspect of public 
policy and regional policy evaluation is supported by the findings of Fischer (1987) and 
Diamond and Spence (1983) respectively. The results of the 1993 round of community 
revisits confirms the public perception of the worthwhileness of mediating structures.
11.3.2 How Can Voluntary Planning Make Government Accountable 
for Its Part of the Implementation?
Ironically, Voluntary Planning owes its existence and importance to the veiy fact that 
the provincial government is ineffective. In other words, if government could provide 
the province with economic answers, Voluntary Planning would not be needed. It 
would remain a province-wide “chamber of commerce”, but it most likely would not be 
a political mediating structure. Given the “checkmate” scenario presented in the model 
appropriateness evaluation, the provincial government might remain ineffective for 
quite some time. In the meantime. Voluntary Planning has a demanding job to do.
The most efficacious way of making government accountable for its part in the 
implementation is for Voluntary Planning to continue supporting the activities of the 
Monitoring Committee. Voluntary Planning can do so by: 1) maintaining its status as a 
non-partisan public accountability vehicle; 2) widely publicizing the results of the 
Report Cards, consultations and report feedback to government; and 3) following the 
Monitoring Committee’s recommendation to conduct a strategic evaluation of its 
efficacy vis à vis the Objectives and Actions committed to for the next three years and 
reposition itself accordingly.
Another important way to ensure implementation of the strategy by provincial ministries 
is for the industry sector committees^ to work closely with their corresponding 
government ministries in order to arrive at joint policy proposals that can be acted upon. 
The Objectives and Actions of the economic strategy that correspond to the various
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economic sectors should be identified and clear pathways to their achievement 
established. The industry sectors would then act as lobbying groups.
11.3.3 How Can Voluntary Planning Motivate ttie Private Sector 
to Implement the Strategy?
“Creating Our Own Future” places the fundamental responsibility for bringing about the 
vision of a thriving economy on the Nova Scotian private sector. Unlike past 
approaches to economic development, the government is not seen as the doer, but 
rather as a partner in this process. However, if there is ever to be a healthy private 
sector in the region, many things will have to change. For example, venture and 
working capital will be required, tax and regulatory structures will have to provide 
incentives for change, companies will have to invest in in-house training, and the 
effects on “competitiveness” of monopoly, patronage and a paternalistic corporate 
culture will have to be addressed. Once again, the irony is that Voluntary Planning 
would not be needed if Nova Scotia’s private sector were competitive. But because it is 
not. Voluntary Planning has a role in fostering this competitiveness.
Voluntary Planning’s membership and board of directors includes some of the most 
important and influential individuals in the province’s private sector. Given the 
polarized political economy presented earlier in this chapter. Voluntary Planning’s 
ability to maintain a balanced view between the various constituencies of an industry 
sector is key to the efficacious functioning of the sector committees. This is a difficult 
task because the organization must, at the same time, represent the needs and demands 
of the small business sector, labour, and the vertical and horizontal members of the 
industrial structure, while maintaining the support of the managers and owners of the 
large companies that dominate most industries. Voluntary Planning needs to continue 
lobbying for the implementation of the economic strategy, mostly through advocacy 
and communications strategies.
In Year Two, Voluntary Planning’s private sector efforts will focus on a three-pronged 
strategy. It will: 1) continue working through the various economic sector committees;
2) implement a communications strategy; and 3) carry out the One-to-One programme,^ 
a strategic intervention designed to help make the abstract goals of the strategy tangible 
at a boardroom and shop floor level.
The ability to change the “feudal” nature of corporate and civic culture in the region will 
most likely be predicated on Voluntary Planning’s ability to appeal to the self-interest of
Chapter 11 289
the elites by demonstrating how the economic strategy benefits them. The fact that 
workers will also most likely benefit through more inspired and caring management, 
rather than only through the usual union “protection”, is a welcomed coincidence. In 
Year One, Voluntary Planning scored top marks for the establishment of a joint 
labour/employer forum. Excellent Year Two performance in this area is expected.
An aspect of the industrial structure of Nova Scotia that is crucial to the success of 
“Creating Our Own Future” is referred to in the development literature as the “missing 
middle”. The notion of the missing middle is that in many developing countries or 
regions there is a polarized industrial structure -  a few very powerful large companies 
and many small powerless ones. The lack of a middle range is considered an impedi­
ment to the transformation of the economic structure because these are exactly the types 
of companies that can benefit fix>m private sector-led development initiatives. Large 
companies will basically march to the global drum regardless of what local economic 
strategists proclaim, while small companies are too strapped to do much more than just 
survive. It is the mid-sized companies which represent a “threshold” for growth and 
competitiveness. They are the companies where entrepreneurship and resources 
abound. Unfortunately, time and word limit constraints did not permit the examination 
of this topic in this thesis. It is certainly on my research agenda for the future.
11.3.4 How Can It Encourage Nova Scotians 
to Identify with and Implement the Strategy in Their Lives?
The round of consultations that led to the final draft of “Creating Our Own Future” 
revealed a profound distrust of both government and the private sector, and a deeply 
ingrained cynicism about the prospects for change. The 1993 community revisits 
revealed a similar pattern. If Voluntaiy Planning’s fundamental role in the implementa­
tion of the strategy is to provide a legitimate forum for two-way communication and 
grassroots political participation within the delegitimized political economy presented 
earlier, it must understand the causes of this distrust and hopelessness and address 
them through remedial action. The summary of the 1990 community consultations 
presented in Chapter 8 and the analytical framework proposed by critical planning 
theory can provide some useful insights on this matter.
As described in Chapter 2, the normative approach to critical planning is concerned 
with helping planners overcome the distortions and repressions inherent in the planning 
system. Forester (1987,1990) views planning as a communicative process which 
“unnecessarily” becomes distorted by political ideology.* He sees critical theory as
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providing “a new way of understanding action, or what a planner does, as attention 
shaping (communicative action), rather than more narrowly as a means to a particular 
end (instrumental action)” (Forester 1987).
The theory suggests that as the norms of “universal pragmatics” -  comprehensibility, 
sincerity, legitimacy and truth -  are violated through either suppression or distortion, 
mutual understanding, trast and cooperation suffer:
As our institutions and organizations violate the ordinary comprehen­
sibility we need to understand situations we face, they confuse and 
bewilder us. As jargons obscure, we are rendered incompetent. As 
organization members violate our ordinary expectation of sincerity... 
they cultivate mistrust, the expectation of and perhaps acquiescence to 
manipulation and deceit... Similarly as political structures and organiza­
tions violate the legitimacy condition, e.g. convert political issues into 
apparently technical ones through appeals to expertise, they depoliticize 
us, excluding us from collectively critical action affecting our lives. And 
finally, as institutions and organizations violate the truth condition 
allowing us ordinarily to draw implications and act, they mislead us, 
concealing from our attention actual possibilities of action... and the 
political and moral culpability and responsibility for the perpetuation of 
existing institutions. (Forester, quoted in Kemp 1982, p. 63)
Forester further suggests that
If planners do not recognize how their ordinary actions may have subtle 
communicative effects, the planners may be well-meaning but counter­
productive nonetheless. They may be sincere but mistrusted, rigorous 
but unappreciated, reassuring yet resented. Where they intend to help, 
planners may created dependency ', where they intend to express good 
faith, they may raise expectations unrealistically. (Forester 1987, 
p. 203, emphasis added)
As revealed by the 1991 and 1993 Voluntary Planning consultations, mistrust, 
incompetence, dependency, resentment and disappointment are all familiar aspects of 
the Atlantic Canadian public arenas. However, this need not be so. While on the one 
hand Habermas* analysis reveals the debilitating power of communication systemati­
cally distorted by the bureaucratic, capitalistic and undemocratic institutions of the state, 
on the other hand it suggests “the enabling power of democratic political criticism, 
mutual understanding, and self-determined consensus’* (Forester 1987). Forester states 
that “by recognizing the practical, communicative character of planning actions, we 
[planners] can suggest strategies to avoid these problems and improve practice as well”. 
Forester’s strategies are provided in Exhibit 2.
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EXHIBIT 2 
Communicative S trategies Complementing P lanners’ Technical Work
Complementing their technical worK planners can;
1. cultivate community networks of liaisons and contacts, rather than depending on the power of documents, 
both to provide and disseminate information;
2. listen carefully to gauge the concerns and interests of all participants in the planning process to anticipate 
likely political obstacles, struggles, and opportunities;
3. notify less-organized interests early in any planning process affecting them (the more organized groups 
whose business it is to have such information won’t need the same attention);
4 . educate citizens and community organizations about the planning process and the "rules of the game";
5. supply technical and political information to citizens to enable informed, effective political participation;
6. work to see that community and neighbourhood nonprofessional organizations have ready access to public 
planning infomtation, local codes, plans, and notices of relevant meetings, and consultations vinth agency 
contacts, “specialists” supplementing their own “in-house” expertise;
7. encourage community-based groups to press for open, full information about proposed prqects and design 
possibilities;
8. develop skills to work with groups and conflict situations, rather than expecting progress to stem mainly 
from isolated technical work;
9. emphasize to community interests the importance of effective participation in informal processes of 
project review, and take steps to make such design-change negotiation meetings equitable to professionally 
unsophisticated groups;
10. encourage independent, community-based project reviews and investigations;
11. anticipate external political-economic pressures shaping design decisions and compensate for them -  
soliciting “pressure we can use” (e.g. countering vested anti-public interests) rather than minimizing 
external pressure altogether.
(These actions are all elements of “organizing” practices, practically mobilizing concerned and affected persons, 
in addition to technically calculating problem solutions.)
Source: Critical Theory and Planning Practice
Voluntary Planning’s 1993 round of consultations allowed the organization to meet the 
promises it had made during the 1991 round to return to the communities to report on 
progress. Its open discussion of the Report Card demonstrated to the citizens of the 
region that it is possible to know the truth about policy-making and implementation, 
that their opinions are valued, and that the government can be held accountable. The 
fact that close to one-fifth of those attending the consultations expressed an interest in 
becoming involved with Voluntary Planning in its efforts to implement the strategy, and 
the repeated statement that citizens would overcome their apathy if given a legitimate 
and effective vehicle for participation, demonstrates that with the proper process the 
political efficacy of Nova Scotians can be increased. This in turn would put pressure on 
the government and the private sector to achieve the objectives of the economic strategy 
they themselves proposed and agreed to implement Voluntary Planning committed 
itself to being a catalyst in the non-govemment sector. In order for this not to be a
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euphemism for the private sector, the organization will have to either involve itself in 
the process of community-based participatory democracy by becoming a mediating 
structure, or it will have to officially return to its private sector/labour advisory role to 
government.
11.4 CONCLUSION
The effectiveness evaluation -  the Monitoring Committee’s “Progress Report on the 
Implementation of the Economic Strategy. Year One” -  concluded that implementation 
progress on the part of both Voluntary Planning and the provincial government was 
poor. The strategy is not working -  yet. The model appropriateness evaluation 
concluded that the impediments to competitiveness were particularly serious in the 
region because they were being by and large ignored in the economic development 
policy documents. The efficacy evaluation of Voluntary Planning concluded that the 
organization’s most efficacious role in implementing the strategy would be that of a 
mediating stmcture, not only between the interests of management/labour and 
government, but also between the interests of the various communities in the region and 
the provincial government. This consultative role should be complemented by sound 
research and analysis. Only in this way can it truly be a “catalyst for change in the non- 
govemment sector”.
The evaluations presented in this chapter provide preliminary answers to the case study 
question -  Why is it (the strategy) not working? In doing so, they bring together the 
objectives of the critical analysis of the literature presented in Parts II and m  of the 
thesis -  an analysis of the dissonance between the generic visions of competitiveness 
and regional realities -  and the objectives of the case study -  the comprehensive 
evaluation and analysis of “Creating Our Own Future” and of Voluntary Planning. As 
far as the case study question -  What can be done about it? -  the efficacy evaluation 
suggests one answer. Part V of the thesis provides additional recommendations and 
answers to this question.
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ENDNOTES
“No one managerial style is universally appropriate and competitivwiess in a specific industry 
results from convergence o f the management practices and organizational modes favoured in the 
country and the sources of competitive advantage in the industry” (Porter 1990b, p. 81). Abell’s 
(1978) notion of strategic windows -  the matching or market requirements with company 
capabilities at a particular point in time -  bears great similarity to Porter’s argument
The Council, APEC and the three Maritime provincial govemm^its see a Maritime “economic 
union” as a way to increase economic growth and competitiveness through integration. Political 
union, a concept that has been discussed (xi sevo-al occasions in Maritime history, has been termed 
a “non-starter” in this round of proposals for regional integration. According to the CMP, APEC and 
the individual provincial governments, economic integration can be achieved without political 
integration.
Several province-wide consultations were held at various times during the Canadian “constitutional 
crisis” of 1990-1992. Since the purpose of these consultations was fundamentally political rather 
than economic development-related, they are not discussed in this thesis. It is interesting to note, 
though, that while New Brunswick, Newfoundland and PJE.I. voted Yes in the 1992 referendum on 
the Charlottetown constitutional amendments. Nova Scotia voted No by a narrow margin. See, for 
example. Nova Scotia Working Committee on the Constitution. (1991, Oct 18). Roundtables on 
the Constitution.
^ This is evidwiced by the grades received in the Rqx>rt Card.
Brian Ives, co-chair of the Strategic Planning Review Committee suggested a research-based model 
for Voluntary Planning.
This thesis did not examine the workings o f Voluntary Planning’s sector committees in detail. 
Instead, it focused on the overall mandate and purpose o f the organizatitxi vis à vis the economic 
strategy.
The One-to-One programme consists of visits by industry leaders of the various economic sectors 
to companies in diese sectors. Sixty industry leaders will be recruited to visit three companies 
each, three times. The purpose of the visits is to discuss the way in which the basic tenets o f the 
strategy could be applied to each specific company setting. Great care will be taken to design a 
One-to-One programme whose impact could actually be measured by establishing adequate criteria 
for evaluation and a simple instrument and format of record keeping. Care will also be exercised in 
company selection in order to insure a representative sample by sector, size, region, and whether 
their firm was “converted” to the principles o f the strategy or not. The programme design will also 
insure effective two-way communication -  from company to Voluntary Planning to government, 
and back. These strategic interventions would be evaluated by administering pre- and post-AIDA 
tests (AIDA - Awareness, Interest, Desire and Action). The pre-test would initially measure aware­
ness of the “Levers” and impediments to their implementation. The post-test would measure the 
effect of visits on the company in terms of actual changes. The evaluation methodology centred on 
measuring initial awareness and implementation of the strategy, changes in managerial values, and, 
more importantly, actual changes in managerial practices as a result of the three visits. An attempt 
was also made to evaluate the ctxnmunications loop. The timetable took into consideration the 
need to increase gMieral levels of awareness o f the strategy as well as the internal constraints on 
change within organizations before axicrete changes can be expected to occur and thus be 
measured. Given the massive scale of the One-to-One project, a pilot programme would be 
conducted first
Forester acknowledges that some distortions in communications are inevitable in any context 
HowevCT, many are artificial, and deceptive.
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PART V
CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 12
SU M M A RY ,  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
12.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
As stated in Part I (Chapters 1 and 2), the purpose of this work is twofold: 1) to 
critically analyze the dissonance between the generic visions of a competitive Atlantic 
Canada articulated in the regional and provincial economic development documents of 
the 1990s and the particular regional realities that must be taken into consideration if the 
plans are to be successful; and 2) to suggest a normative course of action in policy 
planning and implementation that can reduce this dissonance. The methodology for 
approaching these two areas of research involved a critical analysis of the literature on 
competitiveness and on Atlantic Canadian economic and planning history, as well as a 
series of case study evaluations of a representative private sector-led planning agency, 
Nova Scotia Voluntary Planning. Key to this methodological approach were the 
participatory and action-oriented research models provided by cooperative inquiry and 
policy research respectively. The argumentative thrusts of the thesis were organized 
around four fundamental questions:
Fundamental Thesis Questions
How is a competitive economy created in the global context of the 1990s and 
what roles should the state and the market assume?
What prescriptions for competitiveness are being presented in Atlantic Canadian 
economic policy documents?
What impediments and advantages does the Atlantic Canadian political-economy 
present to the realization of this vision of a competitive economy?
How can the economic policy planning and implementation processes be 
improved in order to better the chances of success for these kinds of policies?
Part n  (Chapters 3 ,4 and 5) critically analyzed the literature on the debates surrounding 
the first fundamental question. Chapter 3 concluded that, within capitalist systems, 
determining the right balance between the role of the state and the role of the market in 
the achievement of national competitiveness has more to do with a realistic assessment 
of the particular set of internal and external conditions facing a particular economy at a 
particular time than it does with adherence to any economic orthodoxy, whether from 
the free markets/laissez-faire camp or from the managed trade/industrial policy camp.
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Similarly, Chapter 4 concluded that as far as corporate competitiveness is concerned 
neither size, nor administrative structure, nor ownership etc. is the key determinant of 
sustainable competitive advantage in the 1990s. The ability to “learn faster than one’s 
competitors” is. In sum, in the volatile and chaotic market and political forces of the 
1990s, nations and corporations must adapt fast through specific internal responses 
while at the same time maintaining a holistic “systems perspective”.
Chapter 5 chronicled the various phases of Canadian industrial policy and concluded 
that, since Confederation, policy has swung from one end of the spectrum of the free 
markets/laissez faire vs. managed trade/industrial policy debate to the other, often with 
confusing results. In the 1990s, neo-liberal orthodoxy dominates the economic and 
political debate. The free trade and more competitive markets (i.e. less government 
intervention) that these policies suggest have put in peril Canada’s traditional pursuit of 
regional “parity” and commitment to federal transfer and equalization payments. The 
message to the “have not” provinces from the federal government and the richer 
provinces is “Become more self-sufficient”. This message gains even more urgency 
when Canada’s federal and provincial fiscal difficulties are considered.
Part m  (Chapters 6 and 7) of the thesis examined whether Atlantic Canada is equipped 
to meet the challenges outlined in Part H. It addressed the second and third fundamental 
thesis questions outlined above. Chapter 6 concluded that a wholly satisfactory explan­
ation of the causes of the continued economic decline of the Atlantic region has not been 
found, and that, instead, competing explanations present partial answers that are most 
useful when considered within the context of each other. Chapter 6 also chronicled the 
multitude of regional economic development initiatives that have been carried out from 
1950 to 1990 in an attempt to reverse the trend of economic decline. In this period, 
policy-making has gone from a reliance on federally-funded, state-centred development 
schemes towards endogenous private sector-led and community-based development. 
Chapter 7 presented the economic challenges facing the Atlantic region in the 1990s and 
examined the major Atlantic Canadian regional economic development plans aimed at 
facing these challenges. Three primary themes were identified in these documents:
1) competitiveness; 2) cooperation; and 3) constitution -  what I have termed the “3 Cs”.
Part m  argued that the characteristics of the political economy of the Atlantic region will 
present serious impediments to the creation of the competitive private and public sectors 
articulated in these economic development documents. This political economy is charac­
terized by: 1) monopoly; 2) patronage; 3) low political efficacy; 4) province-building;
5) a vacuum of leadership; 6) antiquated management practices reflecting an anti-labour
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stance; 7) a severe lack of investment capital; 8) a “share of the waste” clientelist men­
tality to public spending held by both the private and public sectors; 8) government 
policies that distort the market and impede the resolution of the very social and econo­
mic problems they are intended to address; 9) the perception by public and private sec­
tor entities that, at all costs, they must protect their “turf*; and 10) high illiteracy rates 
and low investment in worker training. These characteristics stand in sharp contrast to 
the requirements for creating and sustaining competitive economies and firms outlined 
in Part H. Similarly, the ability of the Maritime provinces to achieve economic coopera­
tion, or economic union, will be predicated on the ability of the provincial governments 
and the CMP to transcend both province-building tendencies and the weU-entrenched 
tradition of patronage. As for the constitutional theme. Chapter 7 concluded that 
because the region’s population is so small and its economic and political power so 
weak, Atlantic Canadians will remain constitutional takers, not constitutional makers.
While Parts II and m  of the thesis examined the first three fundamental questions 
through an extensive critical analysis of the literature on competitiveness and on Atlantic 
Canadian political-economic and planning history. Part IV (Chapters 8,9,10 and 11) 
examined the last fundamental question through a series of case study evaluations of 
Nova Scotia Voluntary Planning and of the Province of Nova Scotia’s economic 
strategy -  “Creating Our Own Future”. The case study re-examined the issues 
presented in the critical review of the literature and provided the empirical evidence for 
its conclusions. The case study analysis was organized around three questions:
Case Study Questions
1 . Is the economic strategy working?
2 . Why or why not?
3 . How can the chances for its success be improved?
In order to answer these questions, three types of evaluations were conducted:
Evaluations
Short-Term/Plan-Snecific evaluations addressed the question Is the stra te^  
yyprfçins?
1. An effectiveness evaluation focused on outcomes by measuring the external 
impact of the strategy against its established goals. It was conducted through 
participation in the Monitoring Committee’s “Progress Report on the Implementation 
of the Economic Strategy. Year One”. This document established the official public 
record of strategy implementation of the provincial government and of Voluntary 
Planning in the first year of implementation of “Creating Our Own Future”.
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Long-Term/General/Organizational evaluations addressed the questions Whf or 
why not? and How can the chances for its success be improved?
2. A model appropriateness evaluation re-examined the findings of Parts II and HI 
of the thesis in an attempt to establish if the private sector-led development model 
advocated by Voluntary Planning was appropriate given the political-economy of 
Atlantic Canada.
3. An efficacy evaluation of Voluntary Planning examined the power of the 
organization to produce effects in terms of the objectives it set for itself in the 
economic strategy, and in general, in terms of its role as a mediating structure 
between the various publics of the province.
The effectiveness evaluation concluded that implementation progress on the part of both 
Voluntary Planning and the provincial government for the first year of strategy 
implementation was poor. The strategy is not working -  yet Given that the economic 
strategy had been in effect for only a year and a half at the time the Long Term/General/ 
Organizational evaluations were conducted, the conclusions reached through these 
evaluation exercises are somewhat preliminary. However, the evaluation results do 
reveal clear areas of strength and weakness which must be managed properly if the 
outcomes of subsequent effectiveness evaluations are to improve. The model 
appropriateness evaluation concluded that impediments to competitiveness were 
numerous, and were particularly serious in the region because they were being by-and- 
large ignored in the economic development policy documents. However, while the 
politics surrounding the government of Nova Scotia’s development initiatives, as well 
as the antiquated management culture that prevails in the region, work against any sort 
of significant progress, strong leadership and a powerful monitoring and evaluation 
process have proven capable of getting the implementation process moving in both the 
public and private sectors. The efficacy evaluation of Voluntary Planning concluded 
that while the stmcture of Voluntary Planning might have been adequate for its previous 
role as advisor to government and policy-maker, it is not be suitable for its new role as 
implementer and catalyst for change. It has neither “carrots nor sticks” with which to 
provide incentives to change. The efficacy evaluation also concluded that the organiza­
tion’s most efficacious role in implementing the strategy would be that of a mediating 
stmcture, not only between the interests of management/labour and government, but 
also between the interests of the various communities in the region and the provincial 
government. This consultative role should be complemented by a strong public policy 
research capability in order to give more depth and credibility to policy recommenda­
tions. Only in this way could Voluntary Planning truly become a “catalyst for change in 
the non-govemment sector”. The Strategic Planning Review of the organization 
scheduled for 1993 wQ examine the proper role of the organization in economic
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planning and implementation and will provide guidelines for the necessary 
“re-positioning”.
While the results of the evaluations presented above indicate that there is much room for 
improvement and that a great deal of work remains to be done in order to improve the 
economic condition of the province, the planning and implementation process 
surrounding “Creating Our Own Future” has brought about several very positive results 
in terms of planning as social learning. As mentioned in Chapter 8, “Creating Our Own 
Future” established the importance of a broad-based participatory process in setting 
common goals between various constituencies, it suggested an Action Plan with 
timetables and clearly assigned responsibilities, and it established a monitoring and 
evaluation process aimed at insuring implementation and public accountability. 
Additionally, the CORE Committee process established a strong working relationship 
between business and labour and it the revitalized Voluntary Planning as a more public 
and independent agency. As mentioned in Chapter 10, while it cannot be firmly 
established at this point, chances are that the effects of better labour-management 
relations, of the monitoring and evaluation of economic plans and of an advocacy 
organization on the economy are likely to be positive.
12.2 CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTING FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA
The fundamental conclusions that can be deduced from the findings presented above 
parallel the conclusions I reached in my 1990 APEC/ACEA paper. The in-depth research 
conducted for this thesis suggests that regions like Atlantic Canada can become 
“competitive” (the generic goal of private sector-led development initiatives), but only 
if three conditions are met: 1) the policy prescriptions do more than just parrot calls for 
fashionable management clichés such as quality, excellence and innovation and actually 
implement these principles in the management of public and private resources and 
workforces; 2) they directly address through remedial policy the impediments to 
competitiveness presented by the local political economy such as monopoly, patronage, 
paternalistic corporate culture etc.; and 3) the political efficacy of the citizens of the 
region is increased. The third requirement has two primary implications: 1) plantting, 
implementation and control (monitoring and evaluation), in both the private and public 
sector spheres, must be viewed as an inclusive and participatory process of social 
learning where common values can be articulated and acted upon; and 2) mediating 
stmctures that allow for participatory democracy and for the re-organization of the 
power relations between bureaucrats, technocrats and citizens, as well as between
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managers/owners and workers must be put in place before substantial change can be 
expected.
The thesis findings also strongly support the suggestion made in Chapter 1 that the 
success of the policy content of Atlantic Canadian economic development strategies 
based on competitiveness (the plans) will depend primarily on the way in which the 
process of delivery itself (the legitimacy and efficacy of the delivery agents) reflects an 
accurate understanding of the context in which it is being applied (the political-economy 
of a region). The importance of the planning, implementation and control process is 
examined in more detail in section 12.3.
In sum, Atlantic Canadian economic planners can certainly “think globally” in modeling 
their economic development strategies after the fashionable truisms of the 1990s -  
competitive economies, entrepreneurial companies etc. Unfortunately, they will never 
be able to effectively “act locally” because they are not acknowledging the dynamics of 
where they are -  the regional political economy. The analysis of this dissonance begs 
the questions: If the impediments to Atlantic competitiveness are so serious, why do 
politicians and economic planners ignore them? Why don’t they acknowledge and for 
that matter “do something about” monopoly, patronage etc. in economic planning? The 
critical theory analysis presented in Chapter 11 suggests that the current economic 
strategies based on competitiveness: 1) serve the economic and political interests of the 
present ruling elite since they have the most to gain; 2) are designed to maintain the 
status quo since they do not challenge the structure and dynamics of power relation­
ships; and 3) ignore the structural impediments presented by the political economy of 
the region, and in that way prevent the strategies fi*om actually working. Fortunately, 
these contradictions between the aims of the economic strategy and the likely lack of 
results are not inevitable. Kemp (1982) suggests that through the application of “critical 
planning theory” the relations of political and economic power which constitute and are 
constituted in the planning process can be understood and can therefore be altered. By 
acknowledging the nature and dynamics of “what is”, and by reflecting on how it could 
be different, the planner can redress some of the deleterious consequences of this 
political-economic context on those for whom they are planning. In this way, regional 
economic planners can: contribute to the “achievement, through critique, of a society 
fi*ee fiom all forms of domination” (Kemp 1982, p. 59); be true to Dyckman’s assertion 
that the “very puipose of planning is to release human abilities, to broaden the field of 
opportunity, and to enlarge human liberty” (Dyckman 1978, quoted in Muller 1982, 
p. 255); and provide planning guidance and knowledge to disadvantaged groups in 
order to progressively promote self-sufficiency (Muller 1982).
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The conclusions and recommendations presented in this thesis mirror the views of the 
planning process held by the critical planning theorists. Moreover, the 1993 Strategic 
Planning Review of Voluntary Planning will allow for experimentation with the 
implementation of these planning guidelines into actual practice. In this way, the 
critical, analytic and normative objectives of the thesis will be met
As stated in Chapter 1, my original conceptualization of the thesis revolved around the 
examination of the ways in which the strategic planning/management concepts 
developed for the management of private firms could be applied to the public process of 
economic planning as a way to improve the success rate of economic development 
initiatives. This conceptualization was abandoned in favour of an examination of the 
more laissez faire, private sector-led economic development strategies that characterize 
economic planning in the 1990s, particularly in Atlantic Canada. The irony of the find­
ings of the thesis is that they point to the need to apply strategic management concepts 
in the economic planning process; however, not in the process of planiting the economy 
itself, but in the administration of the economic agents. In other words, the findings of 
the thesis suggest that the success of the more laissez faire/free market models of 
economic planning requires the strategic management of the agents of such change -  the 
private sector firms, the public policy agencies and the communities that form the social 
fabric of the economy. While managers in the private sector have recognized for some 
time the need for strategic management of their firms and for contribution of all stake­
holders in achieving competitiveness, the public sector planning agencies are apparently 
only now beginning to recognize the importance of the strategic management process 
(planning, implementation and control) in the success of their economic blueprints.
It is perhaps now that I have understood the industrial policy and management debates, 
that I have had the opportunity see how policy-making agencies in Atlantic Canada 
derive their policies fix>m the ideas being debated, and that I have personally 
experienced the difficulties facing public and private sector agents in the implementation 
and control phases of planning, that I am ready to research the application of strategic 
management process to public policy. Voluntary Planning’s and the Province of Nova 
Scotia’s newly found emphasis on implementation and control (monitoring, evaluation 
and review) will provide a fertile ground for postdoctoral research on the application of 
the strategic management process to public policy and economic planning.
The 1993 Strategic Planning Review of Voluntary Planning’s mandate and organiza­
tional structure will serve as a testing ground for the findings of this thesis. The initial 
round of consultations with management, labour and community groups (racial.
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gender, religious and special interest communities) conducted for this Strategic 
Planning Review reflect an remarkable consistency with the overall findings of the 
thesis and more specifically with the results efficacy evaluation. While there is 
frustration with the organization’s present level of effectiveness, Voluntary Planning 
is already perceived to be a potentially powerful mediating structure. The consulted 
groups are requesting from Voluntary Planning a more inclusive and participatory 
format for planning and implementing economic strategy as well as a process that 
insures implementation through careful monitoring and lobbying.
The academic research that I will have to conduct in order to make the findings of the 
Strategic Planning Review suitable for scholastic publication will examine a range of 
issues concerned with the application of strategic management concepts to the regional 
economic planning process. I will search for other suitable case studies for the purpose 
of comparative analysis of the conclusions reached in this thesis. A likely choice will be 
Newfoundland, since the provincial government has involved the private sector in 
economic planning and development The comparative case studies will also explore the 
notion that “threshold companies” (mid-sized firms poised for growth) are the appro­
priate audience for private sector-led development strategies. This proposition was 
derived fi'om studies conducted in developing countries which suggest that the “missing 
middle” -  a polarized industrial structure characterized by a few large and powerful 
firms and many small ones without much in the way of threshold firms -  is a problem 
in development strategies that emphasize the role of the private sector. This industrial 
structure is also characteristic of Atlantic Canada.
Besides the strategic planning process, I will also examine the way in which some of 
the private sector management guidelines addressed in Chapter 4 could be applied in the 
public sector planning process. For example, the Total Quality Management (TQM) 
concept which addresses the need for organizations to improve their record of customer 
satisfaction by working in teams of “empowered” workers and managers bears simi­
larities to the notion of mediating structures. I will also take part in the research group 
being spearheaded by Dr. Norman Schaeffer of the University of New Brunswick in 
Fredericton which is exploring the applicability of Porter’s notion of industrial 
“clusters” to economic development in Atlantic Canada and abroad.
The research will also involve an exploration of several meta issues in social science 
that are reflected in the thesis’ analysis. For example, the thesis discussed Sklair’s 
(1991) model of the sociology of the global system as an alternative to the traditional 
stat^market model of the world political economy. While Sklair suggests that this new
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global sociology is the result of the triumph of transnational corporations, the trans­
national capitalist class and the culture-ideology of consumerism, he also suggests that 
a “Third Way” might be possible. These movements would combine the efficiencies of 
the market with some of the structures of the welfare state, and with the commitment to 
restrictions on the abuse of private economic power and to grassroots democracy of 
some socialist societies. This concept of a Third Way is closely tied to the conclusions 
and recommendations derived from the thesis* case study.
The thesis has also addressed, in a broad brush manner, other sociological meta issues. 
Atlantic Canada’s predicament is a direct result of the need for adaptiveness that has 
resulted from the compression of time and space brought about by globalization. The 
deleterious effect of systemic inertia on specific localities has become more evident in a 
world of rapid change. Given these changes, planning organizations themselves will 
have to adapt. Some of the major areas of adaptation will involve the need to address 
the plurality of cultures and discourses that characterizes the post-modern political 
condition^ and critical theory’s concern with the legitimacy of planning and of planning 
organizations as a political process. These themes reflect the “Think Global. Act Local” 
maxim mentioned at the outset of the thesis research. In sum, further research will 
examine the themes outlined above in more depth as well as search for comparative case 
studies in an attempt to find ways to generalize some of the case-specific conclusions 
presented in this thesis.
12.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a series of recommendations that address the fourth fundamental 
question posed by the thesis -//o w  can the economic policy planning and implementat­
ion processes be improved in order to better the chances o f success for these kinds of 
policies? -  as well as to the third case study question -H ow  can the chances for its 
success be improved? As presented earlier, the entire case study was designed to help 
answer the fourth fundamental thesis question. However, the third case study question 
was posed in order to frame case-specific recommendations that could address the 
normative concerns of the thesis. The case-specific recommendations are presented first 
since the provincial case study provided the empirical evidence to support the regional 
conclusions and recommendations made through the critical analysis of the literature 
conducted in Parts II and HI.
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12.3.1 Recom mendations to Voluntary Planning. Areas of High Leverage Change.
As stated in Chapter 2, policy research is action-oriented and committed to practical 
solutions, and cooperative inquiry is participatory. The advantage of using these two 
research approaches is that the likelihood that adequate policies will be developed and 
implemented is increased. In terms of the case study, participation in Voluntary 
Planning’s 1993 Strategic Planning Review process will allow me to present the series 
of action-oriented recommendations outlined below in a context conducive to 
implementation.
The systems perspective of organizations, of the dynamics of change and of impedi­
ments to change outlined by Senge (1990) and refeired to in thesis Chapters 4 and 7 
suggests that in order to bring about change, high-leverage change strategies should 
receive emphasis. These areas are important because they directly address what Senge 
calls the “limiting factors” of the system. Given the systemic underdevelopment facing 
the province, the urgency of its economic problems and the limited resources available to 
Voluntary Planning, a careful targeting of high leverage change strategies is required. 
The high-leverage strategies recommended below revolve around three themes: 1) a 
revised mandate and organizational structure for Voluntary Planning; 2) interprovincial 
efforts; and 3) people (education and leadership). The Actions for Years One and Two 
outlined in the Action Table of “Creating Our Own Future” that were consistent with 
these priority themes are examined. The likely impediments to the implementation of the 
recommendations as well as the future prospects for the organization are also explored.
12.3.1 .a Recommended H igh-leverage Strategies
1) Conduct a Strategic Planning Review
In order to improve the track record of provincial economic development strategy 
implementation, a Strategic Planning Review of Voluntary Planning will be conducted in 
1993. The areas to be examined include:
• How to become more “inclusive” by repositioning the organization from a behind- 
closed-doors advisor to government to that of a mediating structure between the 
various constituencies of the province. The private sector/labour/govemment 
communications axis should be complemented by a community/government axis. In 
this way. Voluntary Planning could become a modem version of the Antigonish 
movement,  ^and similarly provide “the ideology which motivated the emergence of a 
new strategic and institutional framework aimed at eliminating the imbalance of 
economic power and improving the economic environment through the diffusion of 
appropriate knowledge and information and broad cooperative action” (Dodaro and
Chapter 12 305
Pluta 1988, p. 69). This consultative role should be supported by a strong public 
policy research capabiliy in order to ensure the depth and credibility of its 
recommendations.
How to hold the government accountable for its part in the implementation of the 
economic strategy. The Catch-22 of private sector-led development strategies is that 
for them to work properly, governments must also do their part. Otherwise, there is 
likely to be too much distortion such as policies that give the contradictory market 
and political signals. Also, only governments can provide the legislated reward and 
sanction structures (regulations, taxes etc.) that can match stated policy aims. 
Voluntary Planning must also come to terms with the manner in which its depen­
dence on government funding affects its claim to “arm’s-length-to-govemment” ^
status as well as its capability to take independent and possibly controversial policy 
stances. Voluntary Planning must also address the perception by government line 
departments that it is “lightweight” by strengthening its research capabilities.
How to be an effective catalyst for change in the private sector. Voluntary Planning 
cannot legislate change or provide internal/managerial or extemalAegulatory sanc­
tions and incentives for change. It can only influence the decisions of private firms 
through communications efforts. Therefore, rather than being responsible for the 
implementation of economic strategy Actions associated with private sector agents. 
Voluntary Planning should instead direct its efforts towards an effective communi­
cations plan that includes broad-based communication vehicles as well as one-to- 
one contact with firms. One of Voluntary Planning’s greatest assets is that it has 
managed to bring together business, labour, academe and community in the 
planning process. In addition, it is not a single or multi cause/sector lobbying 
group. It must therefore seek to preserve its status as a forum for pluralistic policy 
discussion and planning as well as avoid becoming a lobbying group of any kind. 
How to support the workings of Nova Scotia’s Monitoring Committee. The 
establishment of credible, non-partisan public accountability vehicles should result 
in an increase in the political efficacy of Nova Scotians and improvement of the 
implementation record of the provincial government. However, in order to present a 
true “systems perspective”, monitoring and evaluation initiatives should balance 
these Short-Term/Plan-Specific evaluation objectives with Long-Term/General/ 
Organizational ones.
Once the above issues have been resolved, the final issue to address would be what 
organizational structure would be most suitable for the newly defined organization.
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2) Inter-provincial efforts
The governments of the three Maritime provinces and the Council of Maritime Premiers
should be held to their schedule of interprovincial cooperation. This would involve
implementing two Action Table Actions scheduled for Year Two as well as the elements
of regional integration proposed by the CMP (see Chapter 7).
• Develop a region-wide investment vehicle. Action -  **Develop a venture 
capital mechanism, possibly on an Atlantic region basis, supported by government 
tax incentives*' (Lever -  Creating and Developing Business). This investment 
vehicle should allow for a more realistic assessment of business potential than the 
existing government grant structure and should help wean business from govern­
ment dependency. The fund should also provide businesses with an alternative 
source of funds from that of risk averse banks or “vulture capital”. While this 
option has been discussed for some time, anecdotal evidence indicates that resis­
tance to this option comes from lack of trust in the region’s economy. If this is so, 
this fund will ask all the private sector development champions to “put their money 
where their mouth is”.
• Integrate federal procurement efforts. Action -  "Develop practices fo r  
strategic procurement (consider on an Atlantic basis)”. Rather than focusing on the 
strategic procurement Action as an isolated event, efforts should concentrate on 
regional economic integration as a whole. The counterproductive and non­
competitive aspects of patronage and province-building will be exposed, and ideally 
redressed in this process.
• Strengthen anti trust legislation and create a dispute mechanism with 
“teeth”. This recommendation has never been made in any of the regional develop­
ment documents I have ever examined. Given the unusually high level of economic 
concentration in the region, and the assertions by the competitiveness experts that 
monopoly is one of the major obstacles to competitiveness, this error of omission is 
indicative of the unwillingness of planners and politicians to counteract some of the 
most unsavoury aspects of the regional political-economy. This legislation should 
expose the far-from-competitive practices of the big industrial players in the region. 
Over time it should also increase domestic competition and open up opportunities 
for entrepreneurs.
3) People
• Invest heavily in education at all levels.
In the classroom: Action -  "Establish an awards program to encourage innovation and 
education” (People Lever, Year Two) This award should reflect not just isolated
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incidences of innovative teaching, but a commitment to educational reform at all 
levels of the educational system.
In the workplace: Action -  **Promote increased training for workers in the workplace*' 
(People Lever, Year One) and Action -  “Promote adoption of productivity 
management practices and good industrial relations to produce superior products 
and services to consistently meet customer satisfaction (Quality Lever, Year One). 
The objective would be not just to create better trained workers, but to create 
learning organizations that reflect the need to value and empower people at all levels 
of the firm in order to achieve competitiveness. The Actions associated with the 
Technology and Trade Levers are closely associated with this “hfe-long learning” 
view of the workplace. Voluntary Planning’s One to One programme, described in 
Chapter 8, should help accomplish this Action.
• Seek and support leaders that embody this new vision of the 
province. The core leadership strategy is simple -  be a model. According to 
Senge, leaders that foster the notion of personal mastery build organizations where 
“it is safe for people to create visions, where inquiry and commitment to tmth are 
the norm, and where challenging the status quo is expected -  especially when the 
status quo includes obscuring aspects of current reality that people seek to avoid” 
(Senge 1990, p. 172). Premier Frank McKenna of New Brunswick has provided 
strong economic leadership and Premier Clyde Wells of Newfoundland has 
provided strong political leadership during the constitutional crisis. The political 
economy works against change, but good leaders have proven that leadership can 
overcome many of these obstacles.
12.3.1 .b im pedim ents to Implementing these Recom m endations
1) In terms of organizational change, the organization’s members are quite likely to 
resist change. They are comfortable planning and giving advice when asked and may 
not want to involve themselves any further in the messy issues surrounding “social 
change”. In addition. Voluntary Plaiming’s present funding structure works against any 
radical changes. While the organization maintains that it is an arm’s-length-to-govem- 
ment advisory forum, it is nevertheless funded by the Nova Scotia Department of 
Economic Development. It must therefore be sensitive to government concerns. For 
example. Voluntary Planning has to support the Monitoring Committee’s watchdog 
approach while at the same time not be seen as hurting government credibility. 
Voluntary Planning should consider a mix of public, private and membership funding 
in order to have more room to manoeuvre. This funding model, along with a strong
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research component, has allowed APEC to thrive as a the most well respected and 
credible economic policy agency in the region. As far as Voluntary Planning’s re­
positioning as a mediating structure, the organization would have to weigh the benefits 
of providing a vehicle for participatory democracy against the traditional confidentiality 
and discretion it has maintained whenever consulted by government on sensitive policy 
matters. Being a more public advocacy organization would require that it re-examine its 
current quid pro quo arrangement with the provincial government. Finally, the change 
in government in 1993 fiom a Progressive Conservative (PC) govermnent to a Liberal 
government could also affect Voluntary Planning’s future. PC governments have 
tended to rely on Voluntary Planning for policy planning and implementation, while the 
Liberals’ commitment to Voluntary Planning is more questionable.^ Voluntary Planning 
must therefore foster good relations with all political parties in order to keep “Creating 
Our Own Future” on track and, more importantly, to maintain its claim to “non- 
partisanship”.
2) Interprovincial initiatives will have to overcome a long history of province-building 
by the individual provinces and by the CMP. The fact that there are no organizations 
equivalent to Voluntary Planning in other provinces will also have to be taken into 
consideration in designing the interprovincial policy process. As stated earlier, in 
Atlantic Canada the dis-empowering effects on workers and citizens of the polarized 
nature of power distribution in the political economy is in itself a major contributor to 
regional underdevelopment Thus the design of a competitive economy in the Atlantic 
region will leave regional planners and politicians with very tough choices. For 
example, it will be necessary to carefully examine the impact of regional monopolies on 
the economy and suggest either “trust-busting” or making these business elites much 
more responsible for the development process. Similarly, interprovincial cooperation 
will require giving up some of the political “turf” of planners, bureaucrats and politi­
cians alike. Dismantling the patronage system would leave a political/administrative 
vacuum. Any of these actions in the present political economy of most Atlantic 
provinces would be considered business and political suicide. Strong leadership, an 
informed and politically efficacious public, or a major crisis in the system will be 
required to bring about change. The latter will most likely be a necessary requirement 
The first two are desirable and should be experimented with in the meantime by change 
agents such as Voluntary Planning.
3) Perhaps one of the most deleterious results of the low political efficacy of the citizens 
of the region and of a paternalistic public and private sector is that citizens and workers 
are more likely to perceive change as a threat rather than as an opportunity. Participants
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in an unequal pow er relationship generally do not feel em powered to take control o f  
their lives and effect change them selves. Thus, to bring about the “changes in attitudes” 
that Voluntary Planning has called for, a more inclusive, participatory and less 
authoritarian managem ent ideology and organizational structure must be applied to the 
management o f  the private and public sectors. A s stated earlier, an interprovincial 
investm ent capital funding vehicle and a set o f  strong and enforceable anti-trust laws 
should help “level the playing field”. H owever, enorm ously strong political w ill be 
required to carry these initiatives through.
12.3.1 .c The Future of Voluntary Planning
A t the time o f writing, January o f  1994, the future o f  Voluntary Planning and o f  the 
M onitoring Comm ittee is rather uncertain. In 1993, the Federal and N ova Scotia  
Progressive Conservative administrations, both o f which had been in pow er for several 
consecutive terms o f  office, lost elections to the Liberal Party. B y the end o f  1993, there 
were Liberal administrations in Ottawa and in the four Atlantic Provinces. Even though  
Voluntary Planning has consistently maintained that it is a non-partisan, arms-length-to- 
govem m ent organization, and its membership has been drawn from all political 
denominations, the organization’s record o f  service has been more closely  associated  
with Progressive Conservative administrations than with Liberal ones. Other than the 
fact that the organization was founded by Progressive Conservative Premier Robert 
Stanfield, the “Tory” perception o f  Voluntary Planning is perhaps m ostly an accident 
o f  fate. The N ova Scotia Liberal Party has been in pow er for only one term during the 
30-year life o f  Voluntary Planning, and the Liberal Premier at that time was som ewhat 
suspicious o f  Voluntary P lanning’s “non-partisanship” because o f  its “T ory” origins.
W hile the current Liberal Premier John Savage and som e o f  his Cabinet members have 
been members o f  Voluntary Planning at som e point in their careers, the vast majority o f  
the Liberal politicians and bureaucrats have reservations about the organization for a 
variety o f  reasons (e.g. Toryness, usefulness, effectiveness, costs etc.). In addition, the 
fact that Voluntary Planning and the M onitoring Com m ittee are often seen as one and 
the same has m ade it difficult for Voluntary Planning to establish that it is not a “watch  
dog” organization. The unfortunate result o f  these various perceptions is that Voluntary 
Planning is now  in the unenviable position o f  being regarded both as a Conservative 
organization and as one critical o f  government o f  any stripe.
Sensitive to the fact that Premier Savage’s administration needed to understand and 
appreciate the kinds o f  contributions Voluntary Planning could make to public policy
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before deciding whether or not to continue supporting the organization, the Executive  
Com m ittee o f  Voluntary Planning accepted Premier Savage’s request to organize and 
coordinate a series o f  province-w ide econom ic policy consultations m odeled after U S. 
President C linton’s 1993 econom ic summit. The process, know n as “3 0 -6 0 -9 0 ”'^  for 
the number o f  days in office that it w ould take the new  administration to com plete the 
three consultative and planning phases o f  the initiative, resulted in the publication o f  a 
docum ent entitled “Leadership Starts with Listening. N ova Scotians Speak Out on the 
E conom y” (Province o f  N ova Scotia , Sept. 1993).^ The prescriptions for com petitive­
ness given  in this docum ent are very similar to those in “Creating Our O w n Future” 
even  though the “L evers” had now  been replaced by the “Four C om ers o f  D iscu s­
sion” -  Comm unity Econom ic D evelopm ent, Training for Jobs, B usiness Clim ate, and 
T echnology. Even though the document has been termed by many observers a 
“Creating Our O wn Future” with a red (the Liberal colour) cover, ’’Creating Our Own  
Future” has been shelved. Additionally, the Liberal governm ent has, from a political 
perspective, understandably, taken full ownership and control o f  any future econom ic  
planning and implementation. Nevertheless, as far as promoting a political and bureau­
cratic climate that can foster better government as w ell as private sector com petitiveness, 
Premier Savage deserves credit for steadfastly refusing to grant the vast majority o f  
patronage jobs that every change in provincial administration has traditionally involved.
In terms o f  determining the role that Voluntary Planning could play in the new  
administration. Premier Savage allowed the organization to com plete its own Strategic 
Planning R eview  before subjecting Voluntary Planning to a governm ent-sponsored  
audit. In Novem ber 1993, the Strategic Planning Comm ittee released its report (V .P., 
N ov. 1993). The recomm endations were by-and-large in concert with those presented in 
Chapters 11 and 12 o f  the thesis.^ In D ecem ber 1993 the governm ent-sponsored  
m anagement audit o f  the Department o f  Econom ic D evelopm ent and the Department o f  
Tourism and Culture was released (D eloitte & Touche, N ov. 1993). This docum ent 
contained tw o primary recomm endations concerning Voluntary Planning:
1) that the em ployees o f  Voluntary Planning be rem oved from civil 
service positions and becom e direct em ployees o f  the Voluntary 
Planning organization; and 2) that the government challenge the funding 
agreement to Voluntary Planning and look to an alternate funding 
approach where the membership o f  Voluntary Planning w ould contribute 
to the financial costs o f  operating the organization. (V .P., D ec. 1993) •
W hile these tw o recomm endations were in concert with the recom m endations made by 
the Voluntary Planning Strategic Planning Comm ittee and those made in this thesis, the
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suddenness o f  possib le large funding cuts and personnel changes (from c iv il servants to 
not-for-profit agency workers) has further jeopardized the future o f  the organization.
For Voluntary Planning, the status quo is, for certain, no longer an option.
A s for the M onitoring Com m ittee (Rans, 1994), in the Fall o f  1993 Premier Savage  
asked the Comm ittee to prepare a proposal outlining the role the Com m ittee could play  
in a new  Liberal econom ic strategy. R esponse to this proposal has been delayed for a 
variety o f  reasons. One o f  them is that the specific details o f  the Liberal econom ic  
strategy have not been developed beyond the broad brush parameters established  
through the “3 0 -6 0 -9 0 ” process. Another is  that w hile the Liberal Party liberally used  
the poor Report Card scores o f  the previous Conservative administration in its favour 
during the 1993 election campaign, it has been som ewhat reluctant to em pow er a 
com m ittee to evaluate its ow n progress. In 1991, the N ova Scotian public wanted a 
watch dog group to monitor the progress o f  Conservative Premier Cam eron’s econom ic  
record. W hile not discounting the positive effects o f  an effective monitoring process in 
m aking governm ent “work”. Premier Savage’s administration apparently believes that 
the clean record o f  its brand new administration leaves them som e room  to manoeuvre 
without a third party m onitoring entity “breathing dow n their neck”.
Another issue which might be delaying the establishment o f  a more detailed Liberal 
econom ic strategy plan is the possibility that Maritime, if  not Atlantic-wide, econom ic  
cooperation  initiatives may be in the making (Rans, 1994). The conditions for regional 
cooperation have never been better. There is a Liberal Prime Minister in Ottawa, four 
Liberal Atlantic Premiers, worsening econom ic conditions and ever less Federal m oney. 
If the much touted “econom ic union” does not com e about this tim e around, perhaps 
the powers that be w ill finally realize that som e measure o f  “political union” (Finder’s 
positive integration) is a necessary requirement to econom ic integration.
The constitutional theme has not had nearly the level o f  national exposure it received  
during the M eech Lake and Charlottetown Accord fiascoes. H ow ever, the fact the 1993 
Federal election radically changed the face o f  Canadian politics has decreased the 
stability o f  the federalist proposition. The federalist v iew s o f  the three traditional, 
mainstream Canadian political parties -  Liberal (the ruling party). Progressive 
Conservative (now reduced to only two seats in Parliament), and N ew  Dem ocratic (also  
greatly reduced in number o f  parliamentary seats) -  are now  being strongly challenged  
by the separatist v iew s o f  the B loc Q uébécois (currently the official opposition) and 
the right-wing W estern regionalism  o f  the Reform Party (with the third highest number 
o f  parliamentary seats). The tensions inherent in this political configuration augur a
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period o f  extrem e regionalism  and a further loss o f  the federally controlled powers and 
fiscal resources that have traditionally benefited the “have not” regions like Atlantic 
Canada.
In sum, as far as prescriptions for com petitiveness, calls for regional cooperation and 
constitutional uncertainty (the 3Cs) are concerned, w e are once again in the realm o f  déjà 
vu. The sam e debates rage on. However, the fact that the three fundamental assumptions 
that provided the parameters for the thesis have been proven correct -  there has been a 
progression towards political fragmentation, fiscal austerity and continental econom ic  
integration -  w ill only increase the urgency to find effective solutions beyond just 
rhetoric.
H ow ever, despite these unresolved issues, at least in the Province o f  N ova Scoria, an 
extrem ely valuable process o f  social learning has resulted from the planning exercises 
surrounding “Creating Our Own Future”. The demand for a non-partisan, participatory 
planning forum that can gather the input o f  the private and non-govem m ent sectors has 
been repeatedly and indisputably established through input from Voluntary Planning’s 
1991 Consultations, 1993 Community Revisits, and Strategic Planning R eview , as w ell 
as through the Liberal 30-60-90  process. W hile it was not truly effective in its first year 
o f  im plem entation, “Creating Our Own Future” at least attempted to prevent another 
“dust-collecting” docum ent by preparing an “Action Plan” with tim etables and clearly  
assigned responsibilities, and by establishing a monitoring and evaluation process aimed  
at insuring implementation and public accountability. An additional result o f  the social 
learning that took place during the planning process was the establishm ent o f  a strong 
working relationship between business, labour and com m unity groups.
In conclusion, whether Voluntary Planning and the M onitoring Com m ittee, as currently 
configured, can or should continue to exist, is not what is important at this point. W hat 
is important for the new  Liberal administration is to find a way to capture the benefits o f  
four years o f  learning, hard work and goodw ill by a multitude o f  individuals 
representing a number o f  econom ic sectors, com m unities and special interest 
organizations, and o f  the experimentation with a com prehensive approach to planning.
In the public climate o f  the Nineties where citizen participation and accountability are 
demanded o f  both the public and private sectors, i f  organizations like Voluntary 
Planning and the M onitoring Committee did not exist, they w ould have to be invented.
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12.3.2 Regional Recommendations
W hile the circum stances facing the three other Atlantic provinces are not exactly like 
those o f  N ova Scotia, as Chapter 7 has demonstrated, there is sufficient com m onality o f  
econom ic problems and p olicy  purposes to suggest that other Atlantic Canadian  
planning agencies should consider concentrating their efforts on the same series o f  high  
leverage areas o f  change that I have outlined earlier for Voluntary Planning. T hese  
recom m endations would be directed both at government agencies as w ell as at non­
partisan, private sector-led  organizations such as the Econom ic Recovery Com m ission  
in Newfoundland. The findings o f  this thesis suggest that the formation o f  Voluntary  
P lanning-like organizations should be encouraged for the purpose o f  providing  
m ediating structures for participatory democracy that can advise on policy formulation  
and, more importantly, can hold government accountable for implementation o f  the 
broad policy  recomm endations. Therefore, the establishm ent o f  such organizations 
should be explored in N ew  Brunswick and in Prince Edward Island.
In Chapter 5 , 1 contrasted the econom ic success o f  Quebec with the slow  progress o f  
Atlantic Canada and exam ined the question What does Quebec have that Atlantic 
Canada does not have? The answer was a p ro je t de so c ié té  -  Q uebec Inc. Quebecers 
have been w illing to act decisively upon a vision o f  developm ent in which they are 
m aîtres chez nous. Atlantic Canadians, on the other hand, have so far been unable to 
articulate a com m on vision  o f  them selves, a coherent sense o f  regional identity (other 
than the heritage o f  poverty), and a place o f  importance within the D om inion. A m ong its 
2.3 m illion inhabitants hve: Acadian French, M ic Mac indians, descendants o f  Scottish, 
Irish, German and British immigrants, and Blacks. These com m unities have certainly 
not been able to go  beyond their ow n boundaries to create the strong sense o f  
com m unity across regions, industries, and social groups. Patronage, province-building, 
corporate feudalism , a clientelist attitude towards government, as w ell as racism by 
English-speaking w hites towards all other groups have resulted in mutual distrust, small 
vision  and a fractured sense o f  shared com munity.
T o achieve the elusive dream o f econom ic development. N ova Scotian as w ell as other 
Atlantic Canadian scholars, artists, politicians and populace w ill have to face the chal­
lenge o f  rising beyond their sense o f  helplessness and petty territoriality. They must 
discover the inherent base o f  the region’s confidence, as w ell as articulate a new  vision  
o f  the region based on this rediscovered confidence. Unfortunately, I believe that this 
process w ill probably only take place if  the assumptions that provided the parameters 
for the thesis research com e true. The assumptions were that, in the 1990s: 1) Canadian
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federal transfer payments, subsidies and expenditures in the Atlantic provinces w ill 
continue to be substantially reduced; 2) Quebec w ill seek som e form o f  sovereignty- 
association; and 3) North America w ill continue on its present path towards a U .S ./ 
Canada/M exico trade bloc. The challenges these vicissitudes w ill present to the Atlantic 
region w ill continue to exacerbate both the econom ic conditions and the need for fresh 
thinking and definitive action in regional policy planning and implementation. W hen  
“things get bad enough” and change does occur, legitim ate social and political agents 
w ill be needed as facilitators. In N ova Scotia, Voluntary Planning might prove to be the 
m ost efficacious agent for econom ic change. Other Atlantic provinces should begin  
exam ining which organizations might be able to facilitate local change.
This thesis was also guided by a cavea t -  that the assum ed efficacy o f  particular types 
o f  rem edies for national and international econom ic ills is affected by the popularity o f  
such rem edies at the time, even when there is no truly reliable evidence on which to base 
their likely success or failure. W hen theory -  right or wrong -  is on the side o f  the 
com ing rulers o f  social order, it is generally ensured a long life. In the words o f  Keynes:
The ideas o f  econom ists and political philosophers, both when they are 
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is com m only  
understood. Practical men, who believe them selves to be quite exem pt 
from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves o f  som e defunct 
econom ist. Madmen in authority, w ho hear voices in the air, are distilling  
their frenzy from som e academ ic scribbler o f  a few  years back. (John 
Maynard K eynes, quoted in Fusfeld 1990)
The private sector-led m odel advocated by Voluntary Planning and by other Atlantic 
Canadian p olicy  makers in the 1990s is a product o f  its time and its place -  not a 
panacea. Thus, once again, I believe that the econom ic developm ent o f  the province and 
o f the region has more to do with a change in the pow er relations between the various 
constituencies in the region towards a more participatory and em powered political and 
corporate structure than it does with the application o f  theories on com petitiveness and 
industrial p o licy  that “com e from aw ay”.^
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ENDNOTES
See Heller, A. and Ferenc, F. (1988). The Postmodern Political Condition. Polity Press, 
Cambridge, England.
According to Dodaro and Pluta (1988) the Antigonish Movement “offered an alternate and 
essentially non-political solution to the economic crisis of the 1930s -  an approach which was 
well received by a population which had lost its faith in both the existing political process and the 
free enterprise system.... The basic strategy of the movement revolved around the goal of self 
reliance whereby individuals through education and cooperative action would become ‘masters of 
their own destiny’ ” (Dodaro and Pluta 1988, pp. 50 and 54).
For example. Voluntary Planning’s “dark-days” in the 1970s occurred during a Liberal government 
administration.
 ^ At the invitation of the “30-60-90” organizers, I facilitated one of these consultations in Halifax.
It is interesting to note that while Voluntary Planning commandeered the effort for the 30-60-90 
exercise, the organization’s input was not acknowledged in the final document.
The major difference between the thesis recommendations and those of the Committee are the 
recommendations effectively lobbied by one labour representative in the Committee to have equal 
representation of labour and management, as well as a number of seats reserved for “equity groups” 
within the administrative bodies of the Voluntary Planning. I opposed the first recommendation 
because it would endanger the notion of “inclusiveness” by giving labour and management the 
power to control the organization, and the second because it would “ghettoize” the process of 
inclusiveness by creating a tokenist structure.
“Come From Away” is the expression used by Atlantic Canadians to describe individuals that are 
not from the region, or for that matter from their part of the region.
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COMMITTEE COMPOSITIONS AND G R O U PS 
CONSULTED FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING REVIEW
I. VOLUNTARY PLANNING BOARD MEMBERS 
A. Voluntary Planning Board Members (January 1994)
The first line o f  each entry is the individual’s name and specific post in the Board o f
Voluntary Planning (if  any). The second line is position and place o f  em ploym ent, i f
available from Voluntary Planning records.
Mr. Robert P. Radchuck, Chair, Voluntary Planning Board 
Peat M arwick Stevenson & K ellogg
Mr. Bruce Anderson, Chair, Tourism Sector 
K idston Landing
Mr. Alan V . B ell, P. Eng., Co-Chair, Environment & Econom y Comm ittee 
A D I Nolan D avis
Mr. Dan Brown, Chair, Energy Sector
Mr. W illiam  Byard, Chair, Race Relations Committee
Mr. Paul Campbell 
Ernst and Young
Mr. N ick  C oyle
President and CEO, Micronav International Inc.
Dr. J. Colin D odds, Ph.D.
V ice President, A cadem ic & Research, Saint M ary’s University
Mr. A lvenie D oucet
President, N ova  Scotia Council o f  Labour
Mr. J. D . Eisenhauer
A B C O  Industries Ltd.
Mr. Ron Grant
President, Future Forestry Services Co-op Ltd.
Mr. E. C. Hairis, Q.C., Chair, Taxation Committee 
D aley  B lack & Moreira
Mr. L es H ollow ay
Secretary-Treasurer, Marine W orkers Federation
Mr. Greg Isenor, Chair, Mineral Resources Sector 
Atlantic Industrial Minerals Incorporated
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Mr. Raym ond Ivany, Chair, Human Resources Sector
Dean o f  Institutional Affairs, Assistant to the President, U niversity C ollege o f  
Cape Breton
Mr. Brain Ives, Chair, Fisheries Sector 
Owner, N ova Mariculture
Mr. Gordon F. Jones, Chair, Manufacturing Sector 
Owner, Peninsula Farms Ltd.
Mr. Gordon K eeling
Assistant B usiness Manager, International Brotherhood o f  Electrical W orkers, 
#1928
Mr. M aurice L loyd, Chair, Professional Service Industry Sector 
U M A  Engineering
Mr. A lex  M acDonald
Canadian Paper workers U nion
M s. M arilyn M acD onald
Director, Public Affairs Department, D alhousie University
Mr. B ill MacLennan, Chair, CORE Comm ittee and Phase II Comm ittee 
E xecutive Director, Atlantic Institute o f  Biotechnology
M s. Lynette M ensah
A ssociate Professor, D alhousie University School o f  Nursing, 
and B usiness Owner
M s. Elizabeth M ills, Executive Director, Voluntary Planning
Mr. A lex  Mombourquette
President, N ova Scotia Co-op Council
Mr. Murray N icoll, Co-Chair, Construction Sector
V ice President and General Manager, B easy N icoll Engineering Lim ited
Mr. B ob  O jolick
Ojolick A ssociates
Dr. Elizabeth Parr-Johnston
President, M ount Saint Vincent University
Mr. R ene Q uigley
International Representative, BCT Union
M s. Katherine Rice, Co-Chair, Environment & E conom y Comm ittee 
Principal Consultant, Sage Consulting Group
Dr. John T. Sears
Academ ic Vice-President, Saint Francis Xavier University
Mr. Lester Settle, Chair, Land Resources Coordinating Council
E xecutive Director, Christian Rural Research & Resource Service
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Ms. Elaine Sibson, Co-Chair, Construction Sector
International Brotherhood o f  Electrical W orkers, #625
Mr. A. Keith Thom pson, Chair, Health Care Sector 
Partner, Thom pson W allace Bond Inc.
Mr. W ayne Thom son, Chair, Transportation Sector
Mr. Charles W eir (Jr.)
B usiness Manager, International U nion o f  Operating Engineers, #  968
Mr. Fred W ere
Acting Deputy Minister, Department o f  Econom ic D evelopm ent 
Mr. Peter W ile, Chair, Agriculture Sector 
Ms. Heather W illiam s, Chair, Community D evelopm ent Sector
II. VOLUNTARY PLANNING STAFF
Elizabeth M ills Executive Director
Cathy Berkholder Senior O ffice Secretary
Karen Emberly Secretary
Rita Fraser Sector Coordinator
Sergio G reguoldo Sector Coordinator
Carole M acDonald Sector Coordinator
Penelope R ussell L ogistics Coordinator
P eggy Tibbo-Cameron Sector Coordinator
Lorraine MacCormac Econom ic Strategy
Janice Nugent Econom ic Strategy
III. CORE COMMITTEE AND RESOURCE STAFF (April 1992)
This list provides the nam es o f  the CORE Comm ittee members and their place o f  
em ploym ent, when available from Voluntary Planning records. It also provides the 
names o f  the Voluntary Planning staff and governm ent officals w ho acted in a resource 
capacity.
A. CORE Committee
M s. Robin Gale Anthony, Bowater M ersey Paper Co. Ltd.
Mr. D on  D ow n, B usiness Owner (M P and Liberal Cabinet M em ber as o f  1993 
election)
Dr. Janet Eaton, Director, Community Education Research, D evelopm ent Program, 
D alhousie University.
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Mr. M ax Forsyth-Sm ith, Trade Council.
Dr. Robert O. Fournier, A ssociate V ice President - Research, D alhousie University
Prof. W alter Isenor, A cadia University, School o f  B usiness
Mr. Bruce M acDonald, Plumbers & Steamfitters U nion
Mr. H ector Jacques, Jacques W hitford, Chair o f  the Trade Council
Mr. B ill MacLennan, Executive Director, Atlantic Institute o f  B iotechnology
Mr. Dan M acLeod, Sales M anager M obile Com m unications, Maritime T el & Tel
Mr. Thom as G. Merriam, Deputy Minister, Dept, o f  E conom ic D evelopm ent
Mr. Pat O ’N eil, M anaging partner. Price W aterhouse
Mr. Jim Peers, M anagem ent Consultant, Peers M anagem ent A ssoc. Ltd.
Mr. Stewart Perry, Senior Program Specialist, Centre o f  Comm unity Econom ic  
Developm ent
Mr. Rene Q uigley, Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Union  
Mr. Robert P. Radchuck, O ffice M anaging Partner, Peat M arwick T hom e  
Dr. John Sears, A cadem ic Vice-President, Saint Francis X avier University  
Mr. Gordon W . Stewart, Trade Council, Tourism Industry A ssociation.
B. Government and Voluntary Planning Resource Staff
Ms. Carol Conrad, Duputy Minister, P olicy Board
Mr. Richard Shaffner, Policy Analyst, Econom ic Planning & Tech., Dept, o f  Econom ic  
Developm ent.
Mr. Robert Doherty, Executive Director, Planning and Policy D ivision , Dept, o f  
Econom ic Developm ent.
Ms. EUzabeth M ills, Executive Director, Voluntary Planning
IV. YEAR ONE MONITORING PROCESS -  PARTICIPATING COMMITTEES
T hese four lists provide the names o f  individuals in the various com m ittees and 
organizations that were involved in the Year One monitoring process. A lso  listed are 
their positions and places o f  em ploym ent, i f  available from Voluntary Planning records.
A. Monitoring Committee
Mr. R ick Clarke, President, N ova Scotia Federation o f  Labour 
M s. Karen Cramm, D eloitte & Touch
Dr. Robert O. Fournier, A ssociate V ice President -  Research, D alhousie University
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Ms. Daurene L ew is, Community Services, Kentville, N ova Scotia
Mr. D avid  Nantes, MP
Mr. K en R ow e, I.M .P. Group
Mr. Joe Shannon, Seaboard Liquid Carriers
Mr. Allan C. Shaw, Chairman & CEO, The Shaw Group Ltd.
Mr. Larry W ork, First Vice-President, N ova Scotia Federation o f  Labour
B Secretariat: Henson College of Public Affairs and Continuing Education, 
Dalhousie University
M s. Mary M orrissey, Head o f  Secretariat, D alhousie U niversity  
Mr. E. Grant M acDonald, Dalhousie University  
Dr. Peter Rans, D alhousie University
Prof. Julia Sagebien (un-official member. Saint M ary’s University)
C. Government of Nova Scotia -  Deputy Ministers’ Committee
Mr. Gordon G illis, Prem ier’s O ffice  
M s. Carol Conrad, Policy Board
Mr. Thom as Merriam, Department o f  Econom ic D evelopm ent 
Mr. D ouglas Tobin, M anagem ent Board
D. Voluntary Planning
Mr. Robert Radchuck  
M s. Elizabeth M ills
V. STRATEGIC PLANNING REVIEW:
COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND CONSULTED GROUPS
A. Committee Members (June-December 1993)
This list provides the names o f  the Strategic Planning R eview  Com m ittee members and 
their place o f  em ploym ent, when available from Voluntary Planning records.
Sandy Archibald, M anaging Director, Britex Limited
L es H ollow ay, Secretary-Treasurer, Marine W orkers’ Federation
A lex M acDonald, Representative for Communication, Energy & Paperworkers Union
Lynette M ensah, A ssociate Professor, D alhousie School o f  Nursing
Katharine R ice, Principal consultant. Sage Consulting Group
Juha Sagebien, Assistant Professor, Saint M ary’s U niversity
Lester Settle, E xecutive Director, Christian Rural Research & Resource Service
Fern Tardif, B usiness Manager, International Brotherhood o f  Electrical W orkers, #625
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B. Consultations conducted with:
U nion o f  N ova Scotia Indians
N ova Scotia Federation o f  Labour
N ova Scotia Council o f  Labour
N ova Scotia Federation o f  Agriculture
Council o f  Applied Science and Technology
N ova Scotia Council on Higher Education
N ova Scotia Council o f  Labour
Confederation o f  M ainland M icm acs
E conom ic Strategy Process Phase II Comm ittee
Canadian Federation o f  Independent B usiness
Black U nited Front o f  N ova Scotia
Canadian M anufacturers’ A ssociation
N ova Scotia Chamber o f  Commerce
N ova Scotia Advisory Council on the Status o f  W om en
Atlantic Provinces Econom ic Council
Voluntary Planning Board
Voluntary Planning Staff
Sector Chairs and M embers at Large
Government and elected officials
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